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A bstract
2
This thesis defends the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical 
realism and introduces a new indispensability argument for a substantial conception of 
truth.
Chapters 1 and 2 formulate the main components o f the Quine-Putnam argument, 
namely that virtually all scientific laws quantify over mathematical entities and thus 
logically presuppose the existence thereof. Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion o f the 
logical structure o f some scientific theories that incorporate or apply mathematics. 
Chapter 3 then reconstructs the central assumptions o f Quine’s argument, concluding 
(provocatively) that “science entails platonism”.
Chapter 4 contains a brief discussion o f some major theories o f truth, including 
deflationary views (redundancy, disquotation). Chapter 5 introduces a new argument 
against such deflationary views, based on certain logical properties of truth theories. 
Chapter 6 contains a further discussion o f mathematical truth. In particular, non-standard 
conceptions o f mathematical truth such as “if-thenism” and “hermeneuticism”.
Chapter 7 introduces the programmes o f reconstrual and reconstruction proposed by 
recent nominalism. Chapters 8 discusses modal nominalism, concluding that modalism is 
implausible as an interpretation of mathematics (if taken seriously, it suffers from exactly 
those epistemological problems allegedly suffered by realism). Chapter 9 discusses 
Field’s deflationism, whose central motivating idea is that mathematics is {pace Quine 
and Putnam) dispensable in applications. This turns on a conservativeness claim which, 
as Shapiro pointed out in 1983, must be incorrect (using GOdel’s Theorems).
I conclude in Chapter 10 that nominalistic views o f mathematics and deflationist views 
of truth are both inadequate to the overall explanatory needs o f science.
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6Preface
The problem of how mathematics relates to science (in particular, to physics) has long 
fascinated me. As a teenager, I was intrigued and puzzled by the fact that physical 
projectiles move in parabolas, curves that satisfy a simple mathematical equation. Why 
should physical objects obey mathematical laws? Although I became a theoretical 
physics graduate, this philosophical puzzle has always interested me.
Several philosophers, mathematicians and physicists have discussed this problem, but 
illumination is rare. Discussions usually terminate in a “credo”, which could be realism 
(Gardner, Penrose, Stewart), “conceptualism” (Popper, Hersh & Davis) or even 
formalism (Hilbert, E.T. Bell).
The scales fell from my eyes when I happened quite accidentally upon a second-hand 
anthology, From a Logical Point o f  View, containing an article ‘On What There Is’, by a 
certain Willard Van Orman Quine. At last, an argument is presented to the effect that a 
theory is about those entities which its quantifiers must range over if  it is to be true. 
Furthermore, because natural science incorporates a great deal o f mathematics, 
quantifying in its laws over mathematicalia, any such theory o f modem science is 
committed to mathematicalia. As it transpired, Quinian arguments had been further 
developed by Putnam in 1971, and had attracted serious attempts at refutation by several 
recent philosophers o f mathematics, notably Hartry Field and Charles Chihara.
Having completed my MA in Philosophy at the University o f Warwick in 1992, 
working in the philosophy o f language, logic and science, I decided to work on this 
philosophical problem of the role o f mathematics within science. Joining the London 
School o f Economics in 1994, this thesis now represents four years o f research, under the 
supervision o f Professor John Worrall. It explores the application o f mathematics in 
science, and the consequential implications for the interpretation of mathematics. The 
main conclusion is that if  (as scientific realists sensibly claim) we are entitled to assume 
that a great deal o f natural science is true, then mathematical realism is unavoidable.
7A further, equally important, topic o f this thesis concerns the nature o f truth. I originally 
felt some sympathy for deflationism, the doctrine that truth is ultimately a rather simple 
“insubstantial” concept, governed by the totality of so-called “T-sentences”, o f the form,
*/?’ is true if  and only if  p.
Motivated by an analogy with Hartry Field’s deflationism about mathematics, I guessed 
that the totality o f such sentences would be conservative: truth-theoretic reasoning should 
never generate anything “genuinely new”. The conservativeness o f all the T-sentences 
would partially explain their obviousness or their status as partial definitions. In fact, the 
conservativeness o f the set o f such T-sentences over any theory in the object language, is 
not difficult to prove (indeed Tarski proves it in his 1936). But Tarski’s full theory of 
truth cannot (as John Burgess pointed out to me in a letter) be similarly conservative. For 
by adding Tarski’s theory o f truth to Peano Arithmetic, one can prove that Peano 
Arithmetic is consistent. If Tarski’s theory were conservative, this would contradict 
Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem. Alerted to this logical fact, it occurred to me that any 
adequate truth theory must be non-conservative. It follows that deflationism about truth 
must be wrong. The result is Chapter 5 (which will appear in Mind).
(After I finished this work on truth in December 1997, I received an article from 
Stewart Shapiro, entitled ‘Truth and Proof - Through Thick and Thin’, containing a 
similar argument to the argument sketched above. I have since benefited from a 
rewarding correspondence with him.)
I thank John Worrall o f LSE for his careful supervision o f my thesis, for reading 
countless versions as it gradually developed, and for focusing my style. I also thank 
David Miller o f the University of Warwick for his continuing encouragement o f my 
work. Finally, I acknowledge some technical help from John Burgess at Princeton, who 
pointed out to me the “well-known fact” that Tarski’s theory o f truth must be non­
conservative.
Most importantly, I thank my wife Blanca Fuentes and my mother Patricia Hall for their 
kindness, inspiration and love.
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The Application o f Mathematics
The essential fact is simply that all the pictures which science now draws of 
nature, and which alone seem capable of according with observational fact, are 
mathematical pictures.
Sir Jam es Jeans 1930, The Mysterious Universe, p. 153.
Philosophically, the applied mathematician is an uncritical Platonist. He takes 
for granted that there is a  function u{t), and that he has a right to use any method 
he can think of to learn as much as he can about it.
Philip J. Davis & Reuben Hersh 1980 (1990), The Mathematical
Experience, p. 378.
Most of the literature in the philosophy of mathematics takes the following three 
questions as central:
(a) How much of mathematics is true? For example, are conclusions arrived 
at using impredicative set theory true?
(b) What entities do we have to postulate to account for the truth of (this 
part of) mathematics?
(c) What sort of account can we give of our knowledge of these truths?
A fourth question is sometimes discussed, though usually quite cursorily:
(d) What sort of account is possible of how mathematics is applied to the 
physical world?
Now, my view is that question (d) is the really fundamental one.
Hartry Field 1980, Science Without Numbers, p. vii.
1.1 The Application of Mathematics
Why, in attempting to understand Nature, do we “mathematicize” Her? Why should the 
attempt to explain and predict the behaviour o f concrete physical objects and systems 
involve such ubiquitous use o f mathematical descriptions?
A theory from pure mathematics (such as Peano Arithmetic, Real Analysis or Zermelo- 
Fraenkel set theory) might be thought o f as either,
i. a formal system o f uninterpreted axioms,
C h apter  1: T he  A pplication  of M ath em atics
9or, alternatively, as,
ii. a fully interpreted description o f the properties o f certain abstract entities: 
mathematicalia, like natural numbers, real numbers, functions, sets and 
structures.
It is perhaps puzzling, on both o f these pictures, that the application of mathematics is 
even possible. But it is not only possible: it seems to be indispensable. A physicist (or 
someone familiar with physical laws) would find it hard even to imagine explanations of 
physical phenomena without talk o f measurable quantities, real- and vector-valued field 
quantities defined over space-time, governed by differential equations, conservation laws, 
mathematically formulated symmetry principles, and so on.
Henceforth, we shall refer, somewhat loosely, to the use or application o f mathematics 
within science as “mathematicization” and we shall refer to theories that use 
mathematical concepts to describe Nature as “mathematicized theories”.
Mathematicization goes back a long way. One thinks primarily o f counting (i.e., 
arithmetic) and measuring, which lead to both geometry (literally “earth measurement”) 
and analysis (the theory o f continuous quantities). Mathematicization certainly took off 
in Antiquity around 500 BC, with the Pythagoreans and the Miletians. Indeed, the 
Pythagoreans were so captivated by mathematical explanations that one of their slogans, 
along with not eating beans, was that “all things are numbers”. By the time o f Plato’s 
Academy around 380BC, mathematics lay at the heart o f the curriculum.
However, we begin our study two thousand years later, with one o f the founders o f the 
scientific revolution in Europe, with Galileo’s famous declaration o f 1618:
Philosophy is written in this grand book—I mean the universe—which stands 
continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one first learns 
to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It 
is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, 
circles and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to 
understand a single word of it.
(Galileo 1618 (1960), p. 183-184. Emphasis added).
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The newly emerging experimental or natural philosophy (i.e., mechanics and 
astronomy) is to be formulated mathematically. Galileo is perhaps advocating a 
(generalized) Pythagoreanism, the view that the universe is itself fundamentally 
mathematical1.
The reasons for Galileo’s view are complex, having to do with the debates in astronomy 
about “saving the appearances”2, his distinction between the primary qualities o f bodies 
(shape, size, number, position, quantity of motion: qualities independent o f human 
sensation) and secondary qualities (colours, tastes, odours and sounds: relational qualities 
dependent upon human sensation), and his frequent discussion o f the method of  
idealization and abstraction. Roughly, but not inaccurately, Galileo agreed with Plato that 
although the appearances (or phenomena) can be complex and messy, they are best 
viewed as reflecting a hidden reality properly described by mathematics.
Three hundred years later, in the 1920s, two highly successful British scientists, Jeans 
and Eddington3, took up the Pythagorean-Platonic view. Echoing Plato, Jeans wrote:
From the intrinsic evidence of his creation, the Great Architect of the Universe 
now begins to appear as  a  pure mathematician.
(Jeans 1930, p. 167).
... the final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical description 
of it; so long as  there is no imperfection in this our knowledge of the
1 It should be noted, however, that ‘geometry’ is ambiguous. It can be construed, along with Euclid (and 
Einstein), as a part o f  physics: the study o f physical space, with a subject matter o f  physical “geometricalia”: 
points and regions. Geometry can, in contrast, be construed as the study o f  purely mathematical spaces (e.g., 
topological manifolds, orbifolds, etc.) and then becomes a part o fpure mathematics. It is not clear how 
Galileo would have sided on these deeply distinct construals o f geometry.
Within the purely physical interpretation o f geometry, “triangles, circles and other geometrical figures” may 
be treated as allegedly nominalistically acceptable concrete physical entities. This is Field’s approach, 
sometimes referred to as “geometrical nominalism”, discussed in Chapter 9 below.
2 C.fi, Osiander’s notorious preface to the first edition o f Copernicus 1543, De Revolutionibus Orbium 
Caelestium. Osiander, a cleric, argued that the heliocentric hypothesis is nothing more that a “mathematical 
model” for “saving the appearances” o f  astronomical observation. It is more convenient that the Ptolemaic 
theory, but not any more true as a description o f  the real motions o f the Earth and other bodies.
3 Jeans was Astronomer Royal and worked on stellar combustion. Eddington’s 1919 solar eclipse expedition 
led to the discovery that light was deflected by the Sun twice as much as Newton’s theory predicted and 
precisely as much as Einstein’s theory predicted: Newtonian Mechanics was finally dethroned (this event 
was to inspire the teenage Popper in his search for a Demarcation Principle). Quizzed by a journalist, 
“Apparently, only three people in the world understand Einstein’s relativity theory”, Eddington famously 
quipped, “Who’s the third?”.
C h apter  1: Th e  A pplication  of M ath em atics
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phenomenon is complete ... the making of models or pictures to explain 
mathematical formulae and the phenomena they describe, is not a step towards, 
but a step away from, reality.
(Jeans 1930, p. 177).
Eddington added:
Nowadays we do not encourage the engineer to build the world for us out of 
his material, but we turn to the mathematician to build it out of his.
(Eddington 1928, p. 209).
These forays by scientists into philosophical matters did not go unnoticed by 
professional philosophers. For example, when Stebbing4 came to discuss these doctrines 
of Jeans and Eddington in her 1937, she dismissed them as “at best misleading and, all 
too often, extravagant nonsense”5. Slightly later, but in a similar spirit, Russell added:
Pythagoras, as everyone knows, said that “all things are numbers”. This 
statement, interpreted in a modern way, is logically nonsense, but what he 
meant was not exactly nonsense. ... It is only in recent times that it has been 
possible to say clearly where Pythagoras was wrong.
(Russell 1945, p. 54 & p. 56).
In a witty and memorable passage, Popper argued against the idea that Nature herself is 
mathematical:
Similarly, the success, or even the truth, of simple statements, or of 
mathematical statements, or of English statements, ought not to tempt us to draw 
the inference that the world is intrinsically simple, or mathematical, or British. All 
these inferences have been drawn by some philosopher or other; but on 
reflection, there is little to recommend them.
(Popper 1982, p. 43).
Nevertheless, despite this philosophical scepticism, many scientists who reflect on the 
use (even the success) o f mathematics in describing the physical world find themselves 
led rightly or wrongly to the Pythagorean-Platonic conclusion. A recent example is 
Penrose:
To speak of Plato’s world at all, one is assigning some kind of reality to it 
which is in some way comparable to the reality of the physical world. On the 
other hand, the reality of the physical world itself seem s more nebulous than it 
had seem ed before the advent of the SUPERB theories of relativity and quantum 
mechanics. The very precision of these theories has provided an almost abstract
4 Stebbing 1937.
5 Quoted in Gjertsen 1989, p. 146.
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mathematical reality for actual physical reality. Is this in any way a paradox? 
How can concrete reality become abstract and mathematical? This is perhaps 
the other side of the coin to the question of how abstract mathematical concepts 
can achieve an almost concrete reality in Plato’s world. Perhaps in some sense 
the worlds are actually the same.
(Penrose 1989, p. 556).
In a similar vein, Gardner has written:
To a realist, mathematical structure is mind-independent in two senses. The 
universe is not shapeless, but patterned in ways that are described by 
mathematics. In addition, mathematicians investigate purely abstract structures, 
defined by formal systems, which may or may not have applications to the 
physical world. The proper attitude to take toward the ontological status of these 
abstract systems is, of course, one of the great unending controversies in 
metaphysics. I will here say only that almost all mathematicians agree with 
Hardy that a mathematician discovers truths that are independent of his culture 
and that those truths are qualitatively different from the conventions of traffic 
regulations or codes of etiquette.
(Gardner 1996, p. 268).
1.2 Explaining the Role of Mathematics Within Science
To evaluate the debate concerning the implications of the application o f mathematics, 
we need to go into more detail about how mathematics is used within science. With this 
in mind, let us look at the following passage from the Introduction to a standard textbook 
on Classical Mechanics:
In fact, mechanics—and indeed all theoretical science—is a game of 
mathematical make-believe. We say: If the Earth were a homogeneous rigid 
ellipsoid acted on by such and such forces, how would it behave? Working out 
the answer to this mathematical question, we compare our results with 
observation. If there is agreement, we say we have chosen a  good model; if 
disagreement, then the models or laws assum ed are bad.
(Synge & Griffith 1959, p. 5).
I take this to be a promising account o f how mathematics actually is applied. First, pure 
mathematics tells us facts about a certain kind of abstract mathematical entity, an 
ellipsoid, or perhaps an ellipsoid embedded in abstract Euclidean 3-space. Pure 
mathematics tells us about the properties of this abstract entity: its topology and 
geometry. Next, a mathematical description o f some concrete situation is introduced: this 
description postulates some contingent connection between this mathematical entity and
C h apter  1: T he  A pplication  of M ath em atics
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the concrete system, say the Earth or the solar system. And given this conjectured Earth- 
ellipsoid relation, the mathematical facts about the ellipsoid somehow yield, or “translate 
into” or are “interpreted as giving”, non-mathematical facts  about the Earth. For 
example, a piece o f pure mathematics will determine the sum of internal angles of a large 
“triangle” on the surface (say, the “triangle” formed by joining Dublin, Birmingham and 
Madrid with geodesics).6
I will give an illustration of how this translation might work later in my discussion o f a 
certain simplified theory o f time, which states simply that time is isomorphic to the 
continuum. For example, the density and continuity o f the real numbers (under the usual 
total order <) translates into the density and continuity o f the set o f temporal instants 
(under the temporal “before” relation).
The authors continue:
Let us now sum up the general procedure in theoretical mechanics in the 
following five steps:
(1) A physical system is an object of curiosity; we wish to predict its behaviour 
under various circumstances (The system might be a pendulum, or a pair of 
stars attracting one another).
(2) An ideal or mathematical model of the physical system is constructed 
mentally. (The pendulum is regarded as a rigid straight line and the stars are 
regarded as two particles).
(3) Mathematical reasoning is applied to the mathematical model. (This means 
that differential or finite equations are set up and solved. Formulas are 
developed to give answers to interesting questions, such as those concerning 
the periodic time of the pendulum or the orbit of one star relative to the other).
(4) The mathematical results are interpreted physically in terms of the physical 
problem.
(5) The results are compared with the results of observation, if possible.
(Synge & Griffith 1959, pp. 5-6. Emphasis added).
Much of this provokes philosophical puzzlement. There are at least two basic questions:
i. what is an ideal or mathematical model o f a physical system?
6 Some philosophers o f mathematics, especially structuralists, suggest that we may say that the connection 
between concrete systems (e.g., the Earth) and their mathematical representations (e.g., the ellipsoid) is this:
the concrete system exemplifies (at least approximately) the mathematical entity.
See, for example, Shapiro 1997.1 discuss this important idea a little more below in Chapter 2.
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ii. how are mathematical results (about the model) interpreted physically?
Unfortunately, what many mathematicians, even philosophically sensitive ones, say 
about the application o f mathematics is sometimes not particularly helpful. An example 
is Stewart:
Mathematics is about ideas; about how certain facts follow inevitably from 
others; about how certain structures automatically imply the occurrence of 
particular phenomena. It lets us build mental models of the world, and 
manipulate those models in ways that would be impossible in a  real experiment.
You want to know how far a javelin would travel in Jupiter’s gravity? Plug in the 
equations and set g equal to 27 m sec"2, and work it out. You don’t have to go to 
Jupiter and throw one.
Mathematics is about ideas per se, not just about specific realizations of those 
ideas ... its very abstraction gives it a  unity and universality that would be lost if 
it were made more concrete and specialized.
(Stewart 1987 (1996), pp. 319-320).
It is not difficult to criticize this account. What does it mean to say “that mathematics is 
about ideas”? Perhaps in the sense that trained mathematicians possess (and presumably 
create or discover) lots o f ideas, like the idea o f surjectivity or infinitude, which can be 
linguistically expressed and thereby communicated. But this is surely equally true o f  
economists, biologists and children. Any science is “about ideas”, in this sense. The 
question should be: what is so distinctive about mathematical ideas?
Is it true that mathematics is about “how certain facts follow inevitably from other 
ones”? This seems very much like an unargued conflation o f mathematics with logic. The 
general applicability of logic is easily explained, for logic is concerned with how certain 
propositions follow automatically from others and these propositions can be about 
whatever you like (indeed, the implications hold irrespective o f what they are about: an 
implication holds purely in virtue o f logical form). O f course, there is no denying that 
mathematical reasoning is logical, but so is any correct reasoning (e.g., in economics). 
But is mathematics nothing more than logical reasoning? In particular, can the truth o f 
the axioms of, say, set theory or analysis be established purely through logical reasoning?
C h apter  1: T he  A pplicatio n  of  M ath em atics
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If their truth is not established purely logically, perhaps they are merely arbitrary 
stipulations or (consistent) conventions1. In this case, two enormous puzzles appear:
i. why do we concentrate on just these axioms and not others?
ii. why are these axioms so fruitful in our mathematicized empirical theories?
If mathematics is about how “certain structures automatically imply the occurrence of 
certain phenomena”, then that is merely a restatement o f the problem o f application and 
demands explanation. What is a structured How is a structure connected to (related to) 
the phenomena whose occurrence it implies? Exemplification? What is that?
Suppose I want to know how far a javelin on Jupiter would travel. If mathematics were 
“purely verbal”, or “purely logical”, or “purely conventional”, or “stipulative”, why 
should these purely verbal mathematical equations help me determine the physically 
correct answer?
For another example, consider the following summary by Davis and Hersh:
Mathematics has penetrated sociology, psychology, medicine and linguistics ...
Why is this so? What gives mathematics its power? What makes it work?
On very popular answer has been that God is a  mathematician ... the universe 
expresses itself naturally in the language of mathematics ... Mathematics, in this 
view, has evolved precisely as a symbolic counterpart of the universe. It is no 
wonder, then, that mathematics works; that is exactly the reason for its 
existence. The universe has imposed mathematics upon humanity ...
But there is another view of the matter. This opinion holds that applications of 
mathematics come by fiat. We create a  variety of mathematical patterns or 
structures. We are then so delighted with what we have wrought, that we 
deliberately force various physical and social aspects of the universe into these 
patterns as  best we can ... This view is related to the opinion that theories of 
applied mathematics are merely “mathematical models". The utility of a model is 
precisely its success in mimicking or predicting the behaviour of the universe. If 
a  model is inadequate in some respect, one looks around for a  better model or 
improved version ... [which model] we operate with is determined by such things
7 An early but influential publication, Quine 1936 (‘Truth by Convention’) attacked these ideas. One o f  his 
arguments (related to Carroll’s piece ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’) was that logical rules cannot 
consist o f stipulations about what is to be true: for we should require infinitely many such stipulations. O f 
course, we can get all the (elementary) logical truths from a finite list o f  axioms, but then one needs to use 
the (sound & complete) rules o f logic in order to perform the needed inferences.
However, the idea that the “meanings” o f the logical constants - i ,  a , - » ,  3, etc., are “implicitly defined” 
proof-theoretically (by the introduction and elimination rules governing them) is still a popular, although 
controversial, one. SeeDummett 1991.
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as  simplicity, fruitfulness, etc. ... [models are] derived from prior mathematical 
experiences of a simple nature.
... Truth has abdicated and expediency reigns.
(Davis & Hersh 1980 (1990), pp. 68-70).
Again, philosophical questions flood in. Do we really create mathematical structures? 
This sounds like idealism. Once “created”, do these structures then go on to exist 
objectively? For example, is their existence spatio-temporal? If so, what are the physical 
properties (e.g., mass, optical reflectivity, spatio-temporal extent) of, say, the Cantor’s 
second transfinite cardinal, Ki? Presumably (of course) Ki is not a spatio-temporal 
entity. But, if  this hint o f constructivism-idealism were correct, then what generated, and 
what sustains, N fs  disembodied existence? Surely, we do not in any interesting sense 
“create” mathematical structures, any more than we “create” neutron stars. Either there 
simply is no such thing as Ki (and our talk using the symbol ‘Kj’ is a mere formal game 
or a useful fiction) or there is such a thing as Ki, namely an abstract entity, which Cantor 
discovered, labelled and whose properties he investigated.
Furthermore, the notion that we “force physical aspects o f the universe into a pattern” is 
one advocated by Galileo and most Platonists/realists: this is abstraction and idealization. 
But, in any case, how are such abstracta (like patterns) related  to concreta, like physical 
systems and objects in the Universe? How are these patterns “derived from prior 
mathematical experiences o f a simple nature”? Is this meant as a statement of  
mathematical structuralism? Maybe we somehow perceive simple (finitary) patterns 
objectively “exemplified” in the physical world, and then go on to postulate the existence 
of more complex, perhaps infinitary, patterns (like the continuum) in our mathematical 
investigations. Some o f these may be “exemplified” (e.g., the continuum), some may not 
(e.g., models o f axiomatic set theory with inaccessible cardinals).
I would suggest that Davis and Hersh are not keeping separate issues separate. They 
combine philosophical intuitions from every philosophy o f mathematics in the space of 
six or seven sentences, rather than developing precise arguments about ontology, 
epistemoiogy and semantics. In short, Davis and Hersh—like many mathematical writers 
tackling this difficult subject—take themselves to be advocating some particular position,
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while in reality what they actually adopt is almost unidentifiable: it could be idealism, 
structuralism, Platonism, or formalism. They seem to embrace everything that has been 
proposed. Having outlined this amalgam of everything, they then mischievously give it 
their favourite label (which happens to be “mathematical modelling”).
Davis and Hersh conclude their book with the following passage:
Mathematics is not the study of an ideal, pre-existing nontemporal reality.
Neither is it a chess-like game with made up symbols and formulas. Rather it is 
part of human studies which is capable of achieving science-like consensus ...
Mathematics does have a subject matter, and its statem ents are meaningful.
Their meaning, however, is to be found in the shared understanding of human 
beings, not in an external nonhuman reality. In this respect, mathematics is 
similar to an ideology, a  religion or an art form: it deals with human meanings, 
and is intelligible only within the context of culture. In other words, mathematics 
is a humanistic study. It is one of the humanities.
(Davis & Hersh 1980 (1990), p. 410).
Even abstracting from the fact that I disagree with this, I cannot say that their 
“mathematics is part of culture” summary advances the debate. O f course, mathematics 
is a part o f human culture. No-one disputes that*. Similarly, neutrino physics is a part of  
human culture, but neutrinos are not produced by human brains. Indeed, according to 
physics, zillions o f solar neutrinos pass right through our brains every second, without 
any interaction. It would be ridiculous to say that neutrino physics deals with “human
8 Gardner’s review o f The Mathematical Experience by Davis and Hersh is entitled ‘How Not to Talk 
About Mathematics’, and is reprinted in Gardner 1996:
“For a mathematical realist a tree not only exists when nobody looks at it, but its branches have a “tree” 
pattern even when no graph theorist looks at i t ... The existence of an external world, mathematically 
ordered, is taken for granted. I have yet to meet a mathematician willing to say that if the human race 
ceased to exist the moon would no longer be spherical. I suspect Davis and Hersh would not care to say 
this, yet the troubling thing about their book is that it does not make clear why.” (p. 281)
"... All that mathematician do is certainly part of culture for the simple reason that everything human 
beings do is part of culture ... Conceptualism in mathematics has its strongest appeal amongst 
anthropologists and sociologists who have a vested interest in making culture central. It is a language 
that also appeals to those historians, psychologists and philosophers who cannot bring themselves to 
talk about anything that transcends human experience." (p. 282).
"... No mathematician hesitates to speak about "existence proofs” about objects even when they are 
nowhere modeled, or known to be modeled, by the external world. And most mathematicians, including 
the very greatest, think of such objects as independent of the human mind, though not of course existing 
in the sam e way Mars exists." (p. 284)
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meanings”. One is reminded o f Mill’s famous put-down: Davis and Hersh “must have 
made some progress in philosophy” to arrive at such views.
1.3 Applicability and Mathematical idealism
Intuitionism, espoused by Brouwer, Weyl, Heyting and Dummett, represents a version 
o f idealism (psychologism, conceptualism, empiricism or subjectivism) about 
mathematics and mathematicalia. Intuitionism was popular with a few mid-century 
empiricists, who thought o f themselves (along with their positivist allies) as overcoming 
something derogatively called “metaphysics”.
From an ontological point o f view, intuitionism agrees with platonism in holding that 
mathematical entities exist, but suggests that mathematicalia are mental entities which 
somehow come into being as a result o f human thought processes (or at least, through 
construction processes)!
Heyting put the view as follows,
Intuitionist mathematics consists ... in mental constructions; a mathematical 
theorem expresses a purely empirical fact, namely the success of a certain 
construction. ‘2 + 2 = 3 + 1’ must be read as an abbreviation for the statement: “I 
have effected the mental constructions indicated by ‘2 + 2 ’ and “3 + 1” and I 
have found that they lead to the same result”. ...
The characteristic of mathematical thought is, that it does not convey truth 
about the external world, but is only concerned with mental constructions ...
In fact, mathematics, from the intuitionistic point of view, is a study of certain 
functions of the human mind.
(Heyting 1956 (1983), pp. 72-73).
The canonical objection to idealism is that it implies that if  thinking (e.g., mathematical 
thinking) about some kind of things (the Fs say) had not existed, then the Fs themselves 
(the mathematicalia, such as n or Cantor’s NO would not have existed. The existence of 
Fs is ontologically dependent upon the existence o f thinking: esse est concipi. 
Furthermore, since thinking is often presumed to be limited to finite processes of 
construction, intuitionism expresses scepticism as to whether such a “completed” infinite
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entity as Ki exists. Irrespective of its critique o f proof methods and its repudiation of 
“completed” infinities, all this makes intuitionism ontologically difficult to interpret.
For example, does n “gradually come into existence” as its successive digits are 
calculated (say, using Euler’s series). The decimal expansion o f n is now known to 
millions o f digits (we let computers do this dirty work). But did n exist prior to this 
(partial) determination? Surely, it is more correct to say, along with Hardy, Penrose and 
countless others, that a computer evaluating this expansion is “uncovering something 
already there”, that is, it is discovering what n is and always has been, and this fact would 
still have existed even if  the computer had not been switched on.
It is difficult to see what the argument is for supposing that mathematicalia are mental 
entities. The fact that mathematicians think a lot does not imply that what they think 
about is itself mental. Presumably, idealism requires at least a plausible criterion 
whereby a mental entity x created in the mind o f person A is the same as some mental 
entity y  created in the mind o f person B. But does it make sense to say that the same thing 
exists in two different minds? If not, then there will simply be many mental, purely 
“subjective versions” o f each mathematical object (e.g., “ 71 versions”), and no such 
objective thing as n itself. Thus, intuitionism threatens to make mathematics completely 
subjective.
Long ago, Frege made similar criticisms o f the view that “numbers are ideas”:
If number were an idea, then arithmetic would be psychology. But arithmetic is 
no more psychology than, say, astronomy is. Astronomy is concerned, not with 
ideas of the planets, but with the planets themselves, and by the sam e token the 
objects of arithmetic are not ideas either. If the number two were an idea, then it 
would have straight away to be private to me only. Another man’s idea is, ex vi 
termini, another idea. We should then have it might be many millions of twos on 
our hands. We should have to speak of my two and your two, of one two and all 
twos. If we accept latent or unconscious ideas, we should have unconscious 
twos among them, which would then return subsequently to consciousness. As 
new generations of children grew up, new generations of twos would continually 
be being born, and in the course of millennia these might evolve, for all we could 
tell, to such a pitch that two of them would make five. ...
Weird and wonderful, a s  we see, are the results of taking seriously the 
suggestion that number is an idea. And we are driven to the conclusion that 
number is neither spatial and physical, like Mill’s piles of pebbles and 
gingersnaps, nor yet subjective like ideas, but non-sensible and objective. Now 
objectivity cannot, of course, be based on any sense-impression, which as an
C h apter  1: T h e  A pplication  of  M ath em atics
20
affection of our mind is entirely subjective, but only, so far as  I can see, on 
reason.
It would be strange if the most exact of all the sciences had to seek  support 
from psychology, which is still feeling its way none too surely.
(Frege 1884, §27 (1980), pp. 37-38).
Hardy also argued against idealism in mathematics:
A chair or a star is not in the least what it seem s to be like; the more we think 
of it, the fuzzier its outlines become in the haze of sensation which surrounds it; 
but 2 or 317 has nothing to do with sensation, and its properties stand out the 
more clearly the more closely we scrutinize it. It may be that modern physics fits 
best into some framework of idealistic philosophy—I do not believe it, but there 
are eminent physicists who say so. Pure mathematics, on the other hand, seem s 
to me a rock on which all idealism founders: 317 is prime, not because we think 
so or because our minds are shaped in one way or another, but because it is so, 
because mathematical reality is built that way.
(Hardy 1940, p. 70).
However, the primary motivation o f intuitionism is not ontological. It is 
epistemological, and attempts to supply a methodology whereby knowledge of, or access 
to, mathematicalia is obtained. In particular, this leads to an analysis o f truth in terms of 
(or perhaps, a repudiation o f truth in favour of) proof, and an analysis o f proof in terms 
o f construction. According to intuitionism, a mathematical theorem is not true until 
proved, and is not proved unless proved constructively.
The notion that truth is somehow reducible to proof is a version o f so-called internalist 
theories o f  truth, which are discussed and dismissed below in Chapter 4. One basic 
problem with such theories (amongst their many problems) is generated by Godel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem, which can be formulated (following Tarski) as follows. The 
class o f truths of arithmetic9 is not even recursively enumerable, and cannot be 
recursively axiomatized. No matter how powerful a formal system one chooses, not all 
truths, even o f arithmetic, can be proved.
But constructive proof is much more restrictive than classical proof, for example 
abandoning some kinds o f reasoning by reductio, impredicative reasoning, and requiring 
for any existence proof the construction o f a specific instance. This leads to what is
9 That is, the set o f  sentences in the language o f arithmetic that hold in the intended structure 9?.
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perhaps the canonical objection to the constructivist aspect o f intuitionism. 
Constructivism involves a strong claim about what parts o f classical mathematics “make 
sense”, according to its analysis o f what constitutes an acceptable or meaningful proof. 
The traditional cry o f intuitionists in response to a non-constructive proof is “That’s not 
mathematics: that’s theology!”10. The problem, which is not negligible, is that most 
working mathematicians find such constructivistic demands intolerably restrictive. The 
history o f the Axiom o f Choice (and the acceptance o f impredicative set theory, as 
codified within ZFC, as the “standard framework” for mathematics) is an instructive 
example. Mathematicians o f constructivistic temperament, like Lebesgue and Borel, 
balked at its acceptability, until it was pointed out that their very own work had 
presupposed Choice all along; and furthermore, that this Axiom of Choice appears 
indispensable to the proof o f a great deal o f standard accepted mathematics11.
The intuitionist at this stage may adopt an extreme response: dogmatically dropping (as 
“meaningless”) non-constructive mathematics. Classical mathematicians may protest, but 
what grounds can they offer for the indispensability o f their non-constructive reasoning?
At this stage, another powerful argument comes to light. Modem science, and 
especially modem mathematical physics, uses mathematics that is non-constructive12. If 
this is correct, the constructivist philosopher o f mathematics left claiming that not only is 
classical mathematics theology (which is bad enough), but that mathematical physics is 
theology (which is intolerable)! He or she will be embarrassed to go and tell our modem
10 The realist has an easy riposte: “That’s not mathematics: that’s solipsism!”. Quine has quipped, “I have 
intuitions too, but they’re not the intuitionists’ intuitions” (see Ullian 1986).
11 For a book length discussion, see G.H. Moore 1982, Zermelo 's Axiom o f  Choice: Its Origins, 
Development, and Influence. Drake & Singh 1996 devote Chapter 7 to the Axiom o f Choice. Famously, 
Choice is independent o f the other axioms o f  ZF and is equivalent to several other axioms (modulo ZF): 
Zermelo’s Well-Ordering Theorem, Zorn’s Lemma, HausdorfFs Maximality Principle, the Tukey- 
Teichmuller Lemma. An axiom much studied by set-theorists is the Axiom o f  Determinacy which in fact 
contradicts Choice. Famously, the Choice is inconsistent with Quine’s set theory, “New Foundations”, NF.
12 Here is an anecdote I once heard at Cambridge. A philosophically-inclined mathematician once explained 
the idea o f  “constructive proof’ to the cosmologist Steven Hawking. He replied that almost all o f  his major 
work on singularity theorems (with Roger Penrose), black hole evaporation, and so on, was in fact non­
constructive. Briefly, the major theorems are proved by supposing that a non-singular Einsteinian spacetime 
exists satisfying certain conditions, and deriving a contradiction. By reductio, then, for any such spacetime, 
there exists a singular point.
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theoretical physicists (the likes o f Hawking, Geroch, Thome, Witten et al.) that their non­
constructive inquiries into the mathematical structure o f the physical world are 
meaningless and without substance!
For example, one wonders what Maxwell’s Law for the electromagnetic field can mean 
for an idealist interpretation of mathematics. Maxwell’s Law says, in a modem co- 
ordinate-free formulation,
There are continuous tensor-valued functions F  and J, fields on physical space­
time representing the electromagnetic field and the four-current density 
respectively, such that,
for each space-time point e, dF(e) -  0 and 8*F(e) = J(e).
How could an intuitionist reconstrue this clearly mathematicized physical law as a 
principle concerning what the mind may construct? Would its truth involve some 
(impossible) mental construction, wherein the mind somehow surveys each space-time 
point e, and “constructs” a pair o f continuous tensor fields F  and J  on the space-time 
continuum, such that they represent the electromagnetic field and current density and 
satisfy Maxwell’s equations? Presumably, in order to meet intuitionist standards, one 
would have somehow to prove Maxwell’s Law (which is, after all, a mathematical 
statement, involving reference to functions and their real number values). But how would 
one prove it, let alone prove it constructively ab initio? Rather, we derive physical 
predictions and explanations from the law (concerning things like the deflection of  
electrons in e-m fields) and such predictions either contradict the law or partially support 
it. Of course, we do not construct these electromagnetic fields. They are already part o f  
the furniture o f the universe, correlated with the properties o f space-time and the motion 
of electrons and photons. In short, it just isn’t clear at all how intuitionism is going to 
treat mathematical assertions about the physical world, like all the laws o f  physics.
So, mathematical idealism faces prima facie difficulties concerning the application of 
mathematics. Mathematicalia, according to the idealist, are constructible mental entities. 
But why should these mental entities somehow describe external physical systems? In
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fact, a “full-blown idealist” like Kant or Fichte may refuse to think of even concreta, like 
trees or cups, as “external” to our cogitations: these entities are themselves mental 
entities constituted by the “ <2 priori categories o f pure reason”, in combination with our 
sensory intuitions.
Field has argued similarly against the idealist philosophy o f mathematics:
... on a limited idealist view, one that views mathematical entities as  some sort 
of human construction but makes no claim about the physical world, the 
application of mathematics to the physical world may turn out to be a mystery.
The danger, in other words, is that in order to explain the applicability of mind- 
dependent mathematical entities to the physical world, the idealist about 
mathematics may have to become a full-blown idealist, and hold that even things 
like electrons and dinosaurs are somehow ‘human constructions’. If this danger 
were realized, I would regard that as  a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that 
mathematical objects were human constructions.
(Field 1989, Introduction, p. 27. Footnote 16).
In fact, Field repeatedly stresses the obscurity o f mathematical idealism:
I take mathematical idealism to be not only too obscure to assert, but also too 
obscure to deny. It may well be that my own view could be redescribed as a  view 
according to which mathematical entities exist but are mind- or language- 
dependent.
(Field 1988 (1989), p. 228. Footnote 2).
In what follows, I will follow Frege, Hardy and Field and simply set mathematical 
idealism aside. Any assumption concerning the existence o f mathematicalia will be taken 
in the standard way, as an assumption o f the existence o f abstract non-mental entities, 
rather than of mental ones. Thus, in Chapter 3 below, the simple formula 3xMath(x) is 
introduced to say that there are mathematical entities. For us, this statement will count as 
an assertion o f platonism.
Let us now turn to the meaningless marks o f the formalist.
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1.4 Applicability and Formalism
Formalism emerged in the nineteenth century, partly as a response to the discovery o f  
consistent axiomatic systems o f non-Euclidean geometry13. Formalism, roughly and 
briefly, is the view that mathematics is merely a game, played with meaningless or 
contentless physical marks.14
An early advocate o f formalism in the nineteenth century was a German mathematician 
J. Thomae, who put the position like this:
For the formalist, arithmetic is a game with signs, which are called empty. That 
m eans they have no other content (in the calculating game) than they are 
assigned by their behaviour with respect to certain rules of combination (rules of 
the game).
(Thomae 1898, Introduction)15.
In the early years o f the twentieth century, the foremost proponent o f a position related 
to formalism was Hilbert, whose important contributions to mathematics encompassed 
almost all its sub-branches: from axiomatic geometry, number theory and analysis, to 
applied mathematics and theoretical physics, and then later on to mathematical logic16.
13 The Collins Dictionary definition is this:
Formalism: the philosophical doctrine that mathematical statements have no extrinsic meaning but that 
their symbols themselves, regarded as  physical objects, exhibit a structure that has useful applications.
(Collins Dictionary of Mathematics, p. 226) 
Unfortunately, the second part o f  this definition is false. To say that a system S “exhibits a structure that...” 
is to say that there is a  structure Q such that S exhibits Cl and ... This plainly contradicts formalism, which 
repudiates all abstract mathematical entities, including structures. Indeed, this latter anti-formalist clause is a 
statement o f the rather attractive account o f  application advocated by mathematical structuralism, which is 
itself a version o f platonism.
14 But isn’t a game, as opposed to its particular tokens, an abstract entity? Football, the “beautiful game”, is 
an abstraction, unlike particular matches, which are events. And isn’t an expression, say ‘Tarski’, as opposed 
to its concrete tokens (inscriptions and utterances), an abstract entity?
15 Thomae 1898, Elementare Theorie der analytische Functionen einer complexen Veranderlichen, 
Introduction. Quoted in Frege 1903, Grundgesetze, Vol. ii, §§88-89. Requoted in translation by Kneale & 
Kneale 1962(1988), p. 452.
16 According to Abraham Pais, Hilbert attended a lecture in Gottingen in early 1915 given by Einstein, who 
outlined his latest thinking on General Relativity. Hilbert then wrote down the famous field equations for 
physical spacetime and they were published three weeks before Einstein’s publication in July 1915. Indeed, 
perhaps the most profound laws in modem physics are sometimes called the “Einstein-Hilbert Equations”, 
and the action functional from which they are derived using the usual Least Action Principle is commonly 
referred to as the “Hilbert Action”.
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Hilbert’s formalism is somewhat difficult to interpret, but seems to be this: a tiny 
segment o f mathematics is “contentful” and is, in fact, true in a certain non-mathematical 
interpretation. This part comprises those finitistic parts o f arithmetic, such as quantifier- 
free arithmetical statements (i.e., equations t\ = t2, where t\ and t2 are terms which may 
contain free variables: e.g., 7 + 5 -  12 or x + y  = y  + x). According to Hilbert, these are 
actually truths about certain concrete entities, which Hilbert took to be “physical 
strokes”, like ‘| | |’ and so on. The rest o f mathematics— the so-called ideal part—is 
required merely to be a consistent extension o f this contentful basis.
In particular, because mutually incompatible consistent extensions are possible, the 
notion o f truth lapses and is replaced by relativism: a mathematical assertion (p may be 
TRUE relative to one extension Mi (i.e., cp is provable in Mj), but FALSE relative to 
another M2 (i.e., -i(p is provable in M2).17
During the middle years o f this century, formalism was an important and influential 
position in the philosophy o f mathematics, advocated by many philosophers (especially 
those o f strong empiricist, anti-metaphysical, inclination) and even some 
mathematicians, although formalism has consistently been unpopular with most working 
mathematicians who write about their subject18.
Let us quote a more recent advocate o f formalism, the mathematician and expositor of  
mathematics, E.T. Bell:
Up until the early decades of the twentieth century it was quite commonly 
thought that mathematics has a peculiar kind of truth not shared by other human 
knowledge. For example, E. Everett (1794-1865) expressed the popular
17 An example concerns the truth value o f Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis in set theory, whether the 
cardinality o f the continuum c (i.e., 2K0 = | P (o) |) is equal to the second transfinite cardinal Ki. On this 
topic, Smullyan writes:
There are those called formalists who regard the continuum hypothesis as neither true nor false, but 
entirely dependent upon which axiom system you take, since we can add either the continuum 
hypothesis or its negation to the axioms of set theory and have a consistent system in either case ... At 
the other extreme there are the so-called mathematical realists or Platonists—of which I am definitely 
one— who believe that the continuum hypothesis is either true or false, but we don’t know which. We 
believe that we don’t yet know enough about sets to answer the question, but this doesn’t mean the 
question has no answer!
(Smullyan 1993, pp. 248-249)
18 Examples: Hersh & Davis, Ian Stewart, Roger Penrose, Keith Devlin.
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conception of mathematical truth as follows: “In pure mathematics we 
contemplate absolute truths, which existed in the Divine Mind before the morning 
stars sang together and which will continue to exist there, when the last of their 
radiant host shall have fallen from heaven"...
... Although it would be easy to match this extravagance by many as wild from 
later writings of those who, like Everett, were not mathematicians by profession, 
it must be stated emphatically that only an inordinately stupid or conceited 
mathematician would now hold any such inflated estimate of his trade or of the 
"truths" he manufactures ...
... Against all this rhetoric that has been wafted like incense before the high 
altar of "Mathematical Truth”, let us put the considered verdict of the last of the 
mathematical giants from the nineteenth century. Mathematics, according to D.
Hilbert (1862-1943), is nothing more than a game played according to certain 
simple rules with meaningless marks on paper ... This is rather a  comedown 
from the architecture of the universe, but it is the final dry flower of centuries of 
growth. The meaning of mathematics has nothing to do with the game, as  such, 
and pure mathematicians pass outside their proper domain when they attempt to 
give their marks meanings.
(Bell 1952, pp. 20-22. Emphasis added)19.
Bell, following Hilbert, argues that mathematics is concerned solely with systems of 
meaningless postulates and with what meaningless theorems can be derived formally 
within such systems. He quotes approvingly some o f the early “if-thenist” suggestions o f  
Russell20. Bell remarks:
A postulate is not necessarily ‘self-evident’, nor do we ask, “Is it true?”. The 
postulate is given: it is to be accepted without argument... Modern mathematics 
is concerned with playing the game according to the rules; others may inquire 
into the ‘truth’ of mathematical propositions, provided they think they know what 
they mean.
(Bell 1952, p. 23. Emphasis added).
Are the postulates then completely arbitrary? They are not, and the one 
stringent condition they must meet has wrecked more than one promising set 
and the whole edifice reared on it. The postulates must never lead to an 
inconsistency...
[And finally] one school of twentieth century mathematical philosophers 
discarded ‘true’ in favour of ‘consistent’.
(Bell 1952, pp. 27-28. Emphasis added).
19 E.T. Bell, Professor o f Mathematics at California Institute o f  Technology, published The Queen o f  the 
Sciences in 1931 and the Handmaiden o f  the Sciences in 1937. The book cited, Bell 1952, Mathematics: 
Queen and Servant o f  Science, is “a thorough revision and a very considerable amplification” o f these two 
earlier volumes.
20 See later, Chapter 6, for a refutation o f  formalistic if-thenism.
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Actually, there was a serious attempt to construct a genuinely nominalistic account of 
the formal manipulation o f concrete signs. Such a theory might be called “nominalistic 
syntax”. The programme was outlined in Quine and Goodman 1947, ‘Steps Toward a 
Constructive Nominalism’. We shall see below why this serious attempt to put the rather 
vague formalist ideas about meaningless marks on a proper footing was a failure. In order 
to get the system going, an infinity o f abstract expression types is needed.
Were these recent realists, especially Frege and Godel “inordinately stupid or 
conceited”? After all, it was Godel whose Incompleteness Theorems demolished the 
central plank o f Hilbert’s formalist programme, the aim of finding finitary consistency 
proofs o f infinitary mathematics. But Frege, Cantor, Godel and Church were all realists, 
who thought that it makes perfect sense to inquire o f a mathematical proposition whether 
it is true or not.
The formalist has no workable account o f the application o f  mathematics. There is a 
common (but trivially fallacious) the view that mathematics is applied by taking 
mathematical symbols somehow to refer to concrete physical entities. This is trivially 
false. The symbol ‘A f x y  in electromagnetic theory refers to a function, not to some 
bizarre ghostlike physical presence. The function assigns to each physical space-time 
point a quadruple of real numbers. This function partially characterizes the (abstract) 
stale o f space-time at each point. The state o f space-time at a point e is a mathematical 
entity which mathematically determines (via a differential equation) the behaviour (i.e., 
the geodesics) o f electrons in its vicinity. To deny this is simply not to grasp the physics. 
So, the applicability o f mathematics does not involve some mysterious and impossible 
reinterpretation o f mathematical symbols. (A further simple reason is that there are more 
mathematical, including power sets etc., than physicalia). A more serious account must 
incorporate the idea that the application o f mathematics in real mathematicized science 
involves the use of mixed predicates (and functors, like ‘A f ,  and so on), which
Chapter  1: Th e  A pplicatio n  of M ath em atics
28
express the appropriate structure-preserving relations between mathematicalia and 
concreta.21
So it is hard to see how formalism can even be consistent with the possibility o f  
applying mathematics. The central tenet o f (especially 19th century) formalism is that 
mathematics is the formal manipulation of meaningless combinations o f signs (the 
formalist concedes that the logical particles are interpreted, otherwise the logical inter­
relations o f consistency and implication would not make sense).
It is difficult to know what to make o f such an extreme position. In fact, formalism was 
in deep trouble in the 1890s as a result o f insightful criticisms o f Frege (again concerning 
application). Frege wrote in the Grundgesetze,
Why can no application be made of a  configuration of chess pieces? Obviously 
because it expresses no thought. If it did so and every chess move conforming 
to the rules corresponded to a transition from one thought to another, 
applications of chess would also be conceivable. Why can arithmetical 
equations be applied? Only because they express thoughts. How could we 
possibly apply an equation which expressed nothing and was nothing more than 
a group of figures, to be transformed into another group of figures in accordance 
with certain rules? Now it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a 
game to the rank of a science.
(Frege 1903, Vol ii. §91. Emphasis added)22.
Frege’s question ‘How could we possibly apply an equation which expressed nothing?’ 
was left unanswered (it is unanswerable). There can be no application o f groups of 
figures which do not express thoughts, and are therefore incapable o f being either true or 
false.
The message of formalism has to be that the application o f mathematics is impossible: 
we simply cannot use (as opposed to mention) mathematical statements in our theorizing 
about the world. For to use a statement is to have a certain attitude to its content (usually
21 To take an example, the standard differential equations of, say, accepted classical electromagnetic theory 
contain a quadruple o f four-place functors (viz., ‘ A ^x0, x1, x2, x3)’) and another quadruple o f  one-place 
functors ( W ) ’) To be sure, the variable V  ranges over spacetime points, but it is straightforwardly false 
to say that, given values o f variables (that is, spacetime points as values o f V ) ,  that either the terms ‘cp^(e)’ 
or the terms %A^((p°(e), cp!(e), cp2(e), cp\ e ) ) ’ refer to something concrete in the world: the theory specifies 
that these terms refer to real or complex numbers. Equivalently, the theory says that the cp11 are real numbers 
(which, e.g., can be algebraically manipulated).
22 Translation taken from Geach & Black 1952 (1980), p. 167.
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an assertive attitude). According to formalism, mathematical “forms o f words” are not 
capable o f being used assertively and therefore cannot be asserted (or used in any sense) 
in our empirical theorizing. But this flatly contradicts the assertion o f  mathematical 
statements in the empirical application o f  mathematics. An empirical scientist who freely 
considers (impure) functions from space-time to the real numbers (e.g., field functions 
like mass density or electromagnetic field) or functions from physical bodies to the real 
numbers (e.g., mass, length, temperature) does so by using and indeed, asserting certain 
interpreted sentences which refer to mathematicalia. Consequently, one surely cannot 
coherently maintain that the sentences containing terms that refer to these postulated 
functions are contentless.
Perhaps we need to be more explicit regarding the “use” o f mathematics in science. 
How is mathematics used? Well, scientists sometimes assert mathematicized statements 
and laws purporting to describe Nature. Scientists sometimes test these laws. Scientists 
gather evidence for and against these laws. Scientists debate the truth and approximate 
truth o f mathematicized laws o f Nature. How could this even be consistent with the 
formalist claim that these assertions are not even meaningful?
As Maddy put it,
The Platonist Gottlob Frege launched a fierce assault on early formalism, from 
many directions simultaneously, but the most penetrating arose from just this 
point. It isn’t hard to see  how various true statem ents of mathematics can help 
me determine how many bricks it will take to cover the back patio, but how can a 
meaningless string of symbols be any more relevant to the solution of real world 
problems than an arrangement of chess pieces?
This is Frege’s problem: what makes these meaningless strings of symbols 
useful in applications? Suppose, for example, that a physicist tests a hypothesis 
by using mathematics to derive an observational prediction. If the mathematical 
premiss involved is just a meaningless string of symbols, what reason is there to 
take that observation to be a consequence of the hypothesis? And if it is not a 
consequence, it can hardly provide a fair test. In other words, if mathematics isn’t 
true, we need an explanation of why it is all right to treat it as true when we use it 
in applications.
(Maddy 1990, p. 24. Emphasis added).
To sum up, it is incoherent to insist that mathematical statements are contentless groups 
of figures and yet at the same time to use them in applications. Formalism implies that
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the application o f mathematics is impossible. But the application o f mathematics is 
possible. Therefore formalism is false.
1.5 Illustration I. Measurement & Quantities
In science, we explain the observable behaviour o f physical systems by referring to 
measurable properties o f those systems. Such properties are sometimes called quantities 
or magnitudes. More exactly, a quantity is a function which systematically assigns certain 
mathematicalia (numbers, or sets o f numbers, or vectors or whatever) to concrete 
systems.
For example, the sentence,
(1) the length-in-m o f the Eiffel Tower >100
expresses the fact that the lengthm function assigns a number greater than 100 to a 
certain concretum, the Eiffel Tower.
The technical theory which explores the conceptual foundations o f the mechanisms 
involved in such assignments is known as Fundamental Measurement23. Of prime 
importance in Fundamental Measurement Theory is the discovery (and proof) o f  
interesting Representation and Uniqueness Theorems. A Representation Theorem 
explains how a structure Q built of concreta (a “concrete structure”, as it were) can be 
represented by an “abstract structure” Q', built of abstracta, (e.g., the real numbers, under 
the usual ordering, with the usual algebraic operations). The notion o f representation 
involved is that o f a homomorphism: a structure-preserving mapping p from the “concrete 
structure” Q into the abstract representing structure Q'. The resulting homomorphism is 
called a measurement scale. The lengthm function is just such a measurement scale.
The first explicitly formulated Representation Theorem was discovered and proved by 
Holder. It shows how any ordering Q  = (D, a ) which satisfies certain constraints can be 
represented by the standard linear ordering o f reals Q' = (R, <) by an injective map p: D
23 The classic exposition is Krantz et al. 1971.
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I—> R such that, for any elements x, y  o f D, (x, y )  e  a  if  and only if  p(x) <  p(y). Here D  
may be an impure set o f concreta and a  may some ordering relation amongst these 
concreta (like ‘is less massive than’). Then p is the representing homomorphism 
(measurement scale) which assigns real number values to the relata o f a  in a structure- 
preserving manner.
It almost goes without saying that for any given concretum x, the value p(x) is an 
abstract entity, viz., a real number. Hence quantitative theorems using measurement 
scales are committed (through quantification, ultimately) to mathematicalia. Associated 
with Holder’s Theorem is a Uniqueness Theorem which says that if pi and p2 are both 
such scales, then there is a real number a such that p2 = ap\. Now suppose we fix upon 
some particular concretum, x0  say. Then a Uniqueness Theorem may allow us to prove 
that 3!p(p(jc0) = 1. That is, the Uniqueness Theorem, plus the axiom ‘p(x0) = 1 \  entails 
the uniqueness o f such a p. We then say that x0  is a standard unit for the scale p. Of 
course, there may be many such standard concrete units, which all occupy the same 
location in the ordering.
For example, consider the scale masskg (the mass-in-kilograms scale), ubiquitous in 
physical science. This measurement scale is a homomorphism with respect to the ‘less 
massive than’ relation. That is, for any concreta x and y , we have the theorem,
Less-Mass(x, y) <-» (masskg(x) < m asskg(y))24
Measurement scales for other physical magnitudes, like temperature, pressure, force, 
temporal duration, and so on, are similarly introduced. For more details see Krantz et al. 
1971. All o f these arc represented by measurement scales, which are structure-preserving 
homomorphisms from relations amongst concreta to some (usually the ordering) relation 
on real numbers.
24 Notation: throughout I use the Arial font for formulas and symbols. Predicates, like Less-Msss, begin 
with a capital, while functors, like masskg> begin with a lower-case letter. I use such capital Arial symbols as 
‘T’, ‘M’, ‘P’ and ‘N’ to refer to theories in any formalized language and the symbol ‘L’ to refer to such 
langauges. I sometimes use Fractur ‘3 ’ for interpretations o f  a formalized language, and the .symbol ‘Q ’ to 
range over structures or models, considered as mathematical entities rather than as interpretations, ‘cp’ 
almost always ranges over L-formulas. As a victim o f Quine, I try not to confuse use and mention, but, iike 
most mathematical authors, use many symbols autonymously, so <-» and 3 are symbols.
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Notice that it is the underlying Representation Theorem which says when a 
mathematical operation on values o f some scale is “meaningful”. For example, if  we 
consider the mass scale, masskg, then addition o f values of the mass^ function is 
meaningful, for we suppose that the usual concatenation (or aggregation) operation o on 
concreta is such that:
m asskg(x) + m asskg(y) = masskg(x o y)
On the other hand, the multiplication o f masses is not meaningful: there is no (simple) 
physical operation ® on concreta such that:
m asskg(x) x m asskg(y) = masskg(x ® y)
Thus, we have an explanation o f what a scientist means when he or she says that certain 
mathematical operations have no “physical interpretation”. Adding energies or masses is 
meaningful, adding temperatures is not. Note: it doesn’t follow from this that a 
“meaningless” term like ‘Tj + T2’ cannot occur in a scientific law. The criterion o f  
meaningfulness certainly does not rule out a theory in which “meaningless expressions” 
occur. E.g., in Newton’s Law of Gravitation, the physically meaningless product 
m asskg(x) x masskg(y) occurs, as well as the meaningless square [distm(x, y)]2.
1.6 Illustration II. Geometry and Spacetime Theory
Modem physical geometry has moved far beyond (Cartesian) analytic Euclidean 
geometry. The problems o f space, time and motion have always been at the very centre o f  
philosophical and scientific discussion. A revolutionary new conception emerged 
between 1905 and 1915, in Einstein’s work25. Modem Einsteinian relativistic space-time 
theory, General Relativity (henceforth, GR), provides a unified account o f matter, 
energy, motion, space and time26. The traditional philosophical problems o f time, change
25 For a collection o f Einstein’s major papers and others see Einstein et al. 1952 (Sommerfeld (ed.)).
26 The standard undergraduate text is Rindler 1979. The classic graduate texts are Weinberg’s 1972 and 
Misner, Thome & Wheeler 1975. The standard graduate texts are Wald 1984 and the monumental Choquet- 
Bruhat et al. 1982.
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and trans-temporal “identity”, substantivalism-versus-relationism, conventionality and 
simultaneity, and so on, must all be understood in terms o f Einstein’s work27.
In Cartan’s co-ordinate-free formulation, relativistic space-time theory contains 
theoretical principles like:
If U  is an open set o f points in a region of space-time, then there exists a function
<p from U to an open set in R4 such that (I/, cp) is a co-ordinate chart.28
This statement is, o f course, contingent. It says that space-time is locally diffeomorphic 
to R4. This might be false if  superstring theory (or supergravity theory) is correct, 
according to which space-time is locally diffeomorphic to R 10. In any case, from the 
definition o f a co-ordinate chart, one can immediately deduce (given the existence of 
regions o f space-time containing points) the existence o f real numbers, for a quadruple of 
these is assigned by any co-ordinate chart to each space-time point. Thus, from the basic 
principles o f space-time theory, we may infer:
i. the existence o f mathematicalia: sets o f space-time points, quadruples o f
reals, etc.
O f course, Einstein’s theory is not simply an assertion that space-time is related to 
mathematicalia in a certain way. The theory is profoundly elegant, predictive and 
explanatory. Almost all workers in the field (called “relativists”) think it is true (or so 
close to being true that any successor theory would have to preserve almost all o f its 
content). Einstein’s Field Equations for GR connect the space-time curvature (Ricci) 
tensor Rah and metric gab with the energy-momentum tensor Tah. They are expressed as 
the tensor identity:
(*) For any space-time point e, Rah(e) -  V2R(e)gah(e) = 8nG T&h(e)
(R is the Ricci scalar, = gab/?ab; G is Newton’s constant)
27 A major modern treatment o f  several philosophical problems connected to modem relativistic space-time 
theories is Friedman 1983. An even more advanced treatment is Earman 1995. A discussion o f  Zeno’s 
Paradoxes and “infinite supertasks” in space-time is contained in Earman & Norton 1996.
28 I.e., if  e is a point in U, then the real numbers cp“(e) are the co-ordinates o f e in ( U, cp).
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We can restate this universally quantified law more schematically as follows:
For each space-time point e, CURVATURE at e = ENERGY-MOMENTUM at e
On the question o f a successor theory, considerable interest was created in 1984 when it 
was shown first that closed  superstrings behave just like gravitons (the spin 2 quanta o f  
the gravitational field) and second that superstrings can only “propagate consistently” 
(that is, with the proper cancellation o f certain infinities called “anomalies”) in a space­
time that satisfies Einstein’s fie ld  equations. The methodological principle is clear: any 
theory (supergravity, superstrings, Kaluza-Klein, etc.) that succeeds GR will have to 
explain it or reduce to it in some low-energy limit.
O f course, GR is an empirically testable theory. Given its central law above we can 
infer a spectacular range o f empirical predictions. Some important consequences of 
Einstein’s space-time theory (with auxiliaries, o f course) are:
ii. the existence o f space-time geodesics and null-geodesics;
iii. the time-like geodesic motion of small test bodies in curved space-time;
iv. the null-geodesic paths o f light rays in curved space-time;
v. the precession o f bound orbits;
vi. the gravitational red-shift of light;
vii. gravitational time dilation of clocks (anything that oscillates), 
and so on.
Furthermore, one can show that Newton’s NM “lives on a limiting case” o f GR. This 
proceeds via the linear approximation, where we set gMV = TV + Y^ v, where rjMV is the flat 
Minkowski metric for flat space-time, and is a “small perturbation”:
viii. the Einstein field equations (*) reduce (approximately) to:
V 2yoo oc T oo
And this is Poisson’s field-theoretic formulation o f the law of Universal Gravitation, 
V O  oc p. The reduction shows that the time-time component o f the metric Yoo
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approximates the Newtonian “gravitational field”, O. Einstein himself took this as a 
central constraint in his attempt (with Grossman) to find the correct field equations.
Indeed, within the linear approximation, it can be shown that:
ix: Dy^ v = 0
which is o f course a wave-equation. So, GR predicts the existence o f  gravitational 
waves (wavelike fluctuations in the space-time metric g^v). Indeed, many o f the problems 
in quantizing GR (e.g., non-renormalizability) arise from trying to quantize this equation 
(ix), or rather, the perturbative series equation, in derivatives o f y^ v, o f  which (ix) is a 
limiting case.
In any case, irrespective o f the more physical and testable consequences (ii)-(ix), the 
Platonic deductive consequence (i) reveals that modem space-time theory is “up to its 
neck” in explicit ontological commitment to mathematicalia. In ontological terms, GR 
quantifies over co-ordinate charts, real numbers, sets o f points, tensor functions, and so 
on. Of course, GR is a contingent theory about the nature o f physical space-time, which 
has been empirically corroborated, provides many unifying explanations, and which is 
looked upon (by experts) as one o f the most profound inventions in the history o f human 
ideas. But plainly its contingency does not prevent its quantification over, and thus its 
commitment to, an ontology o f mathematicalia.
1.7 Illustration III. Syntax
Syntax treats the properties o f linguistic expressions and their combinations. Syntactical 
theory quantifies over both concrete physical inscriptions (or tokens) and abstract 
symbols and expressions (or types). Indeed, tokens play an almost insignificant role in the 
theory “proper”, and are only explicitly considered when philosophers ask what syntactic 
theory is really about.
The relation o f “tokening” is somewhat similar to Platonic instantiation: ‘inscription x 
is a token o f symbol y 9 expresses a relation o f concreta to abstracta. This might be
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clarified by introducing a formalization o f syntax. Governing the 2-place predicate 
Token (‘is a token o f ) ,  the monadic predicates Inscr (‘is an inscription’) and Expr ( ‘is 
an expression’), we have axioms such as the following:
(1) lnscr(x) -> 3X(Expr(X) a  Token(x, X)) 
which says that each inscription is a token o f some expression.
Similarly, syntactical theory introduces an operation o f (abstract) concatenation, often 
signified by A, governed by the following closure axiom:
(2) Expr(X) a  Expr{Y) -»  ExpdX  A Y)
The crucial point to recognize is that standard syntactical theory is developed 
Platonistically, for the following reasons. The operation (relation) o f concatenation, 
ConcatiX, V, Z):
Z is a concatenation o f X  and Y,
applies to expressions (that is, types) and is, roughly, the “abstract correlate” o f a 
certain physical relation: juxtaposition, Juxtix, y, z):
z is a juxtaposition o f x an d y , 
which applies to tokens.
Of central importance for Platonistic syntax is the existence/uniqueness theorem for 
concatenation:
(3) Expr(X) a  Expt{Y) -» 3 \Z{Expr(Z) a  Concat(X, Y, Zj)
(For any pair of types, there exists a unique concatenation).
Then we can easily define the concatenation functor A thus:
X A Y=d{(iZ)Concat(X, Y, Z)
The application o f Platonistic syntax then rests on the “Representation Theorem”:
(4) Token(x , X) a  Tokeniy , V) -» Vz(Juxt(x, y, z) -» Token(z, X  A V)).
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That is, if  x and y  are tokens o f types X  and Y, then any juxtaposition o f x and y  is a 
token o f the concatenation o f X  and Y. Abstract concatenation o f abstract types X  and Y 
“represents” concrete juxtaposition o f their respective tokens.
One makes good use o f Platonistic syntax in standard proof theory and metalogic. For 
example, GSdel’s Completeness Theorem for First-Order Logic says that that if a formula 
cp is a logical (semantic) consequence of some set A o f formulas, then there exists a 
(finite) derivation T o f cp from A. As Church argued [see below], this metatheorem is only 
true when a derivation Y is construed as abstractum, i.e., as an arbitrarily long sequence 
of (abstract) expression concatenations. It is not true when derivations are reconstrued as 
concreta, i.e., as concrete tokens. The reason is simple. Only a small finite number of 
abstract proofs have ever been inscribed (as tokens). When we say that (p is derivable 
from A, we means that there exists a (Platonic) sequence o f  concatenations T of abstract 
symbols which constitutes a proof o f (p from elements o f A. We do not mean that 
someone has actually written down, uttered or even thought o f that sequence Y.
In short, any standard proof o f the Completeness Theorem is Platonistic. It appeals 
(albeit implicitly) to principles from Platonistic syntax.
Fifty years ago, Quine and Goodman published a famous paper29, in which they 
outlined certain philosophical principles and attempted to develop rigorously the theory 
of nominalistic syntax. Their paper begins with the announcement:
We do not believe in abstract entities. Noone supposes that abstract entities— 
classes, relations, properties, etc.—exist in space-time; but we mean more than 
this. We renounce them altogether.
(Quine & Goodman 1947 (in Goodman 1972), p. 173).
Roughly, Quine and Goodman assumed the existence o f concrete inscriptions, invoked 
the notion o f concrete juxtaposition, and attempted to derive proof theory. Church’s reply 
to this paper appeared in a letter to Goodman:
... additional tasks that ‘nominalistic’ (better, finitistic) syntax might be asked to 
accomplish [:] the deduction theorem; ... the proof of the rules of substitution as 
derived rules ... Post’s  completeness theorem for the prepositional calculus; the 
metatheorem that every quantifier-free theorem of first-order functional calculus
29 Quine & Goodman 1947.
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has a quantifier-free proof; the principal results about the Skolem normal form;
Gbdel’s incompleteness theorems ...; Godel’s relative consistency proof for the 
axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis; the results of 
Fraenkel, Lindenbaum, and Mostowski concerning the independence of the 
axiom of choice.
(Church 1958b).30
Considerations such as these were instrumental in motivating Quine’s early defection 
from nominalism31. Quine summed up in 1981;
How far could one push elementary mathematics without thus reifying 
universals? Goodman and I explored this at one point. The formalist, we 
remarked, was already involved in universals in treating of expression types ... 
a  formalism of tokens afforded considerable mileage but stopped short of full 
proof theory.
(Quine 1981c (1981a), pp. 182-183).
One central problem for nominalistic syntax is simply that not enough (actual) tokens 
exist. This is why Church emphasized finiteness: standard proof theory is non-finitistic. 
Briefly, the following contingent assertion about tokens is empirically false:
(5) lnscr(x) a  Inscfiy) -» 3z(lnscr(z) a  Juxt(x, y, z))
And because o f this, in nominalistic syntax we cannot define a nominalistic 
juxtaposition functor ‘o’ with the right closure (“extendability”) properties. If we had the 
above theorem (5), it would be easy:
x o y =df (xz)(3ZToken(z, Z) a  Juxt(x, y, z)).
The basic advantage o f Platonistic syntax, then, is its non-finitistic nature: abstract 
concatenations o f distinct expression-types always exist and yield new expression-types. 
Given an initial symbol |, we get 11, and 111, and so on: infinitely many (indeed, a model of 
arithmetic). If we formulate our syntactical theorems in terms o f abstracta (i.e., types), 
then we can (implicitly) appeal to the properties of abstract concatenation to prove the
30 In a letter to Goodman on 1 Dec 1958. Quoted from Goodman 1972, pp. 153-154.
31 In fact, Quine had retracted this nominalistic credo in 1953, and probably had already defected by 1948.
In the bibliography o f his 1953 anthology, he added the comment:
I should now prefer to treat that sentence as a  hypothetical statement of conditions for the 
construction in hand.
(Quine 1953a (1980), pp. 173-174)
That is, Quine conceded that nominalistic syntax is inadequate as a reconstruction o f  standard proof theory, 
with its quantification over abstract expression types.
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standard proof-theoretical and metalogical theorems (that is, we automatically have the 
existence o f an expression X A Y, for arbitrary expressions X, Y). In nominalistic syntax, 
the required properties do not hold o f concrete tokens. Given concrete inscriptions * and 
y ,  there might be no such thing as “jc o y ”.
A “solution” is to introduce modalist nominalistic syntax with a modal existence 
theorem:
for any inscriptions x , y , there could have been an inscription z  such that juxt(x, y,
z)
Or, formally, instead o f (5), we have:
( 6 )  lnscr{x) a  Inscdy) -> 03z(lnscr{z) a  Juxt{x, y, z ))
However, a nominalist would surely view the introduction o f modality as a greater evil 
than admitting abstract objects. As Quine later put it,
... long ago, Goodman and I got what we could in the way of mathematics ... 
on the basis of a nominalist ontology and without assuming an infinite universe.
We could not get enough to satisfy us. But we would not for a moment have 
considered enlisting the aid of the modalities. The cure would in our view have 
been far worse than the disease.
(Quine 1986, p. 397. Emphasis added).
1.8 Illustration IV. Metalogic
Standard formulations of the formal science of mathematical logic32 (sometimes called 
metalogic) invoke a rich variety of mathematicalia in both the syntactic (proof-theoretic) 
and semantic (model-theoretic) components: symbol types, arbitrarily long abstract 
concatenations and sequences thereof, sets and sequences o f objects, functions, relations 
and structures.
32 E.g., Robbin 1969, Mendelson 1987, Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, Machover 1996. See Hodges 1997 for a 
graduate level presentation o f model theory and Takeuti 1975 for a standard presentation o f  p ro o f theory. 
Boolos 1993 relates proof theory to systems o f modal logic.
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Machover 1996 puts this by saying that metalogic operates within an “ambient set- 
theory”:
As any other mathematical theory, our metatheory just starts from a launching 
pad of presuppositions: some underlying concepts, regarded as  known, in terms 
of which further concepts of the theory are defined; and certain fundamental 
propositions, on the basis of which the theorems of our theory can be rigorously 
proved.
Set theory—in the form of ZF or some similar codification—is certainly strong 
enough to underpin our study of logic. Indeed, the entire development ... can be 
read as occurring in set theory.
(Machover 1996, p. 135]
Those parts of our investigation that depend upon the concepts defined in Def 
4.10 [viz., Tarskian notions of logical consequence and satisfiability] will 
generally presuppose the existence of infinite sets as objects, and must be 
viewed as taking place in an ambient theory that incorporates a sufficiently rich 
set theory.
(Machover 1996, p. 157)
For a simple example, in standard metalogic the metatheorem:
(1) the schema 3x(F(x) a  G(x)) is satisfiable,
is actually an abbreviation o f an existential claim about structures:
(2) there exists a structure Q such that Q. (= 3x(F(x) a  G(x))
Indeed, one can find simple formulas (Quine 1950 (1972) calls them “infinity 
schemas”) satisfied only by infinite structures33.
Likewise, a semantic theorem about logical consequence such as:
(3) Vx(P(x) 3yQ(y)) 1= 3 xP(x) -»  3xQ(x) 
is an abbreviation o f a universal claim about structures:
33 An example is.
Vx3yVz(F(x, y) a  ^F(x, x) a  (F(x, y) -> F(x, z ))).
See Quine 1952 (1974), p. 183. A simpler example (using just a constant and a function symbol) is the usual 
axiom for the successor function:
VxVy(s(x) *  0  a  (x *  y  - » s(x) *  s(y))).
The reason is simple. If f .  A —»X -  {a} is injective, then X must be infinite! (One proves by induction: i f  X  
has n elements, a e  X  a n d /  X - ± X -  {a} , th e n /is  not injective).
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(4) for any structure Q, if Q (= Vx(P(x) —» 3yQ(y)), then 
Q f= 3xP(x) -»  3xQ(x)
Now, structures are surely mathematicalia (set-theoretical entities), so the simple 
metalogical theorem that a certain schema is satisfiable implies the existence of 
mathematicalia.
Similarly, Godel’s Completeness Metatheorem for first-order logic says
(5) if  A |=(pthenA |-(p
This refers to an arbitrary set A of premises (which may be infinite, e.g., the axioms of 
first order Peano Arithmetic, PA). But furthermore, the notation ‘ p  can be expanded in 
the standard way:
(6) if  A f= q> then there exists a derivation F o f <p from A
A derivation F in this sense must be an abstract entity: an arbitrarily long (but finite) 
sequence o f sentence types such that every element o f F is either an element o f A or is a 
statement immediately derivable using a rule o f inference from some earlier subset of  
elements in T. If one attempts to reconstrue (6) as a statement about concrete tokens then 
it is false: but only a nominalistic fanatic would try to argue that the first-order logic is 
incomplete because not enough tokens exist!
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C h a p ter  2 
The Structure o f Mathematicized Theories
Standard scientific theory supplies much of the information it supplies about 
physical entities only indirectly, by way of apparatus pertaining to supposed 
relationships of physical entities to supposed mathematical entities and 
supposed classifications of and relationships among the supposed mathematical 
entities themselves. As much of what science says about observable entities is 
‘theory-laden’, so much of what science says about concrete entities (observable 
or theoretical) is ‘abstraction-laden’.
John P. Burgess and Gideon Rosen 1997, A Subject With No Object, p. 84.
2.1 The Logical Structure of Mathematicized Theories
Formally, it is convenient to represent a mathematicized theory o f Nature in a manner 
that distinguishes between the concrete and mathematical. The benefits o f doing so are 
three: logical, ontological and epistemological. Such a representation is achieved using a 
“standard two-sorted mathematicized language” L.
Let us begin with a rather loose definition:
Definition 1: Mathematicized Language
A language L is mathematicized if  it contains the notation o f mathematics 
(e.g., predicates from arithmetic, analysis, set theory, etc.).
Mathematicized theories are formulatable in some mathematicized language. 
Obviously, a sceptic about mathematicalia, a nominalist, can legitimately use a 
mathematicized language. Indeed, he or she must use a mathematicized language in order 
to express disbelief in mathematicalia, for he or she needs to assert statements like ‘real 
numbers do not exist' (or, more generally, 'abstract entities do not exist’).34
34 This is why the view advocated by Carnap 1950, the alleged distinction between “external” and “internal” 
statements, is incorrect. Carnap held that, given the language o f mathematics, the assertion ‘numbers exist’ 
is analytic and thus must be accepted by anyone who uses the language. But this must be wrong. For Hartry 
Field uses the language o f  mathematics and asserts ‘numbers do not exist’. If Carnap were right, Field would
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Next, we adopt the following definition:
Definition 2: Standard Mathematicized Language35
A standard mathematicized language L is a two-sorted language which 
contains:
i. primary variables: xls x2, ..., ranging over concreta.
ii. secondary variables: X h X2, r a n g i n g  over mathematicalia.
If L is a standard two-sorted mathematicized language for formalizing mathematicized 
scientific theories, its predicates can obviously be classified into three kinds, according to 
how they are correctly “saturated” by variables.
Primary predicates', predicates which have only argument places for primary variables: 
such predicates intuitively express relations between concreta [e.g., hotter, taller, and so 
on]. Secondary predicates', predicates which have only argument places for secondary 
variables: such predicates intuitively express relations between mathematicalia [e.g., 
Equinumerous, Isomorphic, Larger, and so on]. Mixed predicates: (2-or-more-place) 
predicates which have argument places for both primary and secondary predicates: such 
predicates intuitively express relations between concreta and mathematicalia [e.g., e , 
Masskg, and so on].
Thus, corresponding to these kinds o f predicate, we obtain atomic formulas o f three 
kinds.
i. Primary formulas,
e.g., Taller(xu x2), HotteriXu x2), etc.,
ii. Secondary formulas
e.g., Equinumerous(Xh X 2), lsomorphic(Xu X 2), etc.,
be contradicting himself! It follows that Carnap is wrong. If a nominalist asserts ‘numbers do not exist’ 
clearly it is incorrect to say that he or she is not using mathematical language. How else could the nominalist 
express his or her disbelief in mathematricalia. By ESP?
For further criticisms o f the inadequacy o f  Carnap’s view, see Quine 1951b and Quine 1954.
35 In adopting this use o f a two-sorted notation, I follow the conventions o f  Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 69.
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iii. Mixed formulas
e.g., x g  X, A4asskg(X, x), etc.
Any statement or axiom in L containing only primary (secondary) predicates will be 
called a primary (secondary) statement or axiom. A statement or axiom containing a 
mixed predicate will be called a mixed statement.
As an example, we may rewrite the axiom expressing the density o f the reals:
(1) there is always a real number between any two given distinct reals 
as the secondary axiom:
(2) VXIVX2(Xj < X2 -> 3X3(Xi < X3 < X2))
And we rewrite the axiom from measurement theory:
(3) every physical object has a mass-in-kg 
as the mixed axiom:
(4) Vx3 XMasskg(X, x)
We will say that a mathematicized scientific theory is standardly formulated if  it is 
formulated in some standard two-sorted mathematicized language L. (Note that i f  we 
adopt this two-sorted language form, then a formula like TalletfX], X2) is not well- 
formed. For Taller is a primary predicate and must be completed with primary variables, 
thus: Taller(xu x2)).
In general, any mathematicized theory o f Nature formulated in a standard two-sorted 
language L has, correspondingly, three kinds of axiom:
Axiom Type 1: Secondary Axioms
Such axioms always occur and their purpose is, loosely speaking, to specify the abstract 
mathematical structure Q that the theory T is going to “apply” to the concrete physical 
world. For example, the structure may be the continuum (for space or time), or a
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symplectic manifold (for Hamiltonian mechanics) or a Hilbert Space (for quantum 
mechanics).
Axiom Type 2: Mixed (Representation) Axioms
Loosely speaking, again, such axioms specify how the structure characterized by the 
pure axioms is “exemplified in” concrete reality. Almost all the laws o f physics 
(differential equations) are in fact such mixed axioms. Imagine a law which asserts the 
existence o f a discrete linearly ordered sequence of temporal instants with an endpoint, 
satisfying the induction principle. A concrete ©-sequence, if  you like. This law is a 
mixed law. In effect, it says that there is a concrete system which exemplifies the natural 
number structure (N, <). (Clearly, it is contingent that such a system exemplifies (N, <))
Axiom Type 3: Primary Axioms
Such axioms, if  they occur at all, specify mundane facts (perhaps observable) about 
physical relations between concreta.
Below I shall provide two examples o f mathematicized theories which are standardly 
formulated.
2.2 The Application of Arithmetic
Three of the basic (axiomatic) mathematical theories we are familiar with, Peano 
Arithmetic PA, Real Analysis RA and standard Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory ZFC, are 
not, as they stand, applicable mathematical theories. For example, the language in which 
PA is standardly formulated is one-sorted, with only first-order variables ranging over 
numbers. There is no place for quantification over non-mathematicalia or concreta, and 
no place for non-arithmetical predicates (that is, primary or mixed predicates).
Arithmetic made be made applicable by adding a predicate-operator #:
#F
meaning, intuitively,
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“the number o f Fs”.
The result o f adding # and a stock of primary predicates (say, ‘apostle’, ‘planet’, 
‘teacup’, ‘moon’, ‘space-time point’, etc.) provides a notation within which we may 
formulate assertions like,
(1) #(apostles) > #(planets)
(2) #(planets) = 9
(3) #(planets) + #(apostles) > #(moons of Earth)
Although these are mathematical assertions, they are not pure mathematical assertions. 
Indeed, each o f them, if  true, is only contingently true. It is only contingently true that the 
number of planets is equal to 9. More importantly, (l)-(3) are not theorems o f applicable 
arithmetic.
So, what is applicable arithmetic? There is sense in which applicable arithmetic is a 
remarkably simple theory, reducible to a single axiom, known as “Hume’s Principle”:
HP: #F = #G <-» (there is a bijection from Fs to Gs)
In order to formulate this properly one needs either set theory or second-order logic. 
The usual second-order formulation is this. The clause “there is a bijection from Fs to 
Gs” means that there is a function/ such that:
i. Vx(F(x) -»  G(flx))) the /-image o f any F  is a G
ii. \/x\/y(x *  y  -> flx) *  fly)) / i s  an injection
iii. Vy(G(y) -*  3x(F(x) a  y  = /* ) ) )  / i s  a surjection from Fs to Gs
In short, the clause is to be rewritten:
3 f(VxVy(F(x) -> G(f(x)) a  (x  *  y  f(x) *  f{y)) a  Vy(G(y) -> 3x(F(x) a  y  = f(x)))
Abbreviate this second-order formula as 
F «  G
Then the second-order formulation o f Hume’s Principle is:
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HP2: # F ~ # G + + F * G
An interesting metatheorem (Boolos 1987, Wright 1983) is that, by introducing 
definitions for 0  and s it can be shown that HP2 |- PA2. That is, HP2 is arguably a kind o f  
logicist representation o f arithmetic36. (Indeed, the second-order theory whose sole non- 
logical axiom is HP2 is sometimes called “Frege Arithmetic”, FA)
2.3 The Application of Analysis
The theory o f real numbers (Real Analysis, RA) is the theory o f what algebraicists call a 
field , a system of objects that can be added, subtracted, multiplied, and for which 
division is generally defined (except by 0)37. The field axioms can be formulated in a 
one-sorted language Lra with the signature (0 , 7, +, x, <) and these axioms in Lra hold in 
the class o f ordered fields. (These axioms are given below in a footnote38). The important 
completeness axiom scheme for RA is:
36 In second-order arithmetic, + and x are explicitly definable using just 0  and S. E.g.,
z = x + y  <-» V/([Vw(f(w, 0) = w) a  Vw,Vw2(/(iv1l s(w2) = s(/(tv1) w2))] -* z = f(x, y)]
37 See, e.g., Birkhoff & MacLane 1965, Chapter II, ‘Rational Numbers and Fields’.
38 The field axioms for the subsignature (0, 1, +, x) are:
RAt x + y = y + x commutativity o f +
RA2 x x y = y x x commutativity o f x
r a3 x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z associativity o f +
RA* x x ( y  xz)  = (xx y ) x z associativity o f  x
RAS x + 0 = x identity element for +
RA, X x 1 = x identity element for x
RA7 3y(x + y = 0) inverse for +
r a 8 x *  0 3y(x x y = 1) inverse for x
r a 9 x x (y + z) = (x x y) + (x x z) x distributes over +
RAjo 0 * 1 .
sr axioms for < are:
RAn ( x < y A y < z ) - > x < z transitivity
RA12 (x < y) -> -<(y < z) antisymmetric
RAn (x < y) v  (x = y) v  (y < x) trichotomy
RAj4 x < y  >(x + z < y  + z) monotonicity o f +
RA,, ( x < y A O < z ) - > x x z < y x z monotonicity o f  x
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RA16 [3xR(x) a  3y-.R(y) a  VxVy(R(x) a  ->R(y) x < y)] -» 3z(Vx(x < z -> 
R(x)) a  Vy(z < y -> ->R(y))39
In set-theoretical language, this is usually written,
(1) For every non-empty subset bounded above, there is a least upper bound
If (X, <) is a linear ordering, and satisfies (1), we say that it is order-complete. This 
order-completeness property o f (R, <) distinguishes the reals from the rationals, (Q, <). 
There are bounded subsets o f Q which lack a least upper bound (supremum)40. Can we 
just fill in the “gaps” in the dense ordering o f the ratios by “postulation”? This idea 
provoked Russell’s famous remark:
From the habit of being influenced by spatial imagination, people have 
supposed that series must have limits in cases where it seem s odd that they do 
not. Thus, perceiving that there was no rational limit to the ratios whose square 
is less than 2, they allowed themselves to "postulate” an irrational limit, which 
was to fill the Dedekind gap ...
... The method of “postulating” what we want has many advantages; they are 
the sam e as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others 
and proceed with our honest toil.
(Russell 1919, p. 71).
I pass over the two standard set-theoretical constructions, due to Dedekind (using 
“cuts”) and Cantor (convergent Cauchy sequences) o f the reals from the rationals41.
As it stands, this axiomatic mathematical theory of real numbers RA is pure and not 
applicable. Its quantifiers and variables range over real numbers and it contains no non- 
mathematical predicates. An extended applicable theory may be obtained by introducing
From Mendelson 1987, pp. 76-77. (The axioms are those for the elementary theory o f ordered fields).
391 take this formulation o f order-completeness from Burgess and Rosen 1997, p. 77. (They call it the 
“continuity scheme”).
40 E.g., consider the subset A = {z  e  Q: z2 < 2/j}. This set is bounded above (by 2I\ for example). But take 
any rational upper bound, say 7m, where (7m)2 is larger than any element o f A. That is, n2 > 2m2. Equality is 
impossible by the standard proof in Euclid. So n2 > 2m2. Since n and m are positive whole numbers, it 
follows that n > m. But we can find another ratio p/q smaller than 7 m such that p 2 > 2q1. This is another 
upper bound. E.g., \e tp  = n +  l , q  = m +  I. Then, pm  = (n +\)m  = mn + m and q n -  (m +  l)w ~ mn + n. So, 
qn > pm. Thus, if  n2 > 2m2, then there are whole p , q  such that p 2 > 2#2 and pm  < qn. So, A does not have 
least upper bound, a supremum. (Intuitively, the required supremum for A is irrational, i.e., just V2).
41 See Drake & Singh 1996, Chapter 6, ‘Developing Mathematics Within ZFC’ (especially Section 6.4).
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a two-sorted notation: change all real number variables to secondary variables (X, Y , ...), 
add primary variables (x, y , ...), add mixed predicates such as,
i. “co-ordinate primitives”, Co-ord\(Xu X2, ..., x), and
ii. “measurement primitives” like Ma$Skg(X, x),
and a fixed stock o f primary (sometimes called “synthetic”) predicates P(xu ..., xn).
There is nothing within applicable real analysis corresponding to Hume’s Principle in 
applicable arithmetic. (Of course, we might want to count non-denumerable collections: 
Hume’s Principle, extended to transfinite sets, is good enough for this, assigning a 
cardinal number | A | to every concept or set A, no matter how transfinitely large42). 
Roughly, the simplest applications of analysis within science are based on co-ordinate or 
measurement notions, using reals as representations or “labels” o f concreta (such as 
points in a line, or instants in time). Such is the purpose o f the mixed co-ordinate 
predicates like,
Co-ordi(X, x) (real number) X  is the co-ordinate o f (concretum) x
and measurement primitives like,
MasSkg(X, x) (real number) X  is the mass-in-kg o f (concretum) x
It is thus possible using these mixed predicates Co-ordt, Mass^g and so on, to write 
down formulas expressing relations between non-mathematicalia (values o f primary 
variables) and real numbers. In other words, to apply analysis and formulate quantitative 
laws.
For example, Newton’s Second Law is a mixed law:
(2) for any point mass * and any instant t, there are real numbers X\, X2, X 3
such that X\ is the mass-in-kg o f x at time t, X 2  is the acceleration-in-mf2  
o f x at time t, X 3 is the total force-in-N  on x at time t, and X 3 = X\ x X2.
42 See Machover 1996, p. 36 or Drake & Singh 1996, p. 47. The naive “definition”, | A | ='| B  | <-> A «  B, 
which is Hume’s Principle again, is incomplete. The definition o f Cantor’s “alephs” Xa and the identification 
o f cardinals with initial ordinals is carried out in Drake & Singh 1996, Section 6.7.
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Since the mixed predicates, ‘mass-in-kg’, ‘acceleration-in-ms ’ and ‘total force-in-N’ 
satisfy the existence and uniqueness constraints discussed below (that is, they determine 
functions from concreta to the reals), this can be rewritten, a la Carnap, as,
(3) Vx, t [total-force-in-N(jc, t) = mass-in-kg(x, t) x acc-in-ms~2(jc, /)]
Physicists usually write down the formula F = ma as a simple mnemonic for (3), but (2) 
makes more explicit what a physicist understands by Newton’s Second Law. (Actually,
(2) only deals with one-dimensional motion: strictly speaking, forces and accelerations 
are 3-vectors, i.e., to be represented by triples of reals).
For the philosophical purposes o f analysing the application o f analysis (and of 
mathematics more generally), we need to consider formulas such as those below,
a. \/x3XCo-ord(X, x)
b. VxVX1VX2(Co-orc/(Xi, x) a  Co-ord(X2, x) -> X x = X2)
c. VX3xCo-o/t/(X, x)
d. [Co-ord(Xu x ^ a  . . .  a  Co-ord(Xn, xn)] - >  [Pixu . . . , x n) < - »  F(XU . . . , Xn)]
where F is a secondary predicate.
Formulas (a) - (c) are called representation formulas (e.g., Burgess & Rosen 1997), 
asserting that concreta are represented by real numbers in a certain way. Formulas (a) and 
(b) are existence and uniqueness assertions, ensuring that the mixed formula Co-ord(X, 
x) may be replaced by the formula X  = co-ord(x), where co-ord(x) is a function symbol. 
Then (c) and (d) become,
c'. VX3x(X = co-ord(x))
d'. [P(xls ..., x„) <-» F(co-ord(xx) , ..., co-ord(xn)\
The formula (c') is thus a very strong constraint, requiring that co-ord be a surjective
map from the set of concreta to the set of mathematicalia. When (a) - (c) are in place, we 
have a very strong representation relation between concreta and mathematicalia (and then
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it follows from a theorem of Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson that the apparatus o f  
analysis, and thus all reference to mathematicalia, may be eliminated43).
A formula such as (d) or (df) is called a Representation Theorem for the synthetic 
predicate P. Any a-tuple o f concreta (x]5 ..., xn) to which P  applies is such that the 
mathematical predicate F is true o f their co-ordinates.
For example, consider the following theory of time, which we shall call Tim. The 
analytic formulation o f Tim has axioms:
i. VX3f(X = co-ord(t))
ii. Vt]\/t2(ti * t 2 -> co-ord(ti) *  co-ord(t2))
iii. Before(tu t2) <-> (co-ord(U) < co-ord(t2))
Axioms (i) and (ii) are strong representation formulas for CO-ord, saying that the 
function it determines is a bijection. Axiom (iii) is the Representation Theorem for the 
primary predicate Before. Together, the axioms (i) - (iii) say that “the structure o f time” 
under the Before relation is isomorphic to the reals under <. But it should be stressed that 
(i)-(iii) are not theorems o f applicable RA. They are contingent extensions o f RA.
2.4 The Application of Set Theory
Standard presentations o f set theory44, including axiomatic set theory, ignore 
applications to non-mathematical subject matter. The reason is that the classical
43 See Burgess & Rosen 1997, Chapter I.B.
44 See Machover 1996 or Drake & Singh 1996, who write o f  the “cumulative type structure” :
In fact, all of our subsequent work could be considered as based on the cumulative type structure, and 
all the axioms we give ... can be given intuitive justification in terms of this structure; we could say that 
they are intended to give a formal description, or theory, of this structure.
(Drake & Singh 1996, p. 9).
The mathematical notion o f set (associated with Cantor and Zermelo 1908) has been associated with the so- 
called iterative conception which is sometimes constrasted with Frege’s and Russell’s “logical” notion o f  a 
class (the extension o f a predicate or a concept, and thus governed by the inconsistent naive comprehension 
principle). For further philosophical explanations o f  this conception, see Boolos 1971, Parsons 1977, and 
Pollard 1990.
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mathematics o f numbers and structures may be developed within ZF without any 
assumption as to the existence o f urelements. More exactly, none o f the constructions 
(significantly, the construction o f ordinals and their properties) presuppose the existence 
o f  urelements or individuals. However, without too much difficulty, set theory may be
formulated as an applicable theory. For example, a system called ZFU (for Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with urelements) may be formulated in a two-sorted language 
permitting quantification over individuals (non-sets).
The easiest way to do this is to augment the language Le of ZF by adding a monadic 
predicate U(x) meaning “x is an (non-mathematical) urelement”, modifying the Axiom of  
Extensionality as follows:
(1) VxVy([3z(z e  x) a  Vz(z e x z e y)] -»  x = y)
and adding the following three axioms:
(2) Vx(3z(z e x) -» -i U(x))
(3) 3x(-i U(x) a  Vz(z g x))
(4) 3xVz(z e  x  <-> U(z))
which assert that no set is an urelement, that there is a set with no elements (viz., 0 )  
which is not an urelement, and that there is a set of urelements.45
It now follows from the Axiom of Separation that, corresponding to any «-place 
predicate P, there is a set o f  ^ -tuples (of urelements) o f which P  is true (the restriction to 
U  o f the extension o f that predicate). So, by expanding the language further by adding 
“urelement predicates” like rabbit, mammal and so on, one obtains theorems o f  ZFU 
like,
(5) 3zVx(x e z e  rabbit{x))
Obviously, we can specify that a new primitive predicate is an “urelement predicate” by 
adding an axiom,
45 For this construction, see Chihara 1990, pp. 148-149. Mostowski 1939 discussed the appropriate 
modification o f  NBG set theory to include ur-elements.
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( 6 )  V X ^ . V X ^ X j ,  . . . 9X j - > ( U ( x i )  A ...  A  U(Xn) ) )
Within this theory one can go on to define a predicate operator Ext as follows:
(7) Ext{P) =df {(xls ..., x j:  P(xls ..., xn)}
where P  is any urelement predicate. One can now formulate assertions such as,
(8) Ext(rabbit) c  Ext(mammaf)
which says that the set o f rabbits is a subset of the set o f mammals. Indeed, from (6), 
plus the modified Axiom o f Extensionality, one may derive a weak form of Frege’s 
Axiom V,
AxV: ExtF = ExtG <-» Vx(F(x) <-» G(x))
This is to be compared with Hume’s Principle:
HP2: #F = #G<->F»G
It will be o f some importance later (when we discuss “if-thenism”, for example) that a 
set-theoretical assertion like (8)— and many like it, about such abstract entities as the set 
o f rabbits and the set o f  mammals— is certainly not a theorem o f ZFU. Such assertions 
are true (if true at all) only contingently. A more interesting example is the contingent but 
still set-theoretical assertion that the physical “time structure” (Tim, Before) is 
isomorphic to (R, <), where Tim =df the set of temporal instants and Before =df the 
relation named by the predicate ‘before’.
I want to quickly introduce something that will play an important role later. Begin with 
the original applied signature Leu = (e ,  U) and expand Leu by adding the signature of  
arithmetic (0, s, +, x). Add as axioms:
i. 0 (0)
ii. U(x) -> U(s(x))
iii. [U(x) a  U(y)] -> [U(x + y) a  U(x x  y)]
plus the usual axioms for Peano Arithmetic, including the induction scheme:
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[0(0) a  Vx(0(x) -> 0(s(x))] -> Vx(L/(x) -» 0(x))
These axioms say that there is an “initial” urelement z, and another s(z), and another 
and so on; and that if  x and y  are urelements then so are x + y  and x x y. Furthermore, x + 
5(y) = s(x + y \  and so on. And finally, if  F  is true of z and true o f s(jc) whenever true o f x, 
then F  is true o f all urelements.
Suppose we forget about e  and the set-theoretical axioms and consider the subtheory, 
call it PAU. This theory is formally equivalent to Peano Arithmetic, even though in its 
intended interpretation z, s ( z \  s(s(z)), etc., may be concrete physical objects. In short, 
PAU might well be (part of) a mathematics-free physical theory o f  concrete entities (we 
shall see later that PAU is a subtheory of Field’s geometrical theory o f space-time: it is 
the theory o f a infinite discrete equally-spaced sequence o f  space-time points with an 
endpoint).
By Gfjdel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, PAU is incomplete. Furthermore, it is 
obviously consistent, for it has a model (e.g., the set o f finite ordinals, ©). By 
arithmetization, its consistency can be formulated as a statement Con expressible within 
the sublanguage but, by Gfjdel’s Second Theorem, Con is improvable from the axioms o f  
PAU. Now suppose we add  the set-theoretical axioms o f ZFU. We apply the 
mathematics. Clearly, PAU + ZFU can prove that PAU is consistent (by proving the 
existence o f  a model o f PAU: indeed, one such model is just the set o f urelements I/, 
structured by s, + and x) and thus can prove the formula Con46. What this means is that 
adding ZFU to PAU is not a conservative extension o f PAU. We shall return to this point 
when we come to discuss (in Chapter 9) Field’s deflationism about mathematics.
46 There is one subtlety involved. To prove Con from PAU + ZFU it is necessary to allow formulas 
containing e  to appear in the induction scheme when the language and theory is expanded. This is perfectly 
natural, for the intention o f the scheme is that it holds for any property P  o f  urelements, including properties 
definable using e . Indeed, if  the intended structure o f urelements is isomorphic to a Peano system, then 
induction must be taken in this second-order manner (first-order PA has non-standard models, even non­
standard countable models). We return to this theme briefly in Chapter 5 (where I show that deflationary 
truth theories are conservative, even on this assumption about axiom schemes) and in Chapter 9, where we 
discuss Shapiro’s 1983 argument that mathematics is not conservative.
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2.5 Applicable Mathematics: Summary
Summarizing the previous three sections, the primary uses o f mathematics within 
science fall into three categories:
i. Arithmetic
Counting (assigning numbers to concepts or to classes o f concreta);
ii. Analysis
(a) Measurement (introducing certain real-valued functions from concreta to 
real numbers: e.g., measurement scales, real-valued classical fields on space­
time);
(b) Geometry (introducing co-ordinate systems on space-time);
iii. Set Theory
(a) Forming collections o f concreta (sets and relations-in-extension);
(b) Exemplification (assigning structures as “representations” o f concrete 
systems).
These uses (i)-(iiia) have been explained. Use (iiib) deserves a slightly more extended 
treatment to which we now turn.
2.6 Exemplification: Structuralist Theory of Application
In the above uses of mathematics in science we included amongst the applications o f set 
theory the notion o f exemplification. Unfortunately, this issue is not at all well- 
understood. Briefly, the suggestion is that the use o f set theory within science allows us 
to attribute structure to physical systems. Set theory (plus mereology) indicates how 
concrete physical systems are “carved up” into complex structures, which such systems 
may be said to exemplify.
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In science we often talk o f the structure of physical objects or systems. For example, we 
say things like:
i. the structure o f each (concrete) NaCl crystal is “Body-Centred Cubic”;
ii. the structure o f space-time is a “differentiable manifold with a metric”;
iii. the structure o f standard LSE coffee cups is a truncated cone in R3.
Similarly, we recognize of countless different types of vibrating system that their 
behaviour over time exemplifies the sinusoidal function A sin(&t + q>). Things that 
vibrate are “simple harmonic oscillators”. And we may say that LSE coffee cups 
exemplify truncated cones.
This idea is highly intuitive, easily illustrated by the following diagram.
LSE C offee Cup Truncated C one in R3
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According to some proponents o f mathematical structuralism, the notion o f  
exemplification lies at the heart o f explaining the very possibility o f the application o f  
mathematics in science. The structuralist account o f  application, advocated by Resnik 
and Shapiro47, asserts that:
i. Pure mathematics characterizes and describes certain structures;
ii. Some o f these structures may be exemplified by concrete objects or 
systems;
iii. The application o f mathematics involves “translating” mathematical facts 
about an abstract structure Q to contingent facts about the concrete system 
x which exemplifies the structures.
I am sympathetic to this (Platonist) analysis o f application. But it is little more than a 
sketch o f the beginnings o f a theory o f application. There seem to be at least three prima 
facie  problems with this account:
i. What is “exemplification”, this relation between a mathematical structure 
and a concrete object?
ii. How do we “translate” mathematical facts about the structure to 
contingent facts about the object?
iii. There are problems connected with the notions o f approximation and 
idealization (as several philosophers o f science have stressed).
For example, consider the following table:
“Real World” Physical System Idealized Mathematical Structure
segment o f the Colorado River triangular prism, containing a vector field
47 For Resnik’s structuralism, see Resnik 1981, 1982, 1988. For Shapiro’s structuralist analysis o f  
application, see Shapiro 1983b. See also Shapiro 1997.
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satisfying the Navier-Stokes equation
football a dodecahedron,
The Earth an ellipsoid in R3
pendulum, spring, etc. a simple harmonic oscillator.
enclosure o f electromagnetic radiation assembly o f simple harmonic oscillators
crystal o f NaCl BCC lattice in R3
All o f these are approximate idealizations. None o f the real physical systems exactly 
exemplifies the mathematical structure in question. The ions in a real NaCl crystal are 
not points; there are always fractures and dislocations; and so on. Suffice it to say that, 
although many have tried, no-one has explained in any enlightening way how idealization 
works.
However, I suspect that we can begin to make sense o f talk o f exemplification itself, 
using ideas from set theory and mereology—the theory o f the “part-whole” relation as 
applied to concrete physical entities. The basic idea is simple. With the resources o f set 
theory and mereology one can define the exemplification relation between physical 
objects or systems and abstract structures. Roughly,
Definition 1: Exemplification w.r.t. Relations R(
A physical object x exemplifies a structure Q with respect to relations R \ , ..., 
Rn if  the impure structure (DXi R} \X i Rn\x) is isomorphic to Q, where Dx is 
the set o f parts o f x and Ri | x is the restriction o f R[ to Dx.
Definition 2: Exemplification Sim pliciter
A physical object x exemplifies a structure Q (simpliciter) if  there are 
relations R\ such that x  exemplifies Q  w.r.t. the Rv
What then o f the translation from the mathematics to the non-mathematical 
description? If a structure Q  has signature L, then associated with any such L-structure Q
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is the set o f L-formulas that it satisfies. This is the theory o f the structure, Thi.(Q). We 
may expect that, if  x exemplifies Q, then the theory o f the structure Th[_(Q) will then be 
translatable into a true non-mathematical description T of the physical object x.
Two philosophically important theses might follow from this account of 
exemplification:
I. Anti-Essentialism :
Any physical object or system exemplifies every structure consistent with the 
cardinality o f the set o f its parts. To get “special” or “natural” structures one must single 
out, using a privileged vocabulary, special parts or special relations on the parts. At the 
very least, if  x exemplifies a structure Q and Q is definitionally equivalent to another 
structure Q*, then x  exemplifies Q*.
This insight is connected to the fact that a scientific or mathematical theory may be 
given many equivalent (intertranslatable) formulations, and is also related to the 
philosophical problems o f “language dependence” that afflict confirmation theory 
(Goodman’s “grue” paradox) and truthlikeness theory (Miller’s reformulation 
paradoxes).
II. Ultra-Platonism
On reasonable assumptions concerning the nature o f the physical world (e.g., 
concerning the cardinality o f the set o f physical individuals: say, space-time points and/or 
regions), there exist transcendent structures: a transcendent structure is a mathematical 
structure Q  such that no concrete physical object exemplifies Q. That is, a transcendent 
structure is so “big” that it is not exemplified anywhere. If I am right, this is just a matter 
of cardinality: if  the biggest physical cardinality is Ka, say, then any bigger mathematical 
structure will be transcendent.
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2.7 Example I: Analytic Euclidean Geometry
An example o f a theory incorporating mathematical analysis is Analytic Euclidean 
Geometry (AEG). Informally, analytic geometry presupposes the ordered field structure 
(R , 0 , 7, + , x , <) o f the real numbers. Consequently, within an axiomatic treatment o f  
analytic geometry, the pure axioms will be those for analysis.
Geometry is the theory o f points, lines and regions. Intuitively, these are elements o f the 
physical world. In this interpretation then, geometiy is a part o f physics. One may 
perhaps distance oneself from the existence o f such points by talking o f idealization: 
points are idealizations o f small blobs o f ink, and lines are idealizations o f Socratic lines 
drawn in the sand, or o f ink lines drawn with a pen. One may further distance oneself 
from any particular ontology by adopting a completely formal and axiomatic method, 
effectively the approach o f Hilbert 1899. The axioms are set down and deductive 
consequences are drawn. (Such consequences hold irrespective o f any intended 
interpretation or ontology).
On the axiomatic approach, the representation axioms (for co-ordinates) o f AEG are: 
3\X,Y(Co-ordi(X, x) a  Co-ord2(Y, x))
3\x(Co-ordi(X, x) a  Co-ord1(Yi x))
That is, each point x is represented by some unique real number co-ordinates X , Y. And 
all co-ordinate pairs (X9 Y) represent some unique point x48. Any further axioms can thus 
be rephrased using function symbols co-orcfi and co-ord2, where X  = co-ord^x) is 
equivalent to Co-ordi(X, x).
The remaining axioms o f analytic Euclidean plane geometry are then formulated using 
two further primary primitives:
i. Bet(x, y, z), meaning intuitively “x lies between y  and z”, and
48 These details about geometry are drawn from Burgess & Rosen 1997, Chapter II. A. One semi-popular 
presentation o f formalized geometry is Tarski 1959.
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ii. Cong(x, y, z, w), meaning intuitively “the segment xy is just as long as the
segment zw”.
The first axiom is a representation theorem for betweenness, Bet:
Bet(xu x2, x3) <-> 3 U[(0 < U < 1) a  (co-ordx(x2) = Uco-ord^Xi) + (1 -  U)co- 
ordi(Xi) a  (co-ord2(x2) = Uco-ord2(x]) + (1 -  U)co-ord2(x3))]
In effect, x2 lies between jcj and x3 just in case x2, represented by (X2, T2), lies on the 
“parametrized straight line” from x x (resp., X h 7^ to x3 (resp., X3, 73). (See Burgess & 
Rosen 1997, p. 103).
The second axiom is a representation theorem for congruence, Cong:
Xi = co-ordiiXi) a  Yi = co-ord2{x^ -> 
Cong(xu x2; x3; x4) o  (X, -  X2)2 + (Y, -  Y2f  -  (X3- X 4)2 + (Y, -  Y<f
In effect, the segment x xx2  is congruent to the segment xyx  ^just in case the “Euclidean” 
metric distance between (the co-ordinates representing) x x and x2 is equal to that between 
x3 and x4. (See Burgess & Rosen, p. 113).
Equipped with these axioms plus the axioms for analysis one can then proceed to derive 
theorems about points (i.e., theorems saying how points are related by betweenness and 
congruence). Indeed, one may derive theorems which do not mention real numbers at all. 
Such theorems are called “synthetic theorems”.
For example, we first define,
“x, y  and z  are collinear”
by the permutation formula,
Bet(x, y, z) v  Bet(y, z, x) v  Bet(z, x, y)
Equipped with just the first representation axiom for betweenness, plus the axioms o f  
analysis, one can derive Playfair's Postulate as a theorem (see Burgess & Rosen 1997, p.
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for any x, y , z  that are not collinear, there exists a point u such that no point is 
collinear both with x and y  and with z and w;
and if  v is any other such point, then z is collinear with u and v.
Burgess & Rosen 1997 mention several other theorems o f elementary geometry
deducible in this theory, commenting that this is a “miniature illustration o f the
usefulness o f algebra and analysis in geometry (and mechanics)” [p. 104].
2.8 Example II: The Structure of Time
Consider the following simple theory Tims o f the structure o f time. In fact, a theory 
along these lines is believed to be true by physicists who study the structure o f space­
time (or rather, this theory is a subtheory of standard space-time theory). The theory talks 
of temporal instants and o f the temporal “before-after” relation on these instants, using 
(primary) primitives lnst(x) and Before(xx, x2). Aside from any implicit set-theoretical 
assumptions, the theory contains two definitions and one mixed axiom:
Defi: Tim = {x: lnst(x)}
Def2: B ef= {(xls x2): Before(xu x2)}
Ax: (Tim, Bef) is isomorphic to (R, <)
(This theory Tims includes some suppressed set theory, hence the subscript s).
Now Tims can be given a sort o f “analytic reformulation”, which we call Tim, that does 
not mention sets (or relations on sets). However, it introduces a co-ordinate notion, co­
ord, functionally correlating instants with real numbers. Thus,
Axiom Type 1: secondary  [“pure”] axiom s
axioms for analysis 
Axiom Type 2: mixed [representation] axiom s
(TimO VX]Vx2(X] *  x2 co-ord(x{) *  co-ord(x2))
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(Tim2) VX3x(X = co-ord(x))
(Tim3) Before(xu x2) co-ord(xx) < co-ord(x2)
Like analytic geometry, this theory has no primary axioms but it certainly has primary 
theorems. For example, it is a theorem of Tim that “density” holds o f the temporal 
instants:
Vxi Vx2(Before(x1, x2) -»  3x3(Before(Xi, x3) a  Before(x3, x2)))
Indeed, any pure mathematical theorem about real numbers expressed using <, can be 
“translated”, via the representation axioms (Timi)-(Tim3) into a non-mathematical 
theorem about temporal instants, expressed using Before.
Recall what we said earlier in Section 1.2 about the application o f mathematics to the 
geometry o f the Earth. The Earth, a physical system, is “represented” as an abstractum, 
an ellipsoid embedded in R3; then mathematical facts about the geometry or topology of 
this abstract ellipsoid can be “translated” into non-mathematical facts about the genuine 
physical geometry or topology o f the Earth.
I suggest that the above analytically formulated theory Tim illustrates more accurately 
how this happens. For example, the density theorem about the real numbers:
(1) VX[VX2 (Xi < X2 —> 3X3(Xi < X3 a  X3 < X2))
“translates”, using the Representation Theorem, into the non-mathematical theorem:
(2) Vxj Vx2(Before(xu x2) -»  3 x3(Before(xu x3) a  Before(x3, x2)))
Roughly, any abstract property o f the system of reals expressible using < is translatable 
into a physical property o f time, using Before. Again this is another illustration o f the 
usefulness o f analysis and algebra within physics.
We shall return to this simple mathematicized theory Tim later on for purposes o f  
illustrating other arguments concerning the application o f mathematics.
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C h a p ter  3 
The Quine-Putnam Argument
Science would be hopelessly crippled without abstract objects. We quantify 
over them. In the harder sciences, numbers and other abstract objects bid fair to 
steal the show. Mathematics subsists on them, and serious hard science without 
serious mathematics is hard to imagine
W.V. Quine 1995, From Stimulus to Science, p. 40.
Surely one of the strongest reasons—if not the only reason—for taking 
mathematical truth seriously stems from the apparently indispensable role 
mathematical theories play in the very formulation of scientific descriptions of the 
material world around us.
Geoffrey Heilman 1989, Mathematics Without Numbers, p. 94.
3.1 The Quine-Putnam Argument
Much o f modem accepted science presupposes, and entails, the existence of 
mathematicalia. A provocative way to put this is to say that “science entails platonism”. 
The originator o f this argument was W.V. Quine, who has presented it several times over 
the years since the late 1940s. Several authors, o f nominalistic inclination, have found 
this ontological conclusion, concerning the commitment o f science to mathematicalia, 
somewhat upsetting and have struggled valiantly to demonstrate that this commitment is 
“only an appearance”, or that science can “get by without mathematics”. But, I shall 
argue, such approaches do not work. Much of science is irreducibly up to its neck in 
commitments to abstract mathematicalia, such as numbers, functions, sets, vectors, 
tensors, and so on.
Quine was the first philosophical author to propose a criterion o f  ontological 
commitment. Quine’s proposal, sloganized in those ten immortal words,
To be is to be the value o f  a variable
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develops through several publications, going back to Quine 1939 and reaching its 
“canonical” form in Quine 1948:
A theory T (perhaps formalized within an interpreted canonical notation L) is 
committed to those entities which must be taken as values o f the bound variables 
of theorems o f T if  T is to be true.
From this, Quine quickly establishes (in his own words) that classical mathematics is 
platonistic: i.e., the theorems o f classical mathematics are committed to an ontology o f  
mathematicalia, via the occurrence o f bound variables ranging over such entities as 
numbers and sets. Finally, he establishes that accepted scientific theory is platonistic: i.e., 
because mathematics is an “integral part” o f virtually any serious scientific theory, much 
o f accepted scientific theory is committed to an ontology o f mathematicalia.
Before we examine this last claim, we should recognize that “what ontology is to be 
accepted’ is not dictated by the criterion of ontological commitment itself:
Now how are we to adjudicate between rival ontologies? Certainly the answer 
is not provided by the semantical formula “To be is to be the value of a variable”;
... we look to bound variables in connection with ontology not in order to know 
what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or 
someone else’s, says there is\
(Quine 1948 (1980), p. 15).
Quine’s argument for actually accepting a platonistic ontology appears in the final
pages:
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance 
of a scientific theory, say a  system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we 
are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which our disordered 
fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged. Our ontology is 
determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual schem e which is to 
accommodate science in its broadest sense; and the considerations which 
determine a reasonable construction of any part of that conceptual scheme, for 
example, the biological or physical part, are not different in kind from the 
considerations which determine a reasonable construction of the whole.
(Quine 1948 (1980), pp. 16-17. Emphasis added).
Quine goes on to discuss the acceptability of a platonistic ontology o f classes. He 
argues that we must accept them into the ontology o f our over-all conceptual scheme:
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... Now what of c lasses or attributes of physical objects, in turn? A platonistic 
ontology of this sort is, from the point of view of a  strictly physicalistic conceptual 
scheme, as  much a myth as that physicalistic conceptual schem e itself is for 
phenomenalism. This higher myth is a good and useful one, in turn, in so far as 
it simplifies our account of physics. Since mathematics is an integral part of this 
higher myth, the utility of this myth for physical science is evident enough.
... The analogy between the myth of mathematics and the myth of physics is, in 
some additional and perhaps fortuitous ways, strikingly close.
... Let us see  how, or to what degree, natural science may be rendered 
independent of platonistic mathematics; but let us also pursue mathematics and 
delve into its platonistic foundations.
(Quine 1948 (1980), pp. 17-19. Emphasis added).
Several philosophical themes are interleaved in these two passages. In the former, we 
see Quine’s pragmatism: a pragmatic account o f theory acceptance (“we adopt the 
simplest conceptual scheme into which our disordered fragments o f raw experience can 
be fitted and arranged”), which might be contrasted, say, with an “evidence-driven” 
account, wherein we should adopt the “most confirmed” conceptual scheme49. 
Furthermore, while Quine’s epistemological pragmatism is a much-debated topic, he has 
repeatedly stressed that his position is inconsistent with scientific anti-realism, scepticism 
or instrumentalism (that is, the claim that theories are nothing more than useful 
instruments for “saving the phenomena” o f “raw experience”).
However, the crucial point is that when we accept a standard scientific theory, we are 
thereby accepting an ontology o f mathematicalia, for mathematics is an “integral part” o f  
virtually any such system. The premise involved is the following thesis:
Integration Thesis
Mathematical assumptions, axioms, etc. (i.e., axioms which quantify over 
mathematicalia), form an integral part o f modem physical science.
The integration thesis is extremely important, especially in relation to possible 
objections to Quine’s argument. In particular, it is a parody o f the logical facts to think o f
49 This is complicated by the fact that a confirmation theorist might want to include simplicity considerations 
within the calculation o f  a theory’s degree o f confirmation (although this is clearly absent from Bayes’ Rule). 
Use ‘justification’ as a neutral term. Then Quine is a justificationist who lays as much stress on pragmatic 
considerations (e.g., simplicity) as on evidential considerations (empirical support) in assessing the rational 
acceptability o f a theory. See Quine 1963b.
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a scientific theory T that uses mathematical axioms as a facile logical conjunction, say N 
u  M, where N represents the physical facts (without reference to mathematicalia) and M 
comprises some pure mathematical axioms. Indeed, the way in which mathematics is 
actually integrated is extremely complex: a typical scientific theory uses a whole host o f  
mixed predicates (and functors) governed by sophisticated axioms. For example, mixed 
predicates like the following play a basic and prima facie indispensable role in 
formulating scientific theories:
x is an element o f (the set) X
(the real number) X  measures how massive x is
x is a token o f type X
the quadruple o f reals (X°, X 1, X2, X3) measures the spatio-temporal location, 
relative to co-ordinate chart <p, o f space-time point x
(the real number) X  measures the value o f the cp field at space-time point x
These are basic, and prima facie irreducible, mixed predicates, especially the latter two, 
which might be more conventionally written
(x°, x 1, x2, x3) = <p(e)
r=<p(e),
where e  ranges over space-time points. Predicates such as these express the crucial 
relations between concreta and abstracta vital to the application o f mathematics in 
science. For example, if  X  is a real number (say, 100) and x a concretum (say, an apple) 
and X  measures how massive x is, then we are asserting a relation between X  and x. 
Actually, the mass-measuring relation must be a relation-preserving relation: i.e., i f  the 
real number X\ is assigned as a mass measure to jcl9 and similarly X2 assigned to jc2, then 
is less massive than x2 just in case X\ is less than X2. Indeed, as we shall see later, it is 
precisely the problem of dealing adequately with the presence o f these mixed predicates 
(which occur in virtually all important accepted scientific theories in physics) that 
frustrates the most sophisticated version o f modem nominalism, Field’s deflationism.
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Furthermore, Quine makes it clear that he himself accepts as true standard physical 
theory, with its overall ontological commitments (to theoretical entities, mathematicalia 
and all) and considers it “a scientific error to believe otherwise”. E.g.,
As an empiricist, I continue to think of the conceptual schem e of science a s  a 
tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience.
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the schem e a s  convenient 
intermediaries—not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible 
posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part, i do, 
qua lay physicist, believe in the physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I 
consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise.
(Quine 1951a (1980), p. 44. Emphasis added)
This talk o f epistemological parity between ‘homeric god’ and ‘physical object’ can be 
misleading, perhaps suggesting that Quine thinks that objects are somehow “produced” 
by our theories. Qua concepts, there is parity between a mythical concept such as 
‘homeric god’ and a theoretical predicate like ‘electron’. They are pieces o f language, 
incorporated within vastly complex theories, and ultimately tied to sensory experience. 
But whether there exist entities answering to these concepts is obviously a distinct and 
separate question. It is the question whether sentences such as ‘3x(x is an electron)’ and 
is a homeric god)’ are true. Indeed, it is this question that divides realists and anti­
realists. Quine adopts realism, insisting that the ‘3jc(jc is a electron)’ is true and ‘3x(x is a 
homeric god)’ is false: according to Quine, there really are such things as electrons, and 
there are no such things as homeric gods50. Thus,
... in likening the physicists’ posits to the gods of Homer, in that essay [Quine 
1948] and in “Two Dogmas", I was talking epistemology and not metaphysics.
Posited objects can be real. As I wrote elsewhere, to call a  posit a  posit is not to 
patronize it.
(Quine 1980, Foreword, p. viii. Emphasis added).
I have given our objector his fair share of program time. He would like us to 
believe, I suppose, that the atoms and elementary particles and the sets and 
numbers and functions are unreal; mere heuristic fictions? Is that right? ... Who 
is to say, then, whether they exist or were invented? Have we here reached the 
limit of knowledge, the unanswerable question?
I think not. If we subscribe to our physical theory and our mathematics, as  
indeed we do, then we thereby accept these particles and these mathematical
50 To be a realist about Fs is simply to assert that there are Fs. In contrast, van Fraassen, for example, is not 
a realist about electrons. Van Fraassen will not assert that there are electrons. He claims to be agnostic.
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objects as real; it would be an empty gesture meanwhile to cross our fingers a s  if 
to indicate that what we are saying doesn’t count.
(Quine 1973 (1976), p. 65).
It is worth remarking that for Quine (and for Tarski, who in his 1936 emphasized the 
disquotational aspect o f alethic concepts o f truth, satisfaction and so on) the phrases 
‘accepts’ and ‘accepts as true’ are simply interchangeable51.
3.2 Recent Formulations
After Quine’s lead, the argument mathematical realism based on science took a new 
and important turn with the appearance o f Philosophy o f  Logic by Putnam in 1971:
... quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable for science ... 
therefore we should accept such [talk]; but this commits us to accepting the 
existence of the mathematical entities in question. This type of argument stems, 
of course, from Quine, who has for years stressed both the indispensability of 
[talk about] mathematical entities and the intellectual dishonesty of denying the 
existence of what one daily presupposes.
(Putnam 1971 (1979), p. 347).
Putnam made the same Quinian point more polemically later, in Putnam 1975:
... mathematics and physics are integrated in such a way that it is not possible 
to be a realist with respect to physical theory and a nominalist with respect to 
mathematical theory.
(Putnam 1975 (1979), p. 74).
Putnam’s illustration involved the Law of Gravitation:
... one wants to say that the Law of Gravitation makes an objective statement 
about bodies—not just about sense data or meter readings. W hat is this 
statement? It is just that bodies behave in such a way that the quotient of two 
numbers associated with the bodies is equal to a  third number associated with 
the bodies. But how can such a statement have any objective content at all if 
numbers and ‘associations’ (i.e., functions) are alike mere fictions? It is like 
trying to maintain that God does not exist and angels do not exist while 
maintaining at the sam e time that it is an objective fact that God has put an
51 The equivalence o f accepting T and accepting ‘T is true’ is closely connected with the disquotational 
aspect o f truth, which is surely constitutive o f  the concept o f truth (the axioms or theorems o f the form “/?’ 
is true iffp’ o f any disquotational truth theory are analytic). This need not be a deflationary view o f  truth, 
for such a view claims also that disquotation is all there is to truth. This is different. Indeed, I think I can 
prove, using Godelian techniques, that the weak truth theory, consisting o f “all” the disquotational axioms, is 
an incomplete theory o f the concept o f truth (see Chapter 5 below).
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angel in charge of each star and the angels in charge of each binary star were 
always created at the sam e time! If talk of numbers and 'associations’ between 
m asses, etc., and numbers is theology (in the pejorative sense), then the Law of 
Universal Gravitation is likewise theology.
(Putnam 1975 (1979), pp. 74-75).
We may thus put together the combined argument o f  Quine and Putnam. It clearly 
comprises two main theses:
T hesis A: Science is platonistic (Quine 1948)
T hesis B: Platonistic sc ience  is ind ispensab le  (Putnam  1971)
This combined argument is sometimes called the Quine-Putnam Indispensability 
Argument for platonism or mathematical realism.
Many philosophers o f mathematics, realists or not, accept Quine’s Thesis A. An 
example is Field, who is a nominalist:
After all, the theories that we use in explaining various facts about the world 
not only involve a commitment to electrons and neutrinos, they involve a  
commitment to numbers and functions and the like. (For instance, they say 
things like 'there is a  bilinear differentiable function, the electromagnetic field, 
that assigns a number to each triple consisting of a  space-time point and two 
vectors located at that point, and it obeys Maxwell’s  equations and the Lorentz 
force law*.) I think that this sort of argument for the existence of mathematical 
entities (the Quine-Putnam argument, I’ll call it) is an extremely powerful one, at 
least prima facie.
(Field 1989, Introduction, p. 17. Emphasis added).
Field’s nominalist strategy is based on trying to overcome Thesis B, Putnam’s 
indispensability component. In brief, Field proposes that we attempt to construct a non- 
mathematical replacement for platonistic science. Indeed, Field argues convincingly and 
correctly that,
If one just advocates fictionalism [i.e., nominalism] about a  portion of 
mathematics, without showing how that part of mathematics is dispensable in 
applications, then one is engaging in intellectual doublethink: one is merely 
taking back in one’s philosophical moments what one asserts in doing science.
(Field 1980, p. 2. Emphasis added).
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Almost all other prominent philosophers o f mathematics similarly endorse Quine’s 
classification o f science as platonistic. Examples are Lewis, Resnik, Burgess, Maddy and 
Shapiro52. For example, opening his critique of the central technical claim o f Field’s 
nominalism (the conservativeness claim), Shapiro writes:
A common argument for platonism, due to Putnam and Quine, is based on the 
role of mathematics is science. The main premiss is a statement to the effect that 
mathematics forms an essential part of virtually every scientific theory. That is, 
scientific theories of the material world are formulated in mathematical terms and 
have variables ranging over abstract mathematical entities, such as  numbers. It 
follows from widely accepted principles of ontological commitment that such 
theories presuppose the existence of these abstract entities.
(Shapiro 1983a (1996), p. 225).
Having looked at these formulations, we will in the next section look at a semi-formal 
argument based on Quine’s position, an argument which derives platonism from science.
3.3 A Semi-Formal Argument
In this section we prove two rather trivial metatheorems, the first o f which we shall call 
the “Basic Metatheorem”. In spite o f its triviality, this theorem plays the central role in 
the argument for mathematical platonism. It says that if  certain kinds o f scientific 
theories are true, then there must be such things as mathematicalia. The Basic 
Metatheorem does not, o f course, prove that mathematical platonism is true. It simply 
demonstrates that mathematical platonism is a logical consequence o f certain other 
statements (namely, many theoretical statements from science).
52 Perhaps the only major philosopher o f  mathematics who disputes Quine’s Thesis A is Chihara. Chihara 
argues in his 1973 that Quine’s criterion o f ontological commitment may be misleading, and that it is not 
beyond dispute that treating the quantifiers o f  mathematical assertions as standard first-order quantifiers 
ranging over a range o f  (abstract) mathematical entities may not be the correct interpretation o f  
mathematical statements. Chihara proposes (in his 1973 and his 1990) a non-literal reinterpretation o f  
mathematical theories, using a certain modal quantifier, called a “constructibility quantifier”, which Chihara 
claims not to carry the Quinian commitment to abstract mathematical entities. We return to Chihara’s 
position in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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It is crucial to emphasize that the statements that imply mathematical platonism do not 
beg the question in any interesting sense53. For careful examination o f our overall 
accepted mathematicized scientific picture of the world, our “overall conceptual 
scheme”, shows that the existence of mathematicalia (i.e., mathematical platonism) 
follows logically from a vast multitude o f important statements already accepted by 
scientists, logicians and philosophers. In short, the semi-formal argument is an attempt to 
make explicit what was implicit all along: the scientific reification o f abstract 
mathematical entities.
The second metatheorem shows why, given a mathematicized theory T, the result of 
simply “deleting” the axioms containing references to mathematical entities need not 
yield a suitable replacement for T. Call the result o f this deletion T°, its primary 
restriction. It is possible to show that in some (important) cases, T° will actually lose 
some of T’s deductive consequences about concrete entities. Technically, T is not a 
deductively conservative extension o f its primary restriction T°.
Suppose that we convert our two-sorted notation L to a single-sorted notation by 
introducing (by a conservative expansion) the following predicate Math which, 
intuitively, means ‘mathematical entity’:
Definition 1: The One-Sorted Language, L ^ :
Let L be a standard two-sorted mathematicized language (introduced in 
Chapter 2). Let LMath be the resulting o f converting L to a one-sorted 
language as follows:
Add a monadic predicate Math governed by the following axioms: for any 
mixed or secondary formula P(X, ..., x ...),
VX(P(Xi, X2 Xn, x , ...) (Mafh(Xi) a  Math(X2) a  . . . ))
53 Of course, every valid deductive argument does beg the question in a trivial sense, for any logical 
consequence o f  a class o f premises £  is already an element o f the consequence class o f E. Properly 
speaking, begging the question is not a logical fallacy, but an argumentative one. One way o f arguing that a 
person P  ought to believe a statement <p without begging the question, is to show that, unbeknownst to P, cp 
already follows from other statements which P  already accepts. Another way, as practised by mothers and 
policemen, is to “rub P ’s face” in the observable evidence for (p.
Ch apter  3. Th e  Q u in e -P u t n a m  A r g u m e n t
73
is an axiom.
Now replace all secondary variables by primary ones.
It can be proved that the addition of the predicate Math, and the axioms governing it, 
constitutes a conservative expansion o f any theory T in L. That is, no new theorems 
expressible in L are derivable.54
The definition o f Math guarantees intuitively that if  x is a set, then Math is true o f x; 
and if  x is a real number, then Math is true o f x; and so on. In short, Math applies to 
mathematicalia. More exactly, if  Set applies to x, then Math applies to x and if  Real 
Number applies to x, then Math applies to x, and so on. Intuitively, Math(x) means ‘x is 
a mathematical object’.
Definition 2: Existential M athematicized Theory (EMT)
A theory T standardly formulated in our mathematicized language LMath is an 
existential mathematicized theory (an EMT) if  T |- 3xMath(x)55.
Now we can define mathematical platonism:
Definition 3: M athematical Platonism
Let LMath be the one-sorted mathematicized language. Then, 
mathematical platonism  3xMath(x).
54 The proof o f  this fact requires only the lemma that if  3  is a model o f  T in L, then there is an expansion 3m 
which is a model o f  T o  {axioms for M ath} in LMath- This is not difficult to prove. Any interpretation 3 of  
our two-sorted language L, has two domains, Dj(3) (over which the primary variables range) and D2(3) 
(over which the secondary variables range). Now suppose 3 is a model o f  T. It is easy to see that the LMcnh- 
interpretation 3Math obtained by simply assigning the whole o f D2(3) as the extension in 3 of Math, yields an 
expansion o f 3 which is still a model o f T and satisfies all the axioms for Math.
55 I am going to analyse ontological commitment o f an interpreted theory T by demanding that T implies
3xF(x), where F  is true (in its intended interpretation) o f  certain entities (in our case, mathematicalia). This 
is slightly different from Quine’s 1948 criterion. Indeed, this criterion using existential quantification was 
advocated by Church 1958a. It avoids problems associated with the fact that even a set o f  elementary logical 
truths carries commitment to at least one object, and a many-sorted extension o f classical first-order logic 
requires one object in each o f its variable domains. Thus, if  Xi is a variable o f sort i, then 3Xj(Xj = Xj) is a 
logical truth. Pace Carnap 1950, we do not want our account to permit the “creation” o f new objects by 
simply introducing a new sort o f variable. I owe this caveat to David Miller.
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By Definition 3, mathematical platonism is simply the existential thesis that there are 
mathematicalia. Strictly speaking, this is consistent with mathematical idealism. But we 
gave reasons in Chapter 1 for not taking existential statements about mathematicalia as 
statements about “what can be constructed”. In what sense can the electromagnetic field 
or the Riemann curvature tensor R^vPc o f space-time be “constructed”?. As I admitted 
earlier (echoing Frege, Hardy and Field) mathematical idealism is hard to make serious 
ontological sense of, especially in connection with the application o f mathematics.
The point o f introducing Math is only to obtain the requisite generality over 
mathematicalia. Without Math we should only be able to derive consequences like 
3X(Real-Number(X)), 3X(Set(X}), and so on. Our soon-to-arrive philosophical theorem 
would then say that science is committed to the existence o f real numbers or sets or ..., 
rather than that science is committed to the existence o f mathematicalia in general.
The trivial metatheorem then follows:
Basic M etatheorem: Science Entails Platonism
Let T be any EMT formulated in LMath- Then T u  {axioms for Math} implies 
mathematical platonism.
Proof (obviously trivial): Let T be any EMT formulated in \-Math- Then there is a 
monadic mixed or secondary predicate P  such that T \- 3xP(x). Since for any such 
predicate P, Vx(P(x) —> Math(x)) is an axiom, T u  {axioms for Math} |- 3xMath(x). 
Hence T implies mathematical platonism. ■
This is the Basic Metatheorem. Any EMT implies 3xMath(x). But doesn’t 3xMath(x) 
express the existence of mathematicalia? If so, we have proved that any EMT implies 
mathematical platonism.
Of course, the implication o f 3xMath(x) is very weak. For example, consider the theory 
below:
3X 13X2[X1 * X 2 a  (X! x Xi = X 0  a  (X! x X2 = X 2) a  (X2 x X! = X 2) a  (X2 x  X2 =X ,)]
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This theory implies the existence o f just two mathematicalia: it is the theory C2 o f the 
cyclic Abelian group o f order 2, more easily recognized by the group multiplication table:
X e a
e e a
a a e
Typically, however, interesting and important applications o f mathematics within 
science will use either arithmetic, analysis or set theory, and thus will imply the existence 
of infinitely many mathematicalia: specifically, numbers (whole or real), or sets.
But all this is slightly tangential. Virtually every modem scientific physical theory is 
what I have called an EMT. So, the range of application o f the above analysis is 
staggering. The theorem obviously also applies to chemistry, linguistics, psychology, etc.: 
modem science logically implies mathematical platonism. It seems surprising to some 
writers that mathematical science—the heritage o f Pythagoras, Eudoxus, Archimedes, 
Galileo, Newton, Maxwell and Einstein—logically entails the existence o f  
mathematicalia. But, unless there is something radically amiss in modem logic, it does.
3.4 The Trivial Indispensability Metatheorem
The second metatheorem concerns the following very naive attempt to eliminate 
reference to, and thus ontological commitment to, mathematicalia. Let T in L be an 
axiomatic mathematicized theory o f Nature. One might (very naively) think that the 
mathematical components o f T are dispensable by simply deleting from the axioms o f T 
any that refer to (quantify over) mathematicalia. If T is formulated in a two-sorted 
language as above, it is possible to do this, for the axioms that refer to mathematicalia are 
simply the secondary and mixed axioms. Let T° be the primary restriction o f T, that is,
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the result o f deleting the secondary and mixed axioms from T. Clearly, T° does not imply 
3xMath(x). It is thus nominalistically acceptable.
One might hope that T° is an acceptable replacement for T. One obvious constraint on 
T°’s being acceptable is this: the procedure does not eliminate any o f the non- 
mathematical theorems o f T. If an axiomatic theory T has this property o f having a 
primary restriction with all the same primary consequences, we then say that the theory T 
is a deductively conservative extension o f the primary restriction T°.
Unfortunately, this simple-minded manoeuvre does not work. For we can easily show 
that there are simple examples of mathematicized theories T such that T is not a 
conservative extension o f its primary restriction T°. To illustrate this simply, suppose that 
L is a standard two-sorted language containing the secondary primitives for real analysis, 
a primary predicate Before(x, y), the mixed predicate Co-ord(X, x) and a pair o f primary 
constants a and b. A theory formulated in L is said to be analytically formulated: it is 
formulated with respect to the mathematics o f real analysis.
Now consider the following theory T in L. Assume that T contains the usual pure 
axioms for analysis plus the mixed axioms:
Tj Vx3 X(Co-orcf(X, x))
T 2 VX3x( Co-orcJ(X, x))
T3 Co-ord(X, x) a  Co-ord( Y, y) -> (X < Y <-» Before(x, y))
(this last axiom is sometimes called a “Representation Theorem”), and the primary 
axiom:
T4. Before(a , b)
From these axioms plus the secondary (density) axiom for real numbers we can derive 
the primary (“synthetic”) theorem:
cp: 3z(Before(a, z) a  Before(z, b)).
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Thus, T [- (p.56 With this information we can prove the following metatheorem: 
M etatheorem 2: Indispensability
the theory T in L is not a deductively conservative extension o f T°,
Proof: We know that T |- (p. Now the sole primary axiom is T4, so the primary 
restriction T° is just T4. But it is obviously false that T4 f- (p. So the theory T is not a 
deductively conservative extension o f its primary restriction T°. ■
Thus, for a mathematicized theory, there may be non-mathematical assertions about 
primary entities (that is, assertions about concreta) that are not derivable in T° but are 
derivable in T. This means that simply taking the primary restriction o f T does not 
generally yield even a minimally adequate replacement for T. More briefly, T may not be
dispensable in favour o/T°.
3.5 Philosophical Analysis of the Basic Metatheorem
From a logical point o f view, the Basic Metatheorem is trivial, saying that certain kinds 
of precisely (i.e., standardly) formulated theories logically imply a certain statement, 
namely 3xMath(x). This consequence expresses the existence o f mathematicalia.
The philosophical analysis o f the Basic Metatheorem rests on two claims:
i. science contains EMTs (each o f which logically implies 3xMath(x));
ii. 3xMath(x) says that there exist mathematicalia.
If we are not yet satisfied with the obvious interpretation o f the Basic Metatheorem, the 
philosophical analysis will have to concentrate on two questions:
56 The proof is this: let ‘C’ abbreviate ‘is the co-ordinate o f  and ‘B ’ abbreviate ‘is before’. Then, by axiom 
Ti, Vx3XC(X, x). And, axiom T2, VX3xC(X, x). By the representation theorem T3, C(X, jc) a  C (y,y) - » (X  
<Y<r> B(x,y)). By the density theorem, VAYVX23X'i(Xl < I 3 a T 3 < X2). Finally, by the primary axiom, B(a, 
b). From Tu 3XC(X, a) and 3XC(X, b). So, C(Xh a) and C(X2, b). Using the representation theorem, X x < 
X2 <-> B(a, b). Hence, X x < X2. From the density theorem, SX3(X\ < X3 a  X3 < X2). Hence, X\ < X3 a  X3 <
X2. Now, from axiom T2, 3zC(X2, z). Hence, C(X3, z). Finally, by the representation theorem again, B(a, z) a  
B(z, b). So there is a z  which lies temporally between a  and b. ■
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Qi. Are there scientific theories whose logical formulations are EMTs?
Qii. Does 3xMath(x) really say that there exist mathematical entities?
It is surely undebatable that countless scientific theories have precise standard logical 
formulations which are EMTs. I have given some important examples already. So, almost 
trivially, Qi receives a positive answer.
Moreover, Qii concerns what the formula 3xMath(x) expresses, and this is a semantical 
problem: however, given the standard accounts we now possess o f truth and ontological 
commitment, there is little hope o f avoiding a positive answer to the question Qii. As a 
preliminary step in including these semantico-ontological assumptions, I wish to develop 
a more “philosophically-oriented” argument which, schematically, is:
Science + Semantic Analysis => Mathematical Platonism
The premises are:
Science
there is a true scientific theory T whose standard logical regimentation Treg is 
an EMT;
Semantic Analysis
i. Scientific theories, especially mathematicized theories, can be standardly 
formalized within some standard formalized language. So, for any theory T, 
if  T is true, then its standard formalization Treg is true,
ii. The truth theory for (semantics for), and ontological theory pertaining to, 
such standard formalizations is standard Tarskian semantic theory and the 
ontological theory is based on Quine’s standard account of ontological 
commitment.
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First, notice that the premise Science  is metalinguistic, it talks o f some true scientific 
theory T such that its standard logical regimentation Treg is an EMT. Why is this 
metalinguistic statement equated with “Science”? Why not simply take some particular 
scientific theory, say General Relativity (GR), as a premise? There are two reasons.
First, we have been explicitly speaking metalinguistically from the outset. We have not 
argued thus:
i. there is a physical phenomenon X
ii. the best explanation for X assumes the existence o f mathematical entities
Instead, we have semantically ascended and have been considering some already 
accepted mathematicized theories (which do in fact possess tremendous explanatory and 
predictive power) and discussing their ontological commitments. For example, we want 
to know what (a precise formalization of) GR logically implies there to be and this 
means that the conclusion we would be looking for would have the form,
(1) if  GR is true, then there are Fs.
Of course, we might simply look for a conclusion o f the form,
(2) if  [GR], then there are Fs,
where ‘[GR]’ is replaced by an explicit conjunction o f the axioms o f GR. However, 
operating explicitly with these axioms would complicate matters and the only fact o f  
importance is that GR |- 3xMath(x). From this fact, plus the soundness o f |-, we derive 
the conclusion that if GR is true then 3xMath(x) is true. The (disquotational) behaviour 
of the truth predicate is then invoked to derive the conclusion, that there are 
mathematicalia, from the intermediate conclusion that 3xMath(x) is true. In effect, we 
prove that if  GR is true, then there are mathematicalia.
There is a second reason for the detour through talk o f truth. The deductive 
consequences o f a theory T are, in the presence o f a standard definition or theory o f truth, 
included in the deductive consequences o f the metalinguistic assertion that T is true. This 
is why, when we establish that T (- (p, we legitimately conclude that if  T is true then (p
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must be true. Conversely, if  we can prove, using purely logical means (that is, no non- 
logical assumptions), the conditional assertion that if  T is true then cp is true, then T must 
imply (p. Indeed, it is tempting to say that T and ‘T is true* are “conceptually” or 
“cognitively” equivalent. However, there are subtleties involved here, which I return to in 
Chapter 5. As a matter o f fact, the metalinguistic assumption ‘T is true’ can, in the 
context o f a standard Tarskian theory o f truth, be deductively stronger than T itself. For 
example, the assumption that first-order Peano Arithmetic PA is true, along with 
standard Tarskian principles governing the concept of truth, permits the derivation o f the 
consistency o f PA (which is expressible as a closed formula CoripA in the language o f  
PA), while PA itself cannot, by Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem, derive its own 
consistency.
This kind o f phenomenon has no importance here. We have a theory T and we know 
that T implies cp. We conclude, by soundness, that if  T is true, then cp is true, and since <p 
in this case is the assertion ‘there are mathematicalia’, we infer that if  T is true, then 
there are mathematicalia.
Call this true mathematicized scientific theory T. Next we isolate some specific 
premises that follow from Analysis. These other assumptions incorporate the Tarskian 
and Quinian components of the argument. We have the assumptions:
Science: T is true and its regimentation Treg is an EMT
AnalysiS\ If T is true then its regimentation Treg is true
Basic Metatheorem if  Treg is an EMT then Treg b 3xMath(x)
Analysis2 ifT reg \-3xMath(x), then ifT reg is true then there exist
entities which satisfy Math
Analysis3 Any entity which satisfies Math is a mathematical entity
Tarski’s semantic theory o f truth implies Analysis2. As Quine later stressed, it connects 
the truth o f any theory T having an certain existential implication 3xP(x) with the 
existence o f entities satisfying the predicate P. Thus, if  a theory T implies an existential
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quantification 3xMath(x), then if T is true then there must exist entities which satisfy 
Math. Since this predicate Math is introduced to abbreviate ‘x is a mathematical entity’, 
it is a disquotational triviality to say that Math applies to mathematical entities. That is, 
the triviality is:
‘x is a mathematical entity’ is true o f all, and only, mathematical entities.
Thus, Analysis3 is a trivial theorem of disquotational semantics. (The air o f triviality, 
or perhaps even analyticity, o f disquotational axioms for theories o f truth and satisfaction 
is examined more closely in Chapter 5 below. It can be shown that disquotation axioms 
are conservative).
The philosophical argument (still a deductive derivation) then proceeds as follows:
From Science, AnalysiSi and the Basic Metatheorem , we derive
(1) Treg |-3xMath(x)
Hence, using Analysis2i
(2) IfTreg is true then there exist entities which satisfy Math 
But, from Science again,
(3) Treg is true 
From (2) and (3),
(4) There exist entities which satisfy Math 
Finally, using Analysis3,
(5) There exist mathematicalia 
To summarize:
i. if  there is a true scientific statement whose standard regimentation is an 
EMT; and
ii. the correct notion o f truth for these regimentations is Tarskian; and
iii. the correct ontological analysis for these regimentations is Quinian,
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iv. then there must exist mathematicalia. 
Schematically, we have:
Science +
implies
Semantical Analysis
Mathematical Platonism
This then is our finished product. The existence o f mathematicalia just follows from 
science (or its truth: almost the same thing57) plus plausible assumptions concerning how 
to semantically analyse theories. The existence o f mathematicalia may seem an 
unacceptable conclusion, especially if  one thinks that abstract entities represent some 
kind o f sin against our “intuitions of reality”. But it seems to me that if  one wishes to 
deny the existence o f mathematicalia, one must deny at least one o f these premises. That 
is, one must argue that either the whole enterprise of developing mathematicized science 
must be wrong (!!) or the standard methods o f logico-semantical analysis must be wrong 
(!!).
The assumptions built into Analysis are standard technical assumptions within applied 
modem logico-semantic theory and are very difficult to combat. Of course, scientists do 
not speak or write in formalized languages, like our standard two-sorted language or 
L/watfi. But there are canonical ways o f regimenting numerous scientific laws, especially 
the mathematicized ones o f physics (mechanics, etc.). The further assumptions involve 
nothing more than platitudes from standard Tarskian truth theory (and, in a sense, 
Quine’s analysis o f ontological commitment is built into Tarski’s theory o f truth). These
57 Modulo what I shall say below in Chapter 5 about deflationism about truth.
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accounts o f truth and ontological commitment are widely, almost universally, accepted 
by philosophers and logicians.
In the next section we collect together some obvious and important corollaries o f this 
argument.
3.6 Corollaries
Corollary 1: M athem atics Entails Platonism
Quine clarified what it means for discourse to be ontologically committed to entities, 
obtaining the result that classical mathematics is committed to the existence o f  
mathematicalia. That is, if  the classical theorem ‘3jc(x is a prime number greater than a 
million)’ is true, then some value of V  must be a prime number. Indeed, this corollary is 
the first application to which the criterion o f ontological commitment was put by Quine 
1948:
Classical mathematics, as the example of primes larger than a million clearly 
illustrates, is up to its neck in commitments to an ontology of abstract entities.
Thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up 
anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics. The issue is clearer now than of 
old, because we now have a more explicit standard whereby to decide what 
ontology a given theory or form of discourse is committed to.
(Quine 1948 (1980), p. 13).
The point is not lost on coherent nominalists. It is summed up by Field thus:
... after all, the existence of mathematical entities follows from the 
mathematical theory itself, not just from the claim that the mathematical theory is 
true in the correspondence sense.
(Field 1988 (1989), pp. 249-250. Emphasis added).
Some nominalists appear to dispute this obvious logical fact. I argue in Chapter 6  that if  
a nominalist denies that the existence o f mathematicalia follows from mathematics, then 
he or she must be engaged in some kind o f contradiction. What this kind of nominalist 
should say is better thought o f as an example o f “hermeneuticism”. Namely, although the 
existence o f mathematicalia follows from certain mathematical statements when literally 
construed, it does not follow from some “reconstrual”.
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For example, the existence o f dogs follows logically from the assertion,
(1) There is a dog in front o f me,
But the existence o f dogs need not follow from some positivistic “reconstrual” o f (1),
(2) An experience similar to previous “doggish” experiences is presently 
occurring in my mind.
Hermeneutic reconstruals o f mathematics generate an important type o f nominalist 
strategy, o f which perhaps the most significant is Chihara’s modal nominalism. I discuss 
the theories of “reconstrual” and their application for nominalistic interpretations of 
mathematics in Chapters 6 ,7  and 8.
Corollary 2: Scientific Realism Entails M athematical Realism
A scientific realist is a person who toes what Fine calls the “homely line” or the “core 
position”:
Then, it seem s to me that both the realist and the anti-realist must toe what I 
have been calling the ‘homely line’. That is, they must both accept the certified 
results of science as on a par with more homely and familiarly supported claims.
... Let us say, then, that both realist and anti-realist accept the results of 
scientific investigations as ‘true’, on a par with more homely truths (I realize that 
some anti-realists would rather use a different word, but no matter). And call this 
acceptance of scientific truths the ‘core position’.
(Fine 1984 (1996), p. 36. Emphasis added).
Actually, Fine goes on to argue that this core position is neutral between realism and 
anti-realism, and labels this position the “Natural Ontological Attitude”, or “NOA”. 
However, his further remarks about truth, reference and ontological commitment make 
this “neutralist” claim implausible:
... When NOA counsels us to accept the results of science as true, I take it that 
we are to treat truth in the usual referential way, so that a sentence (or 
statement) is true just in case  the entities referred to stand in the referred to 
relations. Thus, NOA sanctions ordinary referential semantics, and commits us, 
via truth, to the existence of the individuals, properties, relations, processes and 
so forth referred to by the scientific statements that we accept as true.
(Fine 1984 (1996), p. 38)
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I cannot think o f a more succinct statement o f standard realism. (Perhaps: “we should 
accept certified scientific theories as true and we should treat truth in the standard Tarski 
manner”). In any case, there is nothing to please the anti-realist, sceptic or idealist in 
Fine’s core position. For example, the truth theory (Tarski’s) is inconsistent with 
relativism. And the proposal to accept as true standard certified scientific results is 
inconsistent with scepticism (e.g., van Fraassen 1976, 1980 and Laudan 1981) or 
instrumentalism (e.g., Cartwright 1983).
Musgrave agrees with this estimation o f Fine’s NOA:
Fine thinks that NOA is a minimalist view which is neither realist not anti­
realist. I think that NOA is a  thoroughly realist view.
(Musgrave 1989 (1996), p. 45)
Thus, a scientific realist believes or accepts some scientific theories (not all, obviously, 
but some: namely, those certified as acceptable by working scientists, like Chomsky, 
Penrose, Weinberg, Dawkins, Pinker, etc.). For example, a realist about General 
Relativity believes that space-time is a four-dimensional continuum M, at each point o f  
which there exist a metric tensor #ab and a matter tensor T’ab which jointly satisfy 
Einstein’s Field Equations.
But numerous such theories contain mathematics as an integral part and logically imply 
the existence o f mathematicalia. The argument that we have been considering clearly 
implies that any such scientific realist should likewise be a mathematical realist, and 
accept an ontology o f mathematicalia:
... mathematics and physics are integrated in such a way that it is not possible 
to be a realist with respect to physical theory and a nominalist with respect to 
mathematical theory.
(Putnam 1975 (1979), p. 74).
Of course, a realist with nominalist intuitions may at this point change his or her mind 
and become a “semi-realist”: he or she renounces realism about (standard, accepted 
mathematicized) science, and adopts realism about some (promised) mathematics-free 
replacement for platonistic science. But the onus is clearly on him or her to actually show
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that such a mathematics-free replacement exists and is, indeed, a “good enough” 
replacement for standard platonistic science.
Corollary 3: Metalogic Entails Platonism
We sketched this corollary in Chapter 1, where we discussed the standard platonistic 
analyses o f satisfiability and derivability. Standard metalogic has two components:
i. Syntactical (or Proof-Theoretic) com ponent:
this deals with which formulas can (and cannot) be derived from which (sets 
of) formulas, using specified derivation rules;
ii. Sem antical (or Model-Theoretic) Com ponent:
this deals with which formulas (or sets o f formulas) are, or are not, satisfied 
by various structures or interpretations.
According to the Quinian arguments presented thus far, standard metalogic is doubly 
platonistic. The syntactical component is platonistic through quantification over 
expression types (that is, sequences o f symbol types). The semantics is similarly 
platonistic through quantification over structures, interpretations, sequences and 
valuations.
Corollary 4: Formalism Entails Platonism
The formalist refuses to accept (as true) object level talk about mathematicalia. Instead, 
the formalist semantically ascends to metalinguistic talk about mathematical assertions 
(the symbols and concatenations thereof): that is, to metamathematics. And, according to 
the formalist, nothing more need be said about mathematical statements than,
a. what derivation rules govern their manipulation,
and, o f course, having adopted some system of such formal rules,
b. what results about derivability then follow.
In particular, having thus semantically ascended, the formalist refuses to attribute the 
standard truth values to these assertions (i.e., he or she does not permit the usual method
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of disquotational descent using the truth predicate, returning to object level assertions). 
O f course, the naive formalist has no explanation for the mysterious fact that these 
meaningless symbol combinations play an integral part within science.
But suppose, per impossibile, that mathematics had never been applied. If 
metalinguistic formalism were to count as a version o f nominalism, that is, a repudiation 
o f abstracta, one would still need to be clear as to what statements and symbols are. Are 
statements and symbols concreta? But we saw above, however, that statements, symbols 
and expressions are types, and are thus abstracta. One naturally wonders whether the 
underlying syntactical theory o f expressions could be reformulated as a kind o f  
“nominalistic syntax”, whose laws only quantified over concrete tokens. One wonders 
then whether a formalism of tokens is adequate to formalistic metamathematics itself. 
This is extremely dubious.
Quine and Goodman explored the limits o f nominalistic syntax in 1947. In his letter to 
Goodman in 1958, Alonzo Church provided a lengthy list o f the basic metatheorems o f  
standard platonistic proof theory, emphasizing plain fact that they are not accounted for 
in the nominalistic syntax thus developed.
Hilbert’s formalism contains the explicit suggestion o f a non-literal interpretation o f  
arithmetic in which numerals (or “strokes”) refer to numerals. This might be looked upon 
as an ontological reduction o f numbers to numerals. Technically, this involves finding a 
translation function—a relative interpretation— which maps every arithmetical axiom 
(and thus theorem) to a theorem of nominalistic syntax. We shall call any such relative 
interpretation a token-interpretation o f arithmetic.
However, a token interpretation o f arithmetic does not work. For arithmetic asserts that 
there are infinitely many natural numbers. But if  numerals are “construed” as physical 
tokens, there will not be enough to identify with each distinct number. So the token- 
interpretation is not sound: some arithmetical theorems are translated as falsehoods about 
tokens: indeed, we expect on these grounds that the (translation o f the) first-order 
induction schema will have false instances.
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Thus, the ontological reduction o f numbers to tokens does not work, as Quine readily 
conceded: “a formalism of tokens ... stopped short of full proof theory”58. This, 
remember, was precisely Church’s objection to Quine & Goodman 1947. As we 
mentioned before, a “solution” to this is to adopt modalism, and construct a theory of 
what concrete tokens there might have been. But nominalism, as traditionally construed, 
ought to eschew modal talk o f what might have been the case or talk o f unactualized 
possibilia.
A type-interpretation o f arithmetic, however, can be made to work:
i. numbers are identified with numeral types;
ii. addition is interpreted as (abstract) concatenation;
iii. ‘larger than’ is interpreted as ‘is a longer concatenation than’.
In fact, Hilbert’s notion o f a syntactical interpretation o f arithmetic undoubtedly played 
a suggestive role in stimulating Godel’s idea o f godel-numbering (that is, the reverse: an 
arithmetical interpretation o f syntax).
The type-interpretation is undoubtedly sound, but only in platonistic syntax. Thus, it is 
inconsistent with nominalism. For types are themselves abstracta (construable as 
sequences o f sets o f equiform tokens). Abstract concatenation o f types simply is not 
physical juxtaposition (it may, however, be adequately modelled as the set-theoretical 
operation o f lengthening a sequence).
3.7 The Plight of the Nominalist
The nominalist must face the Quine-Putnam argument, and each o f its corollaries, 
honestly without what Field calls “doublethink”. The coherent nominalist cannot 
consistently accept any of the following:
58 See Quine 1981c.
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i. C lassical M athematics:
Classical mathematics is trivially committed, as Quine and others have 
stressed, to an ontology o f mathematicalia;
ii. Science:
Many accepted scientific theories (as Quine, Putnam and Field and others 
have stressed) include mathematical assumptions about real numbers and 
perhaps other mathematicalia (vectors, charts, etc.) and are thus committed to 
an ontology o f mathematicalia;
iii. Metalogic:
Standard metalogic assumes a platonistic ambient proof theory (quantifying 
over expression types, arbitrarily long derivations, etc.) and a platonistic 
ambient semantics (quantifying over structures, sequences, valuations, etc.);
iv. M etamathematical Formalism:
Even standard formalism requires a platonistic proof-theory, if  one wishes to 
preserve standard metamathematical theorems about completeness, and so 
on.
The nominalist has an ontology of concreta—material individuals (and perhaps their 
mereological aggregates), perhaps spatio-temporal geometricalia (like physical points, 
lines, regions), and perhaps physical events (construed as concrete physical particulars 
occurring in concrete spatio-temporal regions)— and nothing else to work with: no sets, 
functions, expression types, sequences, structures, states, quantities, fields, etc. For all o f 
these entities are abstracta (and may be construed as mathematicalia).
I am not suggesting that a workable, serious, and perhaps even rationally compelling, 
nominalism that eschews sets, functions, expressions, fields, etc., cannot be obtained. I 
am simply pointing out the monumental non-triviality o f the task. Mathematical 
nominalism, if  feasible at all, is only feasible after a great deal o f work has been done.
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3.8 Summary: Properties of Mathematicized Theories
From a philosophical point o f view, a mathematicized theory T o f Nature has at least 
six crucial properties, which become apparent when T is formalized in the manner 
sketched in Chapter 2. Indeed, each of these properties is illustrated by the simplified 
theory o f time, Tim.
i. Mathematicality
This is trivial, but is worth emphasizing. A typical mathematicized theory o f Nature T 
contains axioms (pure and mixed) containing bound variables ranging over 
mathematicalia (e.g., real numbers, sets, and so on).
ii. Platonistic
Again, rather trivially, T [- 3xMath(x). Hence, T is ontologically committed to 
mathematicalia. Note that theories like Tim and AEG do not just imply the existence of 
one mathematical entity: they imply the existence o f continuum many real numbers! (It is 
not clear to me whether it actually makes sense to assert the existence o f just one real 
number, but not the others).
Indeed, it is these two facts (i) and (ii) that illustrate the Quinian component (Thesis A: 
“science entails platonism”) o f the overall Quine-Putnam argument.
iii. Impurity
Typically, the laws o f mathematical physics quantify over both mathematicalia and 
non-mathematicalia. Theories like Tim and AEG (analytic geometry) discussed in 
Chapter 2 illustrate this fact clearly: the mixed axioms o f these mathematical theories are 
impure, expressing relations between concreta and mathematicalia.
iv. Contingency
One version of “mathematical truth” identifies it as theoremhood in an uninterpreted 
pure axiom system. This view is also called “deductivism”. However, a mathematicized 
theory like Tim or AEG does not follow from any system o f applicable mathematical
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axioms (say ZFU, with < suitably interpreted). In particular, the mixed (or 
representation) axioms are not theorems of mathematical analysis.
Moreover, the mixed (or representation) mathematical axioms o f T are contingent. E.g., 
it is only contingently true (if it is true at all) that there is bijection from temporal instants 
to R. Even if  mathematicalia have the mathematical properties they do by necessity, they 
do not necessarily have the relations to concreta posited by T. It is not a necessary trait o f 
R that it is isomorphic to the set o f temporal instants.
Facts (iii) and (iv) are very important. Assume the pure primitives of analysis (<, etc.) 
have been interpreted in the language of set theory (so the pure axioms o f analysis come 
out as ZF theorems). Then there are interpretations o f L which are models o f the pure 
axioms (i.e., the axioms o f applicable set theory ZFU) in which T is false , because the 
mixed axioms are. To put this in an enlightening way, it isn’t “mathematically true” 
(although it is true) that the “instants” in real physical time are isomorphic to the real 
numbers.
v. Empirical Testability
Mathematicized theories like Tim and AEG are testable, falsifiable empirical theories. 
They are used implicitly in physics (e.g., space-time theory). In order to test them one 
derives non-mathematical (synthetic) theorems and attempts to determine their truth 
values, by empirical methods. It may not be easy to test the theories Tim and AEG 
(except perhaps by against our “intuitions” of space and time). At the very least, as 
Duhem and Quine stressed, one must add auxiliary assumptions before empirical 
consequences emerge. They become testable by adding further axioms linking the 
concreta (temporal instants, spatial points) to other more easily observable concreta (like 
moving bodies). Indeed, as a result o f this, Euclidean geometry has been abandoned (if 
straight lines are light paths, then one can show that the geometry o f light paths in the 
vicinity of large masses is non-Euclidean, as Einstein predicted). The continuity o f time, 
however, as embodied in Tim, is still thought to be true.
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vi. Simple Indispensability
The primary restriction T° o f a two-sorted theory T is the theory whose axioms are just 
the primary axioms (non-mathematical axioms) o f T. To see that (vi) is true with regard 
to Tim notice that the primary restriction Tim° of Tim is just the empty set, 0 !  However, 
Tim implies:
VxVy3z(Before(x, y) -» Before(x, z) a  Before(z, y))
[that is, z lies temporally between x and y]
This theorem of Tim is expressed in the primary notation L° but is not a consequence of 
the empty set. So Tim is not conservative over Tim°.
Putnam’s indispensability claim (Thesis B) is connected to fact (vi): one cannot naively 
replace Tim by Tim°, for the full theory Tim implies non-mathematical theorems (which 
we suppose are true) which Tim° does not. That is, Tim is deductively indispensable with 
respect to Tim°.
This is the precise sense in which the mathematicized parts o f a scientific theory T may 
encode information about relations amongst concrete entities. If you like, the net 
information contained in T about these relations is “abstraction-laden”.
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Chapter 4
Theories of Truth
Logic, like any science, has as its business, the pursuit of truth. What are true 
are certain statements; and the pursuit of truth is the endeavour to sort out the 
true statements from the others, which are false.
W.V. Quine 1950 (1972), Methods of Logic, p. 1
There are philosophers59 who stoutly maintain that ‘true’ said of logical and 
mathematical laws and ‘true’ said of weather predictions and suspects’ 
confessions are two usages of an ambiguous term ‘true’. There are philosophers 
who stoutly maintain ‘exists’ said of numbers, classes and the like and ‘exists’ 
said of material objects are two usages of an ambiguous term ‘exists’. What 
mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. What can they possibly 
count as evidence? Why not view ‘true’ as  unambiguous but very general, and 
recognize the difference merely between logical laws and confessions? And 
correspondingly for existence?
W.V. Quine 1960, Word and Object, p. 131. Emphasis added.
4.1 The Role of Truth in the Quine-Putnam Argument
The concept o f truth plays a role in the Quine-Putnam argument reconstructed in 
Chapter 3 because it is the central concept employed in semantico-ontological analysis of 
mathematicized scientific theories. The most obvious way to see this involves the 
observation that this argument involves the claim:
(1) any existential mathematicized theory (EMT) logically implies the 
existence of mathematicalia.
This claim amounts to the “Quine-Putnam conditional”:
(2) if  an EMT is true, then there exist mathematicalia.
59 As examples o f such philosophers, Quine cites Ryle 1949, p. 29; and Russell 1912, Chapter IX.
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Demonstrating this involved showing that any such theory T (or rather, its standard 
formulation) logically implies the existential quantification 3xMath(x), and this latter 
statement is true only i f  there are mathematicalia.
Two possible objections to the Quine-Putnam argument then immediately arise:
i. Is the standard formulation of any such theory T the correct formulation of 
T?
ii. Does the concept of truth, in application to mathematicized scientific 
theories, behave like this?
A subsidiary objection, not to the claim (2) as such, but to its applicability, questions 
the antecedent:
iii. Are we entitled to suppose that any such theory really is true?
This objection involves a general scepticism about scientific theories, and involves an 
argument that it is never rationally permissible to accept the truth o f a scientific theory. A 
position like this is known as epistemic scepticism (or epistemic anti-realism) and has 
recently been advocated by, amongst others, van Fraassen 1976, 1980 and Laudan 1981. 
This position will receive a short and unfavourable evaluation in Chapter 7, where it is 
discussed under the title o f “instrumentalist nominalism”.
Objection (i) focuses on the formulation o f mathematicized theories. The suggestion is 
that it might be possible to reformulate, or reconstrue, such theories so that they no 
longer imply the existence o f mathematicalia. Such suggestions receive discussion later 
in Chapters 6 - 9  where the attempt to reconstrue such theories is discussed under the title 
of “hermeneutic nominalism” and the attempt to reformulate such theories non- 
mathematically is discussed under the title o f “deflationism”
So the remaining question concerns (ii): does the concept of truth really generate 
ontological consequences, like that o f the existence o f mathematicalia? To cut a long 
story short, the answer is yes. The axioms of any standard modem account o f truth, 
including Tarski’s theory and the deflationary theories o f truth (see below), imply that if
C h apter  4. Theories of T r u t h
95
an existential quantification 3xP(x) is true, then there must exist entities which satisfy P. 
Even the axioms o f a very weak theory o f truth, which I shall call the “disquotation 
theory” DT, imply all the individual cases of this, such as,
if 3x(Sef(x)) is true then there are sets,
if  3x(Real Number[x)) is true then there are real numbers,
etc.
(Indeed, the axioms of this theory of truth just are all the individuals cases!)
So the short story is that anyone who thinks that an existential mathematicized theory T 
is true must also think that there exist mathematicalia.
What, then, is the long story about truth?
4.2 Theories of Truth
By the early years o f the twentieth century, philosophers o f opposing schools (primarily, 
idealism and realism) found themselves advocating one o f two quite distinct kinds of 
theory o f truth.
i. Subjectivist (or Internalist o r Anti-Realist o r Epistemic) Theories of Truth
Such theories of truth are favoured by idealists, empiricists and pragmatists, and 
maintain that:
Truth is an “internal property o f a system o f  beliefs (or sentences).
Several variations on this theme o f “truth as an internal property o f representations” 
have been advocated:
i. the coherence theory (where coherence o f a set o f beliefs is a property 
presumably stronger than mere consistency),
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ii. the pragmatist theory (a body of statements is true just in case it is useful 
to believe it),
iii. the self-evidence theory (some statements are true because they are self- 
evidently so).
Musgrave describes such theories of truth in a recent article:
Anti-realist theories of truth identify it with some internal feature of our beliefs 
(their coherence, their usefulness, their self-evidence, their ultimate 
undisbelievability, or whatever)
. . . Down the ages the chief motive for anti-realist truth theories has been anti- 
sceptical, to make truth accessible to us. By identifying truth with some internal 
features of beliefs, they make it something the believer is an authority on and 
can know for certain. Hence they are all called subjective truth theories
(Musgrave 1989 (1996), p. 51)
Then there are the objectivist (externalist or realist) truth theories:
ii. Objectivist o r Externalist or Realist Theories of Truth
Such theories are favoured by realists and maintain that:
Truth is (or involves) an external relation to (typically, 
mind-independent) reality.
The canonical example is the correspondence theory, articulated by Russell in the early 
years o f the twentieth century. A statement or belief is true just in case it corresponds to a 
fact:
When a belief is true, there is another complex unity, in which the relation 
which was one of the objects of the belief relates the other objects . . .  On the 
other hand, when a belief is false, there is no such complex unity composed only 
of the objects of the b e lie f. . . Thus, a  belief is true when it corresponds to a 
certain associated complex, and false when it does n o t . . .
This complex unity is called the fact corresponding to the belief.
(Russell 1912, pp. 128-129. Emphasis added)
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Very few philosophers nowadays seriously advocate a subjectivist theory of truth60. 
Indeed, there are several basic problems with subjectivist theories o f truth. Primarily, it is 
possible to give examples o f systems of statements or beliefs which first have the internal 
features (for a given thinker or community of such), that is, the system is either coherent, 
useful, or has actually been believed and which are straightforwardly false. For example, 
Newtonian Mechanics (henceforth, NM) is presumably coherent, was believed for a long 
time by generations o f scientists, and remains eminently useful, but is not true. Unless 
one thinks that truth is relative somehow (so that NM was true then, or true for those 
thinkers, but is not true now or not true for u s\ a subjectivist theory o f truth seems 
untenable.
Musgrave supplies a damning criticism of subjectivism about truth:
An immediate consequence [of internalist/subjectivist truth theories] is 
relativism about truth. If A’s belief that P  possesses the internal feature and B’s 
belief that P  does not, then P  is true for A and false for B. (Alternatively put, the 
'laws of truth’, contradiction and excluded middle, etc., fail).
To avoid relativism and preserve the laws of truth, subjective truth theorists 
tend to go ideal and to the long run. For example, coherence theorists will say 
that something is true (by definition) if it ‘coheres’, not with your or my beliefs, 
but with the beliefs an ideally rational inquirer would have in the long run.
Of course, such moves immediately threaten the anti-sceptical virtues (if 
virtues they be) of subjective truth theories. What God will be coherently 
believing at the end of time is just as  inaccessible to you or me as is truth-as- 
correspondence (I think it is more inaccessible).
To solve these problems, subjectivists tend to adopt a  policy of flipping back 
and forth. When epistemological concerns are paramount, they stay subjective; 
when semantic concerns are paramount, they go ideal and to the long run. The 
resulting fandango is one of the least edifying sights in philosophy. Let us view it 
no more.
(Musgrave 1989 (1996), p. 52, footnote. Emphasis added)
I shall now leave subjectivist theories o f truth. Serious philosophical discussion about 
truth focuses on objectivist theories, o f which there are roughly three kinds:
60 As ever, there are exceptions to this philosophical consensus. Putnam 1981 and Ellis 1985 both advocate 
something they call “Internal Realism”, according to which, truth is the perfected end product o f the 
application o f  rational scientific method. (The truth is what rational humans shall be believing “in the end”).
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i. The Correspondence Theory^1,
ii. Tarski ’s Theory o f  Truth,
iii. Deflationary Theories o f  Truth.
We discuss Tarski’s theory and deflationary theories more fully below (and in the next 
Chapter). It is easy to see that all o f these truth theories imply the Quine-Putnam 
conditional (2) above. So it seems that any serious conception o f truth under discussion 
will entail the logical link between the truth of standardly formulated scientific theories 
and the existence o f mathematicalia.
For example, according to a correspondence theory, mathematical theories describe a 
realm o f abstract mathematical facts, such as the (mind-independent) fact that no non­
vanishing continuous vector field exists on the 2-sphere S2. According to Tarski’s theory, 
an interpreted statement is true just in case it is satisfied by all sequences o f objects. In 
particular, it can be proved within the truth theory that the statement ‘there are K0 
primes’ is satisfied by all sequences (and is thus true) just in case there are infinitely 
many primes. Supposing the statement true, there must be infinitely many primes; and 
thus, since prime numbers are mathematicalia, there exist mathematicalia. Finally, 
according to the deflationary conception of truth, it is (analytically?) true that the 
statement ‘there are K0 primes’ is true just in case there are infinitely many primes. And 
the same preceding argument goes through.
4.3 Constituting the Alethic Concepts: T-Sentences
Russell’s formulation o f the correspondence theory requires that
(1) a sentence (belief, proposition) is true just in case it corresponds to a fact.
For example, the sentence ‘Madrid is larger than Birmingham’ is true. According to the 
correspondence theory, it is true because a fact “in the world”— the fact that Madrid is
61 Kirkham 1992 (1995) and David 1994 both discuss the correspondence theory. I lack the space to discuss 
any o f  these issues.
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larger than Birmingham— makes it so. In general, a sentence “corresponds” to a “state of 
affairs”, which may either “hold” or not. Three problems arise immediately: what is a 
state o f  affairs'? How do sentences correspond to such states o f affairs? What is it for a 
state o f affairs to hold} Some authors identify “states o f affairs” with propositions (or 
conversely) and thus claim that a sentence corresponds to the proposition it expresses; a 
fact is then just a true proposition; finally a sentence is true just in case any proposition it 
corresponds to (expresses) is a fact62. In any case, the basic idea behind the 
correspondence theory is that it is a fact that makes a sentence or belief true. (A further 
realist notion is that this fact is typically mind-independent and language-independent).
An example suffices to show that the correspondence account can be significantly 
trimmed (some would say: “deflated” o f naive correspondence intuitions). Suppose we 
are wondering what would make a particular proposition—say, the proposition that snow 
is white—true. We instantiate the correspondence definition as follows:
(2) the proposition that snow is white is true just in case the proposition that
snow is white corresponds to a fact.
But presumably,
(3) the proposition that snow is white corresponds to a fact just in case
snow is white.
The proposition is made true by the “whiteness of snow”, as it were.
A series o f major thinkers noticed this connection: Frege 1892, Ramsey 1927 and 
finally (and most significantly) Tarski 1936. So,
(4) the proposition that snow is white is true if and only if  snow is white
62 On this approach, a syntactically well-formed sentence may not express any proposition, for logical 
reasons. It can be argued, for example, that the Liar Sentence “This sentence is not true” does not express a 
proposition, and in fact the Urn Proposition does not exist. If it did, it would be true if and only if not true. 
So it doesn’t (c.f., Russell’s barber who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves).
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This latter statement avoids talk of “correspondence” and “facts” and seems to be a 
perfectly acceptable (indeed, arguably analytic) fact about the truth conditions o f the 
proposition in question. What could be simpler?
A similar piece o f reasoning works as nicely for the sentence ‘snow is white’, yielding,
(5) the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if  snow is white
One may attempt to schematize (4) as follows:
RS the proposition that p  is true if  and only i f  p
And one may similarly attempt to schematize (5) as follows:
DS the sentence ‘/?’ is true if and only if p
These schemes, RS (the “redundancy scheme”) and DS (the “disquotation scheme”) lie 
at the heart o f all serious recent attempts to get to grips with the concept o f truth. For 
example, the “totality” o f statements like (4), all instances o f RS, form the core o f a 
certain kind o f deflationary theory o f  truth: the redundancy or minimalist theory o f truth. 
Similarly, statements like (5), all instances of DS, form the core o f the disquotational 
theories o f truth and, indeed, play the role o f a basic constraint (Tarski’s Convention T) 
on Tarski’s semantical theory o f truth.
Indeed, at the heart of almost all recent work on truth and reference lies a collection o f  
schematic principles, which constrain and perhaps even constitute the alethic concept o f  
truth. There are also similar schemes for names and predicates, governing the alethic 
concepts o f designation and satisfaction respectively, as illustrated in the table below63:
Alethic Concept Scheme Example
designation,
reference
V  designates n, if  n exists ‘snow’ designates snow, 
i f  snow exists
truth of, 
satisfaction
‘F  is true o f x ,y , ... iff Fxy...
‘F* is satisfied by x, y , ... iff Toy...
‘loves’ is true o f x ,y  iff jc loves y  
‘loves’ is satisfied by x ,y  iff
63 This table is inspired by a similar one in Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 57.
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x loves y
truth for 
sentences
the sentence ‘/?’ is true iffp ‘snow is white’ is true 
iff snow is white
truth for 
propositions
the proposition that p  is true iffp the proposition that snow is 
white is true iff snow is white
We may summarize the four constitutional schemes operative here as follows:
DSnam: the name ‘« ’ designates n (if n exists)
DSpred’ the n-place predicate ‘F* is true o f jq ,..., xn iff Fix ls ..., xn)
DS: the sentence ‘/?’ is true iffp
RS: the proposition that p  is true iff p
(As a purely terminological aside, in D S ^  we can replace ‘is true o f  by ‘applies to’ or 
‘is satisfied by’, without significantly altering the discussion.)
A significant property o f these schemes in discussions o f semantic theory is their prima 
facie obviousness or triviality. For example, an instance o f the disquotation scheme DS:
(6) ‘snow is white’ is true if  and only if snow is white
is sometimes called a “T-sentence” and its obviousness seems beyond doubt64.
On this topic, Davidson writes:
... a sentence like,
‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white
in itself provides a clue to what is unique to the semantical approach [to truth].
Of course, ..., such sentences are neutral ground. It is just for this reason that 
Tarski hopes that everyone can agree that an adequate theory or definition of 
truth must entail all sentences of this form.
Davidson 1969 (1984), pp. 50-51. Emphasis added)
Because T-sentences (as we may call them) are so obviously true, some 
philosophers have thought that the concept of truth, at least a s  applied to 
sentences, was trivial.
64 Anyone who has taught philosophy o f logic to undergraduate students quickly learns that trying to 
convince students that these obvious “trivialities” are important is no mean task.
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(Davidson 1973 (1984), p. 65. Emphasis added)
The reason Convention T [see below] is acceptable a s  a criterion of theories 
[of truth] is that (1) T-sentences are clearly true (pre-analytically)—something we 
could recognize only if we already partly understood the predicate ‘is true’ ...
(Davidson 1977 (1984), p. 218. Emphasis added)
However, we ought not to be too easily charmed by the obviousness o f disquotational 
T-sentences. If we are not careful, they lead to the semantical paradoxes. The quickest 
method not involving indexicality (as in the usual Liar Sentence, ‘This sentence is false’) 
is the Grelling-Nelson Paradox o f “heterological words”.
A word or phrase is autological if  it is true o f itself. For example, ‘word’ is true o f  
words; but ‘word’ is a word, and is thus autological. In contrast, ‘red’ is not red and 
‘herring’ is not a herring, so neither ‘red’ nor ‘herring’ are autological. Another example 
is ‘contains twenty five letters’, which contains twenty five letters and is thus autological. 
Now, let a word or descriptive phrase be heterological if  and only if  it is not true o f itself. 
So, ‘red’ and ‘herring’ are both heterological. Now, instantiate the scheme DSpred with 
‘heterological’:
(7) ‘heterological’ is true o f jc if  and only if  x is heterological.
So, in particular,
(8) ‘heterological’ is true o f ‘heterological’ if  and only if ‘heterological’ is 
heterological.
Thus, using the definition o f ‘heterological’:
(9) ‘heterological’ is true o f itself if and only if  ‘heterological’ is not true o f  
itself.
This is a contradiction.
In general, such paradoxes always arise when we predicate semantic concepts o f  
phrases themselves containing semantical expressions. A simple evasion o f the paradoxes 
is simply to avoid instantiating the schemes with expressions containing ‘true’ or ‘true
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o f  (or cognates). (Indeed, with this restriction in place, it is possible to give a simple 
consistency proo f  for the “totality” of such schemes: see next Chapter).
To summarize, there seems to be no question that semantical statements like,
(4) the proposition that snow is white is true if  and only if  snow is white
(5) the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if  and only if  snow is white
(10) ‘white’ is true o f x if  and only if  x is white
are, in some striking sense, obvious. While the semantic paradoxes alert us to the fact
that we ought not to suppose all instances o f the schemes “obvious”, we can still ask why
(suitably restricted) instances o f disquotational and redundancy T-sentences are obvious. 
And in what does their obviousness consist? Are such statements perhaps analytic or 
conceptual truths? Does their truth derive solely from the meanings o f the semantical 
words ‘designate’, ‘denotes’ and ‘true’ (or the other cognates for these concepts)? Are 
these instances a priori? Are they necessary in some sense? I shall return to these 
questions briefly in Chapter 5.
Associated with the schemes RS and DS are Equivalence Principles: 
cp <=> [~the proposition that cp is true! 
q> <=> rthe sentence ‘cp’ is true!
For example,
‘grass is blue’ <=> ‘the proposition that grass is blue is true’
‘grass is blue’ <=> ‘the sentence ‘grass is blue’ is true’
One o f the earliest invocations o f this Equivalence Principle appears in Frege:
One can indeed say T he thought that 5 is a  prime number is true’. But close 
examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence 
'5 is a  prime number*.
(Frege 1892 (1980), p. 34. Emphasis added)
It is this claim, that to assert ‘The proposition that p  is true’ is to assert nothing more 
than tp \  that underlies the deflationist view o f truth, which I discuss below.
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4.4 Redundancy, Disquotation and Deflationism
Deflationism suggests that the concept of truth is redundant or dispensable. The idea is 
that we need to “deflate” philosophical problems connected with truth (e.g., the 
correspondence intuition: truth involves a substantial language-world relation). The 
central idea o f deflationism is that the Equivalence Principles and/or the equivalence 
schemes RS and DS express all there is to be said about truth.
The first such account o f truth, the so-called Redundancy Theory o f Truth, was first 
urged by Ramsey 1927, and later by Ayer 1936:
There is really no separate problem of truth, merely a linguistic muddle.
... it is evident that ‘It is true that Caesar was murdered’ m eans no more than 
that Caesar was murdered, and that ‘It is false that C aesar was murdered’ 
means that Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases that we sometimes use 
for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by the 
statement in our argument.
(Ramsey 1927 (1978), p. 44).
But when we come to consider what this famous question [“What is truth?”] 
actually entails, we find that it is not a question which gives rise to any genuine 
problem; and consequently that no theory can be required to deal with it.
... Reverting to the analysis of truth, we find that in all sentences of the form 'p 
is true’, the phrase ‘is true’ is logically superfluous. When, for example, one says 
that the proposition ‘Queen Anne is dead’ is true, all that one is saying is that 
Queen Anne is dead. ... Thus to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, 
and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. And this indicates that 
the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply 
as marks of assertion and denial.
... We conclude, then, that there is no problem of truth as it is ordinarily 
conceived. The traditional conception of truth as a ‘real quality’ or a  'real relation’ 
is due, like most philosophical mistakes, to a  failure to analyse sentences 
correctly.
(Ayer 1936 (1971), pp. 116-119)65.
65 Shortly after Ramsey’s and Ayer’s advocacy o f deflationism, however, Tarski presented his magnum opus 
on truth, Tarski 1936, in which he proved his Indefinability Theorem. One way to put this is to consider an 
interpreted language (L, A), where A is an L-structure. Then, truth for (L, A), i.e., the set o f  truths in A, is 
not definable in the theory Tt\04), if  the theory Tl\04) is “strong enough”. See below for further 
discussion. This in itself suggests that truth is not dispensable.
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More recently, Horwich has defended a position closely related to Ramsey’s original 
redundancy theory. Horwich call this the Minimalist Theory o f  Truth. Horwich claims 
that the totality of instances o f the redundancy scheme RS yields the “whole truth about 
truth”66. Later I shall reconstruct this minimalist theory as a formalized theory. Indeed, it 
is the theory MT whose logical properties we discuss more fully below in the next 
Chapter67.
Not all thinkers have appreciated (or agreed with) the Equivalence Principle (or the 
Redundancy Scheme). Consider the following passage from Spinoza’s posthumous On 
the Improvement o f  the Understanding:
... if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without knowing whether 
Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far as its asserter is concerned, 7s 
false, or not true, even though Peter actually does exist. The assertion that Peter 
exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does exist.
(Spinoza 1677 (1955), p. 26. Emphasis added). 
(Seemingly, Spinoza didn’t much improve the understanding o f the concept o f truth.68)
The disquotation scheme DS appears first in Tarski 1936, where it is actually dismissed 
as slightly misleading, for problems having to do with the peculiarities o f the quotation 
operator*9:
As a starting point certain sentences of a  special kind present themselves 
which could serve as  partial definitions of the truth of a sentence or more 
correctly as explanations of various concrete turns of speech of the type 'x is a 
true sentence’. The general scheme of this kind can be depicted in the following 
way:
(2) x is a true sentence if and only if p
66 E.g., Horwich 1990 (p. 7), “... our thesis is that it is possible to explain all the facts involving truth on the 
basis o f the minimal theory” and (p. 8), “... the minimalist conception: i.e., the thesis that our theory o f truth 
should contain nothing more than instances o f the equivalence scheme”.
67 To be a little more precise, Horwich thinks that MT should be thought o f  as the (non-linguistic) 
proposition expressed by any such totality o f  axioms.
68 Spinoza is often cited as an early coherence theorist about truth.
69 In particular, we cannot “quantify-in” using a referential quantifier into quotational contexts. E.g.,
3x(Quine wrote a book named ‘x and Object’).
is problematic. However, careful examination shows that we can sensibly “quantify-in” using substitutional 
quantifiers. E.g.,
Ix(Quine wrote a book named ‘x and Object’).
is not problematic, and is in fact true, because ‘Quine wrote a book called ‘Word and Object” is true.
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\In order to obtain concrete definitions we substitute in the place of the symbol 
‘p’ in this schem e any sentence, and in the place of ‘x1 any individual name of 
this sentence.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), pp. 155-156).
Tarski then discusses one o f his famous instances o f this scheme:
It might be thought that all we need to do is to substitute in (3):
(3) ‘it is snowing’ is a  true sentence if and only if it is snowing
any sentential variable (i.e., a symbol for which any sentence may be 
substituted) in place of the expression 'it is snowing’ which occurs there twice,
and then to establish that the resulting formula holds for every value of the
variable, and thus without difficulty reach a sentence which includes all 
assertions of type (3) as special cases:
(5) for all p, ‘p’ is a true sentence if and only if p
... we could try to generalize the formulation (5), for example, in the following 
way:
(6) for all x, x is a true sentence if and only if, for a certain p, x
is identical with ‘p’ and p
At first sight we should perhaps be inclined to regard (6) as a  correct 
semantical definition of ‘true sentence’ ... Nevertheless the matter is not so 
simple. As soon as we begin to analyse the significance of the quotation-mark 
names which occur in (5) and (6) we encounter a series of difficulties and 
dangers.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 158-159).
It is worthwhile quickly looking at the problem Tarski located. Tarski explains some o f  
the peculiarities of quotation-mark names:
In any case, such functors are not extensional; there is no doubt that the 
sentence
for all p and q, if p if and only if q then ’p’ is identical with 'cf
is in palpable contradiction to the customary way of using quotation marks. For 
this reason alone definition (6) would be unacceptable to anyone who wishes 
consistently to avoid intensional functors and is even of the opinion that a 
deeper analysis shows it to be impossible to give any precise meaning to such 
functors.
(Tarski 1936(1956), p. 161).
Actually, it seems to me that Tarski’s scepticism here seems to be misplaced. I suggest 
that we can explain what a quotation function is as follows:
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A quotation function is an injective mapping/from a language L to another L* i f  
may be defined over any class o f L-expressions, even including the comma, say) 
such that if e is any L-expression th en /s) is an L*-term.
Thus, the mapping that maps any expression to the result o f enclosing it in quotation 
marks is a quotation function. For example, such a function maps the sentence ‘snow is 
white’ to the term “ snow is white” . (It may map an expression to a term obtained by 
enclosing within French quotes * « ’ and * » ’, or Smullyan’s quotes ‘Qi’ and ‘Q2’).
The semantics o f a quotation function/is then explained as follows:
An interpretation 3* o f L* is quotation normal (or respects quotation) with 
respect t o / i f  and only if, for any L-expression e, 3 * [ / ( e ) ]  = e.
Suppose we symbolize this operation as <...>: e »-> <e>, where e can be any L- 
expression. The expression <e> is an L*-term, perhaps formed from 8 itself by prefixing 
and appending *<’ and ‘> \
Given the notion of a quotation-normal interpretation, it is easy to see then that the 
quotation operator <...> is not extensional in any such interpretation. A context C(e) of 
the expression e is extensional with respect to an interpretation 3  if  and only if, for any 
expressions Si, e2, if  3[si] = 3[e2], then 3[C(e0] = 3[C(s2)]. For example, let t\ and t2 be 
terms o f a standard first-order language L and let (p(x) be an L-formula with just x free. 
Suppose that 3  is an L-interpretation and that %[t{] = 3[f2]. It trivially follows that 3  f= 
cp(fi) iff 3  J= q>(f2). Thus, any formula cp(0 is an extensional context o f t, for any term t.
The requirement o f extensionality is easily seen to be equivalent to the condition that 
the extension o f C(s) be a function o f the extension of s. (Of course, this idea goes back 
to Frege 1892).
Now, let 3* be a quotation normal interpretation of L* and let £i and s2 be L- 
expressions. Even if e} and s2 are co-extensive (that is, 3[sj] = 3 [s2]), it need not follow 
that 3*[<£i>] = 3 * [ < s 2> ] . Indeed, if  3* is quotation normal, then 3 * [ < e > ]  = 8. So, if  
there are expressions Si and e 2 such that 3 [ e i ]  = 3 [ e 2] and Si *  s2, then <....> is not
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extensional (in this interpretation 3*). This requires only that there are distinct 
expressions that have the same extension. This is trivial to satisfy (e.g., ‘1 + 0’ and ‘1’).
Nevertheless, we have supplied an analysis of a quotation mapping. It is a syntactical 
mapping from expressions to terms. Furthermore, we have defined what it means for an 
interpretation to respect quotation and this makes good sense, even though the quotation 
t e n n is )  containing s is not an extensional context o f e.70
Returning to our main theme, a disquotational version o f deflationism about truth is 
usually associated with Quine and Leeds. For example:
To say that the statement ‘Brutus killed Caesar1 is true, or that T he  atomic 
weight of sodium is 23’ is true, is in effect simply to say that Brutus killed Caesar, 
or that the atomic weight of sodium is 23.
(Quine 1960, p. 24)
... W here the truth predicate has its utility is in just those places where, though 
still concerned with reality, we are impelled by certain technical complications to 
mention sentences. Here the truth predicate serves, a s  it were, to point through 
the sentence to the reality; it serves as  a reminder that though sentences are 
mentioned, reality is still the whole point.
What, then, are the places where, though still concerned with unlinguistic 
reality, we are moved to proceed indirectly and talk of sentences. The important 
places of this kind are places where we are seeking generality, and seeking it 
along certain oblique planes that we cannot sweep out by generalizing over 
objects.
... The truth predicate is a  reminder that, despite a  technical ascent to talk of 
sentences, our eye is on the world. This cancellatory force of the truth predicate 
is explicit in Tarski’s  paradigm:
'Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white
Quotation marks make all the difference between talking about words and 
talking about snow. ... By calling the sentence true we call snow white. The truth 
predicate is a device of disquotation.
(Quine 1970 (1986), pp. 10-12. Emphasis added)
70 It would be an interesting mathematical exercise to study “quotation-normal” interpretations o f  the 
language o f  arithmetic, where the quotation function is just the mapping that takes e to its godel numeral 
Tel. Part o f  the complication is that some numerals (numbers) are not godel numerals (numbers). It follows 
from this that the recursive clause for evaluating the designation o f  S(f) will not work straightforwardly, 
because t  may be a godel numeral but S(t) may not be.
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I’m not sure it is correct to regard Quine as a deflationist (or as a deflationary 
disquotationalist). First, he makes it clear that he thinks that unlinguistic reality plays a 
role in determining the truth value o f sentences,
No sentence is true but reality makes it so. The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is 
true, as  Tarski taught us, if and only if real snow is really white.
(Quine 1970 (1986), p. 10. Emphasis added).
However, the deflationist need not deny this. More importantly, when it comes to 
defining truth, Quine makes it clear that a more sophisticated procedure, transcending the 
totality of disquotational T-sentences, is necessary:
Tarski’s paradigm cannot be generalized to read:
‘p ’ is true if and only if p
since quoting ‘p ’ produces a  name only of the sixteenth letter of the alphabet, 
and no generality over sentences. The truth predicate in its general use, 
attachable to a quantifiable variable in the fashion *x is true’, is eliminable by no 
facile paradigm. It can be defined, as Tarski shows, in a  devious way, but only if 
some powerful apparatus is available.
(Quine 1970 (1986), pp. 12-13).
(I explain this more powerful apparatus, The Theory o f  Satisfaction, invoking a 
metalinguistic predicate ‘satisfies’, below).
Someone may agree with the Equivalence Principle and yet disagree with deflationism. 
Consider Putnam, who is not a deflationist:
... the equivalence principle is philosophically neutral, and so is Tarski’s work.
On any theory of truth, ‘Snow is white’ is equivalent to "Snow is white’ is true’.
(Putnam 1981, p. 129. Emphasis added).
Disquotational accounts o f truth and reference have been widely discussed in the 
literature. For example, Field 1986, Field 1988, and two recent books, David 1994 and 
Kirkham 1992 (1995). David introduces his book with the quip:
“What is truth?”, asked Pilate. “Truth is disquotation”, replied Quine.
(David 1994, p. 3).
Field has done much to clarify the disquotational understanding o f truth:
One way of understanding the notion of truth is “disquotational”. On this 
reading, a sentence of the form
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is true
is to be understood as cognitively equivalent (equivalent by logic plus the 
meaning of ‘true) to the sentence appearing in the blanks, the sentence of which 
truth was predicated.
(Field 1988 (1989), pp. 228-229).
... disquotational truth is a  notion that applies primarily to sentences of one’s 
own language...
(Field 1988 (1989), p. 244).
The idea is this. A competent speaker S of an interpreted language 2 recognizes the 
equivalence o f a statement cp with its corresponding truth-claim Tr{<cp>). Indeed, if  S  
knows that Tir* is a disquotational truth predicate for an alien interpreted language £*, 
then S is able to recognize that Tr*(<cp*>) is equivalent to cp*. But if  S does not 
understand cp* itself, then S  similarly does not understand the truth-claim 7ir*(<cp*>), and 
conversely. To put it differently, S may know that Tr* is a truth predicate (in an 
appropriate extension o f £*) for 2*, but still doesn’t understand the truth claim 7V*(<cp>) 
because he or she doesn’t understand the quoted sentence cp*.
In more concrete terms, I know, for any German sentence cp* not containing ‘wahr’, that 
wahr{«p*>) is equivalent to cp*, but o f course I still needn’t know what cp* means. For 
example, if  someone tells me that ‘Blanca ist sehr schon’ is a German sentence, then, 
equipped with my knowledge that ‘wahr’ is the truth predicate in German, I already know 
that the semantical German sentence,
(1) ‘Blanca ist sehr schon’ ist wahr
is equivalent to,
(2) Blanca ist sehr schon
(This is an empirical claim which could be checked experimentally: a fluent German 
speaker will assent to, or dissent to, both (1) and (2) in precisely the same 
circumstances).
Also, I know that if  cp* means the same as some statement cp o f English that I 
understand, then, if  I stipulate that 7 7 g  is to mean in English “true in German”, then I
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know that I must accept 7 > g (< (P * > ) <-> 9- But Trg, that is, ‘true-in-German’, is not a 
disquotational truth predicate for German sentences, for the trivial reason that cp* is not a 
sentence o f English, so 7 7 g (< cp * > ) <-» cp* is simply not a sentence o f English. (Obviously, 
7”/g (< c p * > )  <-> cp is not a disquotational sentence o f English, for it mentions quotationally 
a German sentence cp* and uses an English sentence cp to “represent” the truth condition 
o f cp*).
To return to the main theme, according to the deflationary conception o f truth, the 
concept of truth is something like a purely logical device, which simply provides a way, 
in any language L, of:
i. “Disquoting” quotations o f L-expressions (and “dispropositionalizing” 
/to-constructions);
For the “disquotation effect”, we are allowed to eliminate the truth predicate in 
predications containing quotations, by inferring from a truth-predication,
(1) ‘snow is white’ is true
the quoted sentence itself,
(2) snow is white
In fact, one might propose the following introduction and elimination rules for Tr.
Tr-lntro: cp |- 7V(<cp>)
Tr-Elim: Tr{<(p>) |-cp
(In a certain respect, then, the truth predicate behaves a little like a logical concept, 
with introduction and elimination rules, analogous to those for -n  and a ) .
However, another logical function o f the concept o f truth has been discussed by truth 
theorists:
ii. Expressing certain infinitely long conjunctions and disjunctions (which
would otherwise require a logical device o f substitutional quantification).
Perhaps the first author to mention this is Quine:
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We may affirm a single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or the 
truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite lot of sentences that we can 
demarcate only by talking about the sentences, then the truth predicate has its 
use.
(Quine 1970 (1986), pp. 10-12. Emphasis added)
Similarly, following Quine’s lead, Leeds wrote:
It is not surprising that we should have use for a  predicate P with the property 
that “ '. . .’ is P” and “..." are always interdeducible. For we frequently find 
ourselves in a position to assert each sentence in a  certain infinite set z (e.g., 
when all the members of z share a common form); lacking the means to 
formulate infinite conjunctions, we find it convenient to have a single sentence 
which is warranted precisely when each member of z is warranted. A predicate P 
with the property described allows us to construct such as  sentence: Vx(x e z -»
P(x)). Truth is thus a  notion that we might reasonably want to have at hand, for 
expressing semantic ascent and descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction.
(Leeds 1978, p. 121).
Leeds follows Quine in explaining the utility o f the truth predicate as a logical device 
for “expressing semantic ascent and descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction”. Is 
Leeds advocating deflationism? It is not clear. He does not explicitly say that there is 
nothing more to the concept o f truth than this, and could, in fact, insist that such a logical 
device (of disquotation) is just the same thing as correspondence.
(There is an important analogy here between the claim that truth is a logical device for 
expressing infinite conjunctions and the idea that quantification is a logical device for 
expressing infinite conjunction: that is, when ordinary objectual quantification itself is 
construed substitutionally, it may (in some cases) be thought o f as a logical device for 
expressing infinite conjunctions: VxF(x) <=> F(a0 a  F(a2) a  ... . However, full objectual 
quantification cannot be so construed, unless one supposes that there is a term for every 
object: a fully named universe. Since we usually impose strong constructive constraints 
on linguistic entities (indeed, usually, there will be at most denumerably many terms), 
this substitutional reinterpretation will not be sound for non-denumerable domains of 
discourse: in particular, those o f analysis and set theory).
For an example o f the expression o f “infinitary disjunctions/conjunctions”, (ii), the idea 
is that we would in principle be allowed to eliminate the truth predicate more generally, 
by replacing any open formula,
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(3) jc is true
by the inflnitary disjunction,
(4) (x =  ‘snow is white’ and snow is white) or (x = ‘grass is green’ and grass is
green) or ...
But because natural languages do not contain such inflnitary logical apparatus, the 
argument is that the truth predicate “serves this purpose” o f “expressing inflnitary 
conjunctions/disjunctions”.
Indeed, if  one imagines that the (meta-)language in question contains a substitutional 
quantifier (with respect to sentences o f the base language), then we may restate (4) 
formally as a substitutional quantification:
(5) Ep(x = <p> a  p)
Technically, (5) is to be formalized within a metalanguage L+sub obtained by expanding 
the object language L by adding a quotation function and substitutional quantification 
with respect to sentences: that is, add sentence variables p u p2, . . ., and a substitutional 
quantifier Ep, with an implicit substitution class o f L-sentences. Then, the formula Ep(x 
= <p> a  p) defines Tr{x). I discuss some properties o f this kind o f truth definition in the 
next Chapter.
4.5 Tarski’s Convention T
Tarski’s theory o f truth is not a correspondence theory in the traditional Russellian 
sense. It does not explicitly express the idea that statements are “made true” by the 
‘|facts” to which they “correspond’. Rather, Tarski intended his semantical conception of  
truth to be a clarification and elucidation of the intuitive idea that:
... a true sentence is one which states that the state of affairs is so and so, and 
the state of affairs indeed is so and so.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 155).
Indeed, Tarski alludes approvingly to Aristotle’s formulation:
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To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not, that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, or of what is not, that it is not, is true
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1011 b26).
Those who follow Tarski’s line on a semantical definition o f ‘true sentence’ sometimes 
put the basic idea like this:
... a sentence (or statement) is true just in case  the entities referred to stand in 
the referred-to relations.
(Musgrave 1989 (1996), p.48).
Lying at the heart o f Tarski’s thinking about truth is Convention T, a comprehensive 
criterion for what counts as a truth predicate for an object language L. Informally 
speaking, we have two languages,
i. an object language L , whose semantic properties are to be discussed
ii. a metalanguage ML, in which the metatheory is formulated.
The metalanguage ML is presumed to contain predicates which express the syntax o f L. 
Thus, ML may contain predicates Pred, Sen, Var, Term, etc., meaning intuitively 
“predicate in L”, “sentence in L”, “variable in L”, “term in L”, etc. In particular, we shall 
assume that ML contains, for each L-formula expression, a term <cp> which means, 
intuitively, “the L-expression cp”.71
This is how Tarski presented Convention T in his 1936.
Using the symbol Tr* to denote the class of all true sentences, the above 
postulate can be expressed in the following convention:
CONVENTION T. A formally correct definition of the symbol Tr', formulated in 
the metalanguage, will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has the 
following consequences:
(a) all sentences which are obtained from the expression 
x e Tr if and only if p
by substituting for the symbol 'x’ a  structural-descriptive name of any sentence 
of the language in question and for the symbol ‘p ’ the expression which forms 
the translation of this sentence into the metalanguage;
71 The syntax o f a language L may sometimes be interpreted within (some theory in) L itself. If L is the 
language o f  arithmetic, this is the arithmetization o f  syntax. In the case o f arithmetic, this is achieved via a 
coding function #, which assigns a gbdel number #9  to each L-expression cp. One can find formulas in L 
which represent all the syntactical concepts o f L. Thus, one can find formulas in L such as Term(x),
Form(x) and so on, which are true o f exactly the godel numbers o f  the terms, formulas and so on in L.
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(p) the sentence
for any x, if x e Tr then x e S [the set of object language sentences]
(in other words T r c  S’)
It should be noted that the second part of the above convention is not 
essential; so long as  the metalanguage already has the symbol T r’ which 
satisfies condition (a), it is easy to define a new symbol Tr" which also satisfies 
condition (p).
(Tarski 1936 (1956), pp. 187-188).
Then, consider the ML scheme:
(T) x  is true in L if and only if  p
Tarski argued that this scheme plays a basic role in constraining any truth theory or 
truth definition. For any L-sentence cp, replace V  by an ML name o f <p (say <cp>) and 
replace ‘/?’ by the translation o f cp into ML (say, r(cp)). Then the result is what is 
sometimes called a materially adequate T-sentence.
For example, suppose ML is formalized fragment o f English plus a predicate ‘true in 
German’, and L is a formalized fragment of German containing the sentence ‘Der Schnee 
ist weiss’. Then corresponding to this German sentence we have the following materially 
adequate T-sentence:
(1) ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true in German if  and only if  snow is white
which is materially adequate because the metalanguage sentence used (that is, ‘snow is 
white’) is the correct metalanguage translation o f the object language sentence 
mentioned or quoted (that is, ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’). This dependence upon the notion 
of translation is quite vital to the general Tarskian semantic conception of truth, and 
Tarski himself made this clear in his locus classicus:
As we know from §2, to every sentence of the language of the calculus of 
c lasses there corresponds in the metalanguage not only a name of this sentence 
of the structural-descriptive kind, but also a sentence having the same meaning.
... W e take the scheme (2) [‘x is a true sentence if and only if p ’] and replace ‘x1 
in it by the name of the given sentence, and ‘p’ by its translation into the 
metalanguage.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 187. Emphasis added).
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The requirement o f a translation from object language L to metalanguage ML 
effectively requires that the object language L be interpreted relative to ML. We may say 
that the translation function T interprets L within ML.
This is one o f the basic differences between a general Tarskian semantical theory o f  
truth and purely disquotational theories. In the general Tarskian setting the metalanguage 
ML needn’t be an extension o f L. In general, to theorize about truth for some object 
language L (say, Spanish) in some metalanguage ML (say, English) we need to translate 
from object language to metalanguage. Suppose that T is a translation function from L to 
ML, mapping every L-formula to an ML-formula. That is, if  cp is an L-formula, then T(cp) 
is an ML-formula. Then, if  P  is a predicate definable in ML, Tarski’s suggestion is, in 
effect:
P  is a truth predicate for L within a metatheory MT in ML just in case, for each L-
sentence cp, every ML-sentence P{<cp>) <-» T(cp) is a theorem o f MT.
This formulation emphasizes two important points:
i. the dependence upon a translation function T from object language L to 
metalanguage ML;
ii. a materially adequate T-theorem is required only for each L-sentence, not 
for each ML-sentence (in fact, the stronger demand may well lead to 
paradox).
Given my formulation above, it is easy to see that disquotational T-instances are 
obtained as a special case o f Convention T. A disquotational truth theory is obtained in 
the case where the metalanguage ML is an extension L+ o f the object language L, and the 
terms <cp> are genuine quotations (obtained, say, in the French manner, by prefixing and 
suffixing the symbols “« ” and “» ” around cp). The crucial notion o f translation is still 
operative but is transparent, because the translation function T from L to ML is simply 
the identity mapping 1.
We can say:
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Tr is a disquotational truth predicate for L within a metatheory MT in ML just in
case, for each L-sentence cp, MT |- Tr(<(p>) <-> cp72.
Many authors have stressed that what Tarski showed how to define was “truth in L”, 
rather than just plain “univocal truth”. This observation has led some authors73 to argue 
as follows:
i. the concepts truth-in-English, truth-in-Spanish, truth-in-Glaswegian, etc., 
all “have something in common”;
ii. this something must be trutlr,
iii. but, Tarski doesn’t tell us anything about that.
I am sceptical about this argument. After all, Convention T provides a general criterion 
for what it is for an ML predicate to be a truth predicate fo r  L, for any sufficiently well- 
understood object language L for which there is a translation T from L to ML.
Putting it another way, suppose we consider formalized fragments of, say,
i. English Li, Spanish, L2, German L3, Hopi L4 and so on,
then we can introduce within the metalanguage ML a system o f truth predicates:
ii. Trh Tr2, Tr3 and so on
and (in the meta-metatheory!) translation functions
iii. Ti, r2, r3, and so on
72 This corresponds to a generalization o f the standard definition o f  a truth predicate in mathematical logic 
texts:
A formula B(y) is called a truth predicate for T if for any sentence G of the language of T, h  G <->
B(TGl).
(Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 180)
My formulation, however, follows Tarski in allowing the truth predicate to appear within the metalanguage 
ML and requires that 77(<cp>) <-» cp be a theorem o f  the (stronger) metatheory in ML. If we collapse ML 
down to L and consider just the object level theory T, then we are asking whether truth in the object 
language can be defined within the object theory. Under standard conditions, this is impossible, as Tarski’s 
Indefinability Theorem shows. However, truth can be defined within the stronger metatheory. For example, 
first-order arithmetical truth is definable in second-order arithmetic (see Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, Ch. 19).
73 E.g., Blackburn 1983.
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such that the “overall Tarskian theory of truth” Truth implies all the materially 
adequate T-theorems: that is,
Truth implies, for any (English) L] sentence (p, 7iri(<(p>) <-> Ti(cp)
Truth implies, for any (Spanish) L2 sentence (p, 7r2(<cp>) <-> T2(cp)
Truth implies, for any (German) L3 sentence (p, 7T3(<(p>) <-> T3((p)
and so on.
Notice, by the way, that such an envisioned over-all “multiple Convention T satisfying” 
Tarskian truth theory Truth has a very powerful explanatory ability:
if  cpa is an (English) Li-sentence and <pb is a (Spanish) L2-sentence and |- T i(<pa) <-» 
r 2(cpb) then Truth implies 77i(<cpa>) <-> Tr2(<cpb>)
For example, Truth will imply theorems like:
‘All ravens are black’ is true-in-English iff ‘Todos los cuervos son negros’ is true- 
in-Spanish
In other words, because Convention T requires a translation from L to ML, the general 
Tarskian truth theory Truth possess the capacity to link together truth-in-L for variable 
‘L’ (obviously and unfortunately, however, this variability in the choice o f L is not 
allowed to include ML itself). Indeed, Tarski’s theory makes it clear how the correlation 
of truth-in-English and truth-in-Spanish (and so on) depends upon the correct translation 
between (non-semantical assertions of) Spanish and English (and so on).
4.6 Tarski’s Theory of Satisfaction
At the heart o f Tarski’s theory o f truth lies the concept o f satisfaction. Tarski provides 
first an informal account o f the concept o f satisfaction using examples analogous to,
a formula Tovesfo, jcj)’ is satisfied by a sequence s if  and only if  loves s-}
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and then gives the following recursive definition o f ‘satisfies’ for the language o f class 
inclusion (I have changed the notation a little):
DEFINITION 22: The sequence s satisfies the sentential function q> if and only 
if s  is an infinite sequence (of classes) and cp is a sentential function and these 
satisfy one the following four conditions:
(a) there exist natural numbers k and I such that cp = ‘xk c  x{ and sk c  Si;
(p) there is a sentential function \j/ such that cp = -nxp and s  does not satisfy the 
function ip;
(y) there are sentential functions \p and £ such that cp = vp v £ and s  either 
satisfies \p or satisfies
(5) there is a natural number k and a sentential function \p such that cp = Vjfkip 
and every infinite sequence (of classes) which differs from s  in at most the k-th 
place satisfies the function \p.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 193).
Tarski adds in a footnote that this recursive definition o f ‘satisfies’ may be converted to 
a direct definition. I will explain this below.
I prefer to treat ‘satisfies’ axiomatically and construct a Theory o f  Satisfaction, which I 
shall call TS. That is, one simply introduces into ML a two-place predicate ‘satisfies’ and 
takes as axioms for TS the “basis axioms”, one for each primitive predicate P  o f L:
(а) for any sequence s , for any variables vx, ..., vn, the atomic formula P(v„
Vq) is satisfied by s iff R fc , ..., sn)
where ‘P ’ is replaced by a name of P  and ‘IT is replaced by P  itself.
and the “recursion axioms”:
(P) for any sequence s, for any formula (p, -i(p is satisfied by s if  and only if  cp
is not satisfied by s
(y )  for any sequence s , for any formulas cp, ip, cp a  ip is satisfied by s if
and only if  cp is satisfied by s and ip is satisfied by s.
(б) for any sequence s, for any variable vif for any formula cp, Vvjcp is
satisfied by s i f  and only if, for any sequence s* that differ from s in the i- 
th place at most, cp is satisfied by s*
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I formalize the axioms (a) - (8) thus: a set o f basis axioms,
(a) VsVi,..., n: (Sat(<P> A f a , vu), s ) «-> P fa ,..., sn))
one axiom for each atomic predicate P. Then,
(P) VsV/: (Sat(neg(f), s) <-> -.Saf(f, s))
(y) VsV/Vg: (Sat(conj(f; g), s) (Saffl; s) a  Saf(g, s)))
(8) VsVA//: (Sat(uniqu(fv{), s ) <-» Vs*(/cfi(s, s*) -» Saf(f, s)))
The conversion of this recursive definition o f Saf to an explicit direct definition o f Saf 
is explained in Quine 1970. One takes the conjunction o f the axioms (a) - (8), then 
rewrites any formula Saf(..., —) as the formula (..., —) e  Z, and takes the resulting 
formula with Z free to define a formula SR(Z), meaning intuitively ‘Z is the satisfaction 
relation’. Then, we can define Sat explicitly as follows:
Sat(x, y) <-> 3 Z(SR(Z) a  (x, y ) e Z )
Tarski 1936 demonstrated two important metalogical facts about this theory of 
satisfaction TS:
i. The Definability of Truth:
One may construct, within TS in the metalanguage ML, a definition o f  truth for any 
standard first-order interpreted object language L. One introduces the above recursive 
characterization of the satisfaction predicate Sat and the explicit definition o f Tr is then 
the ML-formula:
(D) Vx[Tr(x) f>(XG Sen(L) a  Vs(Seg(s) -> Sat(x, s)))]
Tarski’s definition o f truth is given as Definition 23 o f Tarski 1936:
DEFINITION 23: x is a true sentence—in symbols x e Tr—if and only if x e S 
and every infinite sequence (of classes) satisfies x.
(Tarski 1936(1956), p. 195).
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Tarski sketches how it may be verified that from Definitions 22 and 23 (plus the 
metatheoretical axioms o f syntax and set theory) one may derive all the T-theorems and 
thus, the definition (D) satisfies Convention T. Thus, TS f- DT.
Incidentally, the derivation within TS of a disquotational “T-sentence” Tr{<q>>) <-> cp is 
no simple matter. Take any L-sentence cp. A syntactical theorem is obtainable in the 
metatheory o f the form <cp> = f, where t is what Tarski calls a “structural-descriptive 
name” (t is a closed term obtained from the functors exiqu, conj, neg, etc.). Instantiate 
the definition o f truth with this term t and then apply the recursive definitions to the 
right-hand side (thus “decomposing” t). In this way, one eventually obtains a theorem of  
form 77(f) *-> cp°, where cp° is a formula, closely related to cp, but containing 
quantifications over sequences. This is hardly a disquotational truth condition for cp. 
However, one may prove in the ambient set theory the formula cp° <-> cp. (It is not 
logically true!). So, finally, one may prove 77(<cp>) <-> cp. Note that the proof requires a 
certain amount o f set theory, for the appropriate manipulations involving sequences.
Of equal significance to the definability o f truth (for an object language L, in the 
suitably strong metatheory TS in the metalanguage ML) is Tarski’s profound 
Indefinability Theorem.
ii. Tarski’s  Indefinability Theorem
Suppose that T in L is a “sufficiently strong” theory. This can be made more precise: 
the requirement is that Robinson Arithmetic Q can be interpreted within T. And T can to 
some extent express the syntax o f L, by arithmetization. In this situation, an analogue of 
the “Diagonal Lemma” or “Fixed Point Theorem” holds in T. Then no predicate 
definable in T in L is a truth predicate for L in T. This is Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem.
At the “guts” o f the Indefinability Theorem (which is usually presented in the context of 
formalized arithmetic) lies the Diagonal Lemma or Fixed Point Theorem. Let L be the 
language o f arithmetic. Let # be a godel numbering, mapping each expression o f L to a 
number. Let cp be any L-formula. Then the diagonalization o f cp, D(cp), is the formula
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3x(x = T(pl a  <p). Suppose cp has just x free. Then 9i f= D(cp) just in case 91%  ^cp[n]. (I.e., 
9? f= D(cp) just in case cp is true in 91 o f #cp). The diagonal function (for #) is the function 
diag such that diag(n) is the godel number of the diagonalization o f the formula whose 
godel number is n. I.e., m = diag(n) iff n = #cp and m = #D(cp), for some cp. It is possible to 
show that diag is recursive. Since all recursive functions are representable in Q, there is a 
formula diag(x, y) which represents diag. One can then prove the Diagonal Lemma:
for any monadic formula P(x), there is a “fixed point sentence” G such that Q f-
p (Tg 1)<->g .
Now assume L contains a monadic predicate Tr such that T (- Thfcpl) <-» 9, for each 
closed formula <p. If this were possible, then Tr would be a truth predicate for L within T 
in L. However, just take P  to be -iTrand from the Diagonal Lemma, you immediately get 
a “liar sentence” L such that T f- —iT/tj~L~l) <-> L, contradicting the T-theorem Tr§Ll) <-> 
L.
[Actually, the Fixed Point Theorem also holds within any theory T which formalizes its 
own syntax and which can define the diagonal function D, where D((p) is 3x(x = <cp> a  
cp). That is, the theory T is such that there exists an L-formula D/ag(x, y) such that, for 
any cp in L, T |- Vy(D/agf(<cp>, y) <-» y  = <D(cp)>). The Fixed Point Theorem or Diagonal 
Lemma states that for any monadic L-formula P(x) there is a closed L-formula cp such 
that T |- P(<cp>) <-» cp. To prove this, suppose that P(x) is any L-formula. Let F be the 
expression 3y(Diag(x, y) a  P(y)), containing just x free. Let G be its diagonalization, the 
expression 3x(x = <F> a  3y(Diag(x, y) a  P(y))). Clearly, G = D(F). Thus, by 
hypothesis, T f- Vy(Diag(<F>, y) <-» y  = <G>). But G o  3y(Diag(<F>, y) a  P(y)). 
Thus, trivially, T |- G <-» 3y(Diag(<F>, y) a  P(y)). Hence, T |- G <-> 3y(y = <G> a  
P(y)). So, T (- G <-> P(<G>).]74’75
74 This proof is modelled on the proof o f the diagonal lemma in Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 173.
75 For another application o f  the Fixed Point Theorem. Let T be a theory containing formal syntax in a 
language L with quotation. If T satisfies the Fixed Point Theorem, then we can prove:
if  T is consistent, then T cannot define the class o f theorems in T.
Proof: First, T defines a class A o f sentences just in case there is a formula d(x) such that,
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In general, Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem states that the concept o f truth for an 
interpreted notation is not definable in any sufficiently strong theory in that notation. (Or 
in the set o f true sentences in that notation). For example, the set o f true sentences in 
first-order set theory is not definable in first-order set theory (i.e., the theory consisting o f  
all the truths). Thus the set o f first-order truths in Le is not definable in ZFC or any (first- 
order) extension.
An important and philosophical consequential way o f restating GO del’s Incompleteness 
Theorem involves the concept o f truth and is due to Tarski. The class o f truths in any 
theory containing elementary arithmetic is not recursively enumerable. For let T be 
Thi.(9l) (i.e., first-order arithmetic). Suppose that T is r.e. Then, by Craig’s 
Reaxiomatization Theorem, there would be a recursive axiomatization A such that T = 
DedCI(A). Thus, arithmetic would be axiomatizable, contradicting GOdel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem. So, T is not r.e.
Putnam made an epistemologically important comment on this fact:
Even if all statements that can be proved are epistemologically a priori and 
conversely, the statements that can be proved from axioms which are evident to 
us can only be a recursively enumerable set (unless an infinite number of 
irreducibly different principles are at least potentially evident to the human mind, 
a  supposition I find quite incredible). And Gddel’s theorem can (in a  version due, 
fundamentally, to Tarski) be expressed by the statement that the class of truths 
of just elementary number theory is not recursively enumerable
(Putnam 1975(1979), p. 63).
While no theory can adequately formulate its own truth theory (i.e., the disquotational 
truth theory for the language in which it is formulated), there are two more “positive” 
facts known about the definability of truth. The first is that (first-order arithmetical) truth 
for formulas o f bounded complexity is definable in first-order arithmetic. More exactly, if
i. if  cp g A, then T }* A(<cp>)
ii. if  cp g A, then T [- -A(<cp>)
Assume that T defines T. Then by the Fixed Point Theorem, there must be a formula cp such that T \-
-iA(<cp>) <-> cp. Assume cp g T. Then T f- A(<cp>) and T |- -iA(<cp>). This is not possible, since T is
consistent. So, cp g T. Thus, T }- -A(<cp>) and T }• cp. Contradiction. ■
For example, PA cannot define (in this strong sense) the set o f  theorems o f  PA. (Even though one can
formalize as a provability predicate the notion o f proof-in-PA within PA).
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V„ is the class o f g.n.’s of tme first-order formulas o f logical complexity less than n, then 
V„ is definable in arithmetic76. (Indeed, this carries over to set theory). And if  V is the 
class o f g.n.’s of true first-order formulas in arithmetic, then V is definable in second- 
order arithmetic77. (But the class o f true second-order formulas is not definable in 
second-order arithmetic).
Finally, some philosophers have argued that truth (and other semantic concepts, like 
reference and satisfaction) may somehow be “reduced” to physical notions. This doctrine 
is known as “Semantic Physicalism”78. The problem is that this would contradict Tarski’s 
Theorem. For suppose that N is a “strong enough” physical theory in some interpreted 
language (L, A). It follows that the class o f truths in the language o f N (i.e., truths in the 
structure A) is not definable in N. In short, physical truth is simply not a physical 
concept. Analogously, set theoretical truth is not a set-theoretical concept. Analogously, 
mathematical truth is not a mathematical concept. If you like, truth is a “transcendent” 
concept, resisting reduction to either physics, or even physics plus mathematics. Note 
that the class o f first-order truths in set theory is a countable set, and thus not particularly 
“big”, in the set-theoretical sense. Rather it is its “shape” or structure which is beyond 
complete comprehension (computability, axiomatizability, provability, etc.). This 
illustrates the proverb that “size isn’t important —  it’s shape that counts”.
76 See Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, Chapter 19, ‘On Defining Arithmetical Truth’.
77 Ibid.
78 E.g., Field 1972:
physicalism: the doctrine that chemical facts, biological facts, psychological facts and semantical facts 
are all explicable (in principle) in terms of physical facts.
(Field 1972 (1980), p. 93).
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C h a p ter  5 
Deflationism and Tarski’s Paradise
There is really no separate problem of truth, merely a linguistic muddle.
F.P. Ramsey 1927 (1978), p. 44.
... W e conclude, then, that there is no problem of truth a s  it is ordinarily 
conceived. The traditional conception of truth as  a  'real quality’ or a 'real relation’ 
is due, like most philosophical mistakes, to a  failure to analyse sentences 
correctly.
A.J. Ayer 1936 (1946), pp. 116-119.
Truth is thus a  notion that we might reasonably want to have at hand, for 
expressing semantic ascent and descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction.
Stephen Leeds 1978, p. 121.
... our thesis is that it is possible to explain all the facts involving truth on the 
basis of the minimal theory.
Paul Horwich 1990, p. 7.
... the minimalist conception: i.e., the thesis that our theory of truth should 
contain nothing more than instances of the equivalence scheme.
Paul Horwich 1990, p. 8.
5.1 Deflationism About Truth and Mathematics
In the previous Chapter we introduced the so-called deflationary conception o f truth. I 
now want to suggest an analogy between deflationism about truth and deflationism about 
mathematics. Indeed, the deflationary view o f truth has been widely discussed and is 
quite popular amongst philosophers. If I am right, deflationism about truth suffers from a 
problem quite analogous to a problem suffered by deflationism about mathematics, a 
programme initiated by Field 1980. The purpose o f this Chapter then is to show that 
deflationism about truth is untenable.
What is essential to any deflationary view of truth? Many deflationists urge that,
i. The concept o f truth is not essential to explanations
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From this claim it surely follows that,
ii. Any assumptions involving the concept o f truth are eliminable
or,
iii. Anything explained using truth-theoretic assumptions could be explained 
without them
This idea can be made quite precise. In technical terms, the claims (i) - (iii) may be 
reformulated more precisely as:
The C onservativeness Thesis
The result of adding a truth theory to a collection o f non-truth-theoretic 
assumptions always yields a conservative extension.
It is this claim that I shall take to form a basic component o f the deflationary view. This 
idea is based on an analogy with Field’s formulation o f the dispensability o f  
mathematics. Field claimed that,
... any inference from nominalistic premises to a  nominalistic conclusion that 
can be made with the help of mathematics could be made (usually more long- 
windedly) without it.
(Field 1980, p. x).
This is naturally formulated as the claim that adding a mathematical theory to a 
mathematics-free theory always yields a conservative extension. A deflationist about 
truth might put their view similarly. E.g.,
Any inference from non-semantical premises to a  non-semantical conclusion 
that can be made with the help of a truth theory could be made without it.
I discuss Field’s conservativeness claim a more fully in Chapter 9 below.
However there is a further deflationary thesis which might also be laid alongside the 
conservativeness thesis. It is well articulated by Horwich 1990:
C om pleteness Thesis
There is nothing more to truth than is given by the theory consisting o f “all” 
instances o f the redundancy scheme, ‘the proposition that p  is true if  and only
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if  p \  Such a theory, the Minimalist Theory, is a complete theory o f the 
concept of truth.
I shall argue that both theses are false.
5.2 The Conservativeness of Deflationary Theories
Let L be any standard formalized first-order language. L will be the “object level” or 
“base” language for which we shall examine some (also formalized) truth theories. (We 
shall use the symbol ‘nL’ to refer to the set of L-formulas with n free variables).
I will concentrate on three deflationary theories o f  truth for L:.
i. MT = the minimalist theory of truth for (propositions expressible in) L
ii. DT = the disquotational theory of truth for L.
iii. SDT = the substitutional disquotation theory o f truth for L
The minimalist theory MT (c.f., Horwich 1990) is formulated in a metalanguage L+, 
which is an expansion o f L (so, L c  L4) obtained by adding a monadic predicate Tr and a 
term-forming operator <...> which operates only on L-sentences to form L+-terms. If cp g  
0L (i.e., cp is an L-sentence), then <cp> is an L+-term (we assume that <...> is injective: if  
cpi and cp2 are distinct, then so are <cpi> and <cp2>). Intuitively speaking, <...> means “the 
proposition that
Then let Ramsey(cp) be the L+-sentence 77(<cp>) <-> cp, where cp g  0L. The axioms o f 
MT are then all these L+-sentences, Ramsey(cp). Thus, the axioms o f MT are analogous 
to:
(1) the proposition that snow is white is true if  and only if  snow is white
The disquotational theory DT is formulated in a metalanguage L+, which is an 
expansion o f L (again, L c  L+) obtained by adding a monadic predicate Tr and a term- 
forming operator <...>. So, if  s is any L-expression, then <s> is an L+-term (again, we 
assume injectiveness: if  and e2 are distinct, then so are <&\> and <e2>). Intuitively
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speaking, <...> is the quotation operator. We will say that an interpretation 3+ o f L+ is 
quotation-normal if, for any L-expression e, 3 +[<e>] = s. (Such quotation-normal 
interpretations just invert quotation).
Then let Tarski(cp) be the L+-sentence 7>(<q») cp, where cp e 0L. The axioms o f DT 
are then all these L+-sentences, Tarski(cp). Thus, the axioms o f DT are analogous to:
(2) the sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if  snow is white
From a formal point o f view, the truth theories MT and DT are identical, as I have 
hinted in the construction above.
The substitutional disquotational theory SDT is formulated in a strengthened 
metalanguage L+sub, containing the monadic predicate Tr; the term-forming operator <...> 
and a substitutional quantifier E (with a denumerable infinity o f substitutional sentence
variables, Pi, p2 ). Unlike MT and DT which are not finitely axiomatized, SDT
consists simply o f the axiom:
SDT: Vx( Tt\x) *-» Ip(x = <p> a  p)).
It is possible to see that each o f these theories is a truth theory for L, in the sense 
explicated by Tarski, that they satisfy Convention T. And thus, Tr is a truth predicate 
for L in MT, DT and SDT.
Consider the minimalist theory MT.79 Every L+-sentence Ramsey(cp) is an instance of 
RS and thus MT is “the totality o f instances” o f RS. By construction, MT is just the set 
of all these sentences. Similarly, the disquotation theory DT, in Tarski’s terminology, 
satisfies Convention T, for (by construction) it derives every L+-sentence Tarski(cp), =
79 Some authors (e.g., David 1994, p. 107-110) express concern that theories o f truth like MT and DT 
below are infinitely axiomatized and thus not “finitely statable”. I simply do not get the problem. These 
authors have finitely defined the theory. (It is like saying we cannot consider the set o f reals between 0 and 
1, because we cannot finitely list them all). Almost any interesting theory is not finitely (first-order) 
axiomatizable. E.g., first-order PA with the infinity o f induction axioms, first-order Real Analysis (RA) with 
an infinity o f continuity axioms and ZFC with an infinity o f separation and replacement axioms. Indeed, take 
almost any interesting infinite mathematical structure A (e.g., (N, <) or (R, <) and so on). Then the theory o f 
A— the set o f  first-order sentences that hold in A— will not be finitely axiomatizable. (It may not even be 
recursively enumerable! E.g., first-order arithmetic). Nevertheless, the theory o f A is defined as {cp e  0L: A f= 
cp}, and that's finitely statable.
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7 ir (« p>) <-> cp. More precisely, using the terminology o f textbooks, Tr in L+ is a truth 
predicate fo r  L within DT (remember, the truth theory DT is formulated in L+). Finally, 
SDT also satisfies Convention T. The proof is this: begin with Vx(77(x) <-» £p(x = <p> 
a  p)), from which 77(<cp>) <-» Sp(<cp> = <p> a  p)) follows. Within this substitutional 
logic, one may show that <p is derivable from Ip(<cp> = <p> a  p)) (in particular, using an 
axiom scheme governing quotations, namely, <cp> = <vj/> -»  (cp <-» v|/)). So, we may 
derive the T-sentence 7>(«p>) (p.
Now I want to present the first technical result. These deflationary theories o f truth, 
MT, DT and SDT, are conservative over any (“non-semantical”) theory T in L.
Theorem  1: The Deflationary Theories of Truth are C onservative
Let T in L be a theory. Let cp e 0L. Then
(a) if T u D T  |- cp, then T |- cp
(b) if  T u  SDT \- cp, then T f- cp
Proof: Part I: The proof requires a pair o f “expansion lemmas”:
(*) any model o f T may be expanded to a model o f T u  DT
(**) any model o f T may be expanded to a model o f T u  SDT
We prove (*) and (**) by constructing, using any L-interpretation 3, expansions 3+ (for 
L+) and 3 +sub (for L+sub) such that 3 + f= DT or 3 +sub f= SDT. Let 3  be an L-interpretation.
Let 3+ be the L+-interpretation which is an expansion of 3  such that:
i. dom(3+) = dom(3) u  {cp: cp e  0L},
ii. 3 +[<s>] = 8, for any L-expression s,
iii. 3 +[Tr] = {cp e 0L: 3  |=cp}
Let 3 +sub be the L+sub-interpretation which is an expansion o f 3  such that:
i. dom(3+sub) = dom(3) u  {cp: cp e  0L},
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ii. subclass(3+sub) = {cp: cp g 0L},
iii. 3 +sub[<e>] = e, for any L-expression e,
iv. 3 +sub[7r] = {<p e  0L: 3 [=cp}.
Clearly, 3 + (= 7r(<cp>) <-» cp, for any cp g 0L. Hence, 3 + f* DT.
Also, 3 +sub (= SDT just in case 3 +sub |= Vx (7"a(x) <-» Ip(x  = <p> a  p)), just in case, for 
all e g dom(3+sub), 3 +subxe[Tr(x)] = T iff 3+subxJ£p(x = <p> a  p)] = T. This holds just in 
case, for all e g dom(3+sub), e g 3+sub[7r] iff, for some cp e  0L, 3 +subxe[x = <cp> a  cp)] = T. 
This holds just in case (for all e e  dom(3+sub), e = cp, for some cp g 0L and 3  cp) iff (for 
some cp g 0L, 3+subxe[x = <cp>] = T and 3+subxe[cp] = T). This holds just in case, for all cp g 
0L, 3  |= cp iff 3 1= cp. And this holds come what may. That proves the expansion lemmas.
Part II: Using these expansion lemmas we prove that DT and SDT are conservative. 
WeTl do it just for DT. Assume the negation of conservativeness: for some cp g 0L, T u  
DT \- cp and not-(T |- cp). There must be a model 3  o f T such that 3  f= -.cp. Furthermore, 
from the lemma, because 3  f* T, there is an expansion 3 + such that 3+ ( = T u  DT. 
Because 3 + is an expansion o f 3 , it follows that 3 + -.cp. But 3 + ( = T u  DT and, by
assumption, T u  DT J- cp. So, 3+ (= cp. Contradiction. ■
It is possible to provide a proof-theoretic demonstration for the results that the 
deflationary truth theories always yield conservative extensions. In particular, this 
establishes that such theories are conservative even when 77(x) is permitted to appear in 
any axiom schemes within T.
Proof: Let A be a finite set o f closed L-formulas. And let DTA =df {7r(<cp>) cp: cp g
0L and cp g A} = DT n  A. That is, sl finite set of “T-sentences”. Suppose that T u  DT |- 
cp. Then, since proofs must be finite, there is a finite subset A o f proper axioms o f T and a 
finite set A o f L-formulas, such that A u D T a |- cp. (Indeed, DTA is equivalent to a single 
formula).
Let cpi,..., cpn enumerate the elements o f A. Now define an L-formula An(x):
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((X = « P l>  a  <pO V  . . .  V  (X = <Cpn> a  Cpn))
The idea is to find a single formula 'F, a definition o f 77(x), such that 'P f- DTA. First, 
consider Ai(x) =: (x = <cpi> a  cpi). We can show that: Vx(Ai(x) <-> Tr{x)) |- (7>(<cpi>) 
cpi). That is, Vx((x = <cp> a  cp) Tr{x)) \  Tr{<(p>) <-» cp. Next, let 'Fa be the formula 
Vx(An(x) <-* Tr(x)). Then, we can prove (by induction) that 'Fa |- DTa.
So, if  A u  DTA |- cp, then A u  {'Fa} cp. Thus, A u  {'Fa} |- cp. But 'Fa is an explicit 
definition o f Tr(x) in the L-vocabulary; so adding 'Fa yields a conservative extension.
Case 1: Suppose that 71r(x) does not appear in any induction scheme in A. Since the 
definition ¥ a is redundant, we can drop it. So, A |- cp, and thus, T |- cp. Thus, DT is 
conservative over T.
Case 2. Suppose that Tr(x) occurs in instances o f schemes o f T, say, 0 ls ..., <£k, in A. 
We know that A u  {'Fa} cp. Let A* be the result o f replacing Tr(x) by An(x) in each 
scheme d>j in A. The results are simply new schemes in T. So, A* is a set o f axioms o f T. 
Then, A* u  { 'F a } |- cp. Again, A* |- (p. So, T f- (p. Thus, DT is conservative over T. ■
A similar proof-theoretic argument works to establish the conservativeness o f SDT  
even when axiom schemes are in operation. Although SDT is an explicit definition o f Tr, 
we cannot immediately conclude its conservativeness, because it is framed using 
apparatus (i.e., substitutional quantification w.r.t. L-sentences) which exceeds that o f the 
object language. Still, let us suppose that T u  SDT cp, where cp is an L-sentence. So, we 
have a proof from T u  SDT of cp. This is equivalent to a proof o f cp from T kj 
U p(Tr[<p>) <-» p). Now, again, any proof will contain only finitely many L-sentences, 
and we can suppose that all o f these are instantiated from Tlp(Tr(<p>) <-» p). But each 
such instance 77(< cp>) <-> cp is just an axiom of DT. Thus, again, there must be a finite set 
A of L-sentences, such that T u  DTA f- cp. The above argument then goes through to 
show that T |- cp. Again, we conclude that SDT is conservative. ■
It is worth pointing out that the conservativeness results provide consistency proofs for 
the deflationary truth theories DT, MT and SDT. They show that by restricting the
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occurrence o f the predicate Tr in L+-formulas one obtains a consistent theory o f truth 
(and thus avoids the semantic antinomies). I will not examine the proposals for further 
extending the truth theories so as to define truth for formulas themselves containing Tr. 
Tarski’s 1936 proposal is to introduce a hierarchy o f metalanguages L+, L1"*,. and truth 
predicates Tr0, Tru . . .  Instead, Kripke’s 1975 proposal is to maintain a “univocal” truth 
predicate Tr, but relax the Principle of Bivalence for certain sensitive (ungrounded) 
formulas (such as “This sentence is false”)80.
Now, if  all the above looks very abstract, then take note o f the following corollaries.
Corollary 1.1 (the con ten tlessness principle):
No statement (in 0L) follows from a deflationary theory o f truth unless it is a 
logical truth.81.
Corollary 1.2 (the irrefutability principle):
No non-semantical contingent assertion (in 0L) could refute a deflationary 
theory o f truth.
Corollary 1.3 (the consistency  principle):
A deflationary theory o f truth is consistent with any consistent (non- 
semantic) theory (in L).
One might suggest that these corollaries illustrate a kind o f “analyticity” or 
“contentlessness” that deflationary theories of truth exhibit. Adding them adds nothing. 
And perhaps this is somehow connected to the idea that the deflationary truth theories 
illustrate the “redundancy” or “non-substantiality” o f truth. Indeed, one might go further: 
i f  truth is non-substantial— as deflationists claim— then the theory o f truth should be 
conservative. Roughly,
non-substantiality o f  truth <=> conservativeness o f truth theory.
80 See Kripke 1975. See Kirkham 1992 (1995) for discussion.
81 Quick proof: from the conservativeness theorem, if T u  DT |- cp, then T |- <p. Now let T = 0 .  Hence, if 
DT (p, then 0  [-(p. That is, if DT |- <p, then (p is a logical truth (in L, o f  course). QED.
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5.3 Non-Conservativeness of Tarski’s Theory of Truth
Next I present the second main technical result, concerning Tarski’s theory of 
satisfaction TS. The result is that TS not generally conservative over theories in the 
object language L. We shall now briefly treat this theory as a formalized theory. It is 
formulated in a more powerful metalanguage L+, still an expansion o f L, containing the 
following extra apparatus:
i. syntactical predicates and functors: Form{x), Sen(x), varfj), etc., with 
obvious intuitive meanings (“formula”, “sentence”, “the /th variable”, 
etc.).
ii. syntactical functors: neg(x)y conj(x, y) and exiqu(x, /), with obvious 
intuitive meanings (“the negation o f ’, “the conjunction o f ’, “the 
existential quantification w.r.t /th variable”);
iii. the concatenation functor,A;
iv. all the terms generated by a suitable quotation-operator <...> (that is, for 
any L-expression e, <s> is an L+-term);
v. a two-place satisfaction predicate, Sat(x, s)
vi. the mathematical predicate, e.
We assume that within this set-theoretical metalanguage we can define three further 
notions:
vii. a one-place predicate, Seq(s)y meaning “s is a sequence”;
viii. a three-place predicate, ld(s, $*, /), meaning “sequences s and s* are 
identical except possibly at the /th place”;
i x . a two-place functor tm(s, /) ,  meaning “the /th term of the sequence j ”.
Aside from any axioms governing the syntax of the object language or the set theory,
the axioms governing Sat in TS are as follows:
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A. The Basis Axioms o f TS
for each w-place L-primitive P,
V/...VnVs[Saf(<P> A var{i) A... A var{n) , s) <-> P(tm(s, /),...., tm(s, n))] 
is an axiom.
B. The Recursion Axioms o f TS
\/Ns[Sat(neg(f), s) -iSat(f, s)]
VNgVs[Sat(conj(f; g), s) (Saf(f, s) a  Saf(g, s))]
\/i\/Ns[Sat(exiqu(f, /), s) <-» 3s*(Seg(s*) a  /cf(s, s*, /) a  Sat(f, s*))]
And, finally,
C. The Explicit Definition o f Tr in terms of S a t
Vx[Tr(x) <-» (Se/7(x) a  Vs(Seg(s) Sa/(x, s))]
Notice that the metatheory TS must be taken also to include,
i. some (suppressed) axioms governing formation rules for formulas o f the 
object language L (e.g., if  P is an «-place primitive predicate and Xi is the 
/th variable, then the concatenation of P  with xis ...xn is an atomic formula; 
and so on),
ii. some (suppressed) set-theoretical axioms governing the properties o f 
sequences (e.g., an axiom saying that s is a sequence if  and only if  s is a 
complete function on the natural numbers).
The full theory o f satisfaction TS is then the union o f these axioms (syntactical, 
semantical and set-theoretical). The importance of TS is that, as Tarski showed, it can be 
shown to derive DT and thus satisfies Tarski’s Convention T: that is, TS |- DT.
We shall prove, using Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem, that the metatheory 
TS is not in general conservative over theories in L. We shall prove this with respect to 
PA, first-order Peano Arithmetic:
C h apter  5. D eflationism  a n d  Ta r sk i’s Pa r a d ise
135
Theorem  2: N on-Conservativeness of the  Full Theory of Satisfaction
Let L be the language o f arithmetic and let TS be the theory o f satisfaction in 
L+ for L. Then PA u  TS is not a conservative extension o f PA
Proof Sketch82: We know from Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem that there is a 
sentence CoripA expressible in L (expressing the syntactical consistency o f PA) which is 
not derivable from the axioms o f PA. However, in PA u  TS one may prove that PA is 
true (that is, the existence o f a standard model of PA), and thus prove the consistency o f  
PA. Hence, within PA u  TS one may derive ConpA. ■
We can construct a proof-theoretic argument for this result using some standard facts 
about PA and some further facts, established by Tarski 1936, about what can be proved 
using TS. We know from Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem that:
I: there is a provability predicate Provpa definable in L which satisfies the
usual constraints on a provability predicate83. Then the assertion ConpA, = 
-iP n ovf 0  *  0~l)84, is expressible in L and “asserts” that PA is consistent.
II: not:-(PA (-ConpA).
Let PA+ = PA u  TS. Let TrpA be the L+-formula Vx(P/Wpa ( x )  -»  77(x)), which asserts 
(intuitively speaking) that PA is true (that is, anything provable in PA is true). Then we 
have two further important facts:
i. TS (- 7V(f (pi) cp, for any sentence <p of L
ii. PA+ f-TrPA
Fact (i) just states that TS satisfies Tarski’s Convention T. That is, TS derives the 
materially adequate T-theorems. Equivalently, TS |- DT.
82 This fact is apparently well known to mathematical logicians. I am indebted to John Burgess for pointing 
this out (private communication).
83 See Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, Chapter 16, “Provability Predicates and the Unprovability o f  Consistency”.
84 Instead o f the L+-quotation <0  = 0>, I have switched to the standard godel numeral \ 0  = 0 \, which is in 
fact a term in the base language L. This makes no essential difference, for if the base theory T is strong 
enough (roughly, as strong as PA), then the syntax o f L may be formalized (via arithmetization) within T.
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Fact (ii) just states that PA+ derives the conclusion that PA is true (that is, that every 
theorem o f PA is true; that is, that if  (p is provable in PA, then q> is true). In fact, this 
result is equivalent to Theorem 5 of Tarski 1936, which Tarski expresses as Pr <= Tr. 
Informally, Tarski proves this by showing first that the metatheory can prove that each 
axiom o f the object theory is true85. Next, one shows that the metatheory can prove that 
the rules o f deductive inference preserve truth, so that anything derived from true 
assumptions is also true86. Thus, the metatheory can prove that all the theorems o f the 
object theory are true.
From (ii), we infer, PA+ |- Provppfi0 ^ 0 1) -»  7ir(f0  0~|). And, using (i), PA+ |-
ProvpA(f 0  *  0"l) -> 0 *  0. Then, PA+ |- - 1(10 * 0 ) - +  -.ProvPA(T0 *  0~|). But PA+ |- -,(0 *  
0). Thus PA+1- ConpA. ■
To summarize, adding the theory TS of truth/satisfaction for the language o f arithmetic 
to PA permits the deduction of the consistency o f PA, which is an assertion not 
deducible within PA itself (assuming PA is consistent (which it is, o f course)).
Consider the second-order case. If T is a categorical second-order theory (say 
axiomatic second-order Peano Arithmetic, PA2), then any new theorems in T u  TS are 
L-assertions which already hold in the (effectively unique) model o f T and are thus 
semantically implied by T. But Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem still applies, but now as 
an incompleteness o f the second-order deducibility relation, |-. In the first-order case, 
Gcjdel’s (1930) Completeness Theorem ensures that the proof-theoretic concept |- is 
coextensive with the model-theoretic concept f=. But in the second-order case, Godel’s 
(1931) Incompleteness Theorem ensures that |- is a proper subset o f (=. E.g., ConpA is not 
a theorem o f PA2 but is a logical consequence ((=) o f PA2. Indeed, the second-order 
formula PA2 a  -iConpA is consistent but unsatisfiable (logically-false!). In any case, 
adding the satisfaction theory TS allows the deduction o f some of these previously
85 The axioms o f  the object theory T are also axioms o f the metatheory T u  TS. Note also that the 
metatheory contains an explicit definition o f ‘cp is an axiom of T \
86 Roughly, the metatheory T u  TS can prove:
if  A is a set o f true L-sentences and cp is a deductive consequence o f A, then cp is true
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underivable logical implications (of course, T u  TS is not complete: it is an axiomatic 
theory within which PA may be interpreted, so it may be godelized too!).
5.4 co-lncompleteness, Truth Laws, Non-Standard Models
Above, we constructed our deflationary disquotational theory o f truth DT simply as the 
set o f all required theorems 7?(<q») <-» cp. There is nothing wrong with this (if the 
procedure is consistent, of course: which it is!). DT is the set o f all ML-formulas, 
Tr(<(p>) <-» cp, for each L-sentence cp. Then clearly, by construction, Tr is a disquotational 
truth predicate for L within DT in L+.
However, the deflationary theory DT is not (in the usual sense) a definition. A simple 
argument (using the Beth Definability Theorem) shows that DT cannot even implicitly 
define Tr[see below].
Furthermore, DT does not provide for unique eliminability o f the truth predicate in any 
open formulas Tr(x) of the metalanguage. To clarify this, using the disquotation theory 
DT we can eliminate the truth predicate from certain metalanguage statements, say 
7"/(«pi>) <-> -iTr(<(p2>). We just get the “deflation” o f this statement, namely cpi <-> -icp2. 
However, we cannot eliminate Tr from a metalanguage statement like Vx(7ir(x)) v
77(x)) containing an open formula Tr{x). This sentence, we might say, is non­
deflat able. Of course, within Tarski’s full theory of truth TS, we may eliminate 7V(x) 
using the definition, leaving a formula containing Sat. Furthermore, if  the object 
language L does not contain the membership predicate e , then the recursive definition o f  
Sat can made explicit, so we may also eliminate Sat (of course, by Tarski’s 
Indefinability Theorem, this is impossible if one attempts to define satisfaction for the 
first-order language o f set theory within first-order set theory).
The deflationary theory DT has four important logical properties:
i. DT has important non-standard models;
ii. DT cannot prove certain general laws o f truth (like the law for negation);
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iii. DT can prove “all the instances” of such general laws, so it has a property 
analogous to co-incompleteness;
iv. DT does not implicitly define Tr (or “fix the extension” o f Tr).
First we prove (i) by exhibiting a non-standard model o f  DT. That is, we exhibit an 
interpretation o f the metalanguage L+ which is a model o f DT but in which the general 
“law of negation” fails. This proves (ii). Then we show that, despite DT’s failure to prove 
this law, it still has the power to prove “all” of its instances, so it is analogous to certain 
incomplete axiomatizations o f arithmetic (like Robinson Arithmetic Q). Finally, we 
prove (iv), which is a refutation of the oft-made claim that Tarski’s Convention T on its 
own “fixes the extension” o f ‘true’.
i. Non-Standard Model 3*
Let 3 be any L-interpretation. Let Tr be the theory o f 3  (the set o f true L-sentences in 
3). A standard model o f DT is just the expansion (3, Tr). Construct a non-standard 
model 3+ns by setting:
i. dom(3+ns) = dom(3) u  {a, 0 } ,  where a is not an element o f dom(3).
ii. %+m[Sen ] = {cp: cp g 0L} u  {a}
ii. if  cp e nL, for some n, then 3 +ns[/?eg](cp) = —.cp 
3+ns [neg](a) = a
if  x is neither an L-formula nor a, then %+ns[neg](x) = 0
iii. 3 +ns[Tr] = {cp e  0L: 3  |= cp} u  {a}
iv. 3 +ns[<e>] = e, for any L-expression e.
Now 3+ns is surely a model o f DT, because, for any L-sentence cp, 3 +ns |= Tr{<cp>) <-» cp. 
Now call anything in the extension in 3 +ns o f Sen a SENTENCE. In particular, the object 
a is a SENTENCE. Call the extension in 3+ns o f neg the NEGATION function. And call 
anything in the extension in 3 ^  of Tr a TRUTH. If we assign any sentence cp to x, then
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the formula Sen(x) -> ( Tr(neg(x)) -i77(x)) comes out true in %+m. But if  we assign,
say, the SENTENCE a to x, the formula comes out false. This is because both the object 
a and its NEGATION (i.e., a itself) are TRUE SENTENCES.
ii. DT d o es not imply the  general law of negation
Now consider the law of negation, NEG, which is just the L+-formula
NEG: Vx(Ser?(x) - » [Tr(neg(x)) <-> —«7Xx)])
It is easy to check that this formula is false in 3 +ns, because, as we noted above, a and 
its NEGATION are TRUE SENTENCES.
iii. DT is “©-incomplete”
Despite the fact that DT does not imply NEG, it still implies all the “instances” o f  
NEG. That is, for any (p, DT [- 77(<-i<p>) <-» ->Tr{<cp>). The proof is straightforward:
i. DT |- T r{< ^ > )  —icp
ii. DT |— iTr(<cp>) <-> —«cp
iii. Hence, DT |- Tr{<-i(p>) <-> -iTir(«p>), for any (p e  0L.
Now compare this with the notion o f ©-incompleteness. A theory T in the language of 
arithmetic L is ©-incomplete if  and only if  there is a formula P(x) such that,
i. for all natural numbers n ,T  P(ri)
ii. not:-(T |-VxP(x))
Obviously, we may adopt an analogous notion for theories that talk about syntactical 
items, like closed formulas. That is, T is ©-incomplete when there is a formula P(x) such 
that T always implies P(<cp>), for each L-formula (p, but does not imply VxP(x). We may 
summarize the findings o f the last three sub-sections thus:
Theorem  3: DT (MT) is “©-Incomplete”.
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Proof: DT (MT) implies all the “instances” of NEG, but does not imply NEG. ■
Compare this with Robinson Arithmetic Q:
i. For any natural numbers n, m, Q \-n + m  = m + n.
But Q does not prove the general law of commutativity for addition, namely,
ii. Q does not imply VxVy(x + y  = y + x ) .
Q is good at (finite) arithmetic, but bad at algebra.87
iv. DT and MT do not implicitly define Tr.
A number o f authors writing about Tarski’s theory have claimed that Convention T (in 
effect, the infinite list o f T-sentences: i.e., the theories DT and MT) “fixes the extension 
o f ’, or implicitly defines, ‘true’. Examples of such authors are Quine88, Haack89 and 
Corcoran90.
Certainly, if  we set up two disquotation theories DT] and DT2 governing truth 
predicates Tr\ and Tr2, then since DT] f- Tr;(<(p>) <-» cp, we see that DT] u  DT2 j- 
Tri(<(p>) <-» 7r2(«p>), for each cp e  0L. But it does not follow that TrY and Tr2 are 
coextensive in DTt u  DT2, as an argument using the Beth Definability Theorem shows:
Theorem  4: DT and MT do not implicitly define Tr.
Proof: Assume that (i), the language of DT, excluding the predicate Tr, contains only 
apparatus that may be interpreted in the underlying theory T in the object language L (so 
the syntax o f L may be formalized within T in L); and (ii), the theory T in L is a
87 For a detailed presentation o f Q see Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, Chapter 14, “Representability in Q”.
88 See Quine 1953b, p. 136: “Nevertheless the [disquotation schemes] resemble definitions in this 
fundamental respect: they leave no ambiguity as to the extensions, the ranges o f  applicability, o f  the verbs 
in question
89 See Haack 1978, p. 100: “The point o f  the (T)-schema is that, if  it is accepted, it fixes not the intension or 
meaning but the extension o f the term ‘true’.”
90 See Corcoran 1997: “One o f Tarski’s major philosophical insights is that ... all Tarskian biconditionals 
whose right hand side exhaust the sentences o f a given formal language constitute an implicit definition o f  
‘true’ as applicable to sentences o f that given formal language.”
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consistent extension of Q (so Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem applies). Now, assume that 
DT implicitly defines Tr. Then, by the Beth Definability Theorem, there exists an explicit 
definition o f 7? in DT, say Vx(Tr(x) <-» 'F(x)). By assumption, may be translated into 
the object language. Hence, we should have an explicit definition o f Tr in the object 
language. This contradicts Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem. ■
The disquotation theory DT does, however, rather trivially fix the extension o f Tr in 
“standard models”. For suppose we add an extra predicate Tr*9 and construct the 
analogous theory DT*. Let 3  be any L-interpretation. Let Tr be the theory o f 3  (the set of 
true L-sentences in 3). A standard model o f DT is just the expansion (3, Tr). Obviously, 
if  3+ is any standard model of DT u  DT*, then 3+[7r] = 3 +[7ir*]. For the standard model 
o f DT u  DT* is just (3, Tr, Tr).
5.5 Further Inadequacies of Deflationary Theories
The deflationary theories of truth are, I claim, incomplete accounts o f the concept of 
truth. The Tarskian theory o f satisfaction is a much more complete account o f our 
conception o f truth. For example Tarski’s theory, unlike the deflationary theories DT and 
MT, yields all the usual theorems expected from a (classical) theory o f truth:
for any closed formula cp, -icp is true if  and only if  cp is not true
if  I  is a set o f true closed formulas, then any deductive consequence o f X is true.
for any set o f closed formulas X, if  X is true then X is consistent
... and so on
Consider the attempt to express ‘T is true’ within T. The statement‘T is true’ means, 
for any closed formula cp, if  cp is provable in T, then cp is true.
Now if ‘true’ is not definable in T, then we have a problem. But we can make certain 
progress. Let T be a consistent axiomatizable extension o f first-order Peano Arithmetic. 
Now let cp be any L-sentence, we want to express,
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(1) if  cp is provable in T then cp is true
Now a provability predicate, Provj, is expressible in T and we can express (1) in the 
metalanguage L+ by,
(2) ProvT([cp]) Tr{[cpl)
But we can “disquote” the truth-predication and obtain,
(3) Provr(r cpl) —> cp
Any such formula is called a “reflection principle”91. Let Reflr be the set o f all these 
reflection principles in L. One might think of this infinite collection o f sentences Reflj as 
expressing within T the truth of T. However, it is possible to show that, if  T is a 
consistent axiomatizable extension o f Peano Arithmetic, then not-(T |- Reflr) . 92 Actually, 
Reflr implies Corir!93 So T u  Reflr is certainly not a conservative extension o f T.
But more importantly, one may show that adding DT to T is insufficient to derive a 
certain metalanguage formula which expresses the “truth o f T”. First, define the “truth of  
T”, thus, as an L+-formula:
Trr: \fx(Provj{x) -» Tr{x))
Now it is possible to prove the following theorem,
Theorem  5: T u  DT does not imply TrT.
Proof. Assume that T u  DT |- Try. Then, T u  DT [■ \fx(Provj(x) -»  Tr{x)). Then, T u  
DT |- Provt(T0 ± Ol) -* 7XT0 * 0]). Then, T u  DT |- Conr. And this is impossible, 
because, by GodeFs Second Incompleteness Theorem, T does not imply Conr and DT is 
conservative. The same holds for the other conservative deflationary truth theories MT 
and SDT. ■
91 See Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 283.
92 Use Lob’s Theorem (see Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 187), which says that, if  T |- Provt(Tcpl) —» cp, then T 
f- q>. So if T implied Reflr, it would have to imply every sentence cp, and T would be inconsistent.
93 Again, use Lob’s Theorem: First, Reflr [  P rovjft->0 = Ol) -» -,0  = 0. Thus, Reflr |- 0 = 0 -> 
-iP rovjf-^O  = 0"|). Thus, ReflT + 0 = 0 |- ConT. Hence, ReflT ConT.
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Incidentally, it is worth quickly looking at how does this works for Q, which is finitely 
axiomatized. Of course, we may suppose that Q is a (finite) axiom in L, and then we can 
“express its truth” in L+ as a single formula T/lf Q~l). Q also has provability predicates, 
say Prova and we can also “express it truth” as Trc*: the formula, V x (P /to v q (x ) -»  77(x)).
What we can then show is that,
i. Q u  DT does not imply Tr<a
ii. Q u D T  does not imply Tr§Q~|) <-> TrQ.
The proof o f (i) is analogous to the above Theorem 5. The proof of (ii) resides in the 
fact that DT Thfcfl) <-» Q (by construction!!). So, Q u  DT [- Tr^Ql). If Q u  DT 
implied Tr(TQl) <-» TrQ, then it would also imply Tro, which it doesn’t by (i). So (ii) is 
proved.
This further strengthens the case for thinking that the deflationary truth theories really 
are weak and incomplete theories o f truth.
5.6 Tarski’s Theory and Godel Sentences
The non-conservativeness result is very interesting. Let T in L be a consistent axiomatic 
extension o f PA. Then let G t be a Godel sentence for T. Now, Gy “says that” Gy is not 
provable in T. So, GT is true if and only if Gy is not provable in T. This can be 
formalized within T. Indeed, T |- GT <-> -P r o v f  Gyl). There is such a sentence, by the 
Diagonal Lemma (or Fixed Point Theorem).
Theorem  6: Provability of Godel Sentences
Let T be a consistent axiomatic extension o f PA. Let Gy be a fixed point of 
-iProvy. Then T u  TS |- Gy.
Proof: By a basic property o f TS (Tarski 1936, Theorem 5), T u  TS [-Try. Thus, T u  
TS |- ProVy(fcpl) -»  Thf cpl), for all cp e  0L. And, T f- Gy -.ProVy(T Gyl). Thus, T u
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simple logic, T u  TS \- Gy. ■
We can certainly “recognize” that a Godel sentence Gj for T is true (on the assumption 
that T is true), but our knowledge of its truth does not obtain from correct formal 
derivations within the theory to which it applies. For example, one way o f recognizing the 
commutativity o f addition on natural numbers (i.e., the truth o f the formula VxVy(x + y  
= y + x)) is to assume that each axiom of PA is true and to derive VxVy(x + y  =  y  + x)), 
using the induction scheme (twice), from these axioms o f PA. But this does not work for 
a Godel sentence Gpa. For Gpa is not a consequence o f PA (if PA is consistent, etc.).
How then do we “recognize the truth” of Gy? According to an argument associated with 
Lucas 1961 and, more recently, Penrose 1989, this recognition involves some kind of 
non-computational “insight”94. Although I (like them) am inclined to disagree with the 
computational theory o f mind, I think they are wrong on this matter, for:
Gy is deducible from the strengthened theory: T plus the standard Tarskian
theory o f  truth for the language of T.
Theorem 6 above can be deformalized as follows. We have the Fixed Point Theorem:
Hypi. T implies that Gy is true if and only if  Gy is not provable in T 
plus the “Generalized Equivalence Principle”:
Hyp2. T + TS implies that T is true 
Then we proceed as follows:
(1) T + TS implies that, for any cp, if cp is provable in T then cp is true
(2) T + TS implies that if  Gy is provable in T then Gy is true
(3) T + TS implies that if  Gy is not true then Gy is true
(4) T + TS implies that Gy is true
(5) T + TS implies Gy
94 See Penrose 1989, Chapter 4, ‘Truth, Proof and Insight’.
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In any case, remember that a deflationary theory o f truth cannot achieve such “insight” 
(i.e., reasoning). It is conservative, so T u  “deflationary theory” does not imply Gt. 
Indeed, Hyp2 fails for DT. If I am right, our ability to recognize the truth o f Godel 
sentences involves a theory o f truth (Tarski’s) which significantly transcends the 
deflationary theories.
To summarize, an adequate theory of truth looks like it must be wow-conservative. 
Indeed, it is bound to be non-conservative if  it satisfies the generalized “Equivalence 
Principle” above. Tarski’s theory does the job nicely. But the deflationary theories are 
conservative. So they are inadequate.
5.7 Tarski 1936 Revisited
Some o f the technical material presented above appeared, in slightly different clothing, 
in Tarski’s famous 1936 essay, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’.
i. The C onservativeness of DT
In the later (often unread by philosophers) sections o f Tarski 1936, we read:
THEOREM III: if the class of all provable sentences of the metatheory is 
consistent and if we add to the metatheory the symbol 'Tr1 as a new primitive 
sign, and all the theorems that are described in conditions (a) and (p) of the 
Convention T as new axioms [i.e., all the "disquotational T-sentences”], then the 
class of all provable sentences in the metatheory is consistent.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 256).
This theorem is certainly implied by the conservativeness o f DT. For if  T u  DT is a 
conservative extension of a consistent theory T, then T u  DT must also be consistent. 
Actually, Tarski’s Theorem III implies conservativeness also. Theorem III says that, for 
any consistent theory T in L, T u  DT is consistent. So, if  T u  DT is inconsistent, then so 
is T. Suppose that T u  DT |- cp, where cp is an L-sentence. Then, T u  {^cp) u  DT is 
inconsistent. By Theorem III, T u  {—icp} must be inconsistent. Thus, T |- cp.
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ii. The “© -Incom pleteness” of DT
Shortly after Tarski’s introduction and proof sketch o f Theorem III, we read:
The value of the result is considerably diminished by the fact that the axioms 
mentioned in Theorem III [i.e., the axioms of DT] have a very restricted deductive 
power. A theory of truth founded on them would be a highly incomplete system, 
which would lack the most important and most fruitful theorems.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 257).
To illustrate this, Tarski discusses the formula, ~^Tr{x) v  -iTr{neg(x)). He first points 
out (in effect) that DT proves -n77(<(p>) v  -iTr(neg(<(p>)), for any L-sentence cp. He 
then points out that the universal closure of this formula, Vx(-i77(x) v  -iT^neg(x))), 
which he calls the Law of Non-Contradiction, is not a theorem of DT. He discusses this, 
along with a proposed “Rule o f Infinite Induction”, or an ©-rule, on pages 257-261.
iii. DT Does Not Implicitly Define Tr
Having noticed the refutation, using the Beth Definability Theorem, o f the claim that 
Convention T fixes the extension o f ‘true’, I discovered that Tarski had already said 
pretty much the same:
Thus it seem s natural to require that the axioms of the theory of truth, together 
with the original axioms of the metatheory, should constitute a categorical 
system. It can be shown that this postulate coincides in the present case with 
another postulate, according to which the axiom system of the theory of truth 
should unambiguously determine the extension of the symbol ‘Tr’ which occurs 
in it, and in the following sense: if we introduce into the metatheory, alongside 
this symbol, another primitive sign, e.g., the symbol Tr", and set up analogous 
axioms for it, then the statement T r — Tr" must be provable. Bui this postulate 
cannot be satisfied, l-or it is not difficult to prove that in the contrary case tne 
concept of truth could be defined exclusively by means of terms belonging to the 
morphology of the language, which would be in palpable contradiction with 
Theorem I [Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem].
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 258. Emphasis added).
It is interesting that Tarski’s proof, which he does not give explicitly, involves a similar 
argument to the Beth Definability Theorem, which was not in fact proved until later 
(Beth 1953).
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iv. The N on-Conservativeness of the Full Tarskian Theory of Truth
Finally (Tarski 1936, pp. 274-276), Tarski discusses what amounts to our non- 
conservativeness result. In particular, the provability o f undecidable-in-T Godel 
sentences in the overall truth-theoretic metatheory T u  TS. He writes:
The definition of truth allows the consistency of a deductive science to be 
proved on the basis of a metatheory which is of higher order than the theory 
itself. On the other hand, it follows from Godel’s investigations that it is in 
general impossible to prove the consistency of a theory if the proof is sought on 
the basis of a metatheory of equal or lower order. Moreover, Godel has given a 
method for constructing sentences which—assuming the theory concerned to be 
consistent—cannot be decided in any direction in this theory. All sentences 
constructed according to GOdel’s method possess the property that it can be 
established whether they are true or false on the basis of the metatheory of 
higher order having a correct definition of truth. Consequently, it is possible to 
reach a decision regarding these sentences, i.e., they can be either proved or 
disproved.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 274. Emphasis added).
Tarski then discusses Godel’s method of obtaining a sentence G
... which satisfies the following condition: G is not provable if and only if p, 
where 'p' represents the whole sentence G.
Tarski then goes on to show that this sentence G is “actually undecidable and at the 
same time true”. He concludes,
By establishing the truth of the sentence G we have eo ipso . . . also proved G 
itself in the metatheory. . . .  the sentence G which is undecidable in the original 
theory becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory.
(Tarski 1936 (1956), p. 276)
5.8 Conclusion: Deflating Deflationism
It seems to me that if  the result o f adding a higher level theory T2 to some lower level 
theory T i yields new theorems, expressible in the language o f the lower level theory Ti 
but not derivable in T1? and we have reasons for thinking that these extra theorems are 
themselves true, then T2 could not be considered dispensable in favour o f T! (or 
somehow redundant). The non-conservativeness results above show that adding the full
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theory of satisfaction for L to a theory T in L, need not yield a conservative extension. 
And we have reasons for thinking that the extra theorems are themselves true.
Part o f the basic (not necessarily deflationist) idea about truth is that a particular 
statement <p and its “truth” 7r(<cp>) are somehow “equivalent”. I think this is correct 
(indexicals aside), and if  a truth theory satisfies Convention T then it proves the 
equivalence. But we must go further. Any adequate theory o f truth should be able to 
prove the generalized “equivalence” of a possibly infinitely axiomatized theory T and its 
“truth” Trj (that is, the metalanguage formula \fx(Provj(x) - »  Tr(x)). And Tarski’s 
theory comes up trumps. It is possible to show that with Tarski’s theory of satisfaction 
TS, one has,
i. TuTSj-Trr
However, the preceding arguments indicate that with the deflationary theories one has,
ii. T u  deflationary truth theory does not imply Try
The “recognizability” o f Godel sentences further emphasizes these points. Indeed, the 
ability to “see” that Gt and Cony are in fact true is a fundamental element of  
understanding the significance of Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems: we can “see” that 
Gt and Cony are true, even though the consistent axiomatic theory T itself cannot prove 
them. There are truths that cannot be proved. Truth and proof come apart95. We have 
seen that Tarski’s theory o f truth helps explain this phenomenon. Suppose we accept a 
standard axiomatization o f arithmetic (PA, say). It seems correct to say that we also 
(implicitly) accept its truth, and thus we surely then think that it is consistent. Tarski’s 
Indefinability Theorem tells us that we cannot define a truth predicate for L in the 
language L of PA, but we can (using Godelian techniques) express the consistency o f PA 
in L. So, having accepted PA, we think it’s true, and we seem to be committed to 
thinking it consistent. But the consistency of PA is not deducible from the axioms o f PA,
95 Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 180: “And perhaps the most significant consequence o f  [Godel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem] is what it says about the notions o f truth (in the standard interpretation o f  the 
language o f arithmetic) and theoremhood, or provability (in any particular formal theory): that they are in no 
sense the same.” Music to Platonist ears: the Godelian overture to realism.
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by Gddel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. Nevertheless, the consistency o f PA is a 
true statement if  PA is consistent. How do we ‘‘know it”? What we have shown is that by 
adding a strong enough theory o f truth (the theory o f satisfaction for the language of 
arithmetic), we can deduce the truth of PA (i.e., TrpA) and hence the consistency o f PA 
(i.e., CoripA) from this truth-theoretic strengthening o f PA. However, we have also 
shown that the deflationary theories o f truth are powerless to achieve this deduction, for 
they are conservative (anything derivable with them is derivable without them).
To summarize:
(1) The deflationary theories DT, MT and SDT are conservative;
(2) DT and MT are “©-incomplete”;
(3) Neither DT nor MT implicitly defines ‘true’;
(4) The standard Tarskian theory of truth/satisfaction TS is non-conservative;
(5) T u T S f-T r j;
(6) T u  deflationary theory does not imply Try;
(7) T u  TS implies Godel sentences: T u  TS [  Con-r; T u  TS |- Gy.
To sum up, / /  “deflationism about truth” is construed as incorporating the following
claims,
C onservativeness Claim (implicit in the idea of redundancy)
The result of adding a truth theory to a collection o f non-truth-theoretic 
assumptions yields a conservative extension.
C om pleteness Claim (explicit in Horwich’s  minimalism):
Deflationary theories of truth constitute “all there is to truth”,
then deflationism is false. Formalized theories based on the deflationary conception of 
truth are incomplete with respect to our prior grasp o f the “truth about truth”. If I am 
right, there is simply more to truth than is expressed by the deflationary truth theories.
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In the introduction I hinted at a close analogy between the indispensability of 
mathematics and the indispensability o f a substantial theory o f  truth. Field’s deflationary 
programme aims to show that mathematical theories (like standard set theory) are 
convenient fictions: ultimately redundant and (in principle) dispensable.
As we shall see in Chapter 9, this deflationary programme for mathematics founders on 
the non-conservativeness o f adding mathematics to “mathematics-free” nominalistic 
theories, like the quasi-Newtonian theory of the gravitational field in Euclidean space­
time presented in Field 1980. I have argued that Tarskian truth theory is in some way 
analogous (N.B., a Tarskian truth theory contains set-theory). So I would like to conclude 
by suggesting that this analogy between the indispensability o f (Tarskian) theories o f  
truth and the indispensability o f mathematical theories deserves more intensive 
investigation. In the meantime, no-one will drive us out o f  Tarski's truth-theoretic 
paradise!!
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Chapter 6
Mathematical Truth
It is my contention that two quite distinct kinds of concerns have separately 
motivated accounts of the nature of mathematical truth: (1) the concern for 
having a homogeneous semantical theory in which the semantics for the 
propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for the rest of language, and
(2) the concern that the account of mathematical truth mesh with a reasonable 
epistemology. It will be my general thesis that almost all accounts of the concept 
of mathematical truth can be identified with serving one or the other of these 
masters at the expense of the other.
Paul Benacerraf 1973 (1983), ‘Mathematical Truth’, p. 403.
And perhaps the most significant consequence of Theorem 6 [Godel’s  First 
Incompleteness Theorem] is what it says about the notions of truth (in the 
standard interpretation of the language of arithmetic) and theoremhood, or 
provability (in any particular formal theory): that they are in no sense the same.
George Boolos & Richard Jeffrey 1989, Computability and Logic, p. 180.
6.1 Semantic Monism and the Benacerraf Dilemma
We argued in Chapter 4 that subjectivist (epistemic, internalist or anti-realist) truth, 
theories lead to an unacceptable relativism. I have suggested that disquotational T- 
sentences are (in some sense) analytic or trivially true, primarily due to the 
conservativeness of their “totality” (one needs to be careful to avoid semantic paradox, 
imposing a restriction that the truth predicate Tr may not appear in the formulas o f which 
truth is predicated). However, we argued in Chapter 5 that such deflationary theories o f  
truth, consisting simply o f the (restricted) totality o f such sentences, are inadequate as a 
theory o f  truth. Such theories are weak in several senses: in particular, they are 
demonstrably conservative over theories in the object language, while an adequate truth 
theory must be wow-conservative in order to correctly represent truth-theoretic reasoning. 
E.g., an adequate truth theory should be able to prove that if an object level theory T is 
true, then it is consistent; but if  the truth theory could do this, it would have to be non­
conservative. Tarski’s theory does in fact represent this reasoning correctly. (The
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deflationary truth theories DT and MT are weak in further senses: they do not imply the 
generalized “laws o f truth”, and do not implicitly define truth).
By elimination that leaves as candidate theories o f truth:
i. Tarski-style truth theories,
a. A recursive definition of a referential relation (like satisfaction) for the 
recursively specifiable formulas of the object language,
b. Truth defined in terms of this referential relation,
c. Satisfy Convention T, by proving all the T-sentences as theorems;
ii. Russell-style correspondence theories,
Truth defined as a “correspondence relation” between each sentence and a 
“fact”.
In this section, I want to examine a doctrine I shall call {standard Tarskian) semantic 
monism and its relation to the problem of “epistemic access” explained by Benacerraf 
1973. Semantic monism is the doctrine that the standard semantic conception o f truth 
and satisfaction (or some suitable generalization thereof to handle, say, indexicals) is 
applicable to all pieces of linguistic discourse. In particular, semantic monism entails that 
the standard semantic conception o f truth applies readily to mathematical discourse, both 
pure and applied. We shall say that someone who advocates a non-semantic conception 
of “truth” for mathematical sentences is advocating a non-standard conception o f  
mathematical truth.
Actually, unbridled semantic monism would be the thesis that we should apply one 
uniform semantic theory for all linguistic discourse: mathematics, natural science, 
psychology, ethics, aesthetics, poetry, etc. Tarskian semantic monism is the thesis that the 
theory o f truth required is Tarski’s (or a suitable extension, for indexicality, modality, 
etc.).
Consider the “logico-semantic structure” of the following sentences:
(1) There is a mountain between Manchester and Leeds
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(2) There is a prime number between 10 and 12
The prima facie “logical regimentations” of these statements are respectively:
(1 )r 3x(mountain(.x) a  between(jc, Manchester, Leeds))
(2)r 3jc(prime-number(jc) a  betweenfx, 10,12))
Notice that both are instances o f the formal schema:
(3) 3x(F(x) a  G(x, a, b))
The semantic analysis o f (1) and (2) requires that in both ( l ) r and (2)r, the quantifier 3 
should be interpreted as a referential quantifier and that the predicates and variables be 
treated in the usual Tarskian way. Arbitrary «-place predicates are true o f  ^ -tuples of 
objects; the extension o f an n-place predicate P  is the class o f  ^ -tuples o f which P  is true’, 
any valuation a  satisfies the sentence P(t\, fj, tn) just in case (aft], aft], ..., a ft j)  e  
the extension o f P.
The alleged problem with a standard Tarskian treatment o f mathematical truth, 
explaining truth in terms o f satisfaction (reference), is that it forces mathematical 
statements to be construed as descriptive o f a realm o f (presumably abstract) 
mathematical objects (i.e., the values o f variables). Some authors refer to this as 
“objects-platonism” The problem, if  there is one, with objects-platonism is that it might 
be difficult to see how facts about such abstract objects could be known. The locus 
classicus for this alleged epistemological problem is a celebrated article by Paul 
Benacerraf.
In his 1973, Benacerraf imposes two conditions upon an “acceptable over-all account of 
mathematical knowledge and truth”:
The first component of such an over-all view is more directly concerned with 
the concept of truth. We can state [the first component] as the requirement that 
there be an over-all theory of truth in terms of which it can be certified that the 
account of mathematical truth is indeed an account of mathematical truth. The 
account should imply truth conditions for mathematical propositions that are 
evidently conditions of their truth (and not simply, say, of their theoremhood in 
some formal system). This is not to deny that being a theorem of some system 
can be a truth condition for a  given proposition or class of propositions. It is 
rather to require that any theory that proffers theoremhood a s  a condition of truth 
also explain the connection between truth and theoremhood.
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Paul Benacerraf 1973 (1983), ‘Mathematical Truth’, p. 408.
Another way of putting this first requirement is to demand that any theory of 
mathematical truth be in conformity with a  general theory of truth—a theory of 
truth theories, if you like—which certifies that the property of sentences that the 
account calls 'truth” is indeed truth . . . [This] amounts only to a  plea that the 
semantical apparatus of mathematics be seen as  part and parcel of that of the 
natural language in which it is d one . ..
I suggest that, if we are to meet this requirement, we shouldn’t be satisfied with 
an account that fails to treat ['there are at least three large cities older than New 
York’] and ['there are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17’] in parallel 
fashion . . .  I take it we have only one such account: Tarski’s, and that its 
essential feature is to define truth in terms of reference (or satisfaction) on the 
basis of a particular kind of syntactico-semantical analysis of the language.
{op. cit., p. 408. Emphasis added)
Accounts o f mathematical truth which violate the constraints imposed are simply not 
accounts o f truth. According to semantic monism, the appropriate concept o f truth for the 
sentences o f a mathematical theory is the semantic conception o f truth as explicated by 
Tarski 1936.
Now why should this create a problem? As we noted above, the application o f Tarskian 
semantical theory to mathematics theories leads us to construe the statements o f such 
theories as purporting to describe a realm of mathematicalia. (In particular, if  any 
existential statements are true, then mathematicalia must exist).
Benacerraf goes on in his 1973 article to argue that the implication o f the existence o f 
(presumably abstract) mathematicalia, proceeding via the theory o f truth, leads to the 
problem of our knowledge o f such entities:
... accounts of truth that treat mathematical and nonmathematical discourse in 
relevantly similar ways do so at the cost of leaving it unintelligible how we can 
have any mathematical knowledge whatsoever;
(Benacerraf 1973 (1983), pp. 403)
This is the Benacerraf puzzle o f “epistemic access” to mathematical objects. If 
mathematics is a body o f known truths about a realm o f abstract mathematicalia, and 
knowledge acquisition is a matter o f causal interaction with our surroundings, then how 
is knowledge o f such abstracta possible? The puzzle is sometimes expressed as,
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The Benacerraf Dilemma:
Either our truth-theoretic semantics is deeply flawed or our “causal” 
epistemology is deeply incomplete.
This dilemma has been one o f the most widely discussed problems in the philosophy o f  
mathematics in the past twenty-five years. Although several philosophers o f mathematics 
(notably Chihara, Kitcher and Field) take the dilemma as a strong argument against 
realism, it is noteworthy that Benacerraf himself does not advocate nominalism.
I shall try to briefly summarize the three most prominent proposals for resolving the 
problem o f epistemic access along lines consistent with Tarski’s theory and mathematical 
realism:
i. Godel, Maddy and Mathematical Intuition
The first proposal derives from some remarks o f Gddel 1944, 1947 and concentrates on 
a proposed epistemic faculty o f “mathematical intuition”, whereby mathematical truths 
are forced upon the mind o f the mathematician:
... the assumption of [sets] is quite as legitimate a s  the assumption of physical 
bodies and there is quite as  much reason to believe in their existence. They are 
in the sam e sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as 
physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions.
(Godel 1944 (1983), pp. 456-7).
... the objects of transfinite set theory ... clearly do not belong to the physical 
world and even their indirect connection with physical experience is very loose 
(owing primarily to the fact that set-theoretical concepts play only a minor role in 
the physical theories of today).
But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something 
like a  perception also of the objects of set theory, a s  is seen from the fact that 
the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don’t see  why we should 
have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, 
than in sense experience, which induces us to build up physical theories and to 
expect that future sense experiences will agree with them and, moreover, to 
believe that a  question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in 
the future.
(Godel 1947+1964 (1983), pp. 483-4. Emphasis added)96.
96 G6del 1947+1964 is a revision to Godel 1947. It appears in full in Benacerraf & Putnam (eds.) 1983.
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The most well-known advocate o f a version o f this proposal is Maddy 1980, 1990. 
Maddy does not argue that pure mathematicalia are themselves perceivable. Rather, she 
argues that it is possible to perceive impure mathematicalia, such as sets o f (or structures 
composed of) concrete urelements. Suppose you open the fridge, and there before you is 
a carton o f eggs. Standard set theory with urelements assert the existence o f a set o f these 
eggs. Now, you can see the eggs all right, for photons emitted by the fridge light are 
reflected from the eggs into your eyes, stimulating the rods and cones in your retinas, and 
sending electrical information to the brain, which results, presumably causally, in the 
brain somehow “assenting” to the propositional message “Eggs ahoy”. According to 
Maddy, you can perceive the set o f eggs, as well as the eggs. The idea is that impure 
mathematicalia (i.e., sets containing concrete urelements) have physical properties and 
are causally active.
I find this implausible. What, for example, is the optical reflectivity o f this setl Just 
how does this set transfer energy and momentum to the photons whereby it is perceived? 
Standard physics doesn’t attribute physical properties to the set o f eggs, and it might be 
argued that Maddy’s proposal is simply inconsistent with the sorts o f physical 
mechanisms postulated by conventional physics.97’98
ii. Neo-Fregeanism  and the  Theory of Abstraction
The second proposal involves from Frege’s theory o f abstraction99. The example Frege 
gives concerns the existence and properties o f directions o f lines. The “abstraction 
principle” is that, if  A and B are lines, then,
the direction of A = the direction o f B just in case A and B are parallel.
97 To be fair, however, Maddy does discuss in detail psychological work on perception, and it does seem to 
be little more than a truism to say that human perceivers are able to perceive simple patterns and structures, 
concretely exemplified.
98 On the Indispensability Argument, Maddy recognizes that mathematics is indispensable for science, but 
argues that the use o f mathematics within science is typically “idealizing”, and that, because we are not 
therefore committed to the literal truth o f such idealized theories, the argument for realism is undercut. See 
Maddy 1992, 1996.1 disgree. The continuity, and indeed, full manifold structure, o f spacetime, for example, 
is not thought o f  as an idealization in serious physics. See Earman & Norton 1996.
99 See Frege 1884, §§ 65-68.
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Since parallelism || is an equivalence relation, this principle is in fact derivable if  we set 
dir(A) =df [^]|(.
According to the Neo-Fregean position advocated by Wright 1983 and Hale 1987, we 
can know that there is such an abstract entity as the number o f  eggs (that is, the abstract 
object #(egg)), because statements such as,
#(egg) = #(left-hand fingers) just in case (the eggs are 1-1 correlated with left- 
hand fingers)
are analytically true, and provide implicit definitions o f the singular terms ‘#(egg)’ and 
‘#(left-hand fingers)’, which designate the appropriate abstract objects. Such statements 
are instances o f Hume’s Principle, which we mentioned briefly in Chapter 2. Neo- 
Fregeans argue that we possess a priori and indefeasible knowledge o f such “abstraction- 
introducing” principles. Obviously, such principles are comprehension principles, 
asserting the existence o f certain entities. This would be more convincing if it weren’t the 
case that the analogous principle for sets (or extensions) is actually inconsistent, by 
Russell’s paradox. Instead, standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory proceeds in a more 
piece-meal fashion, asserting the existence of certain sets, and ways of generating “new” 
sets (e.g., via the power set operation).
iii. Quine’s  Holism
In his classic articles, “On What There Is” (1948) and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 
(1951), and later work, Quine set out a comprehensive epistemological position which 
might be called (covering all bases) pragmatic conjectural naturalistic holism.
Quine’s position offers an epistemology which sharply distinguishes, as all realists 
should, between the ontology o f a theory T and the ontology o f the evidence e for that 
theory. Indeed, there need be no simple connection (and certainly no causal connection) 
between the entities reified by a theory or conjecture T and the objects reified in the 
observational evidence e for that theory. Even if  evidence statements typically quantify 
over “middle-sized observable concrete bodies” and events, that is simply no restriction 
on what theoretical statements may quantify over (and such statements may count as
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justified or confirmed by their corroborating evidence). Trivial examples include 
conjectures about future events (e.g., the return o f Hailey’s comet), and more 
sophisticated examples might involve hidden space-time singularities inside causally 
inaccessible black holes100. These entities and events are clearly not causally responsible 
for our beliefs about them. The same argument transfers to our conjectural knowledge o f  
abstracta like numbers and classes101.
It is worthwhile looking a little more closely at Quine’s epistemology. On this position, 
theory-formation and concept-formation does not involve a naive empiricistic copying 
into the mind o f “sensations”, which are supposed to be caused by, and to be 
representations of, objects in the local observable environment. Instead, Quine 
emphasizes a process o f cognitive growth: language acquisition, concept formation, 
theory construction, and the full-blown hypothetico-deductive scientific method involves 
the successive incorporation o f more and more sophisticated conceptual apparatus, 
beginning with holophrastic observation sentences (“Mama!”, “Dog!”), tightly 
conditioned to stimulation, passing through the emergence o f predication (“Milk is hot”), 
truth functions (“If there is milk, then there is food”) and culminating, relatively early on, 
in the introduction o f objectual quantification over abstractions.102
On this conjectural holistic view, mathematicalia (and abstract entities generally) are 
“on a par” with electrons and photons, in being hypothetical or theoretical entities 
postulated by evolving scientific conjecture. Indeed, because Quine rejects the notion o f  
immediate knowledge o f a “given” object, he views all objects as theoretical103.
100 No light signal emitted inside a black hole horizon can leave it. If there are such singularities and event 
horizons in spacetime, we certainly do not know about them by their “causing” us to know about them. This 
reminds me o f  a joke by Putnam: “What is the dominant cause o f our beliefs about electrons? Textbooks, o f  
course”.
101 Along similar lines, Hart 1979 argues that Quine’s epistemology solved the Benacerraf problem avant la  
lettre.
102 Quine’s speculations are set out at length in Quine 1974 and more succinctly in Quine 1995.
103 See Quine 1981b. N.B., this is not intended to be idealism or anything like that. That would be to 
confuse epistemology with metaphysics, as Quine stressed in his Foreword to Quine 1980. Properly 
speaking, it is the concepts ‘electron’ and ‘dog’ that are (epistemologically) on a par.
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In fact, this is supported by a well-known experimental fact, discussed in any decent 
textbook on child development or cognitive growth104. An early conjecture (or discovery) 
of the developing child is the “object-concept”105, the discovery that objects still exist 
when not perceived)06.
Quine, as always, argues there is no fundamental difference between high-level 
conjectures about theoretical entities like electrons and low-level childish conjectures 
about the behaviour o f toys and Mama. The fact that high-level conjectures involve 
explanations o f effects (like lightning, rusting and so on) by the postulation o f atoms, 
electrons and molecular forces indicates no difference in kind)01. The 10 month old child 
learns to “pad” his or her system with unobserved toys, while the 24 year old physicist 
“pads” his or her system o f the world with atoms, quarks, space-time points, forces and 
force fields, numbers, functions, classes, and so on.
A further component o f Quine’s position is a repudiation o f naive empiricism in favour 
o f pragmatism. Our primary drive in this activity is not solely evidential or based on 
“theory-neutral” observations108. Rather, our conceptual growth is driven by pragmatic 
considerations o f simplicity, convenience, elegance, explanatory power, and so on. 
Quine discusses a mathematical example: we “round out” our theory o f integers with a 
theory of interspersed ratios; and, again, we round out our “gappy” theory of ratios with a
104 E.g., Flavell 1985.
105 This is Piaget’s terminology. It is sometimes called the “object-persistence” concept and sometimes even 
called the “object-independence” concept.
106 The experimental demonstration o f this is (I am told) a common undergraduate psychology experiment. 
The child is presented with a toy, and one checks whether the child understands or expects that the toy is 
still there even if it is hidden from view behind an obstacle or screen. It transpires that one can 
experimentally demonstrate the normal child’s conceptual transition from “Berkeleyan idealism” to “Lockean 
realism” in the first year o f development. (So much for Berkeley’s a  priori philosophical proof of 
immaterialism)!
107 This is connected to the so-called “Piaget-Chomsky” debate in development theory. Chomsky argues 
that the development o f mental faculties such as the object-concept (and, indeed, general language 
acquisition) is biological and innate, while the Piagetians are silent on the matter. In contrast, Chomsky 
points out that knowledge o f high-level physical principles is not innate. This is why learning a language is 
“easy” and learning high-school physics is “hard” (Chomsky thinks that mathematics, at least the simple 
parts o f counting and geometry, lies in between). It is a question o f the way the brain is designed.
108 Quine argues in his 1951a and later articles that there can be no hope o f  observational reductionism, o f a 
phenomenalistic reduction o f science to an evidential foundation o f “remembered similarity” between sense 
data, or anything like that. This is one o f  “Dogmas” o f  empiricism.
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theory o f densely interspersed irrationals; and finally we pad our theory o f reals with a 
theory o f complex numbers, obtaining full algebraic completeness: every polynomial has 
a root. Similarly, we interpolate a smooth curve between plotted data points, and 
extrapolate our curves into the unknown.
6.2 Arguments for Semantic Monism
Benacerraf is sharply aware that any non-standard conception o f mathematical truth 
leaves it unexplained how to connect the obtaining o f non-standard conditions (e.g., 
derivability in an uninterpreted axiom system) with the truth o f mathematical assertions:
... whereas those [accounts of mathematical truth] which attribute to 
mathematical propositions the kind of truth conditions we can clearly know to 
obtain, do so at the expense of failing to connect these conditions with any 
analysis of the sentences which shows how the assigned conditions are 
conditions for their truth.
(Benacerraf 1973 (1983), pp. 403-4).
Is there an argument for treating the sentences o f mathematics and physics on a par, 
semantically? One argument is this. Tarski, following Frege and Russell, originally 
developed standard “referential semantics” for mathematical languages. Out o f this arose 
model theory. The theories to which model theory were applied were, in the beginning, 
always mathematical theories, like arithmetic, analysis, algebra, geometry and set theory. 
Hence, the discovery o f non-standard models o f arithmetic and analysis, as well as non­
standard models o f set theory. For example, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that 
first-order set theory ZFC has a non-standard denumerable model (Z), e): such a model 
has a denumerable domain D, and hence could not contain “all sets” constructible from 
this domain, in the intuitive sense, since the power set o f D, by Cantor’s Theorem, is non- 
denumerable; and thus e  could not mean membership (in the intuitive sense). Only later 
were Tarski’s ideas were taken up as a more or less correct way to do semantical theory 
by philosophers o f language, like Davidson and McDowell, and applied to non- 
mathematical discourse about trees and milk.109
109 See, e.g., Davidson 1967 and other papers anthologized in Davidson 1984.
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The argument then is that Tarski proposed his theory primarily to explicate the concept 
o f truth for mathematical discourse110, and only afterwards was this theory applied to 
non-mathematical discourse111. It would be odd to abandon this eminently workable and 
standard theory o f truth for extremely dubious philosophical reasons.
In any case, it seems to me that a stronger argument for semantic monism is this. In 
Chapters 2 and 3 we emphasized that we need to recognize the presence of, and analyse 
the logico-semantic properties of, mixed predicates and axioms in scientific theories. 
Standard mathematicized physical theories are expressed in languages containing 
polyadic mixed predicates simultaneously true o f physical and abstract mathematical 
entities.
Quine discusses exactly this aspect o f applied mathematics in his 1986 “Reply to 
Charles Parsons”:
Another example of applied mathematics is the use of number in measurement.
In terms of physical testing procedures we describe a Fahrenheit temperature 
function whose arguments are place-times and whose values are real numbers. 
Fahrenheit temperature is a class of pairs of pure real numbers and concrete 
place times. Similarly distance in metres is a  class of triples, each comprising 
one pure real number and two concrete localities.
Mathematical objects and concrete objects are thus in perpetual interplay, 
participating in the same triples and pairs. Mathematical vocabulary and 
empirical vocabulary are in perpetual interplay, participating in the same 
sentences. We see  this already at the most primitive level of applied 
mathematics, when we say that there are fifty people in this room: the pure 
abstract number, fifty, is how many concrete people there are in this concrete 
room. I see  pure mathematics as  an integral part of our system of the world.
(Quine 1986, p. 398).
E.g., the dyadic predicate o f thermodynamic theory,
(the real number) r is the temperature-in-°C o f (the concrete body) x
110 Tarski’s main fully worked-out example in his 1936 is the first-order language o f  classes, with c  as 
primitive. Definition 22 contains the recursive definition o f satisfaction and Definition 23 contains the 
explicit definition o f truth in terms o f satisfaction.
111 Tarski 1936 famous expressed sceptical doubts about extending his ideas to “colloquial language”. These 
problems have been widely discussed by Davidson and his followers, who propose that a theory o f  truth for 
a natural language can function as a theory o f meaning for that language. A discussion o f Davidsonian truth- 
theoretical semantics would take us too far afield. A good exposition is Platts 1979. For opposition, see 
Blackburn 1983.
C h apter  6. M a them atical  T r u t h
162
or, more concisely,
T°c(*, r \
or a mixed predicate used in theorizing about the nature o f time,
(the real number) r is a co-ordinate o f (the temporal instant) t
It would be odd to say the least to treat the primary variable 7 ’, which ranges over 
physical bodies or regions o f space-time, referentially and the secondary variable 7 ’, 
ranging intuitively over real numbers, in some non-standard non-referential way.
Actually, there is a proposal in the literature to do something like this: to treat V9 as a 
substitutional variable, and treat any quantifier that binds it as a substitutional quantifier. 
This approach might be labelled “substitutionalism”112. It cannot work for 
mathematicized theories generally, mainly for the reason that it is inadequate to the needs 
o f real analysis. By Cantor’s diagonal argument, for any standard language L with 
denumerably many expressions, there are more real numbers than numerals in L for real 
numbers113.
The important issue here concerns the dual application o f standard Tarskian semantics 
to physics and mathematics. Perhaps there would be little cause for even regarding 
mathematical sentences as meaningful, let alone true, were it not for the applicability o f  
mathematics. If mathematics were (per impossibile) entirely autonomous as an activity, 
then a severe version of formalism would be appropriate and, perhaps, quite attractive. 
Mathematics could then simply be regarded as the manipulation o f meaningless physical 
symbols. The arrangement o f such symbols might “echo” those o f sentences in 
interpreted language, but there would be few constraints on such manipulation. 
“Consistency” o f a formal system would simply mean (nothing more than) that, for any 
“sentence-like” symbol (p, the pair o f sentence-like symbols (p and -i<p never turn up in 
such manipulations. Treating such sentence-like symbols as interpreted statements
112 An approach like this, based on substitutional quantification, is perhaps implicit in some o f the work o f  
Lesniewski. It is an explicit proposal in Parsons 1971 and Gottlieb 1980.
113 Non-standard languages may, o f course, be studied, with a distinct constant Br for every real r. Such 
languages are, o f course, abstract mathematical objects, and thus o f no discernible use to a nominalist.
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would, on such a formalistic view, be perverse; and asking whether they are true or false 
would be equally perverse. In short, if  mathematics were not applicable, then 
mathematics could be construed just as Hilbert and Wittgenstein thought it should: a 
“language game” with only internal, conventional rules.
But this supposition is, o f course, are wrong. Mathematics is applicable. It remains 
puzzling that Hilbert himself never recognized this problem, for he made major 
contributions to theoretical physics114.
Finally, there is a burden o f proof argument that the onus is surely on the person who 
thinks that standard semantic theory should be replaced (by some non-standard semantic 
theory) to actually provide such a novel, non-referential, semantic theory. In particular, 
this theory must deal adequately with the troublesome mixed predicates and axioms. In 
the absence o f a non-standard semantics, the nominalist who wants to argue that standard 
existential assertions of mathematics are not true faces a basic problem. As we have seen, 
the referential apparatus o f satisfaction will force us to conclude that if  these existential 
mathematical statements are true, then there must exist certain entities for these truths to 
be truths about. But we think o f mathematicized statements o f certain scientific theories 
like relativity and quantum theory as truthful (or at least approximate truthlike) 
descriptions o f the natural world. Mathematical Platonism is just a consequence o f our 
antecedently accepted natural science.
6.3 The Standard Conception of Mathematical Truth
The techniques that Tarski introduced for theorizing about truth (simpliciter) are 
perfectly applicable to any standard formalized notation L. The trick is to introduce a 
metalanguage ML which extends the object language L by adding a new satisfaction 
predicate S at and the membership predicate e ,  and which contains axioms (TS)
114 Especially in the treatment o f action functionals and their use in the derivation, via a Least Action 
Principle, o f physical laws: the action for General Relativity is called the “Einstein-Hilbert Action”. Note: his 
work on abstract Hilbert spaces predated its application by Weyl, Jordan, von Neumann and others within 
quantum mechanics.
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formulated in ML that recursively define the new satisfaction predicate Sat with respect 
to the syntactic structure o f object language expressions.115
Thus, suppose that we are formulating the semantics116 o f some mathematical theory T. 
Let L be the object language in which T is formulated. Let Tirbe a truth predicate for L in 
L+, some sufficiently powerful metalanguage which extends L. The standard theory of 
satisfaction TS in L+ for L derives a closed formula 7V(<cp>) <-» <p, for each sentence cp of  
L. O f course, we cannot require that Sat or Tr be definable (in T) in the object language 
L. But we know that for any o f the usual mathematical languages (in particular first-order 
and higher order extensional languages), we can introduce a Tarskian theory of 
satisfaction for L, TS, which does contain an explicit definition o f Tr and derives all the 
T-theorems (one for each object language sentence, not each L+ sentence; otherwise, by 
the Diagonal Lemma we should derive a contradiction: typically Tr is not definable in the 
base theory T in the object language L)117.
Now consider a thinker contemplating mathematical assertions. Suppose he or she 
accepts 77X<cp>), where cp is some existential mathematical statement. For example, like 
almost anyone, he or she will say,
(1) the theorem ‘there exist infinitely many prime numbers’ is true.
115 In general, it will also be necessary to introduce within ML new predicates and functors, like Sen(x), 
Formix), neg(x), conj{x, y), var(x, /), etc., governed by appropriate axioms, for discussing the syntax o f L.
116 By ‘semantics’ I mean the theory o f truth simpliciter, not the theory o f “truth in a model”. To be sure, 
model-theoretical semantics is important. But to say that T has a model (is satisfiable) is not to say that T is 
true. Ptolemaic Astronomy, Newtonian Mechanics, and aromatherapy all have models, but are not true.
117 This is even possible when the object language is set-theoretical and the axioms governing e  are, say, 
ZFC. In this case, Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem ensures that one cannot convert the recursive definition 
o f  Sat to a direct definition (one can do this when e  does not appear in the object language). But even so, 
the theory o f  satisfaction TS is well-defined in the metalanguage, and it derives every T-sentence for the 
object language as required by Convention T (i.e., formulas not containing Sat or Tr). In the set-theoretical 
case, Tarski’s Theorem makes it clear that “satisfaction is untranslatable foreign language” (Quine 1970, p. 
45). This is a very strong reason for not confusing truth simpliciter with the relational notion o f “truth in a 
model”. The relation, “x is true in model AT’ is fully definable in ZFC. But no set-theory can define the 
intended interpretation o f the language o f set theory: the interpretation in which the formula xx e  Xj is 
satisfied by a sequence s  iffs, e  s .
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But if  he or she accepts this truth claim, then he or she will be forced to accept cp itself, 
for we assume that he or she also accepts the Tarski T-theorem 7>(<cp>) <-> cp. So he or 
she will accept,
(2) there exist infinitely many prime numbers
Now cp itself will usually possess direct ontological commitment to abstract entities. 
That is, (2) implies,
(3) there are mathematicalia
Finally, suppose that this person claims to be nominalist. By assumption, he or she will 
reject the existential claim 3xMath(x). Consequently he or she must reject cp (since cp 
implies 3xMath{x)). Thus he or she accepts,
(4) there are no mathematicalia
This is clearly a contradiction.
Now there is a version of nominalism, strongly hinted at by Chihara 1990, according to 
which,
We should accept the truth claim 77(<cp>), when cp is, say, a theorem of standard 
mathematics (e.g., Euclid’s Theorem of the infinity o f primes).
For example, Chihara writes:
This is just the sort of development one would expect on the hypothesis that 
mathematics is a system of truths and mathematicians are attempting to arrive at 
truths.
(Chihara 1990, p 171. Emphasis added)
Many of these mathematical beliefs have been checked and rechecked 
countless times, and in countless ways, by both sophisticated and elementary 
methods . . . We thus have some strong reasons supporting the belief that 
mathematics is a body of truths.
(Chihara 1990, pp. 172-173. Emphasis added)
We shall discuss this briefly below, as the “hermeneutic” conception o f mathematical 
truth. (We shall discuss Chihara’s overall modal nominalism later, in Chapter 8).
According to this conception o f mathematical truth, we should accept:
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(5) Euclid’s Theorem is true
But, as nominalists, we should not accept:
(6) there are infinitely many prime numbers
for this statement logically implies,
(7) there are numbers.
which nominalists insist we cannot accept.
But it is surely a triviality that we all should accept the following instance o f the 
disquotation schema:
(8) ‘there are infinitely many primes’ is true if  and only if  there are infinitely
many primes
Now clearly, this sort o f nominalist is suggesting that we accept (5) but we should reject
(7). The problem is that (7) is a logical consequence o f (5) and (8). And the 
disquotational T-sentence (8) is a triviality. Thus, such a nominalist position is logically 
inconsistent. How can anyone suggest we should accept A and B, which imply C, but 
reject C?
It seems to me that a coherent nominalist must reject (5), the truth claim concerning 
Euclid’s Theorem. Thus, someone like Chihara simply cannot argue that mathematics is 
a body o f truths and also say that the disquotational truth conditions o f its theorems do 
not hold.
One (trivial) way a nominalist can reject the truth claim is simply by replacing the 
predicate ‘true’ (which has been tightly constrained by the disquotation axioms and 
Tarski’s full theory o f satisfaction) by some new unexplained phrase, ‘mathematically 
true’. That is, the nominalist proposes the quite radical idea that the standard Tarskian 
semantical conception of truth is somehow “inappropriate” for mathematical statements. 
According to this nominalist idea, no existential mathematical theorem <p is true (in the 
standard classical sense). Instead, any existential mathematical theorem <p is merely 
“mathematically true”, although not true. Let us call this new predicate o f mathematical
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sentences M-Tr, to be read, intuitively, “mathematically true” (and whose meaning is yet 
to be specified!!).
Such a Tarski-repudiating nominalist must then suggest that we have to break the 
Tarskian disquotational link between M-7V(<(p>) and (p. That is, the nominalist rejects 
(some of) the troublesome equivalences o f the form:
M-Tr{<q») (p
Indeed, the whole motivation for this kind o f nominalist is to achieve a coherent 
situation wherein he or she could consistently accept M-Tr{<cp>) without accepting cp. 
But this means that M-Tr has lost its claim to being a truth predicate. This nominalist 
strategy involves introducing a non-classical conception o f “mathematical truth”, 
radically different in its logical behaviour from truth:
i. for truth simpliciter, we must accept every instance of:
77(< cp>)«-»cp
Rejecting these equivalences amounts either to simply assigning a deviant meaning to 
the word ‘true’, or to misunderstanding the concept o f truth. For the concept of truth is 
conceptually grounded in the disquotational T-equivalences. Furthermore, the totality o f  
such instances (that is, the theory DT) is really quite harmless: it is conservative, and so 
alone it implies nothing but logical truths (in the base language), and even if  added to 
another base theory implies nothing new.
ii. for “mathematical truth” we are free to accept some instances of,
M- 77X<cp>) a  —icp,
Quite clearly, the nominalist must urge that M-Tr * Tr.
However, we need to ask what this new predicate M-Tr means. There are two accounts 
o f “mathematical truth”, different from and incompatible with the standard Tarskian 
semantic conception o f truth.
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6.4 Non-Standard Mathematical Truth I: If-Then ism
One proposal for analysing “mathematical truth” is that it is nothing more than 
derivability in some axiom system M.118 This proposal is popular with those minimalists 
who assume that mathematics is nothing more than theorem proving (or the deductive 
study o f uninterpreted formal axiom systems)119. Indeed, this proposal is closely 
connected to a version o f formalism known as if-thenism. An early statement o f if- 
thenism appears in Russell,
Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form ‘p implies 
where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the sam e in 
the two propositions, and neither ‘p’ nor ‘cf contains any constants except logical 
constants.
(Russell 1903, p. 3)
To this suggestion, Quine commented:
. . .  all that is left to the mathematician, for him to be right or wrong about, is 
whether various of his uninterpreted sentence schem ata follow logically from his 
uninterpreted axiom schemata. All that is left to him is elementary logic, the first- 
order predicate calculus.
(Quine 1978a (1981), p. 149).
For example, the following would presumably be a proposition o f such “pure 
mathematics”:
'F{xy implies *3y(P(y) a ^ - x ) ’ 120.
A slight generalization o f this idea is that what a mathematician discovers when he or 
she “discovers the truth” o f some statement cp is simply that,
cp is formally derivable from the mathematical axioms M121
118 But which one? The reply “Any consistent extension o f  quantifier-free arithmetic” will not do. For there 
are incompatible systems Mi and M2 which are both consistent extensions. Since they are incompatible, at 
least one must be false (simpliciter). Why do we prefer the axiom system which implies that the ratios are 
dense? There is certainly an “axiom system” containing the primitive ‘x is a rational number’ which implies 
the theorem ‘ VxRat3yRat-i3zRat(y *  x a  z  is between x  andy)’, which says that the ratios are not dense. A  
realist will say that the ratios really are dense, and that this axiom system is false. The usual axioms are 
truths about the ratios or about the “rational number structure” (i.e., any countable dense linear ordering 
without endpoints: all o f  these are isomorphic, by Cantor’s “back-and-forth” proof).
119 As Paul Erdos once put it, “a mathematician is a machine for turning coffee into theorems”.
120 For us, o f  course, this is just a metalogical theorem.
Ch apter  6. M ath em atical  Tr u t h
169
That is, the existence o f a formal derivation T o f (p from M.122 In this sense, the 
“assertibility” o f the statement (p does not consist in, or derive from, its truth. Rather, 
when a mathematician occasionally “asserts” (p, what he or she “really” means to assert 
is rather the (validity o f the) conditional M -»  q>. For he or she knows, by a chain o f  
metalogical reasoning, that this conditional is true (indeed, logically true) just in case M 
[- cp, and this is what he or she has proved.
The central advantages o f this proposal concerning “mathematical truth” are these:
i. ontological innocence;
ii. epistemological innocence.
For example, the statement
(1) There is a prime number between 100 and 1000
could be “mathematically true” even though there were no prime numbers. The 
statement (1) is “mathematically true” because it is derivable from the axioms o f first-
121 We must suppose, if our purposes are nominalistic, that M is a single axiom. For we want to say that the 
sentence cp is derivable from the sentence M. We cannot (at this stage) suppose that cp is derivable from M, 
which is permitted to be a set o f axioms, for that would contravene the nominalistic repudiation o f  
mathematicalia. However, three points must be made:
First, if M is a (possibly infinite) recursively specifiable set o f first-order axioms, and M |- cp, then the very 
notion o f proof (i.e., its finitistic nature) ensures that there is a single axiom M* such that M* |- cp (that is, 
there is a finite subset o f M axioms which derives cp, and this may be conjoined into a single axiom M*). Of 
course, if the “axioms” o f M are, say, all the truths offirst-order arithmetic, then no such M* exists.
Second, if M is a recursively specifiable set (possibly infinite) o f axioms, M = (cp in L: F(cp)}, we can explain 
M J- cp as follows: cp is derivable from some o f  the Fs, and this can be expressed (in the metatheory) using 
B oob s’ monadic second-order plural quantification (thus not referring to some subset o f  Fs).
Third, we can represent any axiom scheme in, say PA or ZFC, as a single second-order axiom. Thus, by 
moving to a second-order formulation, we can express the antecedents for our naive if-thenist conditionals 
as a single (second-order) axiom.
122 Again, the nominalist will have problems with the status o f T. Is this a mathematical object, a certain 
sequence o f formulas, as standard proof theory asserts? Or is it an actual inscription, as the nominalist 
requires? If the nominalist construes ‘M f- cp’ to mean that a proof cp has actually been inscribed, then this 
will simply falsify some o f the standard principles o f proof theory (e.g., The Deduction Theorem: if M, cp 
then M |- cp -»  x)- This is the basic reason why some o f those who wish to “nominalize” metalogic have 
proposed that modal notions being introduced, so ‘M |- cp’ means that cp could be derived from M.
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order Peano Arithmetic PA123. In short, “mathematical truth” in this sense will not 
require a realm of abstract mathematical objects for mathematical statements to be about.
Furthermore, if  an arithmetic assertion q> is “mathematically true”, we can in principle 
(and quite easily in this case) discover or verify that cp is “mathematically true”. We 
simply construct a formal proof o f cp (a refutation o f —icp) from some finite subset o f the 
axioms of PA. More generally, suppose the background axiom system is M. Suppose that 
cp is derivable from M. So, the assertion M -» cp is a logical truth. Its “knowability” (in 
principle) is assured (at least in the first-order scenario)124. Since there is a complete 
proof procedure for first-order logical truth, all such logical truths can be routinely 
checked by a Turing Machine125. So, if  mathematical truths are “really” all logical truths 
o f the form M -> cp, then it is at least possible in principle to obtain “epistemic access” to 
such truths: formal deduction is enough, without recourse to empirical experience126. In
123 I doubt whether anyone has actually performed this boring derivation. The if-thenist has to actually write 
down the inscription before he or she can legitimately assert that (1) follows from PA. To say that he or she 
knows that it “could be done” would be to use standard platonistic proof theory to support a modal 
conclusion. Not very nominalistic.
124 The Completeness Theorem for first-order logic says that if M semantically implies cp, then there exists a 
derivation T o f  cp from M. It places no finite bound, or upper level o f complexity, on this derivation. It is 
perfectly conceivable that there are consequences cp o f certain axioms M such that no-one will ever discover 
(by formal derivation) that cp follows from M. That is, the complexity o f the proof may exceed human 
powers o f  computation (although it does not exceed the Platonic idealization o f such powers, as encoded in 
the notion o f a Turing Machine).
125 Of course, the Completeness Theorem is proved using mathematics (what Machover 1996 calls the 
“ambient set theory”). The coherent nominalist should really produce a new proof not using any mathematics 
(as Goodman & Quine 1947 valiantly attempted), or refrain from asserting this mathematical fact. Of course, 
most self-professed nominalists adopt the usual “double-think”, asserting the Completeness Theorem and 
then denying the means o f its proof.
126 Of course, some meta-mathematical results, like G6del 1931, Godel 1940 and Cohen 1963, have the 
form: cp is not derivable from M. Of course, the if-thenist might say that Cohen still proved a logically-true 
conditional, namely, if ZFC is true, then ZFC does not imply CH. The problem is that this cannot be 
logically true. If it were, then ZFC would imply “ZFC does not imply CH”. Thus, ZFC would imply its own 
consistency, and this is ruled out by Gddel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. Now every mathematician 
accepts that CH is not derivable from ZFC, but the simple fact is that it requires the assumption o f  a 
stronger set theory to construct the model o f  ZFC where CH fails.
There is a view that what Godel “really” proved in 1931 is this: //PA  is consistent, then Con is not a 
theorem o f PA. Nonsense! Godel proved that Con is not a theorem o f PA. (No one doubts that PA is 
consistent). The reason this view is so pernicious is illustrated by an analogy. My wife says, at dinner, 
“Where’s the margarine?”. I reply, “If an external world exists, and if  there is no wicked Cartesian demon, 
or a Putnamian scientist, and if  the laws o f Nature are still the same, and ..., then it’s in the fridge”. Not only 
would this be profoundly pretentious sophistry, it simply wouldn’t reflect what I actually believe to be the 
truth, which is that the margarine is in the fridge. (We make no pretences at certainty in our assertions).
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this sense, mathematical knowledge reduces to “a priori” logical knowledge, although of  
course, we do not suppose (as the logicists did) that the concepts invoked in the axiom M 
can be defined in purely logical terms and that M itself is an a priori (analytic) logical 
truth.
In the second-order scenario, matters are worse. For any sound formalization o f  
deductive reasoning for a second-order notation, there will be logical truths (relative to 
the model theory) which are not provable in the formalism. A simple example is PA2 —> 
ConpA, which is true in all models: any model o f PA2 is isomorphic to Di and ConpA 
holds in any such model, and so ConpA is a semantic (logical) consequence o f PA2. But, 
o f course, ConpA is not deducible from PA2, by Godel’s Second Incompleteness 
Theorem. It follows that, on the if-thenist analysis o f “mathematical truth”, there are still 
mathematical truths (logically true conditionals) which cannot be derived. (In order to 
recognize or prove the metalogical fact that PA2 f= ConpA, one needs to assume (as true) 
a set theoiy strong enough to characterize the intended model o f PA2 and to prove things 
about isomorphisms and consequences. This is a repudiation o f if-thenism, unless one 
applies if-thenism to the metatheory! That is, one believes something like the conditional 
ZF2- » “PA2 J= ConPA”).
Actually, it is hard to find a canonical textual defence o f if-thenism127, although it is 
sometimes defended by others in conversation. A recent very brief description o f “if- 
thenism” appears in Heilman 1989:
Consider [naive non-modal if-thenism]. Suppose it represents sentences cp of 
arithmetic by means of a material conditional, say, of the form:
PA2 - » cp 
or some refinement thereof.
(Heilman 1989, p. 26).
Heilman then proceeds to present what he calls the “canonical objection” to if-thenism, 
an objection which is actually quite mistaken:
Suppose also that, in fact, there happen to be no actual ©-sequences, i.e., that 
the antecedent of these conditionals is false. ... Then, automatically, the
127 However, see Putnam 1967a, ‘The Thesis That Mathematics is Logic’.
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translate of every sentence cp of the original language is counted as  true, and the 
scheme must be rejected as wildly inaccurate. (Well, at least it gets half the 
answers right—not the worst imaginable performance! Compare the case of the 
broken watch).
(Heilman 1989, p. 26).
For example, suppose (as the nominalistically-inclined if-thenist actually maintains) 
that there are no such things as numbers. Then the axiom PA2 for second-order Peano 
Arithmetic is false. But then, obviously, for any sentence (p o f arithmetic, the reconstrual 
PA2 - » cp will be true, simply because the antecedent is false. Does this criticism work?
I think that this criticism is mistaken. For the adequacy constraint implicitly required by 
the naive if-thenist “translation” is not that M -> cp be true (simpliciter). The constraint is 
that if  cp is a theorem in M, then M - » cp should be logically true. We know, merely from 
the soundness of that this constraint is satisfied. For suppose that M |- cp. Then, by the 
deduction theorem, we infer that f- M —» cp. And then by the soundness o f |-, we infer that 
M ->■ cp, and thus that M —» cp is a logical truth.
(The converse argument only works in the first-order case. By the definitions o f logical 
truth and semantical implication f=, we know that if  (= M —> cp, then M (= cp; and we then 
infer, by the completeness o f first-order derivability that M |- cp.)
In any case, according to the if-thenist, the truth value o f the mathematical axiom M is 
actually irrelevant. All that matters is that if M —> cp has the appropriate formal property 
(logical truth, validity) if  cp is derivable from M. In particular, the naive if-thenist with 
nominalistic intentions is going to claim that M is in fact not true (or even, is perhaps 
meaningless: for M may be regarded as uninterpreted), but, even so, mathematical 
practice is faithfully reconstructed. For mathematical practice, according to the naive if- 
thenist, is exhausted by theorem-proving and mathematical knowledge consists in the 
metalogical knowledge that cp is derivable or not derivable from M.128
128 Field 1984a makes it clear that the logical knowledge that cp is not derivable from M presents a problem 
for if-thenism. It is equivalent to knowledge o f consistency and this is not accounted for within naive if- 
thenism. Normally, one proves consistency by constructing a model (e.g., the finite ordinals for PA). 
(Because there is an algorithmic proof procedure for inconsistency, there is no problem. But, by Godel’s and 
Church’s theorems, there is no such proof procedure for consistency). The if-thenist might “ascend” a step
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A problem does arise for incomplete axiom systems (or the incompleteness o f the 
second-order derivability relation). But this is separate. The naive if-thenist can simply 
rest with the claim that the “mathematical truth value” o f an allegedly undecided 
sentence (e.g., Choice, the Axiom of Determinacy (which contradicts Choice), Cantor’s 
Continuum Hypothesis, Godel’s Axiom of Constructibility, the existence of large 
cardinals) is simply undetermined by current mathematical practice. This is a very 
unsatisfactory position, but it might be maintained. For to determine “truth values” of 
(current) undecidables, new axioms must be added to decide these undecidables. Why 
accept these axioms and not others?
In any case, the falsity o f M is not an objection to the adequacy o f the naive if-thenist 
reconstrual. Actually, the reconstrual is deeply inadequate, but one can hardly fault the 
nominalistically-inclined if-thenist for supposing something which he or she obviously 
holds (namely that the axiom M is, when construed literally, not true).
6.5 Problems for If-Thenism
There are several reasons for thinking that if-thenism is unacceptable. A preliminary 
argument is that mathematicians, in asserting a mathematical theorem cp, do not in fact 
intend to assert merely a conditional of the form M —> (p. The mathematician does not 
mean, in asserting the existence of a homomorphism from SU(2) to SO(3), that the 
proposition expressing this is merely deducible from ZFC. He or she means that there is 
such a homomorphism.
However, it might be possible to teach this mathematician some of the profound 
discoveries o f the philosophy o f mathematics (in particular, the two Benacerraf 
problems, the “identification problem” and “epistemic access”). His or her natural 
reaction, without knowing the further Godelian, Quinian and Putnamian arguments for 
realism, might be to descend to an if-thenist or formalist position.
further by saying that this sort o f knowledge is actually knowledge o f  further “logical truths” o f the form: if  
S is true, then cp is not a theorem o f M (where S is some suitably strong axiomatic set theory).
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However, this view (and others like it) suffer from tremendous problems. First, this 
non-standard conception of “mathematical truth” does not conform to Convention T. It 
is a non-standard conception of truth. If the nominalist is going to propose some axioms 
governing M-Tr, they certainly must not entail the T-sentence,
(1) 43x(number(jc) a  prime(*))’ is M-Tr if  and only if  there are prime
numbers
Indeed, the nominalist will assert something inconsistent with this, namely:
(2) ‘3x(number(jt) a  prime(jt))’ is M-Tr and there are no prime numbers
Now suppose the nominalist proposal is that whenever a mathematician asserts,
(3) (p is true
we are to “reconstrue” this assertion as,
(4) cp is “mathematically true”
where “mathematically true” means “derivable in axiom system M \
This is, to put it bluntly, ignorant. Godel’s theorem implies that proof and truth are quite 
different concepts. There is no formal axiomatic system which proves all the truths o f  
elementary arithmetic.
Let us introduce the “if-thenist” reconstrual mapping, T m : cp »-> T m( cp)  = M -> cp. We 
shall say that Tm is literal with respect to an intended interpretation 3  just in case, for any 
sentence cp in L, if  3 (= cp then M cp. It is possible to prove that no such literal “if-then 
reconstrual” exists for arithmetic.
Let M be an extension o f Robinson Arithmetic Q, so M is strong enough to represent all 
recursive functions, including the diagonal function. Then Godel’s First Incompleteness 
Theorem will apply to M, and this theorem entails the non-existence o f a literal 
translation function with respect to 91, the intended interpretation o f arithmetic.
C hapter  6. M ath em atical  Tr u t h
175
Theorem 1: Literal If-thenist R econstruals r M Do Not Exist.
Let M be a finitely axiomatized extension o f Robinson Arithmetic, Q in L, 
the language o f arithmetic. Let 91 be the intended interpretation of L. Then 
the “if-thenist” reconstrual function w.r.t M. does not have “literalness”.
Proof: First, let Prov^ be a provability predicate for M and let Gm be a Godel sentence 
with respect to Provm for the axiom M. That is, by the Diagonal Lemma, M |- Gm 
-iP /W m (T G m ~I). S o ,  M implies that “ Gm is true if and only if  it is not provable in M”. We 
know, of course, that 91 |= Gm and, by the First Incompleteness Theorem, not-(M |- G m ). 
Thus, not-( |- M - >  G m ). Thus, not-( |- Tm (G m )). Thus, there is a cp such that 31 f= cp but not- 
|- r M(cp). Thus, Tm does not have “literalness”. Thus, a “literal” if-thenist translation 
function cannot exist for any sound finitely axiomatized extension o f Q. ■
Of course, the above theorem may be viewed as irrelevant. We are implicitly assuming 
that M is true (that is, true in the intended interpretation 9? o f L). We then recognize that 
Gm is similarly true, but not provable from the axiom M. But the if-thenist has a reply: he 
or she does not have to admit that cp is true just in case Tm(cp) is a logical theorem. In 
short, this kind o f formalistic if-thenist will simply reject (as irrelevant) the “literalness” 
condition on the translation function Tm.
However, it is not hard to see that any identification o f truth with derivability within an
axiom system is incoherent, as the following theorems show.
Definition 1: Deductivist “Mathematical Truth”
Let T be axiomatic mathematical theory. Then, for any mathematical 
sentence cp, cp is mathematically true w.r.t. T iff T |- cp.
If T is strong enough, this can be formalized within T itself. When T is an extension o f
PA, suppose that Provt  is a provability predicate for T. Define within T a predicate M- 
77t, to be read “mathematically true in T”:
V x (M -7 7 t ( x )  Provt ( x ) )
Now we can prove two “inequivalence theorems”:
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Theorem 2: Only an Inconsistent Theory Can Equate “D eductivist 
Mathematical Truth” with Truth Sim pliciter
Let T be an axiomatic extension in L o f PA. Let M-Trj be the deductivist 
“mathematical truth in T” predicate (i.e., a provability predicate for T). Let 
DT be the disquotation truth theory for L. Now suppose that
T u  DT I- Vx(7V(x) +> M-Trr(x)),
Then T is inconsistent.
Proof: Let cp be any sentence of L. From our assumptions we infer that T u  DT f- 
rnfcpl) <-> P r o v jf  cp~|). By the “disquotation principle” for DT, we infer T u  DT cp <-» 
ProvT([cpl). Now, by the Conservativeness Theorem for DT, we infer that T |- cp <-» 
P rovj^ cpl). Thus, T |- P rovjficpl) -> cp. Hence, by Lob’s Theorem, T |- cp. Thus, T is 
inconsistent. ■
Theorem  3: Deductivist “Mathematical Truth” is not Truth Simpliciter
Let T be an axiomatic extension in L of PA. Let M-Trj be Provj (i.e., a 
provability predicate for T). Let TS be the full Tarskian truth theory for L. 
Then,
T u  TS [ 3x(Tr(x) a  -iM-Trj(x)\
That is, M-Trj *  Tr.
Proof: By the Diagonal Lemma, one may construct a fixed-point sentence Gy such that 
T |- Gj <-> -^Provjf Gyl). From the Non-Conservativeness Theorem for TS we know 
that T cj TS f- Gy. So, T ^  TS |- T/tfGjl). But T vj TS }- Gy and T vj TS {- Gy 
—iProi/t(fGTl). Thus, T cj TS j— \Provj([Gyl). Thus, T cj TS [* —lM-TryCTGj I). Hence, 
T u T S  |-  Tr(r Gyl) a  -tM -TrjftGT1). Hence, T u  TS \- 3x(Tr(x) a  -,M-Trj(x)). ■
The deductivist conception o f “mathematical truth” is simply different from truth 
simpliciter. Of course, this is to be expected. The nominalist will believe that ‘There are 
infinitely many primes’ is “mathematically true” (that is, derivable within the usual
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axioms of arithmetic) even though he or she will believe that it is not true simpliciter. 
But what these arguments show is that the nominalist cannot blithely say ‘true’ (as 
applied to a mathematical assertion) just means ‘provable’. Truth and provability are 
different concepts.
Nevertheless, on the alternative assumption that mathematical truth is genuine truth 
(that is, truth in the intended model o f arithmetic), there can be no reconstrual scheme 
mapping every arithmetical truth to a valid theorem o f first-order logic.
The above objection operates within pure mathematics. It is essentially equivalent to 
the claim that “mathematical truth cannot consist in provability”:
Elementary number theory is the modest part of mathematics that is concerned 
with the addition and multiplication of whole numbers. W hatever sound and 
usable rules of proof one may devise, some truths of elementary number theory 
will remain unprovable; this is the gist of Gbdel’s theorem .. . .
We used to think that mathematical truth consisted in provability. Now we see 
that this view is untenable for mathematics as a whole, and even for 
mathematics in any considerable part; for elementary number theory is indeed a 
modest part, and it already exceeds any acceptable proof procedure.
(Quine 1978b (1981a), p. 144).
And perhaps the most significant consequence of Theorem 6 [Godel’s  First 
Incompleteness Theorem] is what it says about the notions of truth (in the 
standard interpretation of the language of arithmetic) and theoremhood, or 
provability (in any particular formal theory): that they are in no sense the same.
(Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 180).
It seems to me that if  an if-thenist were to claim that “mathematical truth consists in 
provability”, then he or she is simply abusing the word ‘true’ (assigning a deviant 
meaning to a word which has a well-defined meaning, as explained by Tarski 1936, and 
which is formalized within the “Theory o f Satisfaction”, TS). The debate is 
terminological, but deeply misleading. All o f  the philosophical issues in the philosophy o f  
mathematics centre on whether mathematical assertions (or theories) are true and it is 
misleading (given the quite clear Tarskian sense given to the notion o f truth and the well- 
known Godelian logical results demonstrating the difference o f these concepts) to 
propose an “identification” of truth with provability.
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To conclude, the if-thenist can say that he or she is not interested in whether arithmetic 
or set theory is true (i.e., not interested in the philosophy o f mathematics). But he or she 
cannot, without contradicting Tarski, Gddel, et al., say that ‘true’ means ‘provable’.
6.6 The Refutation of If-Thenism
Setting aside some further (actually important) reservations about this approach within 
the philosophy o f mathematics (primarily, the choice o f “uninterpreted” axioms in the 
first place; are the axioms true?), we shall now see why the if-thenist reconstrual does not 
work for mathematical principles integrated within scientific theory. Whatever its merits 
as a philosophical interpretation for mere theorem proving, if-thenism is utterly incapable 
of working for any mathematical theory which occurs as a component o f an accepted 
mathematicized scientific theory. Since arithmetic, analysis and a certain amount o f set 
theory are certainly such components of many scientific theories, it is simply incoherent 
to maintain if-thenism for these mathematical theories. In short, the proposal is 
inconsistent with the judgement as true o f the mathematical statements o f science.
Consider again our stand-by mathematicized scientific theory Tims, whose sole mixed 
axiom is:
(1) the (impure) structure {Tim, Bef) is isomorphic to (R, <)
This theory Tims is a theory which experts on space-time theory believe to be true (or 
at least, an exceedingly accurate approximation to the truth). As textbooks on space-time 
put it, “time is isomorphic to the continuum”. Moreover, Tims is not meant to be 
necessarily true, or simply a theorem of pure mathematics. Indeed, Tims has contingent 
non-mathematical consequences. For example,
(2) between any two instants, there is another
and thus cannot be a consequence o f any applicable mathematical axiom system (like 
mathematical analysis plus set theory with individuals).
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Now let us drop the V  suffix (indicating the presence o f set theory within Tim). To 
simplify things, suppose we reconstrue the use o f mathematical analysis within Tim in 
terms of some set-theoretical surrogates (so quantification over real numbers is replaced 
by quantification over sets o f some kind) and let ZF2 be the formalization o f  second- 
order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with ur-elements (that is, ZF2 is now a single axiom). 
Let us say that ZF is quasi-pure, for it quantifies over and talks about concreta.
The central problem is this. Tim is obviously not derivable from ZF2. Indeed, Tim, 
although explicitly mathematicized, is a contingent law about the physical world. But it 
is possible to show that the only non-mathematical facts derivable from ZF2 are logical 
truths. But Tim has numerous non-mathematical consequences, so it could not be 
derivable from ZF2 (unless ZF2 is inconsistent, o f course).
Moreover, Tim is part o f accepted physical science. Arid sceptical puzzles aside, it is 
accepted as true (it is part o f the result of applying Fine’s “core position”). We have seen 
that its acceptance cannot consist in its being derivable from (impure, applicable) set 
theory with individuals. Indeed, we naively think that Tim is part o f an (at-worst 
approximately) true description o f the nature of non-mathematical time.
Furthermore, we can quickly see that the if-thenist reconstrual o f Tim is not an adequate 
replacement for Tim. For Tim implies (2), but the if-thenist reconstrual ZF2 -» Tim does 
not imply (2). Why is this? The negation o f (the single axiom) ZF2 certainly does not 
imply (2). So, there is a model o f -Z F 2 in which (2) is false. Hence, there is a model o f  
-Z F2 v  Tim in which (2) is false129. The if-thenist reconstrual ZF2 -» Tim does not 
reproduce the mathematics-free theorems o f Tim.
A similar argument works for any mathematicized law of accepted physics. Suppose 
that PL is Poisson’s Law, governing the electrostatic potential (the laplacean V2 on the 
potential O is proportional to the charge density p, at each space-time point e). That is,
(3) for any space-time point e, V20 (e ) = Xp(e)
129 This is just trivial logic. If A has a model then so does A v  B (i.e., because A J- A v  B).
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The simple fact is that most working physicists accept PL as a true (or highly truthlike) 
description o f (part of) the electromagnetic field. But again, a conditional ZF2 ->  PL is 
clearly not a suitable “reconstrual” or replacement for PL.
In general, where T is a mathematicized theory o f nature and M some (quasi-pure) 
mathematical axiom, the if-thenist reconstrual M -> T is not an adequate replacement for 
T. In short, there are true mathematical theories (namely, those o f science) which are not 
“mathematically true” in the if-thenist sense (namely, logical consequences o f some 
uninterpreted system of mathematical axioms).
For a further example, consider Schrodinger’s Law:
SL: for any system S  at time t, HTOS, t) -  {ihl2n)dm{St t)/dt.
SchrOdinger’s Law has the following properties:
i. according to current science, SL is true (or at least approximately true).
ii. SL is a mathematicized statement (quantifying over state vectors, etc.)
iii. SL is also a contingent physical statement (it is not necessary that there is 
such an abstract state vector T  associated with any physical system).
But SL is not “mathematically true” on the deductivist conception o f “mathematical 
truth”. We know from a theorem given by Field in his 1980 (a sort o f Conservativeness 
Theorem for applicable mathematics) that SL is not derivable from any system of axioms 
for applicable mathematics. But if  SL is true, as many physicists seem to think, then (as 
we argued in Chapters 2 and 3) there must exist such mathematicalia as state vectors 
(e.g., elements o f the Hilbert space, the quantum mechanical state space for physical 
systems).
In short, this anti-realist conception o f “mathematical truth” is irrelevant and inadequate 
to the central use o f mathematics in our scientific world view. It plays precisely no role in 
accounting for the truth o f mathematicized laws like SL and countless other 
mathematicized laws in science. For, according to standard accepted current science,
i. SL is true (or at least approximately true), but
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iv. SL is not “mathematically true” (derivable in any standard uninterpreted 
mathematical axiom system, say applicable set theory).
It seems to me that any account o f “mathematical truth” that allows certain substantial 
mathematical statements to be true but not “mathematically true” is barely worth 
considering. Indeed, mathematical truth is not even coextensive with “derivability in 
some axiom system”, unless those axioms are already true.
Consider set-theoretical axioms like pairing, infinity, power set, union, separation and 
so on. Scientific theories like General Relativity would naturally incorporate these 
axioms if  the use o f analysis were reinterpreted along standard lines. It logically follows 
that if  you think that GR is true, you must think that the axiom o f  infinity and so on are 
true.
If-thenism is either irrelevant (if it makes no negative claim about the truth value of  
these axioms) or false (if it claims, for example, that the axiom of infinity is not true).
6.7 Non-Standard Mathematical Truth II: Hermeneuticism
A different, but still non-standard, conception of mathematical truth arises within a 
position I shall refer to (following Burgess 1983) as “hermeneutic nominalism”. 
According to hermeneutic nominalism, the literal or disquotational truth conditions of  
mathematical assertions are misleading. Mathematical assertions are not meant as literal 
assertions about mathematicalia. In short, mathematical assertions are “true”, but only in 
some mystical non-literal sense, accessible only to soothe-saying philosophical 
sophisticates, but not to simple-minded mathematicians.
A proponent o f such a view is Chihara 1973, 1990. Although Chihara argues that 
“mathematics is a body o f truths”, he refuses to accept that there are such things as real 
numbers, sets, functions and so on. Chihara seems to agree with the human race that,
(1) ‘there is a real number whose cube is T  is true,
but also refuses to assert also that,
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(2) there are real numbers.
The problem is that (1), plus the disquotation axiom that,
(3) ‘there is a real number whose cube is T  is true if  and only if there is a real 
number whose cube is 7.
just logically implies (3), which Chihara refuses to accept.
It is incoherent for a nominalist to reject such disquotational equivalences130. For the 
concept o f truth—indeed, the correct use of the truth predicate— is constrained a priori to 
satisfy such T-sentences (this is why ‘true’ cannot mean ‘provable’). If I am right, 
disquotational T-sentences are a good example of analytic sentences.
The resolution, I suggest, is partly verbal: Chihara simply doesn’t (indeed, I urge, 
cannot) mean truth when he writes ‘mathematics is a body o f truths’. What he actually 
means by an assertion,
(4) (p is true
is (something like),
(5) cp has a “correct” but “non-literal reconstrual” cp* which is true.
Thus, this kind o f hermeneutic nominalism involves the basic idea o f reconstruing 
mathematical statements. This position has several versions, as I discuss later in Chapters 
7 and 8. In particular, aside from one’s sheer incredulity that such non-literal reconstruals 
are what mathematicians “really mean” when they assert mathematical theorems, most 
suffer from the problem of accounting for the application o f mathematics. The most 
promising reconstruals (Heilman 1989, Chihara 1990) use modality, but it is hard to 
believe that what ordinary assertions about numbers and sets “really mean” is to be given 
by a modal reconstrual involving merely possible structures (Heilman) or linguistic 
tokens (Chihara).
1301 have hinted (no more) in Chapter 5 that the incoherence o f denying any sentence o f the form Tn(<<p>) 
<->• cp resides in its “analyticity”, and that its analyticity resides in its being a “partial definition” (not: part o f  
an implicit definitions) o f truth. And this, I hint, is connected to the conservativeness o f  DT, that is, all these 
T-sentences.
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Thus, according to hermeneuticism, each mathematical statement cp is to be non- 
literally “reconstrued” as some other statement cp*. For example, the nominalist might 
argue that we should “reconstrue” the mathematical sentence,
(6) there are numbers greater than 10 
as the “nominalistically acceptable” sentence about concrete linguistic entities:
(6)* there is a numeral token longer than ten strokes
or its weakened modal version:
(6)** there could have been a numeral token longer than ten strokes 
Again there are two alleged advantages of this proposal:
i. the reconstrual cp* will lack ontological commitment to abstracta.
ii. the truth o f the reconstrual cp* can be easily known or verified.
I want to suggest that the hermeneuticist can put the suggested “reconstruals” to an 
important use in defining a non-classical conception o f “mathematical truth”. For he or 
she may suggest that we accept every non-disquotational axiom:
M-7X<cp>) <-» cp*,
where cp* is the correct nominalistic “reconstrual” o f cp. Indeed, he or she can adopt the 
each o f these axioms as a partial definition of hermeneuticist “mathematical truth”, M- 
Tr, just as the standard Tarskian approach takes each o f the T-sentences, the 
disquotational instances, 77{<cp>) <-» cp, as partial definitions o f literal truth, Tr.
So, the hermeneutic nominalist could follow the disquotationalist and introduce, by 
similar means, a theory o f hermeneutic mathematical truth, call it HT. The axioms o f HT 
are non-disquotational “partial definitions”, such as:
(7) ‘there are numbers greater than 10’ is “mathematically true” iff there 
could have been a numeral token longer ten strokes
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In fact, equipped with a systematic correlation o f mathematical assertions and their 
hermeneutic reconstruals cp*, given by a translation function T such that cp* = r(cp), the 
axioms of HT are M-Tr{<cp>) <-» r(cp), for each mathematical assertion cp.
Indeed, the nominalist might think that ‘true’ just means ‘mathematically true’, as 
partially defined by HT. Strictly speaking, however, this procedure is not even consistent, 
i f  he or she also,
i. accepts the disquotation theory, wherein ‘true’ is partially defined by DT;
ii. accepts that certain existential mathematical assertions are true;
iii. claims that that numbers or sets do not exist.
Suppose that this nominalist proposes that Tr and M-Tr express the same concept (at 
least in application to mathematical sentences). That is, we should accept Vx(Tr(x) <-> 
M -Tr{x)\ where x ranges only over mathematical assertions. It is easily seen that HT and 
DT, plus this definition, jointly entail cp <-» T(cp), for each such mathematical assertion cp. 
The problem is simply that the nominalist accepts the reconstrual T(cp), but rejects the 
mathematical assertion cp.
Perhaps, he or she can always reply that by ‘true’ (as predicated o f a mathematical 
sentence), he or she always means ‘mathematically true’ as partially defined by HT 
axioms alone. The above argument shows clearly that this manoeuvre (plus the 
proposer’s background theory) simply assigns a deviant meaning to ‘true’. That is, a 
meaning extensionally different from concept expressed by ‘true’ as partially defined by 
DT.
Finally, let us quickly look at the possible relation o f cp to its “reconstrual” cp* within 
the interpreted language o f the hermeneutic nominalist. In the scenario under discussion, 
there will be many mathematical sentences cp such that,
i. the hermeneuticist accepts cp* (as literally true),
ii. the hermeneuticist rejects cp (as literally false).
It follows from this that,
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iii. the consistent hermeneuticist cannot accept the biconditional cp <-» cp*.
And it follows from this that,
iv. cp and cp* cannot “mean the same thing” (from the nominalist’s point o f  
view).
For let cp be an existential mathematical assertion with explicit ontological commitment 
to abstracta. Let cp* be its hermeneutic reconstrual. Assume now that cp and cp* mean the 
same in the interpreted language of the hermeneutic nominalist. Then, minimally, in the 
combined language o f these sentences, the biconditional cp <-> cp* must be analytically 
true. Now suppose the nominalist accepts cp*. He or she would then be compelled 
(“rationally”) to accept cp. But this, on his or her nominalist principles, he or she rejects. 
Therefore, cp and cp* cannot mean the same.
Indeed, the hermeneutic nominalist cannot even (rationally) believe that cp <-> cp* is 
true\ From this, it follows that the hermeneutic reconstrual does not preserve truth! Oddly 
enough, a similar argument shows that a platonist can (if he or she wishes) argue that cp 
<-» cp* is true (but presumably will add that they obviously do not mean the same).
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Chapter 7
Nominalism: Reconstrual & Reconstruction
Numquam ponenda est plurales sine necessitate.
William of Ockham, Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum,131
It would be satisfying to contrive a systematic account of the world while 
staying strictly within an ontology of physical objects, and indeed physical 
objects big enough to be perceived. ... We have to conclude that multiplication 
of entities can make a substantive contribution to theory. ... Pad the universe 
with classes or other supplements if that will get you a simpler, smoother overall 
theory. Otherwise, don’t. Simplicity is the thing, and ontological economy is one 
aspect of it, to be averaged in with the others.
W.V. Quine 1966-74 (1976), 'On Multiplying Entities’, p. 259.
To say what someone is talking about is to say no more than how we propose 
to translate his terms into ours. We are free to vary the decision with a  proxy 
function. The translation adopted arrests the free-floating reference of the alien 
terms only relatively to the free-floating reference of our own terms, by linking 
the terms.
W.V. Quine 1981b (1981a), Things and Their Place in Theories’, p. 20.
The Hungarian phrase ‘Can you direct me to the railway station?’ is here 
translated as ‘Can you please fondle my buttocks?’.
Monty Python, 1971.
7.1 Nominalism: introduction
According to the argument of Chapters 1 to 3, an ontology o f (presumably abstract) 
mathematicalia is built into much o f modem science. The examples given covered 
quantitative laws, space-time theory, syntax and metalogic. Trivially, if  one wishes to 
reject such an ontology, one cannot also adopt Fine’s allegedly neutral “core position”, a 
realist acceptance as true o f the “certified theories of science” and a realist view o f  truth 
(e.g., Tarski’s) wherein a theory is true just in case the entities, processes, events and
131 Quoted from Kneale & Kneale 1962 (1988), p. 243.
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properties it quantifies over exist and are related as the theory says they are. In short, the 
renunciation o f mathematicalia is simply inconsistent with science.
Nominalism is the renunciation or repudiation o f abstract entities, including 
mathematicalia. The puzzle is obvious. Nominalism contradicts science. How can 
nominalism and modem science be reconciled if, as Quine and Putnam argue, they are 
incompatible? The remaining task of this thesis is to discuss and assess some recent 
attempts by nominalistically-inclined philosophers o f mathematics to square this circle.
Nominalism emerged historically in the thought o f certain mediaeval thinkers, notably 
Garland and Roscelin132, who opposed the reality o f Platonic universals. Instead, they 
urged that general terms like ‘angel’ and ‘man’ are not names or designations o f  
universals. Rather, such term are nothing more than predicates, applying individually to 
each and every concrete instance, be it a particular angel or man. In the notorious words 
o f Roscelin (as reported by his pupil, Abelard), universals are flatus vocis, the “breath o f  
voice”. The most celebrated o f the later, fourteenth century, nominalists (the so-called 
nominales) was William of Ockham:
For the truth of the proposition This is an angel’ ... it is sufficient and 
necessary that the subject and the predicate suppone for [refer to] the sam e ...
And so it is not meant that this has angelity, or that angelity is in this, or anything 
of the kind, but simply that this is truly an angel, not indeed that it is that 
predicate but that it is that for which the predicate suppones.
William of Ockham, Summa Totius Logicae, ii.2133
The proposal is that talk of abstract universals be eliminated in favour o f talk o f  
linguistic entities', predicates. The truth of ‘a is an angel’ requires only that the concrete 
referent o f ‘a ’ be a thing o f which the predicate ‘angel’ is true. It does not require that 
there be an abstract universal {angelity) which inheres in the referent of V .
What is the motivation for such a repudiation of abstract universals? By common 
consent, the motivation resides in Ockham’s famous “Razor”, sometimes called “The
132 See Kneale & Kneale 1962 (1988) for a discussion, in the context o f logical theory, o f  this tradition o f  
nominalism.
133 From Kneale & Kneale 1962 (1988), p. 270.
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Principle o f Parsimony”, expressed (probably apocryphally) by the slogan “entia non 
multiplicanda sine necessitate”.
Scholarly debates rage as to the precise meaning and intent o f Ockham’s anti-Platonist 
slogans. Some recent commentators have de-emphasized the ontological component (the 
parsimonious renunciation o f abstract entities) and emphasized instead the idea of  
conceptual simplicity (the parsimonious renunciation o f redundant concepts and 
assumptions). An early advocate, though hardly a scholar, o f this interpretation o f  
Ockham was the Tractarian Wittgenstein,
Occam’s razor is, of course, not an arbitrary rule nor one justified by its 
success. It simply says that unnecessary elements in a  symbolism mean 
nothing. Signs which serve one purpose are logically equivalent, signs which 
serve no purpose are logically meaningless.
(Wittgenstein 1922 (1981), 5.47321, p. 129).
A notable advocate o f parsimony, both ontological and conceptual, as an organizing 
(pragmatic) principle of reason within our evolving “conceptual scheme” is Quine:
It is not to be wondered that theory makers seek simplicity. When two theories 
are equally defensible on other counts, certainly the simpler of the two is to be 
preferred on the score of both beauty and convenience. ... [the maxim of 
simplicity of nature] seem s to be implicitly assum ed in every extrapolation and 
interpolation, every drawing of a smooth curve through plotted points. And the 
maxim of uniformity of nature is of a piece with it, uniformity being a species of 
simplicity.
(Quine 1963b (1976), p. 255).
Quine points out that there may even be a tension between these two edges o f  
Ockham’s Razor: conceptual simplicity and ontological parsimony may conflict:
We move into a conceptual scheme of electrons, neutrons, and other 
hypothetical particles that can never be directly observed; a  conceptual scheme 
of kinky four-dimensional space-time, and of mathematical abstractions—sets, 
relations, functions, integers, ratios, irrational numbers, imaginary numbers, 
infinite numbers. None of these extras are observable. ... What then is all this 
extra apparatus of ours? Is it sheer mythmaking, unwarranted by observational 
evidence?
Paradoxically, the purpose of ail this extra apparatus is simplification. We are 
out to systematize and integrate the testimony of our senses by devising laws 
that relate the observable phenomena systematically to other phenomena; and 
the most systematic network of relations for this purpose turns out to be a 
network that links all these phenomena up with a lot of additional, hypothetical 
entities that are only assumed for integrating the system.
(Quine 1973 (1976), p. 62. Emphasis added)
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Nominalism re-emerged in the early twentieth century, advocated by able logicians, like 
Stanislaw Lesniewski at Warsaw, and Nelson Goodman and W.V. Quine at Harvard. Let 
us refer to this particular form of nominalism as Logical Nominalism, a scientific 
research programme aimed at showing how to redevelop or reconstruct mathematics or 
science so as to avoid reference to abstract entities. The eliminative programme had its 
central goal o f ridding science, and even mathematics itself, o f reference to abstractions, 
like numbers and sets. Lesniewski’s mereology and Goodman’s calculus o f  individuals 
were proposed as nominalistic replacements for standard set theory.
If such a constructive programme of eliminative nominalism were workable, the 
indispensability component o f the Quine-Putnam argument would fail. Although science 
and mathematics would still, when literally construed, count as a platonic system, the 
nominalistic replacement would provide the correct fluff-free description o f the facts. 
Any fluffy Platonic talk o f abstract mathematicalia could (in principle) be dropped, or 
regarded as a mere fagon de parler, a convenient fiction.
7.2 Non-Nominalizability: Preliminaries
Let us say that an assertion which carries prima facie  commitment (usually via 
quantification or by naive semantics) to abstracta is platonistic. Let us say when such a 
statement may be “re-expressed” without such platonistic commitment, that it is 
nominalizable.
An example of a nominalizable platonistic statement is the assertion,
(1) the number of eyes = 2
whose prima facie logical structure requires an entity, presumably abstract, for the 
singular terms ‘the number o f Fs’ and \2’ to be names. The “nominalization” o f (1) is the 
statement,
(2 ) 3x3y(E(x) a  £(y) a  x  * y  a  Vz(E(z) -» z = x  v  z = y))
whose explicit logical structure require the existence solely o f two concrete eyes.
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So, the natural question for the programme of eliminative nominalism is this:
A. Are some (perhaps scientifically important) platonistic statements non- 
nominalizable?
This question is complicated by a related problem. The nominalist might introduce 
novel or non-standard “logical apparatus” which, it will be urged, carries no platonic 
commitments. So, the related question is this:
B. Suppose a nominalization strategy is proposed, involving some novel 
“logical apparatus”. Is this apparatus genuinely free o f abstract 
commitments and thus nominalistically acceptable?
For Lesniewski, the new logical apparatus included mereology and substitutional 
quantification. Goodman and Quine likewise adopted mereology as part o f their strategy 
for “constructive nominalism” (although the inadequacy o f mereology as a replacement 
for set-theoretical mathematics was soon recognized by Quine). More recent nominalistic 
or quasi-nominalistic strategies have considered introducing higher-order quantification 
(e.g., Field, Boolos) and modal operators (Putnam, Chihara, Field, Heilman).
We shall pursue both questions in a piecemeal fashion.
Examples, now classic, o f non-nominalizable statements were found and given detailed 
attention by the post-nominalist Quine, from 1947 onwards. Statements o f fixed definite 
cardinality, like (1) above, seem nominalizable. But what about cardinality comparisons? 
For example,
(3) there are more Fs than Gs
This assertion can be expressed using mathematical notions thus:
(4) there is an injection from {x: G(x)} to {x: F(x)} and there is no injection 
from {x: F(x)} to {*: G(x)}
As such, it is committed by the obvious quantification to various mathematicalia (to 
sets and injections). Is it possible to maintain that (3) is “really” a nominalistic
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statement? To begin, note that (3) implies each o f the nominalistically expressible 
statements,
(3') if  there is at most 1 F, then there are no Gs;
(3") if  there are at most 2 Fs, then there is at most 1 G;
(3"f) if  there are at most 3 Fs, then there are at most 2 Gs;
Since each o f this infinite set can be nominalized using a numerical quantifier, one 
might wonder then whether we could re-express (3) using these quantifiers (one 
quantifier for each numeral /?: 3nx) and a substitutional quantifier, thus,
(5) nn(3<a+1xF(x) -» 3^xF(x))
The problem with this proposal is the acceptability o f the logical apparatus. Is 
substitutional quantification with respect to an infinity o f numeral types nominalistically 
acceptable?
Issues deepen. Even with this apparatus, we cannot re-express an assertion like,
(6) There are more space-time points than points in an co-region
for a quite simple reason. Standard space-time physics implies that there are c-many 
space-time points. According to physics, the totality o f space-time points forms an ur- 
element set which can be structured as a 4-dimensional topological manifold. But there is 
no nominalistically definable numerically definite quantifier 3,x corresponding to ‘there 
are c-many Fs’. (One cannot re-express 3<xcp using a finite formula, using just identity 
and no mathematical notions).
The assertion about injections (4) can be re-expressed in second-order logic thus,
(7) 3f(lnj(/) a  Vx(G(x) -» F(f(x))) a  -,3/(lnj(/) a  Vx(F(x) -> G(f(x)))
where Inj(/) is the formula VxVy(x *  y  f(x) & f(y)). But, again, it is doubtful that this 
use o f second-order logic is nominalistically acceptable.
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Another example discussed by Quine is the non-nominalistically-definable relation 
expressed by ‘ancestor’,
(8) x is an ancestor o f y
For example, Eve is an ancestor of Cherie. That is, Eve is a parent o f a parent o f ... a 
parent o f Cherie. We may recursively define ‘ancestor’ thus,
(a) any parent o f x is an ancestor of x
(b) any parent o f an ancestor o f x is an ancestor o f x
(c) if  y  is an ancestor o f x, then either y  is a parent o f x  or y  is a parent o f an
ancestor o f x
This may then be converted to an explicit definition (“directified”) using set theory. 
This explicit definition o f ‘ancestor’, due essentially to Frege 1879, can be formulated as,
(9) y  is a member o f every class that contains x and contains any parent 
of z  if  it contains z
(Frege’s use o f this is to define “natural number”: a natural number is something such 
that 0 is an ancestor under the successor relation). As Quine emphasizes, this assertion 
quantifies platonistically over classes. If one wants to reduce ‘Eve is an ancestor of 
Cherie’ to a claim about parents, one must use set theory (or second-order logic):
(10) Eve is a member o f every class that contains Cherie and contains any 
parent o f z if  it contains z
This analysis o f ‘ancestor’ has the consequence that an apparently nominalistic and true 
assertion like,
(11) Napoleon is not an ancestor of Boolos
implies the existence of a class134. Is this odd? Part of the use o f mathematics is to 
provide a “finite encapsulation” o f the infinite, as we sometimes indicate in our informal 
language by ellipsis, ‘... ’, or by expressions like ‘and so on’. Thus, (11) means,
134 E.g., see the first paragraph o f  Boolos 1985:
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(12) (Napoleon is not a parent of Boolos) and (Napoleon is not a parent o f a 
parent o f Boolos) and ... (so on!)
It is quite unsurprising that the encapsulation o f this infinitary statement, involving the 
enigmatic \ ’ should introduce mathematical entities like classes.
More recent examples o f non-nominalizability have come to light. For example, in 
Methods o f  Logic, Quine mentions the so-called “Geach-Kaplan sentence”,
(13) Some critics admire nobody but one another
This can be expressed using set theory straightforwardly thus,
(14) There is a set Z o f critics such that, for any x, if  x e  Z, then * admires y  
only if  y * x  an d y  e  Z.
Or, more formally, (taking a domain of critics only), as,
(15) 3Z(3x(x g Z) a  VxVy(x e Z  a  A(xt y) -»  (y *  z  a  y  e  Z)))
Now this can be rewritten using second-order logic, as,
(16) 3Z(3xZ(x) a  VxVy(Z(x) a  >4(x, y) -> (y *  x a  Z(y)))
The important thing about (13) is its non-nominalizability. Kaplan showed how to prove 
that the second-order statement (16) is not equivalent to any first-order formula 
containing just A(x, y )135.
Further examples o f difficulties in nominalizing platonistic statements have been 
provided by Putnam 1971 and Field 1980. Following Quine’s early lead, both authors
Frege's definition of “x is an ancestor of y” is: x is in every class that contains y’s parents and also 
contains the parents of any member. A philosopher whom I shall call N. once asked me. “Do you mean 
to say that because I believe that Napoleon was not one of my ancestors, I am committed to such 
philosophically dubious entities as classes?” Although it is certain that Frege’s  definition, whose logical 
utility, fruitfulness and interest have been established beyond doubt, cannot be dismissed for such an 
utterly crazy reason, it is not at all easy to see what a good answer to N.’s  question might be.
135 Kaplan’s proof that (16) is not equivalent to a formula containing just A is based on demonstrating that 
the second-order formula (16) discriminates between certain elementarily-equivalent interpretations and 
3 2. This is impossible for any first-order formula (or set o f such) containing just A. See Boolos 1984, pp. 
432-433.
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discuss those mathematicized statements used in formulating scientific laws. In 
particular, statements using mixed predicates and quantification over mathematicalia.
Consider a platonistically definable relation amongst concreta:
(17) (x is r-mass-related to y) <-» (mkg(x) = r x  mkg(y))
Here’s a “law” using this notion relating concreta,
(18) if  jc is 7c-mass-related to y, then A*) is ^-mass-related to g(y) 
which is expressible platonistically as,
(19) if  mkg(x) =  7i x mkg(y) then mkg(ftxj) = X x mkg(g(y))
Now, Field explained in his 1980 how some platonistically definable relations amongst 
concreta may be redefined nominalistically using certain “nominalistic” primitives:
‘jc is massless’,
‘x is less-massive thanjy’,
‘the mass-difference o f x andy  is congruent to the mass difference o f z and w \
For example, given these, we can re-express the relation,
(20) x is twice as massive as y
by,
(21) (y is less-massive than x) a  3 w ( w  is massless a  cong-mass(vt% yx)) 
However, it is not so easy to re-express,
(22) jc is 3.14 times as massive asy
But it is possible. We can in fact re-express (22) as follows,
(23) there is something z such that z is 314 times as massive as y  and z is 100 
times as massive as x
That is, mkg(z) = 314mkg(y) and mkg(z) = 100wkg(jc). One then has to define ‘z is 314 
times as massive as y 9 and ‘z is 100 times as massive as x ’ using the afore-mentioned
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nominalistic primitives. Notice that the proposed nominalistic definition o f this rather 
complicated mass relation between concreta requires the postulation o f  sufficiently many 
other objects, in the appropriate primitive mass relations. If these other objects did not 
exist, then x simply could not be 3.14 times as massive asy.
Even with such notions alone, we can re-express,
(24) x is 7i times as massive as y
Such a statement requires quite advanced nominalization techniques. For example, we 
might introduce a notion,
the line segment r measures the mass of x,
and then, using geometrical techniques (in particular, invoking the fact that such line 
segments can be thought o f a real number surrogates136), re-express (23) roughly as,
(25) there is a line segment rx which measures the mass o f x and there is a line 
segment r2  which measures the mass ofjy, and the ratio rx: r2  is equal to n.
where V  is now defined nominalistically as ‘the ratio L : Z), where L is a circumference 
and D  a diameter for any circle C \ and where a circle is a locus o f points all equidistant 
from a fixed point. (More exactly, ‘the ratio x : y* is an “incomplete symbol” which is 
governed by a Eudoxian principle: ‘x : y  = z  : w <-> x x w = z x y ’, where it is assumed 
that multiplication (x) is somehow made sense o f for concrete line segments x , y , z  and 
w).
The above examples are attempts to obtain what I below identify as expressive 
conservativeness. Suppose that we attempt the following reconstruction. We begin with 
our standard two-sorted mathematicized theory T. The aim is to eliminate the reference 
to secondary entities (mathematicalia). We expand T in L to a new theory T§ in an 
expanded language L§ by adding new nominalistic primitives (e.g., ‘jc is massless’, ‘jc is 
less massive th an y) and new axioms governing these primitives.
136 There are several “mechanical” ways o f converting masses to distances. Old-fashioned analogue 
weighing scales convert mass to a distance along a marked scale. Likewise a spring balance.
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First, we require deductive conservativeness. The reconstruction T§ in L§ of T in L must 
imply all the original non-mathematical (primary) consequences o f T. That is, if  T |- cp, 
where cp is a mathematics-free assertion in L, then we require that T§ f- cp.
Second, T§ must be able to re-express using its primary predicates (in L§) all the 
platonistically definable relations, expressible in the language L o f T, amongst primary 
entities. That is, for any mixed mathematicized formula F(x1; ..., xn) in L containing only 
primary variables, we require that there be a mathematics-free formula F§(xh ..., xn) in 
L§ such that T§ |- Vxj... Vxn(F(xl9 ..., xn) F§(Xi, ..., xn)). For example, we might be 
able to prove (in T§) that wkg(x) = 0 if  and only if  x is massless (so we can eliminate 
‘mkg(x) = 0 \
If we now take the primary restriction of T§ in L§, we obtain a nominalistic theory (T§)° 
in (L§)° such that, if  T |- cp, then (T§)° |- cp, for any mathematics-free assertion cp; and, 
furthermore, if  T (- cp(F, G, ...), where F, G, ... are mixed predicates in L, then (T§)° (- 
cp(F§, G§, ...).
For example, our nominalistic reconstruction of “mass theory” must imply,
(26) for any objects jc, y, ((jc  is n times as massive as y ) <-» / ^ ( jc, >>))
This will guarantee that, if  T |- 3x3y{m(x) = n x m(y)), then (T§)° |- 3x3y(F^(x, y)).
I think it is clear that the demand of expressive conservativeness is acceptable. If it is 
dropped, then the mathematicized theory expresses relations amongst concrete (primary) 
entities which the nominalistic reconstruction loses. For example, it is natural to demand 
that the relations amongst concreta defined by Newton’s laws for mass, acceleration and 
force should be somehow encoded within the nominalistic reconstruction. This 
(abstraction-laden) information is central the explanation o f the dynamics o f moving 
bodies. If the nominalistic reconstruction is just a list o f the mathematics-free predictions 
of the platonic theory T, these mathematics-free predictions will look completely ad hoc. 
So, expressive conservativeness is important.
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Moreover, a nominalistic redefinition will be required for every platonistically 
definable relation amongst primary entities! This is no easy task. The extent to which 
mathematics can be thus eliminated from our scientific statements about the world is the 
topic o f the remaining Chapters.
7.3 Three Construals of Nominalism
Typically, an advocate o f nominalism will begin by expressing his or her outrage at the 
introduction o f abstractions in science. Platonistic mathematicized theories, whether 
within pure unapplied mathematics or whether fully integrated within science, are an 
affront to our a priori philosophical intuitions,; they are an affront to our epistemology 
(abstractions are “unknowable”). At any cost, such platonistic theories must be dropped.
In an important position paper (Burgess 1983), John Burgess explained why he “is not a 
nominalist”. The method was that o f exhaustion. Burgess argues that nominalism about 
mathematicalia may be construed in three quite distinct ways:
i. Instrum entalist Nominalism
Mathematicized theories that require such mathematicalia are “convenient 
fictions”. The world simply behaves “as i f ’ there are such things, even 
though there are no such things.
ii. Hermeneutic Nominalism
Mathematicized theories which appear to imply the existence o f such 
mathematicalia do not “really” imply any such thing. When properly 
“interpreted”, such theories are committed only to mundane concreta.
iii. Revolutionary Nominalism
Science is to be revolutionized, dropping all mathematicization. Presently 
accepted mathematicized theories o f Nature, like relativity and quantum 
theory, are to be replaced by mathematics-free reconstructions.
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Burgess explains why none of these positions is satisfactory or even appealing. He 
thereby concludes that nominalism, in any of its forms, is unacceptable.
We shall briefly discuss the instrumentalist variety o f nominalism, which Burgess 
compares to the fictionalism of Hans Vaihinger, the author o f The Philosophy o f “As I f  
(1913), and to the sceptical instrumentalist philosophy o f van Fraassen 1980. Burgess 
refers approvingly to Putnam’s arguments against instrumentalism and scepticism 
(especially Putnam 1971). I will not go into details, for the obvious reason that extreme 
scepticism is a trivial way o f avoiding any argument. The extreme sceptic just thinks that 
nothing is rationally compelling137. But this is sheer nihilistic a priorism. With the 
greatest o f respect to van Fraassen 1980, Laudan 1981, and Cartwright 1983,1 can see no 
reason to accept their irrational a prioristic conclusions about rationality. The plain fact 
is that real rational flesh-and-blood working scientists do find Relativity, Quantum 
Theoiy, Transformational Grammar, Evolutionary Theory and so on, rationally 
compelling and, arid sceptical puzzles aside, they quite correctly ignore the rationally 
uncompelling (and often technically deficient) arguments o f some philosophers. If 
Schrodinger’s Law is not true (“it lies”), as Cartwright has amazingly “discovered”, isn’t 
it just a little odd that no-one has ever found a counter-example, despite countless 
experiments, predictions and explanations? Of course, it could be false (which no one 
denies), but such extremist (and quite pretentious) “arguments” simply do not touch the 
matter o f whether it is false. If these arguments were rationally compelling, then the 
whole physics community (unless they are irrational) would say: “Gosh! Van Fraassen 
and Cartwright have shown how the whole of modem high-level quantum physics and 
space-time theory is an elaborate myth, spreading terrible lies about such fictions as the 
topological non-triviality o f the vacuum. Let’s close down CERN and Fermilab!”
The issue o f extremist scepticism about science is somewhat tangential to the general 
theme o f this dissertation. I assume that the reader is the normal person who thinks that 
standard accepted scientific theories like GR, QED and so on, are pretty good
137 Not even simple mathematical truths, logical truths, or the observationally “given”. As Descartes pointed 
out, a “malicious demon” may be supposed who forces us to think in a manner that appears valid, but in fact 
sometimes isn’t (i.e., leads from truths to falsehoods).
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descriptions o f the Universe. I shall quickly come to a sceptical conclusion about extreme 
scepticism.
A succinct summary o f the unsatisfactory nature o f scepticism, and, in fact, o f the 
untenability o f “uncompromising empiricism”, was given long ago by Russell, in a 
classic discussion of Logical Positivism:
There is one matter of great philosophic importance in which a careful analysis 
of scientific inference and syntax leads ... to a conclusion which is unwelcome to 
me and (I believe) to almost all logical empiricists. The conclusion is that 
uncompromising empiricism is untenable. From a finite number of observations 
no general proposition can be inferred to be even probable unless we postulate 
some general principle of inference which cannot be established empirically. ...
As to what is to be done in consequence there is no agreement. Some hold that 
truth does not consist in conformity with fact, but only in coherence with other 
propositions already accepted for some undefined reason. Others, like 
Reichenbach, favour a posit which is a mere act of will and is admitted not to be 
intellectually justified. Yet others make attempts—to my mind futile—to dispense 
with general propositions. For my part, I assum e that science is broadly 
speaking true, and arrive at the necessary postulates by analysis. But against 
the thoroughgoing sceptic I can advance no argument except that I do not 
believe him to be sincere.
(Russell 1950 (1956), pp. 381-382. Emphasis added).
In the last sentence, Russell presents what might be called the Shamming Objection to 
scepticism. Namely, those who affect to be sceptics, really aren’t: they are “shamming”. 
On this view, irrespective o f van Fraassen’s detached lip service to scepticism, he is (in 
some sense) shamming when he affects to express disbelief or agnosticism about atoms, 
molecules, electrons, genes and so on. Field 1980 calls the analogue o f this (in the 
philosophy o f mathematics) “intellectual dishonesty”, namely “refusing to assert in one’s 
philosophical moments what one assumes all the time in doing science”.
7.4 Reconstrual: Preliminaries
In ordinary language, a range o f statements carry prima facie  ontological commitment 
to abstracta. Examples138 are:
(1) Humility is a virtue
1381 take the first two o f  these examples from Quine 1960, pp. 122-123.
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(2) Redness is a sign o f ripeness
(3) The number o f apples on the desk is 2
Anyone with nominalistic scruples might well balk at the admission o f such abstracta 
(humility, redness and the number o f apples on the desk) into their ontology, and might 
wish to eliminate such abstract references. One procedure would be to engage in an 
eliminative programme o f showing such statements to be merely perverse ways o f saying 
humdrum things about mundane concrete bodies.
Such an eliminative programme was discussed long ago in Goodman & Quine 1947. In 
1947, Quine wrote:
... Another and more serious case in which a  man frees himself from 
ontological commitments of his discourse is this: he shows how some particular 
use which he makes of quantification, involving a prima facie commitment to 
certain objects, can be expanded into an idiom innocent of such commitment...
In this event the seemingly presupposed objects may justly be said to have been 
explained away a s  convenient fictions, manners of speaking.
(Quine 1947 (1980), pp. 103-104. Emphasis added).
Quine was no doubt thinking o f Russell’s 1905 paradigmatic theory o f descriptions, 
wherein we expand out any context,
G(the F)
as,
3x[G(x) a  F(x) a  Vy(F(y) -> y  = *)].
Quine referred to this kind of expansion, following Russell, as a contextual 
definitionI39. That is, a definition which permit the elimination o f ‘the’ from any context. 
Indeed, one can, and probably should, think o f Russell’s explanation as a logical analysis 
of the meaning o f ‘the’ (or as an analysis o f truth conditions o f sentences containing 
‘the’), as it is usually used, prefixed to a polyadic predicate to form a definite description.
The suggestion that a person may “free himself from ontological commitments o f his 
discourse” by showing how a statement exhibiting a prima facie  commitment to certain
139 Quine traces such contextual definition back to Bentham’s “paraphrasis”.
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objects “can be expanded into an idiom innocent o f such commitment” and thus that “the 
seemingly presupposed objects may justly be said to have been explained away as 
convenient fictions, manners o f speaking” lies behind the recent flurry o f nominalistic 
reconstruals, which are to be discussed below. We expand platonistic mathematical 
statements “into an idiom innocent o f such commitment”.
Actually, it would be more accurate to say that, for each o f these reconstruals, a 
mathematical assertion is non-liter ally reconstrued, rather than simply “expanded out”. 
For it would seem that Russell, Quine and others would have argued that,
(4) 3x[G(x) a  F(x) a  \fy(F(y) -> y  = x)]
is actually the literally correct logical form of,
(5) G(the F).
Russell, reflecting later on this matter, wrote:
Meinong maintains that there is such a thing a s  the round square only it does 
not exist, and it does not even subsist, but nevertheless there is such an object, 
and when you say T he round square is a fiction’, he takes it that there is an 
object 'the round square’ and there is a  predicate ‘fiction’. No-one with a sense 
of reality would so analyse that proposition. He would see  that the proposition 
wants analysing in such a way that you won’t have to regard the round square as 
a constituent of the proposition.
(Russell 1918-1919 (1956), p. 223).
Another paradigm of “expanding out” statements with commitment to abstracta is 
clearly illustrated by the use o f numerically definite quantifiers. For example,
(3) The number o f apples on the desk is 2
may be “expanded out” as,
(6) 3x3y(x * y  a  A(x) a  A{y) a  Vz(A(z) (z = x v  z  = y)))
The mathematicized statement (3) contains an apparent reference to an abstractum (the 
number 2). The reconstrual (6) using numerically definite quantifiers is only committed 
to the existence of a pair of apples on the desk (I discuss such quantifiers below).
However, it might be urged that a literal regimentation of (3) is,
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(7) #A  = 2
where is an operator on predicates yielding a singular term which designates 
numbers and ‘2 ’ is a bona fide singular term designating a number. If this is correct, then 
we must explain the relationship between the ontologically committed (7) and its 
mathematics-free reconstrual (6).
Similarly, there is a literal regimentation of,
(8) The cube root o f seven is less than 2,
namely,
(9) 3\x(x3 = 7 a *  < 2).
To regiment ‘The cube root o f 7 is less than T  as something logically inequivalent to
(9) is to adopt a non-literal reconstrual.
Returning to our earlier example, consider,
(1) Humility is a virtue
Someone philosophically puzzled by the apparent reference to an abstractum, namely 
humility, might wish to reconstrue this statement nominalistically, namely as,
(10) All humble persons are virtuous
which only quantifies over persons. A similar proposal might be made for (2), with its 
reference to another abstractum, redness. We simply reconstrue (2) as,
(11) All ripe fruit are red
In 1960, Quine put such eliminativism as follows:
One might, with laudably scientific motives, resolve to sweep these abstract 
objects aside. One might begin by explaining ‘Humility is a virtue’ and ‘Redness 
is a  sign of ripeness’ away as perverse ways of saying of humble concrete 
persons and red concrete fruit that they are virtuous and ripe.
(Quine 1960, p. 122).
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However, Quine140 was sceptical that this kind o f programme might fully succeed in its 
aims:
But such a program cannot without difficulty be carried very far. What of 
‘Humility is rare’? We may for the sake of argument construe 'Humility is a  virtue’ 
and ‘Humility is rare’ as ‘Humble persons are virtuous’ and ‘Humble persons are 
rare’; but the similarity is misleading. For whereas 'Humble persons are virtuous’ 
m eans in turn that each humble person is virtuous, ‘Humble persons are rare’ 
does not mean that each humble person is rare; it m eans something rather 
about the class of humble persons, viz., how small a  part it is of the class of 
persons. But these classes are abstract objects in turn—not to be distinguished 
from attributes save on a technical point. So ‘Humble persons are rare’ has only 
the appearance of concreteness; ‘Humility is rare’ is a more forthright rendering.
Maybe this abstract reference can still be eliminated, but only in some pretty 
devious way.
(Quine 1960, pp. 122-123).
If we bracket questions o f whether such abstractum-eliminating “reconstruals” might be 
found for such recalcitrant cases as ‘Humility is rare’, a more serious question arises. 
This was first raised by Alston 1958, a paper sharply critical o f Quine’s method of 
nominalistic paraphrase. Roughly, Alston’s question is: what exactly legitimizes the 
claim that any such nominalistic reconstrual cp° is an adequate reconstrual o f some such 
(allegedly problematic) abstractum-committed assertion cp?
In short, noone has clarified what it means to say that,
(12) (p° is an adequate reconstrual o f cp.
For example,
(13) ‘Humble persons are virtuous’ is an adequate reconstrual o f ‘Humility is a 
virtue’
Now, Quine himself was deeply opposed to (even the scientific intelligibility of) saying 
that,
(14) cp° means the same as cp.
140 Remember, it was Quine who, with Goodman, initiated modem logical nominalism in Anglo-American 
philosophy. Quine was amongst the keenest to explore the possibilities o f and limits o f such “abstractum- 
eliminating paraphrases”.
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However, if  we provide no constraints on reconstrual, then we could suppose that 
anything might count as a reconstrual of cp. (Then, when I utter some sentence cp in the 
presence o f my interlocutor, he or she will be completely in the dark as to what I  mean, 
even if  he or she knows the conventional meaning o f cp).
Let me clarify. The hermeneuticist has an “intuition”, that
(3) #A  = 2
may be reconstrued as,
( 6 )  3 x 3 y ( x  * y  a  A(x) a  A(y) a  V z ( / \ ( z ) -> ( z  = x  v  z  = y ) ) )
I am not disputing the “intuition”. But intuitions are slippery beasts, and if  nothing 
counts as a constraint on the introduction of reconstruals, we have the beginning o f a 
slippery slope towards total anarchy. If some hermeneutic anarchist comes along and says 
that statements like,
(15) Churchill was a great leader
(16) I dreamt last night that my mother tripped over and broke her hip
are to be construed as,
(15)° I implicitly endorse the mythologizing authoritarian apotheosis of 
leadership and coercion
(16)° I have a repressed desire to re-enter my mother’s womb, but also know 
that to escape from my present obligations would lead to pain
then what are we to say? Is there an “intuition” behind such reconstruals?
Returning to the serious case, if  there is an “intuition” behind the reconstrual o f (3) as
(6), and even perhaps behind the reconstruals o f (15) and (16) as (15)° and (16)°, then it 
needs to be “brought to the surface”, clarified and criticized.
Progress on this problem was made somewhat accidentally in the late 1960s in some 
important work of Putnam. For our purposes, the problem was immensely clarified when 
Field 1980 introduced a theory o f “the abstract counterpart relation”. This theory is
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discussed below. It may be said to have the nominalistic advantage o f not introducing 
such things as meanings for cp and its reconstrual cp° to share.
7.5 Abstract Counterparts
I now want to discuss the important theory of the relation between certain kinds o f  
mathematical statements and their “intuitive” non-mathematical reconstruals. Once 
pointed out, this theory has the sort o f obviousness and elegance that important truths 
often have. This theory (so far as I know) was first introduced by Putnam in 1967:
Now consider an inference from (applied) arithmetic rather than from logic, say:
There are two apples on the desk
There are two apples on the table
The apples on the desk and table are all the ones in this room 
No apple is both on the desk and on the table
Two plus two equals four____________________
therefore There are four apples in this room
The logicist account of such an inference is well known. The logicist definitions 
of ‘there are two As’ and ‘there are four As’ are such that one can prove that 
‘There are two As’ is equivalent to a statement of pure quantification theory (with 
identity) namely: There is an x and there is a y such that x is an A and y is an A 
and x * y and such that, for every z, if z is an A then either z = x or z = y’. ... The 
entire inference above is equivalent, line by line (except for two plus two equal
four) to an inference in pure logic, by the narrowest standard—quantification
theory with identity. What of the line ‘two plus two equals four’? The answer is 
that the above inference is still valid with that line omitted!
(Putnam 1967a (1979), p. 27).
To this, he adds later:
... let us abbreviate the statement ‘the set of planets belongs to the number 
nine’ as  P, and the statement ‘there is an x and there is a y and ... such that x is 
a  planet and t is a  planet and ... and x * y and ... and such that for every z, if z 
is a  planet then z = x or z = y o r ...’, which expresses ‘the number of planets is 
nine’ is a purely first order way, as  P*. The equivalence P  <-» P* is a  theorem of 
Principia, and hence holds in all models.
(Putnam 1967a (1979), p. 31).
Building on Putnam’s work, Field 1980 put these ideas to great use. First, in developing 
a “theory o f abstract counterparts”; and second in trying to explain the utility o f
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mathematics within science (his explanation is exactly like the explanation Putnam gives 
o f the above inference).
Putnam’s insight was to notice that the connection between statements like,
(1) The number o f apples on the table = 2
(which carries a prima facie commitment to numbers), and nominalistic statements like,
(2) There are two apples on the table
which is committed just to apples, is really veiy simple. They are provably equivalent 
modulo a background theory.
Before we discuss the mathematical case more fully, let us return to Quine’s correlated 
pair o f statements:
(3) Humility is a virtue
(4) All humble persons are virtuous
To illustrate the Putnam-Field idea, consider the platonistic theory P with the axioms:
Pi Vx(humble(x) <-> has(x, humility))
P2 V.x(virtuous(.x) 3y(virtue(y) a  has (x,y)))
Clearly, P is a platonistic theory which explains being humble as having the attribute of 
humility, and explains being virtuous as having some attribute which is a virtue. It is now 
quite simple to prove the conditional,
P h (3) -> (4)
That is, the platonistic theory P licenses the inference from (3) to (4). Presumably, a 
platonist about ethics will believe the two axioms P\ and P2 (and much else, o f course). 
Not surprisingly then, he or she will be able to deduce (4) from (3). In fact, with extra 
platonic theory, he or she might be able to show that (3) and (4) are equivalent, modulo 
the platonistic background theory.
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This is the Putnam-Field idea. A humdrum statements about concreta and their 
“abstract counterparts” are provably equivalent, modulo a platonistic background theory.
Let B be some background theory. Then it may be the case, for two assertions, say <p 
and cp° (neither of which, in the interesting case, are theorems o f B), that their 
equivalence is provable in B. That is,
B |- (p <-> <p°
If cp and cp° are theorems o f B, then cp <-» cp° is trivially a theorem of B. If cp is a theorem 
and cp° isn’t, or vice versa, then o f course cp <-> cp° cannot be a theorem o f B.
In the case o f simple mathematicized statements, the proposal works like this. Consider 
the pair o f statements:
(5) {x: rabbit(jc)} c  {jc: mammal(;c)}
(6) Vjc(rabbit(jc) -»  mammal(x))
Field agrees that (5) is committed to abstracta, a set o f rabbits and a set o f mammals. In 
fact, statement (5) asserts the existence o f sets Z\ and Z2 such that Z\ is the set o f rabbits 
and Z2 is the set of mammals and Zx c  Z2. However, he insists that (6) is free of  
ontological commitment to anything but concrete rabbits and mammals. Intuitively 
speaking, (5) is an “abstract counterpart” of the non-mathematical statement (6).
Now introduce standard set-theory with ur-elements ZFU which contains a theorem:
(7) 3 ZVx(F(x) o x g Z)
for any non-mathematical predicate F. (This theorem follows from the specification 
that F is an ur-element predicate, so Vx(F(x) —» U(x)) is a theorem, that there is a set of 
ur-elements, and the Axiom of Separation. This was explained in Chapter 2).
Field’s idea is that (5) is an abstract counterpart o f (6) because, given standard 
applicable set theory ZFU, we can prove the equivalence, (5) (6). Thus,
ZFU |- ({x: F(x)} c  {x: G(x)}) Vx(F(x) G(x))
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In this way, we can show that certain set-theoretical statements (which are not theorems 
o f ZFU!) are “abstract counterparts” of certain non-mathematical statements about 
concreta.
This account readily transfers to the application o f arithmetic. Consider the pair of  
statements,
(8) #F  = m
(9) 3mxF(x)
where F is any urelement predicate true only of concreta (e.g., ‘apple’ or ‘space-time 
region’) and m is any specific numeral.
The statement (9) uses the numerically definite quantifier 3m, where m  is a specific 
numeral (0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.). The theory of such quantifiers is given by the following 
recursive definition:
(Def0) 3oxF(x) <"*df ~i3xF(X)
(Defi) 3*s(0)XF(x) <->df 3xF(x)
(Def2) if  n *  0, then 3>s(p)xF(x) *->df 3x(F(x) a  3any(y  x  a  F(y))
(Defs) i f n^ O,  then 3nxF(x) <->df 32nXF(X) A  -,32s(n)XF(x)
(Def2 says that: there are at least n + 1 Fs just in case there is an x such that Fx and 
there are least n things y  such that jy *  x and Fy. Def3 says that: there are exactly n Fs just 
in case there are at least n Fs and it is false that there are at least n +  1 Fs).
We can show (model-theoretically) that these definitions capture what is meant by 
specific attributions o f finite cardinality.
Theorem  1: C orrectness of the Numerical Quantifiers
For any finite whole number n and any interpretation 3.
if 3 f= 3nXF(x), then 13[FJ | = n.
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Proof: This is proved by induction as follows. It clearly holds for 3 qxF(x). Assume it 
holds for n and that it does not hold for n +  1. Thus, there is an 3  = {D, F) such that 3  |= 
3S(n)*F(x) and 13[F] \ * n + \ .  Thus, | {x: F(x)} | * n  + 1. And, from the definition of 3S(n), 
3  |= 3x(F(x) a  3ny(y *  x A  F(x))). S o , there is an e e  D  such that e e  3[F] and 3 xe[3ny (y  
^ x a  F(x))] = T. But, by assumption, if  3   ^3ny(G(y))], then | 3[G] | = n. Thus, | {x: F(x) 
a  x *  e} | = n. Thus, since e e  F, we conclude that | {x: F(x)} \ = n +  1. Contradiction. ■
Returning to the counterpart relation, Field agrees that (8) is committed to an 
abstractum (the number m). However, he insists that (9) is free o f ontological 
commitment to anything but concrete Fs. Of course, for (9) to be true, there must be m 
Fs, but there needn’t exist the number m in addition to the m concrete Fs. Again, the 
Putnam-Field idea is that (8) is an abstract counterpart o f (9) in the sense that, given 
standard applicable (platonistic) arithmetic T, we can prove that:
(*) for any canonical numeral n, T [ (#F = n) 3nX F(x).
Let us refer to this formula (#F = n) 3nxF(x) as Redn. Presumably, it is possible to 
prove each formula Redn in second-order Frege Arithmetic FA, using the recursive 
definition o f the numerically definite quantifiers above. To prove this inductively, we 
first show that Redo is a theorem. Next we assume that Redn is a theorem o f FA. We 
want to show that RedS(n) is also a theorem of FA. It then follows by induction that, for 
each natural number n, FA |- Redn. That proves (*).
To summarize, Putnam and Field have explained how a non-mathematical statement cp° 
may be correlated with an “abstract counterpart” <p, where the condition for cp° to be an 
abstract counterpart of (p is simply that M |- (p <-> cp°, where M is the background 
(platonistic) mathematical theory.
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7.6 Hermeneuticism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Hermeneutics is “the science o f interpretation, especially Scripture”141. A 
hermeneuticist is an exponent o f the science of interpretation. Hermeneutics has been an 
integral part o f philosophy down the ages, for philosophers have traditionally been 
concerned with what certain kinds of statements “really mean”, are “intended” to mean, 
or how they are to be “interpreted”.
Modem theologians, perhaps sensing the untenability (that is, falsity142) o f a literal 
interpretation o f Biblical stories about “God”, “the Holy Spirit”, “Creation”, “Adam and 
Eve” (and other myths) seek to inform us what religious doctrines (about the wrath o f  
God, or transubstantiation, say) are “really about”. Namely, something else.
... reconstructive nominalists may be likened to those ecumenically minded 
thinkers who have suggested that religion can be made perfectly congenial to 
humanists by (re)-interpreting religious language so that ‘God’ refers, not to a 
transcendent supernatural being, but to something more innocuous, such as  the 
good in human beings or an immanent historical process of liberation and 
enlightenment. But there is a great difference between offering such a 
reinterpretation as a substitute for more traditional creeds in which humanists 
have lost faith or offering it as an exegesis of what the canonical scriptures have 
really meant all along, despite appearances to the contrary that have misled the 
unsophisticated.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 6).
In the context o f debates about mathematical realism, the hermeneutic philosopher of 
mathematics promises to provide a “correct” (but non-literal) interpretation o f  
mathematical discourse.
On what may be called the hermeneutic conception [of nominalism], the claim 
is instead ‘All anyone really means—all the words really mean—is ...’ (here 
again giving the reconstrual or reinterpretation). Reconstrual or reinterpretation 
is taken to be an analysis of what really ‘deep down’ the words of current 
theories have meant all along, despite appearances ‘on the surface’. It is taken 
to be a means to the end of substantiating the claim that nominalist disbelief in 
numbers and their ilk is in the fullest sense compatible with belief in current 
mathematics and science.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 6-7).
141 Chambers English Dictionary, from the Greek hermeneutikos, from the god Hermes.
142 We philosophers are inclined to rephrasing strong assertions by weaker, often subjective, assertions. 
E.g., to say “it seems to me that.. .” instead o f “it is true that. . .”, or “it is implausible (or untenable) that 
. . . ” instead o f “it is false that.. .”. I acquiesce, but register my protest.
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For example. Suppose a group o f mathematicians are debating the existence o f non- 
modular elliptic functions143. The hermeneutic philosopher of mathematics suggests that 
such talk is somehow not “really” about elliptic functions, but is somehow “really” about 
something else (perhaps constructible linguistic tokens, or merely possible structures, or 
performing concrete valid derivations, or even empirical matters o f manipulating eggs).
Consider the simple existential arithmetic assertion,
(1) there is a prime number greater than 13
According to hermeneuticism, this is not literally true (there are no such things as 
numbers). However, there is some sense in which this is not even what it “really means”. 
What (1) “really means” is to be given by a hermeneutic reconstrual, which will in fact 
turn out to be true, not committed to such things as numbers, and (preferably) more 
easily “knowable” or “epistemically accessible” that (1).
For three illustrative examples, consider the following:
The If-Thenist Reconstrual with respect to an  axiom M (say PA2):
(1)° M - » (there is a prime number greater than 13)
The Modal Constructibility Reconstrual:
(1)°° there might have been a numeral token with the “primeness
property” which is longer than 1 111111111111’
The Structuralist If-Thenist Reconstrual:
(1)°°° ‘there is a prime number greater than 139 holds in any ©-sequence
Obvious questions arise. Is it plausible to hold that, when mathematicians engage in 
mathematical discussion, they are “not really” making assertions about numbers, 
functions, sets, and so on? Is it plausible to maintain that what their assertions “really 
mean” is given by some hermeneutic reconstrual? What evidence is there for this 
reconstrual? Would it be evinced by experimental linguistics? (Burgess 1983 takes this
143 The non-existence o f such functions is equivalent to Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT): this is how Andrew 
Wiles proved FLT in 1994.
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quite seriously: the hermeneuticist is making a claim about what statements “really 
mean” and such a claim should presumably be supported by empirical linguistic 
evidence).
Is some “reconstrual” already in the mind of the mathematician? Then it might be 
appropriate simply to ask the mathematician what he or she means by asserting, or 
seeming to assert, some theorem. (Perhaps, one might have to hypnotize the 
mathematician). I think it would be conceded that this would lead nowhere. For it is just 
not true (and obviously not true) that mathematicians always have some reconstrual “in 
mind” when they assert things like the existence o f non-standard models o f first-order 
analysis, or the existence of a homomorphism between SU(2) and SO(3).
But if  a mathematician asserts a theorem, and philosophers are not satisfied with it 
(because it implies the existence o f mathematicalia), then to what extent is it even 
legitimate to insist that the mathematician must “reconstrue” his or her theorem as some 
philosophically acceptable reconstrual? What exactly makes it legitimate for 
philosophers to tell mathematicians what they mean? Philosophy has hardly covered 
itself in glory in its analyses of “meaning” (e.g., the logical positivists were blatantly 
wrong about the meaning o f theoretical statements).
Furthermore, if  a mathematical theorem is really about the nominalistically acceptable 
entities quantified over in its “correct” reconstrual (possible numeral tokens, say, or 
possible structures), then why exactly do mathematicians bother with the indirection, 
with the talk of real numbers, sets, functions, modular curves, topological spaces and so 
on?
Despite my serious misgivings about the whole programme o f hermeneuticism in the 
philosophy o f mathematics, I think it is worthwhile trying to get the basic components o f  
the programme clear.
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7.7 Reconstrual: Adequacy Constraints
The underlying strategy o f the hermeneutic programme about mathematical discourse is 
to provide a system o f nominalistic reconstrual. Reconstrual is a form o f translation. We 
have some puzzling mathematical statement (p and we attempt to find another statement 
cp°, the nominalistic “reconstrual” of (p. Since the statements that the hermeneuticist is 
reconstruing are often already formalized (or easily formalizable), the problem in many 
cases resolves into studying translation mappings from one formalized language I_m (say, 
a mathematicized notation for set theory, arithmetic, or analysis) to another Ln (say, a 
“mathematics-free” notation for space-time points, or numeral tokens, or modal logic).
A general or unified theory o f translation between formalized languages does not exist, 
although fragments of such a treatment can be found, and indeed, the important notion of 
a (relative) interpretation is really just an example o f a translation function, namely one 
that satisfies the constraint that theorems are mapped to theorems.
The idea o f a translation function is simple. Suppose the signature o f L* is (Pi*, ..., 
Pm*) and the signature o f L is (Pi, ..., Pk). Then an elementary translation from L* to L 
is a map T from the formulas o f L* to those o f L such that, first,
for each atomic formula Pi*(Xi,..., xn) in L*,
r(Pi*(Xj,..., xn)) is an L-formula containing exactly the same free variables.
In fact, we shall suppose that,
r(Pi*(Xj,..., xn)) = % (PU ..., Pk)(x i,..., xn)
where T^Pi, ..., Pk)(xj, ..., xn) is an L-formula built from the Px. We shall call the 
formulas the defining formulas o f T. We shall see below that they determine the 
associated “structure map”.
And, second, where cp* and x* are L*-formulas,
T(-.cp*) = - ’fXtp*)
T(cp* a  %*) = T(cp*) a  T(x*)
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r(axn(p*) = 3xnr(cp*)144
It is possible to verify (model-theoretically) that if  A* q>*, then T(A*) |- r(cp*), so that 
implication is preserved. However, it is possible that A* be consistent while T(A*) is 
inconsistent. For example, let L* be the prepositional notation ( p * ,  q*). Define a map T 
from L* to a prepositional notation ( p ,  q) thus:
T  ( p * )  =  p
r ( c / * ) = p A p
Clearly, the consistent L*-formula - i p *  a  q* is mapped to the inconsistent - ^ p  a  ( p  a  
q). So, consistency-preservation is non-trivial constraint.
What about truth-value preservation? To answer this, we need to look at the 
fundamental theorem of translation, what I call the “Co-extensionality Theorem”. To 
explain it, we need to define the induced “structure map”. Let A = (D, R \ , ..., Rn) be an L- 
structure. Then, T induces a map (we’ll call it T also) from A to some L*-structure, T(^ 4) 
= (D *, R i * , ..., Rm*). This structure map is defined as follows:
dom(r(4)) = dom(^4)
Ri* = '¥l(A) [i.e., T(A)[Pi*] = lFi(y4)]
Each defining formula 'Fi first-order defines a relation ^ (A ) on the structure A. I.e., (ah 
... an) e  'F(A) iff A (= 'Flai, ..., an].145 The idea is that this relation ^ 0 4 ) is then 
identified as the /th relation in the L*-structure T(y4), the extension o f the L*-predicate
Pi*.
Then we can prove:
144 What model theorists call an interpretation is slightly more general (see Hodges 1997, Ch. 4). A 
“reduction formula” is introduced in image notation (L) and all translations o f  quantifications are then 
relativized to this formula. For example, consider the reduction o f arithmetic in La to set theory in Le. Any 
statement o f arithmetic Vx<p is translated as the set-theoretical assertion Vx(x e  © —» r(cp)). The reduction 
formula isx  e  co. (Choosing T correctly, the result is that every axiom o f PA, say, is mapped by T to a 
theorem o f ZFC. We say: PA is relatively interpretable within ZFC).
145 I use the usual model-theoretic notation: A f= \F [a i,... a j  just in case any A satisfies *F(Xi,..., xn) when 
the sequence (alf att) from dom(/4) is assigned to x*. See Hodges 1997.
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Theorem: The “Co-extensionality Theorem ”
for any L*-formula cp*(jcj, . . . ,x n) and any L-structure A,
A f=r(<p*)[ai, . . . ,a n] o  T(i4) | = < p * [ a i , a j .
Proof: Let cp* be an atomic formula, say Pi*(xb xn). Then, T(cp*) = *Pi(Xi, ..., xn). 
Then, assume that A f= r((p*)[fli> ..., a j .  Thus, A (= 'Pi[cii, ..., a,J. Thus, (a i 9 ..., an) e  
Wi(A). Thus, (ah ..., an) e r(^)[Pi*]. Thus, T(^) |= (p*[«i, ..., an]. Conversely, suppose 
that T(/l) |= <p*[fli,..., o j .  Then, similarly, (au ..., an) e  'P ^ )  and thus A |= T(cp*)[«i,..., 
an]. By induction on complexity, a similar argument shows that the relation holds if  <p* is 
molecular. B146
Specializing to closed formulas, we immediately deduce from the above the very useful 
“Equivalence Theorem”:
A br(cp*) o  T(A) Is cp*
For our purposes, to examine hermeneutic translations, what matters is translational 
adequacy. So, here is a simple list o f some adequacy constraints:
a. Preservation of relations of implication and consistency;
b. Preservation of truth values;
c. Preservation o f meanings;
d. Preservation of modal properties o f necessity and possibility:
e. Preservation of non-mathematical consequences.
We have seen that implication is automatically preserved by T, but consistency isn’t. 
What about truth? Suppose that (L*, A*) and (L, A) are interpreted first order languages 
and T: L* -> L an elementary translation. Then we can prove:
Theorem: Truth Preservation
146 Although it took me two years to arrive here, this is in fact a standard result in model theory, known as 
the “Reduction Theorem”. See Hodges 1997, Chapter 4.
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A* = T(i4) if  and only if, for any (p* e oL*, A* |= cp* iff A |= r((p*).
Proof: Suppose A* = T(A). Then, for any cp* e  L*, A* (= cp* iff T(A) |= cp*. By the 
Equivalence Theorem, we deduce that A*  ^cp* iff A |= T(cp*). Conversely, suppose that 
for any cp e L*, A* cp* iff A f= r(<p*). Then, quickly, A*  ^ cp* iff T(y4) |= cp*, so A* =
r (A), m
This shows that the assumption of elementary equivalence o f A* and T(A) is equivalent 
to the constraint that the translation T from (L*, A*) to (L, A) preserves all truth values. 
Thus, if  A* and F(A) are not elementarily equivalent, truth preservation will fail. In fact, 
it is quite trivial to find a pair of interpreted languages and a translation that does not 
preserve truth. E.g., take (p*, T) and (p, T) and the translation map T(p*) = -.p.
An odd thing about any reconstrual mapping introduced by some hermeneutic strategy 
is that it cannot preserve truth values. We stressed in Chapter 6 that the hermeneutic 
nominalist cannot think that mathematical assertions are literally (disquotationally) true; 
but his or her idea is to map these literal falsehoods onto truths about the concrete 
domain. For example, Chihara thinks that there are no such things as prime numbers, and 
so must think that the mathematical assertion,
For any prime number, there is prime that is larger
is literally false. But, his strategy involves translating this (allegedly false) mathematical 
assertion to a (rather bizarre) true assertion, namely,
For any numeral token with the “P-property” that it is possible to construct, it is 
possible to construct a longer token with the “P-property”.
(where he must define ‘token x has the P-property’ so that the resulting, mostly 
unactualized (!), set of such tokens work as “surrogates” for the prime numbers).
There are number of neat results about the structure map T. For example, it preserves 
elementary equivalence and isomorphism. So, i f^i  = A2, then T ^ )  = r(A 2)]47; and if  A x
147 This follows quickly from the “Equivalence Theorem” above.
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« A2, then r(>4i) » r(/f2)148. There are also some interesting connections between the 
properties o f injectiveness/surjectiveness for the translation map and the corresponding 
properties for the associated structure map. One can prove that if  the structure map is 
surjective, then the translation map is consistent (and this result strengthens to “i f f ’ in the 
case o f propositional languages). Furthermore, one can show that if  the translation map 
satisfies appropriate surjectiveness and injectiveness condition, then it is invertible; and 
then, if  A* = T(A), that these structures are definitionally equivalent (as are the theories 
o f the structures).
Returning to adequacy constraints in reconstrual, we need to quickly mention “meaning 
preservation” and preservation o f modal properties. It is clear that extensional model- 
theoretic semantics has nothing to say about either o f these topics (unless modality is 
understood metalogically: see next Chapter). Occasionally a philosopher will suggest that 
the meaning o f a sentence is connected to its class o f models (or that the proposition 
expressed by a sentence is its equivalence class under narrow logical equivalence). This 
is nonsense, for ‘Derrida is a genius’ and ‘Derrida is a charlatan’ have the same models 
but express different propositions. Similarly, ‘Hace calor hoy’ and ‘It’s hot today’ are 
plainly not logically equivalent, but happen to express the same proposition (they are 
synonymous, and synonymy is not the same as logical equivalence).
The final adequacy constraint for a hermeneutic nominalist to honour is preservation o f  
mathematics-free consequences. Take our stand-by theory, Tim. This theory implies that 
time is dense and continuous (in technical terms, order-complete). If a hermeneuticist 
wishes to translate this into his or her favourite language, the result Tim* must still imply 
these things. We saw in Chapter 6 that the so-called “if-thenist” cannot cope with this. 
Just as he or she translates each assertion (p in the language o f a mathematical theory M 
as the conditional M —> <p (and then checks to see if  the result is valid), he or she will 
perhaps wish to translate Tim as ZF2 -> Tim. But this conditional is not valid (obviously 
we cannot prove contingent things about time from ZF2 alone), and it does not imply the
148 To prove this, one needs to show that if a relation R* on a domain D* is the image o f another R  on a 
domain D  under a bijection p, then various relations 3R* and 3R, D* -  R* and D - R ,  and so on (generated 
by logical operations) are also in bijective correspondence.
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mathematics-free consequences implied by Tim. We shall see in the next Chapter that 
Heilman’s modal proposal also falls foul of this requirement (the solution to this 
technical hiccup involves something rather metaphysical, called an “actuality operator”).
7.8 Reconstruction Techniques a ia Burgess
In this section Burgess’s discussion of various nominalistic reconstruction techniques is 
outlined (see Burgess 1984 and Burgess & Rosen 1997).
Imagine a two-sorted theory T in a two-sorted notation L. This theory T talks about 
primary entities (i.e., in our case, concreta) and secondary entities (in our case, 
mathematicalia). Assume that T implies the existence of secondary entities. What we 
want to provide is a nominalistic reconstruction T* in L* which satisfies the following 
constraints:
(1) T* in L* expresses and derives all the information about primary entities 
expressible and derivable in T in L.
(2) T* in L* no longer talks about nor implies the existence o f secondary 
entities.
It is worth emphasizing some aspects of constraint (1) which were not made clear in
Chapter 3. Constraint (1) is a conservativeness constraint. In Chapter 3, we proved the
“trivial indispensability theorem”, which says that an EMT T in a mathematicized 
notation L might not be deductively conservative over its primary restriction T° in L° 
(i.e., the result o f deleting all mixed and secondary axioms). An example is our stand by, 
the analytically formulated theory o f time Tim.
But there are in fact two important notions of conservativeness:
i. Deductive C onservativeness
T in L is a deductively conservative extension o f T* in L* if  and only if, for
any closed formula cp* in 0L*, if  T f* cp* then T* |- cp
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ii. Expressive C onservativeness
T in L is an expressively conservative extension o f T* in L* if  and only if  for 
any formula cp(xl s ..., xn) in L containing only primary free variables, there is 
a formula cp*(X], ..., xn) in L* containing the same variables such that T |- 
V X i...V x n(q> <-> q>*).
We have explained and utilized the notion of deductive conservativeness before, in 
Chapter 3 (to prove the trivial non-conservativeness o f some theories over their primary 
restrictions: e.g., Tim is not a deductively conservative extension o f Tim°) and Chapter 5 
(to prove the conservativeness o f the deflationary theories o f truth and the non- 
conservativeness o f Tarski’s theory of satisfaction).
The notion of expressive conservativeness is explained in Burgess & Rosen 1997:
If for every formula F in the language L of T having only primary free variables, 
there is a formula F° of the language L° of T° with the sam e free variables such 
that it is deducible from T that F and F° hold of exactly the same primary entities, 
then in jargon T is called an expressively conservative extension of T°. In this 
case, the class (if there is just one free variable) or relation (if there are several 
free variables) determined by a formula F of L is also determined by the formula 
F° of L°, and in this sense any assertion about classifications of or relationships 
among primary entities that is expressible in L is (according to T itself) already 
expressible in L°.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 83-84).
Expressive conservativeness is clearly a stronger constraint than mere deductive 
conservativeness. Indeed, it is a natural constraint on any adequate reconstruction o f a 
mathematicized theory like Tim. Roughly, a mathematicized theory might imply facts 
about primary (concrete) entities which are not in any way represented in the primary 
consequences. Such facts are expressed using mixed predicates. For example, T in L 
might imply a mixed consequence Vx3XR(x, X), for some mixed formula R(x, X). This 
consequence says that every primary entity x has a certain (mathematically definable) 
property (i.e., the monadic property o f primary entities expressed by 3R). This 
consequence wiil automatically be omitted from the primary restriction T°, for it 
quantifies over secondary entities (mathematicalia).
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So constraint (ii) demands that mixed consequences like VxBXR(x, X) are “preserved” 
in the reconstruction T* in L*, by a reconstrual within L* o f the mixed formula 3 XR(x, 
X). One cannot simply delete this concept 3 R  which concerns primary entities, for then 
one simply deletes a piece o f information about primary entities, namely Vx3XR(x, X).
For example, suppose the mixed formula 3XR(x, X) classifying primary entities is in 
the language L o f T. The requirement of expressive conservativeness is that there be a 
primary formula R*(x) o f L* such that T |- Vx(3XR(x, X) <-> R*(x)). As Burgess & 
Rosen 1997 point out, if  there is no such formula R*(x), then the factual classification o f  
all those primary entities that satisfy 3XR(x, X) is simply not expressed within L*.
Burgess & Rosen 1997 sketch three technical methods o f achieving such a 
reconstructive goal:
a. Tarskian elimination
b. Skolemite elimination
c. Craigian elimination
We shall quickly describe these techniques now.
a. Tarskian Elimination
The term ‘Tarskian elimination’ derives from a technique introduced in a 1953 
monograph (quite unrelated to nominalism) by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson. 
Tarskian elimination is the most natural form of elimination o f secondary entities which 
conforms to the constraints (i) and (ii) above.
We say that a theory T in a two-sorted notation L has the elimination property just in 
case it has a merely redundant extension T* in an extended notation L* that is fully 
conservative over its primary restriction.149
149 T* in L* is a merely redundant extension o f  T in L just in case it is a deductively and expressively 
conservative extension o f T in L. See Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 83-85.
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Tarskian elimination depends upon T in L satisfying a certain strong representational 
constraint. Briefly, the appropriate metatheorem says that,
if  T in L has the representation property, then it has the elimination property
T in L has the representation property just in case there is a mixed “representation 
formula” R ( X ] , x n, X) in L such that,
A. T |-VX3xi...3xI1R(x1, ...,x„,X)
saying that every secondary entity X  is represented by some n-tuple jcj, ..., jcn o f primary 
entities, and
B. T |-V x1...VxnVXiVX2[(R(x1, ...,xn, Xj) a  R(Xj, ..., xn,X 2)) —»Xi = X2]
saying that there is at most one secondary entity X  represented by any n-tuple xu ..., xn
of primary entities.
Burgess & Rosen 1997 point out that “by modifying the definition o f R, arbitrarily 
designating some one secondary entity (such as 0  in the case where the secondary entities 
are real numbers) and arbitrarily stipulating that a k-tuple that did not represent anything 
else under the original definition o f R is to be counted as representing this special 
secondary entity, one may also assume”,
C. T f- VXj...Vxn3XR(xls ..., xn, X)
What is going on here? Roughly, the “representation theorems” say that each 
mathematical entity has a “concrete counterpart”. E.g., each real number r (e.g., n) might 
be represented by some concrete geometric space-time line segment Lr. The idea is to do 
away with the abstract reals in favour of their representatives, the line segments Lr. (The 
problem that arises is when set theory enters the picture. Unless our physical theory 
contains a spectacular physical assumption that every abstract transfinite set has a 
“concrete exemplification”, the Tarskian method does not work to eliminate a set 
theoretic ontology).
On the assumptions (A)-(C), the technical metatheorem is then not difficult to prove. 
Namely, that there is a merely redundant extension T* in some extended notation L* that
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it is fully conservative over its primary restriction T*°. The proof is given on pp. 87-90 o f  
Burgess & Rosen 1997. They also make clear that this elimination method actually 
provides an implication-preserving reconstrual T: L t-> L§ such that, for any primary 
formula cp in L°, T(cp) = cp. In particular, it follows that if  cp is a closed primary formula, 
then if T |-cp, then T(T) f- cp.
b. Skolem ite Elimination
If we drop the demand that there exist a representation formula for T (i.e., a formula in 
L, R(Xj, ..., xn, X) such that existence and uniqueness principles follow from T), an 
easier method o f reduction is available. One expands the original two-sorted language L 
to L+ by adding a new unexplained primitive representation predicate ®(x, X), and one 
adds as axioms governing this predicate,
i. VX3 !x®(x, X)
ii. Vx3 !X®(x, X)
to obtain a new theory T+. The method o f eliminating quantification with respect to X  
then proceeds as before.
The bizarreness of such a procedure is easy to describe. Suppose T contains set theory, 
which posits a vast transfinite hierarchy of sets. To eliminate quantification over these 
sets, one must introduce the stupendous physical assumption that every transfinite rank is 
represented by some unique concrete physical object. This assumption, that everything 
implied to exist in standard set theory has a physical exemplification, is a pretty hard one 
to swallow.
The resulting theory T+ in L+ can be proved deductively conservative over T using the 
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem150.
150 See Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 91-92.
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c. Craigian Elimination
Let us say, just for a moment, that a theory T is “nice” when it is recursively 
axiomatizable. It can be specified by an effectively decidable class o f axioms (which we 
identify with T)151. The theory proper is just the deductive closure o f T. If the class o f  
axioms o f T is decidable, then, under a Godel coding system, the Godel numbers o f its 
class o f axioms is recursive. On this assumption, the class o f theorems o f T is recursively 
enumerable151.
It is possible to show that, for any r.e. set of numbers A , there is a Turing Machine MA 
which prints out all and only the elements of A. Then, Craig’s Reaxiomatization Theorem 
(Craig 1953) is this:
Any deductively closed r.e. set o f formulas is the deductive closure o f a recursive 
set o f axioms153.
This means that any deductively closed r.e. set o f formulas can be recursively 
axiomatized (no matter how inelegantly). That is, if  A is r.e. and closed, then there is a 
decidable (recursive) set o f formulas A* such that A = Cn(A*).
Now consider a recursively axiomatized “nice” theory T in a two-sorted notation L. 
Consider the deductive closure o f T, Cn(T). This set is r.e. Next consider definable
151 Incidentally, by Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, full first-order arithmetic is not a “nice” theory! The 
class o f truths in 3? is not recursively axiomatizable. “Niceness” is a kind o f  accessibility constraint, that we 
impose because we think o f the human mind as a “finite recognition device”. But Godel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem, as Putnam once remarked, implies that the whole truth can never be fully “accessed”.
152 Any set A o f  numbers is r.e. if and only if there is a recursive relation R  such that, for any w, n e  A iff 
3mR(m, n). E.g., the set o f (g.n.s of) theorems o f Robinson Arithmetic Q is not recursive, but is r.e. Indeed, 
the set o f  valid theorems o f  first-order logic is not recursive, but is r.e. (Church’s Theorem).
153 A proof o f  Craig’s Theorem is to be found in Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, solution to Exercise 15.4, pp. ISO- 
181. Another proof sketch is given in Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 93. The proof is this. Assume that A" is a set 
o f formulas. Suppose that X*, the class o f g.n.s o f J fs  members, is r.e. So, there is a recursive relation R  
such that X* = {«: n is the g.n. o f a formula in X) = {«: 3mR(n, m)}. The proof involves constructing a 
decidable set Y o f formulas whose closure is X. For any formula <p and number n, let (pn = (cp a  cp) a  cp a  ... 
a  cp, the conjunction o f n + 2 occurences o f cp. Let Y =  {cp": i?(#cp, n)}. If cp € X, then for some n, R(#cp, n), 
so cp" e  Y. And if  cpn e  Y, then cp e  X. But cp and cpn are equivalent, so X  and Y  must imply all the same 
fomulas, and thus X  must be the deductive closure o f Y. Finally, Y is decidable. Because R  is recursive, it is a 
decidable matter whether or not R{#cp, n), for given cp and n. If R(#cp, n), then cp" e  Y. If not-i?(#cp, «), then 
cpn g Y. This set Tis thus a decidable axiomatization ofZ.
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restrictions o f Cn(T). In particular, the class Cn°(T) in L°, the class o f formulas 
containing only primary notation in L. That is, the primary restriction o f Cn(T). If Cn(T) 
is r.e., then Cn°(T) is also r.e.154 Since Cn°(T) in L° is r.e., then it is recursively 
axiomatizable, by Craig’s Theorem. Call the resulting decidable set o f axioms Craig°(T). 
This is a “nice” theory in L° which has exactly the same consequences in L° as does T in 
L. In short, Cn(Craig°(T)) = Cn°(T). Clearly, Craig°(T) does not imply the existence of 
secondary entities. Indeed, it talks only o f primary entities. However, it implies all the 
original primary consequences o f T. If T is a mathematicized theory in a two-sorted 
mathematicized notation L, then Craig°(T) is a potential nominalistic replacement for T.
The question now is: is Craig°(T) a “good replacement” for T?
A common objection to Craigian reaxiomatizations is that they omit much o f the mixed 
“internal information” about primary entities encoded in T. That is, T is not an 
expressively conservative extension o f Craig°(T). For example, if  T implies a mixed 
consequence \/x3XR(x, X), then this consequence, which says that every primary entity x 
has a certain mathematically definable property (i.e., the monadic property 3 R), is simply 
omitted from the Craigian reaxiomatization, for it mentions secondary entities. More 
exactly, although T is, by construction, a deductively conservative extension o f  
Craig°(T), it need not be an expressively conservative extension o f Craig°(T).
Burgess & Rosen 1997 describe a quick and novel route around this objection. First 
extend T in L to a new theory T+ in L+ by adding, for each formula P(xi , ..., xn) in L with 
no free secondary variables a new primitive Ff{xi, ..., xn) along with an axiom BP, 
VXi... Vxn[FP(Xj, ..., xn) <r> P(Xj, ..., xn)]. One obtains a new theory T+ in L+, which, by 
construction, is expressively conservative over T. But note: L+ now has infinitely many 
primitives, FP. Now suppose T+ |- cp, where cp is a primary assertion (no secondary 
variables). Simply add each such nominalistic consequence cp as an axiom o f a new
154 When T is recursively axiomatized, there is a Turing Machine My that prints out all (and only) the 
theorems o f T. This machine need only be modified so as to print out all the theorems containing just 
primary notation, and this condition is effectively checkable (a sub-machine is easy to construct such that for 
any input formula cp, the sub-machine decides whether or not cp is a primary formula).
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theory T*. Finally, discard from the extended language L+ all secondary and mixed 
assertions, to obtain a primary language (L+)°. The restriction o f T* to this language is the 
final theory. Call this theory T°. Again, as Burgess & Rosen make clear, it is possible to 
apply Craigian reaxiomatization to obtain a decidable set o f axioms T°° whose deductive 
closure is just T°. The advantage o f this method is that T* yields an expressively 
conservative extension o f T.
However, there is a consensus (even among nominalists) that there is something very 
fishy about the latter two techniques of non-Tarskian reduction: Skolemite and Craigian 
eliminations. Skolemite elimination simply introduces a “completely unexplained 
representation primitive and completely unjustified existence and uniqueness axioms” 
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 92). The Craigian reaxiomatization is “little more than a 
formal counterpart o f the instrumentalist ‘theory’ consisting o f the bare assertion that 
concreta behave as if  abstracta existed and standard scientific theories are true” (Burgess 
& Rosen 1997, p. 94).155
Burgess & Rosen conclude that,
Ultimately dissatisfaction with non-Tarskian reduction [Skolemite, Craigian] 
depends upon the grounds for dissatisfaction with instrumentalism, on the 
grounds for dissatisfaction with a  merely negative, destructive nominalism, on 
the motivation for engaging in a positive, reconstructive nominalistic project in 
the first place.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 94).
7.9 Two Strategies: Modal and Geometrical
In the next two Chapters, we shall concentrate on two specific nominalistic strategies 
for reconstruction o f mathematicized theories:
155 See Putnam 1979, Chapter 14, ‘Craig’s Theorem’, for a further discussion.
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a. Modal S trateg ies
This group of strategies is based on modal logic, having its roots in work by 
Putnam 1967 and Chihara 1973. This strategy provides quite a powerful way 
of reconstruing mathematics within modal logic (indeed, suspiciously 
powerful!).
b. Geom etrical Strategy
This strategy is geometrical and based on the idea o f aiming for a more 
recognizably nominalistic (non-modal) physics. It has its roots in Field 1980 
(and in some respects, in Hilbert 1899). Although this strategy provides a 
way o f reconstruing mathematical analysis (real numbers) within geometry, 
it cannot get rid o f those nasty big sets.
We examine these strategies in the next two Chapters.
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... there is not, from the mathematical point of view, any difference between the 
assertion that there exists a set of integers satisfying an arithmetical condition 
and the assertion that it is possible to select integers so as to satisfy the 
condition. Sets, if you will forgive me for parodying John Stuart Mill, are 
permanent possibilities of selection.
Hilary Putnam 1967b (1996), ‘Mathematics Without Foundations’, p. 174.
The basic idea of the approach to be taken in this work is to develop a 
mathematical system in which the existential theorems of traditional mathematics 
have been replaced by constructibility theorems: where, in traditional 
mathematics, it is asserted that such and such exists, in this system it will be 
asserted  that such and such can be constructed.
Charles Chihara 1990, Constructibility and Mathematical Existence, p. 25.
8.1 Modalism: A Counter-Revolutionary Movement?
When demonstrative mathematics emerged in Ancient Greece, much mathematical talk 
was deeply “constructive”, “dynamic” or “modal”156. Mathematical axioms and 
postulates were standardly framed as assertions about what “it is possible to construct”, 
and so on. The pattern is set by Euclid’s The Elements151, as described in Boyer 1968,
In most manuscripts of The Elements we find the following ten assumptions:
Postulates. Let the following be postulated,
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a  straight line
3. To describe a circle with any centre and radius
4. That all right angles are equal
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior 
angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if 
produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles are less than 
two right angles.
156 These descriptions are taken from Shapiro 1997, Chapter 6, ‘Construction, Modality, Logic’.
157 For a standard translation o f Euclid see The Thirteen Books o f  Euclid's Elements, translated and edited 
by T.L. Heath (Heath 1956).
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Common Notions:
1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another
2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal
3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal
4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another
5. The whole is greater than the part
(Boyer 1968, pp. 116-117).
Some o f these postulates concern what “can be constructed” or “produced”, in a rather 
literal sense, using a straight-edge and so called Euclidean “collapsible” compasses, as 
Boyer goes on to describe:
Postulate 3 is interpreted in the very limited literal sense, sometimes described 
as the use of Euclidean (collapsible) compasses, whose legs maintain a 
constant opening so long as the point stands on the paper, but fall back upon 
each other when they are lifted. That is, the postulate is not interpreted to permit 
the use of a  pair of dividers to lay off a distance equal to one line segment upon 
a noncontinuous longer line segment, starting from an end point. It is proved in 
the first three propositions of Book I that the latter construction is always 
possible, even under the strict interpretation of Postulate 3. The first proposition 
justifies the construction of an equilateral triangle ABC on a  given line segment 
AB by constructing through B a circle with a  centre at A and another circle 
through A with centre at B, and letting C be the point of intersection of the two 
circles
(Boyer 1968, p. 117).
Plato protested as this talk o f “constructing”, “extending”, “producing”, “adding” and 
so on. Plato urged that mathematicalia (like line segments, triangles and circles) are 
“static” abstract entities in the real Parmenidean world o f “Being”, and not ephemeral 
entities in the imperfect Heraclitean world of “Becoming”:
Then if geometry compels us to view Being, it concerns us; if Becoming only, it 
does not concern us? . . . Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with 
geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat 
contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians. . . . They have in view 
practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of 
squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities 
of geometry with the those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of 
the whole science . . .  the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of 
the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.
(Plato, Republic, Book VII, 527. In Plochman 1973, p. 442).
Whatever the intrinsic merits o f Plato’s Platonic protests, the history and practice o f  
mathematics suggests that the Platonic vision has won out. A Platonic revolution occurs
C hapter  8. M o dalism  in  M athem atics
229
in mathematics every time a modal locution of the form “it is possible to find ...” or “it is 
possible to construct...” is replaced by a static Platonic assertion o f the form “there exists 
...” We have what might be termed the Platonic demodalization o f  mathematics.
Consider the modal notion of provability. The locution “(p is provable in M”, means, 
intuitively, “it is possible to construct a proof o f cp in M”. But the standard modem 
analysis o f provability, a recent development within mathematics158, indicates the 
demodalization nicely. Nowadays, “cp is provable in M” is taken to mean (in proof 
theory) “there exists a derivation Y o f cp from the axioms o f  M”.159
For another example, consider the important locution with mathematical analysis, 
the real-valued function/is continuous at*.
This may be explained in the modal constructive vernacular as follows,
IX*') - f ix )  | can be made as small as you like by taking | x' -  x | ever smaller
The exact demodalized Platonic definition was not discovered until the nineteenth 
century, in the works o f the great analysts Cauchy and Weierstrass, and results in the 
standard e-S definition:
for every e > 0, there is a 6 > 0 such that, for any *', if  | *' -  * | < 8 then \fix ’) -
A x) I < e
Finally, perhaps the most famous example. Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidean 
Geometry appeared in 1899. Within his presentation, he explicitly and deliberately 
replaced Euclidean modal or constructive locutions, like ‘for any two points p  and q, one 
may construct a line L such that ... ’ by demodalized locutions like ‘for any pointsp  and 
#, there exists a line L such that . . . ’. Paul Bemays, one of Hilbert’s later collaborators, 
described this 35 years later,
If we compare Hilbert’s axiom system to Euclid’s, ignoring the fact that the 
Greek geometer fails to include certain postulates, we notice that Euclid speaks 
of figures to be constructed, whereas, for Hilbert, systems of points, straight
158 The major figures in the development o f the mathematical study o f mathematical reasoning, mathematical 
proof theory, are Hilbert, Gentzen and Godel.
159 A standard text on modem (Gentzen-style) proof theory is Takeuti 1975.
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lines and planes exist from the outset. Euclid postulates: One can join two points 
by a straight line; Hilbert states the axiom: Given any two points, there exists a 
straight line on which both are situated. “Exists” refers here to existence in the 
system of straight lines.
This example shows already that the tendency of which we are speaking 
consists in viewing the object as cut off from all links with the reflecting subject.
Since this tendency asserted itself especially in the writings of Plato, allow me 
to call it “platonism”.
(Bernays 1935 (1983), pp. 258-259).
Surely the above are examples of fundamental progress within mathematics, 
introducing an improved and clearer understanding o f our mathematical concepts. 
Examples like the notions o f continuity and provability above suggest that sometimes 
progress consists in demodalization.
The value of platonistically inspired mathematical conceptions is that they 
furnish models of abstract imagination. These stand out by their simplicity and 
logical strength. They form representations which extrapolate from certain 
regions of experience and intuition.
(Bernays 1935 (1983), p. 259)
Naturally, modal or constructive talk continues in the vernacular o f the working or 
teaching mathematician:
Here are two ways of thinking about continuity of fa t a.
(1) In terms of approximations: we can ensure that f{x) approximates f{a) within 
any prescribed degree of accuracy by choosing x to approximate a  sufficiently 
accurately.
(2) Geometrically: given a horizontal band of any positive width 2s centred on 
height f(a), we can choose a  vertical band of some suitable width 28 centred on x 
= a such that the part of the graph of f in this vertical band is also in the 
horizontal band.
(Sutherland 1975, p. 14. Emphasis added).
Indeed, I am no Platonic puritan, having said many things like “owe may construct a 
fixed point sentence ... ”. Of course, I view such colloquial assertions exactly as Plato 
would have done. As Burgess & Rosen 1997 put it,
Historical relics of the former practice persist even today in colloquial 
mathematical language, as  when one speaks of an integer or equation or 
function or space or formula that is divisible or solvable or differentiable or 
metrizable or provable, as being one that can be divided or solved or 
differentiated or metrized or proved—whereas the formal definition is that it is 
one for which there exists a divisor or solution or derivative or metric or proof.
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(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 125).
If this is correct, the working mathematician will agree that the underlying reality 
behind constructive talk of divisibility, solvability, differentiability, metrizability or 
provability, the reality that he or she studies is a “static” realm of Platonic, abstract and 
demodalized mathematicalia: divisors, solutions, derivatives, metrics or proofs, and 
further o f choice functions, isomorphisms, limits and so on.
Given this Platonic demodalization o f mathematics, it is then rather surprising that 
some recent philosophical interpreters of mathematics have suggested turning back the 
clock. We describe some o f these proposals below. But what is to be gained? Should we 
similarly return to Ptolemaic Astronomy, or to co-ordinate-dependent formulations o f 
General Relativity? To ether theories o f light? The Platonic tide is powerful. In a sense, 
Platonic demodalization is a component o f the basic methodology o f mathematicization. 
The suggestion that mathematics be re-modalized looks regressive and reactionary.
8.2 The Analysis of Modality
Almost all recent philosophical discussion of modality occurs within the context of  
various formalized treatments o f modal logic. Ironically, modem modal logic is, in a 
certain sense, developed non-modally. (The semantics for modal logic is developed using 
Platonic demodalized mathematics). We have in the possible-worlds semantics of 
Kripke160 (and others, like Kanger and Hintikka) a sort o f Platonic demodalization of 
modality itself!
Within the recent philosophical literature on modality, there are roughly two ways of 
understanding modal notions: the metalogical construal and the metaphysical 
construal.161
160 Kripke’s original paper is Kripke 1959. A more philosophical approach is Kripke 1963.
161 Of course, other construals o f  modality are possible: e.g., a proposition may be “physically impossible”, 
in the sense o f  being logically incompatible with a “necessary” law o f  Nature.
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i. The Metalogical Conception of Modality
The metalogical analysis o f modality invokes the metalogical notions, like satisfiability 
or, perhaps, proof-theoretic consistency. This construal o f modality is related to the 
epistemic notion o f modality,
(1) it may be the case, for all we know, that...
However, the only attributions o f modality that make sense on this analysis are de dicto 
attributions o f possibility and necessity to (the contents of) closed sentences. The 
standard notation for such the above “modalization” is,
(2) 0( . . . )
The analysis o f this operator proceeds in the semantic metatheory, in assigning truth- 
conditions to modal formulas. For example, on this analysis, if  cp is a closed formula 
(sentence), then,
(3) the formula Ocp is true just in case cp is satisfiable.
The reason proof-theoretic consistency is not the right analysis is that there are proof- 
theoretically consistent closed second-order formulas which are not satisfiable, and thus 
do not seem to correspond to any logical possibility. For example, let cp be PA a  
-iConpA. This formula PA2 a  ->ConpA is consistent but unsatisfiable, because ConpA
•y
holds in any model o f PA . It seems then that this formula is necessarily false, so Ocp is 
not true, whereas on the proof-theoretical analysis, Ocp would be true162.
It is difficult to make sense o f a metalogical analysis o f an open formula like 0F(x). 
Model-theoretic satisfiability is a property o f closed formulas. How might we deal with 
open formulas? A simple suggestion is that 0F(x) is true o f  an object e (in an 
interpretation 3) just in case there is a term t designating (in 3) e such that 0F(t) holds in
3. So, 0F(x) is true in 3  o f an object e just in case there is a term such that 3[f] = e and 3
162 However, there is growing literature (within modem mathematical logic) on provability interpretations o f  
modal logic. Roughly, D tp means ‘it is provable that cp’, where provability is usually taken to be provability in 
some background mathematical theory, such as PA or ZFC. For example, a modal formula like D tp  -»  cp 
corresponds to a reflection sentence for P A  i.e., a formula ProvpA(T( p i )  —» <p. An excellent text on this 
interpretation o f modality is Boolos 1993, The Logic o f Provability.
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f= F(t). The problem with this is that objects do not have “canonical designators”. There 
may be no term designating e, or there may be two terms t\ and t2 both designating e such 
that 0F(ti) is true and 0F(f2) is not true.163
A famous example (modified from examples given by Quine in Quine 1953c) is given 
by the open sentence ‘x * 9 \  Clearly, '0(9 *  9)’ is false but ‘0(the number o f planets *  
9)’ is true. And, o f course, ‘9 ’ and ‘the number of planets’ are terms which designate the 
same object, (i.e., the number 9). In Quine’s terminology, modal contexts like ‘0(x *  9)’ , 
may be referentially opaque. The usual resolution involves introducing possible worlds 
and saying that while ‘9’ refers to 9 in all possible worlds, ‘the number o f planets’ may 
refer to different numbers in different possible worlds: that is, the descriptive phrase ‘the 
number o f planets’ is not, in Kripke’s terminology, a “rigid designator”164.
ii. The M etaphysical Conception of Modality (c.f., Tense)
The alternative analysis o f modality is metaphysical. After decades o f sometimes 
acrimonious dispute between the enemies of metaphysical modality (notably, Quine165) 
and its advocates166, over the very intelligibility (or, perhaps, scientific respectability) o f 
modality, it emerged that metaphysical modality is the prime notion at play when one 
wants to quantify into modal contexts, as, for example, in formulas like 3xUF(x). Such a 
notion o f modality is sometimes called de re modality, for it involves the attribution of
163 For further discussion see Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 139-140.
164 See, e.g., Kripke 1980, for the classic discussion of how Venus, Nixon and Godel might have been. See 
Forbes 1985 for further discussion.
165 Since modal logic is a form o f intensional logic, Quine’s position might be called extensionalism. The 
reason modal logic is intensional is that the context □ (...) is non-extensional. That is, one may have a pair o f  
sentences q>i and tp2 such that cpj <-» cp2 is true, but Dcpj ■<-» Dtpi is not true. This is a sign o f  non- 
extensionality. Indeed, Quine’s extensionalism is rather extreme: modal locutions are regarded as simply 
unintelligible.
166 Famously, Ruth Barcan who first developed a formal system o f  quantified modal logic, and then, later, 
Saul Kripke, who along with others, developed a model-theoretic semantics and adequacy theorems for 
modal systems. Paul Benacerraf has a nice anecdote on these matters:
... w as it in 1962 that Hilary Putnam, then at MIT, called me to tell of this young man who was making 
sense of what, to our everlasting shame, we used to call “muddle logic”?
(Benacerraf 1996, p. 17)
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necessary (or essential) properties to particular things. This is “essentialism”. The 
properties o f an object (irrespective o f how described) are classified into the essential 
(holding in all possible worlds) and accidental.
For example, a formula like 3xDF(x) says that there is something x, such that the 
property expressed by F holds necessarily or essentially o f  x. An example cited by 
Putnam involves the statue and the lump of clay from which it is formed. According to 
the metaphysical analysis, the property of being a statue is a necessary or essential 
property o f the statue, but is not a necessary property o f the lump of clay. The lump o f  
clay might not have had this property. In short, the lump o f clay and the statue are two 
different things\ They are discriminated by a modal property, expressed by “x might not 
have been a statue”. The lump of clay is a statue at the actual world w*, but there are 
accessible possible worlds w where the lump of clay exists where it isn’t a statue. In 
contrast, there is no accessible possible world at which the statue exists at which it is not 
a statue. It is an essential property o f the statue itself that it be a statue.167
Early appreciation o f this metaphysical point lies at the heart o f Quine’s lifelong 
campaign to expose the scientific un-intelligibility o f quantified modal logic. De re 
modality, with its concomitant essentialism, is to be contrasted with the less menacing 
so-called de dicto modality, associated with the metalogical analysis discussed above, 
which solely attributes necessary truth to closed propositions.
The standard model-theoretical analysis of de re metaphysical modal quantification 
theory introduces (in the metatheory) quantification over possible worlds. Although 
possible worlds themselves are not mathematicalia, the “Kripke models” built from such 
possible worlds are:
The development of modal logic was greatly advanced with the introduction, by 
Saul Kripke and others, of mathematical models (now called Kripke models) of 
Leibniz’s fantasy of the actual world as one “possible world” amongst others. In 
Kripkean semantics, sentences are true or false a t  various possible worlds, but,
167 On the provability interpretation o f  modality, things are less problematic. For example, consider a modal 
extension o f the language o f PA by adding, for any formula cp, the formula D tp . Then stipulate that the modal 
formula DF(Xi, ..., x„) is true under an assignment which assigns the numbers nt to variables Xj just in case 
the formula F(nu ..., is provable in PA. E.g., 3xDF(x) is true if there is a number n such that PA f- F(n). 
SeeBoolos 1993, p. xxxiv.
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typically, not all worlds are possible relative to, or “accessible from”, others. A 
Kripke model is a  triple (IV, R, V), consisting of a  domain W, the set of (possible) 
worlds, a  binary relation R on IV, the accessibility relation, and a relation V 
between worlds and sentence letters specifying which sentence letters are true 
at which worlds. The truth value of a truth-functional compound at a  world is 
computed in the familiar manner from the truth values of its components at w.
And a sentence □ A is true at w iff A is true at all worlds x such that wRx. (Thus 
the box acts like a universal quantifier over possible worlds). A sentence is valid 
in a model (IV, R, VO iff it is true at all worlds in IV.
(Boolos 1993, p. xix).
On the standard philosophical conception, possible worlds are supposed to be causally 
isolated from the actual world. We lonely inhabitants o f the actual world cannot 
influence events in other possible worlds. More precisely, there is no transmission o f  
energy-momentum from one possible world to another168.
A Kripke model for modal logic (W, R, V) is a highly static Platonic entity, built o f a 
domain W o f static possible worlds and their Platonic inhabitants, a static accessibility 
relation R and a static assignment function V. The same may be said o f Kripke models 
for intuitionist logic, and of models for tense logic: temporal instants, and entities that 
will exist (in the future) and did  exist (in the past), are treated as static “untensed” 
entities (such as Tony Blair-at-11.59pm-Dec-31-1999). In fact, a recent text on the 
metaphysics o f modality provides a full translation scheme taking modal assertions into 
first-order logic, with the resulting quantified variables ranging over possible worlds and 
sets o f entities existing at such worlds169. For example, a modal schema Dp -»  p  is 
translated as Vwp(w) -»  p(w*).
Finally, it is worth mentioning two significantly different ways o f analysing so simple a 
de re modal assertion as,
(1) Quine might have been a chef
168 Science is strange. Modem quantum physics can be interpreted as a theory about a plurality o f  possible 
worlds. Indeed, several recent physicists have contemplated the construction o f  quantum-computation 
devices, which work by operating massively “in parallel”, multitasking in countless parallel worlds. Perhaps 
this is nonsense. But if it isn’t, it suggests that there is some kind o f  interaction between physical possibilities 
(e.g., they can interfere; they can be combined in superpositions). It is unclear how this relates to modality as 
studied by philosophers and logicians. It may be the case that both tense logic and modal logic are really 
parts o f physics]
169 Forbes 1985, The Metaphysics o f  Modality, Appendix.
C hapter  8. M o d a lism  in  M athem atics
236
According to the view favoured by Kripke, (1) says, o f  Quine himself that he might 
have been a chef. In other words, the modal property, “might have been a chef’ applies to 
the actual Quine (who actually is not a chef). Modality is just o f way o f saying new things 
about ordinary entities. It is this introduction of new ideology or notions that permits us 
to modally discriminate objects which are identical in the actual world, such as the statue 
and the lump of clay. Kripke thus tends to think o f possible worlds, rather Platonically, as 
“abstract possibilities”.
In contrast, consider the highly metaphysical view o f David Lewis, who is the arch 
champion o f the reality o f possible worlds. According to Lewis, (1) says o f some object x 
in some accessible possible world w, first that x is a “counterpart” at w o f the actual 
Quine, and second that x is a chef. This possible object, Quine-at-w is simply different 
from Quine-at-w*. For the actual Quine, Quine-at-w*, is not a chef and this “unactualized 
Quine”, Quine-at-w, is a chef. Lewis’s theory is called Counterpart Theory170 and the 
semantics for such an analysis o f modality is called Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics171.
If Counterpart Theory sounds strange, there is an analogy with some analyses o f tense 
and temporality. For example, a perfectly intelligible (and true) tensed assertion is,
(2) Quine was once taller than he is now
According to one analysis o f temporality—an analysis which dovetails nicely with 
modem relativistic space-time physics—the Quine is a four-dimensional entity with 
temporal parts, or time-slices. A time, or a temporal instant, is a spatial hypersurface o f  
the physical Universe. A time-slice o f such an entity x at a time t (that is, the time-slice x- 
at-/) is just the mereological intersection of x with the spatial hypersurface whose time 
label is t. In particular, the “at” function is injective: so, if  t\ *  t2, then jc-at-fi *  jc-at-/2- 
Thus, the time-slice Quine-at-(3pm-June-3rd-1936) is different from the time-slice 
Quine-at-(3pm-June-3rd-1998). The former had no wrinkles, for example, and was taller. 
Indeed, the time that is “now” is exactly such a temporal instant (unlike normal singular
170 See Lewis 1979.
171 For a discussion o f Counterpart Theory and many other important topics in the philosophy o f  modal 
logic, see Forbes 1985.
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terms, “now” is an indexical singular term that designates different times at different 
times. At time t, ‘now’ designates t). Quine himself is the mereological aggregate o f all 
these time-slices. Thus, (2) is analysed as,
(3) For some time t, before now, Quine-at-/ is taller than Quine-at-now.
Lewis’s idea then is that Quine is, in fact, a vast “transmundal” entity (c.f., a four­
dimensional aggregate over time-slices, at different times) with disjoint “modal slices” in 
particular unactualized possible worlds. Quine himself is the transmundal aggregate o f all 
these modal slices. Thus, on the counterpart analysis, (1) is analysed as,
(4) For some possible world w, accessible from the actual world w*, Quine-at- 
w is a chef
8.3 Modern Modalism: Putnam 1967
The first recent philosopher o f mathematics to seriously propose such a (counter­
revolutionary) remodalization o f mathematics was Hilary Putnam, whose 1967b proposes 
a new picture o f mathematics, the “modal picture”, which is contrasted with the “objects 
picture” (advocated by platonists). The sting in the tail is that Putnam goes on to claim 
that these pictures are “equivalent pictures”172.
Putnam gave as an example Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT)173. FLT is the statement,
(1) There do not exist non-zero natural numbers n, jc, y , z  such that n >  2 and
n , n _  nx + y  — z
The negation o f FLT is then, prima facie, an existence claim,
(2) There exist non-zero natural numbers n, jc, y, z  such that n > 2 and * " + /
172 Putnam was motivated by an analogy: the allegedly “equivalent” pictures in the interpretation of  
Quantum Mechanics: e.g., the Schrodinger picture versus the Heisenberg picture; the wave picture versus 
the particle picture.
173 Or, perhaps, more correctly, the Fermat-Wiles Theorem, since Andrew Wiles o f  Princeton managed to 
prove it in 1993-1994.
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Call this statement -iFLT. Putnam argued that if -.FLT is true, then it will be derivable 
from some finitely axiomatizable portion of elementary arithmetic. Indeed, had -iFLT 
been true, it would have been derivable from a simple extension (the single axiom for) 
Robinson Arithmetic Q. The extension adds the recursive definition o f exponentiation:
i.e., the axioms Vx(exp(x, 0) = s(0)) and VxVy(exp(x, s(y)) = exp(x, y) x x). All 
recursive functions are representable in (this extension of) Q. Addition and 
exponentiation are recursive. So, if  (n{? + (n2f  = (^ 3)", then Q f- exp(n1, n) + exp(ir?2, 
n) = expfriz, n). From this it follows that, if  -.FLT is true, then Q f- -iFLT. Actually, 
Putnam does not specify that it is this extension of Q that will serve this purpose. This is 
why I have tried to spell it out. Next, Putnam points out (in effect) that Q (- -iFLT just in 
case the conditional Q -> -iFLT is valid. Furthermore, Q -»  -iFLT is valid just in case 
the modal statement D[Q -»  -iFLT] is true. Next, Putnam asks us to imagine that the 
component non-logical symbols ‘0’, ‘s’, ‘+’ and ‘x* and ‘exp’ are replaced by purely 
schematic function symbols. Call the resulting uninterpreted schemes Q* and FLT*. But 
the interpreted sentence D[Q —> -iFLT] is true just in case the modal formal schema 
□[Q* -»  -iFLT*] is a valid theorem of modal logic. Let us write ‘ |-mi_ 9* to mean ‘(p is a 
theorem of modal logic’. Thus, we have:
(3) if Q I- -.FLT, then |-Ml  □[Q* -.FLT*]
Thus, we have converted (or translated) a certain existential mathematical statement 
(that is, one which says that there are certain entities) into an uninterpreted modal 
schema. In the language of my earlier discussion o f reconstrual theory, the (implicit) 
modal reconstrual function r m<xj converts theoremhood to modal validity (theoremhood).
Now let us examine what Putnam says about the significance o f the relationship 
between the mathematical statement and the associated schema. He says:
Now the mathematical content of the assertion D[Q* -» -.FLT*] is certainly the 
same as the assertion that there exist numbers x, y, z, n (2 < n, x, y, z *  0) such 
that xn + yn = / .  Even if the expressions are not synonymous, the mathematical 
equivalence is so obvious that they might as well be synonymous a s  far as  the 
mathematician is concerned. Yet the pictures in the mind called up by these two 
ways of formulating what one might as well consider to be the sam e 
mathematical assertion are different. When one speaks of ‘the existence of 
numbers’ one get the picture of mathematics describing eternal objects; while (2)
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simply says that Q* entails -iFLT*, no matter how one may interpret the 
predicate letters, and this scarcely seem s to be about ‘objects’ at all.
(Putnam 1967b (1996), p. 173).
In fact, this looks exactly like a version of if-thenism, which we argued against in 
Chapter 6. The truth value o f FLT is being reduced to its theoremhood (derivability) in 
Q. Allegedly, when we say ‘FLT is false’ we just mean ‘-iFLT is a theorem of Q \ So, 
how does Putnam’s position differ from if-thenism? Briefly, in addition to saying that 
there are modalized if-thenist truths of the form,
(4) necessarily, if  (X , f)  is an ©-sequence, then ...,
Putnam says that we must add “categorical” assertions like,
(5) ©-sequences are possible.
Thus,
‘Numbers exist’; but all this comes to, for mathematics anyway, is that (1) co­
sequences are possible (mathematically speaking); and (2) there are necessary 
truths of the form ‘if a  is an ©-sequence, then ...’ (whether any concrete 
examples of an ©-sequence exists or not).
(Putnam 1967b (1996), p. 174).
Actually, Putnam does not clarify sufficiently what he means by a ‘concrete example of  
an ©-sequence’ (although he explains later what he means by a concrete example o f a 
model o f set theory).
In any case, what Putnam’s modalism adds to naive if-thenism is a categorical 
component. The modalist (if he or she is a nominalist) does not believe to be true a 
mathematical theorem (p as it stands, even if  cp has been correctly derived from PA or 
ZFC. This would imply the existence o f mathematicalia. Instead, he or she believes that,
i. the inference is correct, and
ii. the axioms from which <p was derived are consistent (possible)
Note that the modal categorical assertion is very weak. It asserts merely the consistency 
(or possibility) o f M. The realist, in contrast, says that M is true.
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In this respect, Putnam’s modalism closely resembles formalism. Mathematical 
knowledge consists in knowledge—for various examples o f M and (p— that cp is a logical 
consequence o f some consistent axiom M. That is, in appropriate cases, the sort o f  
mathematical knowledge that formalism says mathematicians have is o f  the form:
i. cp is derivable from M
ii. M is consistent
Putnam’s point (I think) is that we may put all this modally. If cp is derivable from M, 
then D(M - » cp) is true. If M is consistent then 0M is true. So, the modalist believes,
i°. D(M -> cp)
ii°. 0M.
It might seem then that the modalist has discovered a deflationary way o f analysing 
“mathematical practice”. That is, identifying the sorts o f propositions that 
mathematicians really believe (or: really that they ought to believe, if  they were 
philosophically sensitive enough).
I mentioned the sting in the tail. Putnam claims that objects-platonism and modalism 
are “equivalent pictures” of mathematics:
In my view the chief characteristic of mathematical propositions is the very 
wide variety of equivalent formulations that they possess. ...; what I mean is 
rather that in mathematics the number of ways of expressing what is in some 
sense the sam e fact (if the proposition is true) while apparently not talking of the 
same objects is striking.
... Reichenbach coined the happy term 'equivalent descriptions’ for this 
situation [in QM],
... the two theories are, so to speak, on the sam e explanatory level. Any fact 
that can be explained by one can equally well be explained by the other. And in 
view of the systematic equivalence of statements in one theory with statements 
in the other theory, there is no longer any point to regarding the formulation of a 
given fact in terms of the notion of one theory as  more fundamental (or even as  
significantly different from) the formulation of the fact in terms of the notions of 
the other theory.
(Putnam 1967b (1996), pp. 170-171).
My purpose is not to start a new school in the foundations of mathematics (say, 
‘modalism’). Even if in some contexts the modal logic picture is more helpful than 
the mathematical objects picture, in other contexts the reverse is true. ...
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Looking at things from the standpoint of many different ‘equivalent descriptions’, 
considering what is suggested by all the pictures is both a healthy antidote to 
foundationalism and of real heuristic value in the study of first-order scientific 
questions.
(Putnam 1967b (1996), p. 181).
However, it is strikingly unclear that objects-platonism and modalism are in fact, as 
Putnam claims, “equivalent pictures” of the same mathematical facts. I will argue later 
that some simple modal translations (using just the modal □ operator) o f mathematicized 
theories o f Nature are not equivalent to their standard objects-platonism formulation.
I shall suspend criticism o f Putnam’s modalism and return to it later. Next we turn to 
another version o f hermeneutic modalism in recent philosophy o f mathematics.
8.4 Modal Constructibility Theory: Chihara 1990
Charles Chihara has adopted a quasi-nominalist strategy striking similar to the 
programme of the mediaeval nominalists of old. Talk o f abstract mathematicalia (c.f., 
universals) is to be replaced by talk o f linguistic entities. In Chapters 2 and 7 we 
mentioned the 1947 programme of Quine and Goodman, the attempt to develop a 
genuinely nominalistic syntax. Quine noted later that more could have been achieved by 
adding a component o f modality, but commented, “ ... we would not for a moment have 
considered enlisting the aid o f the modalities. The cure would in our view have been 
worse than the disease. (Quine 1986, p. 397. Emphasis added). Unlike extensionalists 
(like Quine), and other philosophers (like Putnam) who regard the introduction o f a 
robust notion o f modality as anti-nominalistic, Chihara does indeed propose enlisting the 
aid o f the modalities. And, he also proposes invoking (again much like the mediaeval 
nominalists) a basic semantical notion (viz., satisfaction) with which to replace talk o f  
the basic mathematical notion o f membership.
Chihara’s calls his modal system Constructibility Theory (CT). It is really a kind o f  
notational variant o f (Russellian) Theory o f  Types, replacing the membership symbol e  
by a satisfaction predicate, and replacing standard quantifiers by modal “constructibility
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quantifiers”, Cx. The purpose o f this “constructibility quantifier” is to replace, or to 
reinterpret, the usual existential quantifier 3x used in canonical formulations of  
arithmetic, analysis and set theory. So, the modal strategy involves reinterpreting 
standard existential assertions about mathematicalia as assertions o f constructibility:
The basic idea of the approach to be taken in this work is to develop a 
mathematical system in which the existential theorems of traditional mathematics 
have been replaced by constructibility theorems: where, in traditional 
mathematics, it is asserted that such and such exists, in this system it will be 
asserted that such and such can be constructed.
(Chihara 1990, p. 25).
Chihara emphasizes that his constructibility quantifier should have no intuitionist or 
constructivist connotations, for that would severely limit the amount o f classical 
mathematics reconstructible in his system:
Now it is clear that I will need a more powerful notion of constructibility than 
that of the Intuitionists if I am to obtain anything like classical mathematics
(Chihara 1990, p. 25).
Furthermore, the discussion should make it clear that my constructibility 
quantifiers are very different from the quantifiers of Intuitionistic mathematics, 
according to which 3xFx is assertable just in case  there is available a 
"presentation” of an object b and a proof of F{b). Thus, the assertion (Cx)Fx 
should not be taken as implying that one has (or even that one could in principle 
devise) an effective procedure for producing an x such that Fx.
(Chihara 1990, p. 38).
Another reason for distinguishing between the notions o f constructiblity in intuitionism 
and his system, is that Chihara certainly does not want to say (as some intuitionists do) 
that it is mathematical objects, like numbers, functions and sets, that are constructed.
Instead, Chihara’s idea is to reconstrue mathematical existence assertions as asserting 
the constructibility of concrete linguistic items. In particular, the constructibility of  
tokens o f open-sentences:
What kinds of things are to be said to be constructible by the mathematical 
theorems in my system? In Intuitionistic mathematics, it is proofs or mental 
constructions that are asserted to be constructed or constructible. In my system, 
mathematics will be concerned with the constructiblity of open- 
sentences—indeed, tokens (as opposed to types) of open-sentences will be said 
to be constructible.
(Chihara 1990, p. 40. Emphasis added).
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Two further passages clarify the overall hermeneutic strategy, including the implicit 
reconstrual mapping:
When the formal system is interpreted classically (so as  to reflect the intended 
Fregean ontology), the predicate variables takes as  values Fregean concepts 
and the existential quantifier is explained in the standard referential way. So, for 
each type of concept, we have a standard existential quantification over the 
totality of concepts of that type. All of these existential quantifiers will be 
replaced in my system by constructiblity quantifiers involving variables for open- 
sentences of the corresponding type. Essentially, then, a  phrase of the form 
‘There is a  concept F  such that’ in the classical system gets replaced in my 
system with the corresponding phrase '/f is possible to construct an open- 
sentence F  such that’.
(Chihara 1990, pp. 44-45. Emphasis added).
Thus, corresponding to the assertion in the classical system that there is a 
monadic concept of level 1 which all objects fall under, there is an assertion in 
my system that it is possible to construct a monadic open-sentence of level 1 
which all objects satisfy.
(Chihara 1990, p. 45. Emphasis added).
In summary,
i. Mathematical statements about sets are to be systematically reconstrued as 
statements about possible tokens o f open sentences,;
ii. The basic set-theoretical relation e  is then reinterpreted as the satisfaction 
relation between objects and such open sentence tokens.
The very simplest example would be the following theorem of type theory,
(1) there is a level-1 set z such that no level-0 object is an element o f z 
which is reconstrued as a theorem of the Constructibility Theory,
(2) it is possible to construct a level-1 open sentence token x such that no 
level-0 object satisfies x
Formalizing somewhat, we have, corresponding to (1), the set-theoretical theorem,
(1)° 3zVxV g r1)
which is reconstrued, corresponding to (2), as the modal constructibility theorem,
(2)° Ca1Vx°-iSaf(a1, x°)
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In fact, as Chihara notes, in some cases it is possible to reformulate the modal 
constructibility quantifier Cx using the more transparent modal quantifier 03x, meaning 
“it is possible that there is an x such that. . . ”. Thus, (2)° becomes,
(3) 0 3 a 1Vx°-iSa<(a1, x0))
However, Chihara says that this reconstrual can in other cases be misleading to the 
intended meaning o f Cx. Chihara cites an objection due to Dale Gottlieb concerning this 
rendering o f the constructibility quantifier:
Let us classify any sentence consisting of the words There are no more than’, 
followed by an Arabic numeral, which in turn is followed by the word ‘star1, as  an 
S-sentence. For example, There are no more than 1,000,000 stars’ is an S- 
sentence. Now consider the following sentence
[1 ] Cx(x is an S-sentence and x is true).
As I explicated such sentences, one can regard [1] a s  saying, informally,
[2] It is possible to construct an S-sentence that is true.
Gottlieb suggests that we can regard these sentences as  asserting
[3] 03x(x is an S-sentence and x is true)
Now as [1] is intended, it is true just in case there are finitely many stars. But
[3] is true even if, in fact, there are infinitely many stars. For no matter how many 
stars may in fact exist, it is possible that only finitely many stars exist. Strangely, 
what Gottlieb concludes from this is not that it is improper to replace '(Cx)’ with 
‘0(3x)\ but rather that the constructibility interpretation of the existential 
quantifier that I gave does not “assign truth values in an acceptable manner”. It 
should be clear to the reader, from what has been given above, that Gottlieb’s 
interpretation of my constructibility quantifier, using the possibility operator, is a 
distortion.
(Chihara 1990, pp. 37-38).
It has to be checked that every axiom of standard set theory is reinterpreted by the 
modal constructibility translation function Tmc as a theorem o f CT. In fact, the axioms o f  
CT are more or less a notational variant of the axioms of Russellian Type Theory. 
Indeed, as Chihara develops CT in Chapter 4 of his 1990, he introduces first the many- 
sorted (co-sorted) notation (he calls it Lt) and then suitable axioms for formulas in Lt. 
These include The Axiom of Extensionality, Axioms o f Identity, The Axiom of 
Abstraction (Comprehension) and a “Hypothesis of Infinity” (guaranteeing the existence 
o f infinitely many level-0 ur-elements). We shall simply suppose that standard Type 
Theory translates under the implicit interpretation map Tmc properly into CT. For
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example, Shapiro 1997 points out that it is possible to translate the type-theoretic version 
of Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis into CT,
In Chihara’s system, there is a sentence equivalent to the following:
For every level-3 open sentence a, if a  can be satisfied by uncountably 
many surrogate natural-number open sentences, then a  can be satisfied by 
continuum many such open sentences.
Such a sentence is obtained by translating a type-theoretic version of the 
continuum hypothesis into Chihara’s language. The sentence is fully objective, 
and, of course, it is independent of the axioms of the system.
(Shapiro 1997, p. 231).
Many questions now arise. Are CT theorems, like (2), meant to have the same meaning 
as their standard set-theoretical progenitors, like (1)? If so, then assertions about sets may 
be understood as assertions about the constructibility of open sentence tokens. But, 
conversely and symmetrically, assertions about the constructibility o f certain open 
sentence tokens must be construed as assertions about sets. It looks as though this could 
provide no succour to the nominalist. The synonymy relation is symmetric.
The hermeneutic nominalist adopts the following hermeneutic principle:
The literal, disquotational, truth conditions o f mathematical assertions are 
misleading: their correct mathematical truth conditions are given by their 
nominalistic reconstruals.
As we noted in Chapter 6, a systematic hermeneutic translation mapping can be put to 
use in partially defining non-literal (non-disquotational) “mathematical truth” conditions, 
a theory HT of hermeneutic truths analogous to the (incomplete) theory DT of 
disquotational truth. Let <p be some mathematical assertion about numbers or sets. Let 
r mc(cp) be its modal constructibility hermeneutical reconstrual. Then the hermeneutic 
nominalist may adopt:
(3) cp is mathematically true iff r mc(cp) is literally true.
For example,
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(4) ‘There is an empty set’ is mathematically true iff ‘it is possible to 
construct an open sentence token x such that nothing satisfies x ’ is literally 
true.
But literal truth includes disquotational truth, so,
(5) ‘There is an empty set’ is mathematically true iff it is possible to 
construct an open sentence token x such that nothing satisfies x
Statements such as (5) then form the axioms of HT, the theory o f hermeneutic truth. O f 
course, we also have the literal (disquotational) truth condition:
(6) ‘There is an empty set’ is true iff there is an empty set
But a nominalist is someone who asserts ‘There are no sets’ and thus rejects ‘There is 
an empty set’ (indeed, any existential mathematical assertion (p). A coherent nominalist 
thus must therefore reject the truth claim “ There is an empty set’ is true’ (that is, ‘<p is 
true’). However, the hermeneutic nominalist can accept ‘cp is mathematically true’ (that 
is, he or she accepts this just in case he or she accepts the reconstrual T(cp)).
Having briefly sketched Chihara’s position, we shall subject it to criticism below.
8.5 Modal Structuralism: Heilman 1989
Modal structuralism was introduced by Geoffrey Heilman in 1989 and is an attempt to 
combine the modalism of Putnam 1967b with the structuralism in the philosophy o f
mathematics that goes back (at least) to famous discussions by Dedekind 1888 and
Poincare 1905. Heilman’s position involves an explicit hermeneutic claim concerning 
how mathematical statements are to be reconstrued, and is advocated as a means o f  
avoiding the “objects-platonism” discussed by Putnam174.
174 The main problems o f so-called “objects-platonism” are the two conditions I shall call “Benacerrafitis”. 
The problem which structuralism aims to resolve is the one articulated by Benacerraf 1965, the identification 
problem. If mathematicalia, like numbers and sets, are definite objects, then there ought to be definite 
identities between them. But numbers can be identified with sets in countless acceptable ways, and none 
seems priveleged. According to structuralism, it is just the structures that count. As long as we have the 
“natural number structure” or the “real number structure”, then it simply doesn’t matter what we identify the
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One o f the most pleasing aspects of structuralism is its very attractive (but still 
Platonist, I should say) account of application of mathematics (briefly introduced in 
Chapter 2 above):
i. The S tructuralist Thesis
Theories in pure mathematics semantically characterize (and assert the 
existence of) certain types of abstract structure (e.g., progressions or co­
sequences, rings, modules, ordered fields, etc.);
ii. The Exemplification Thesis
Abstract structures are sometimes exemplified by physical systems in the 
physical world (e.g., time exemplifies the structure o f  the ordered 
continuum);
iii. The Application Thesis
Mathematics is applicable because it characterizes precisely those structures 
which we find exemplified in the physical world.
There are two components to Heilman’s position:
A. Structuralism
Introduced to avoid reference to some particular intended model, with a 
particular domain of particular abstracta (numbers or sets);
B. Modalism
positions in the structure with. Arithmetic and analysis are branches o f mathematics which try to figure out 
the facts about these structures. How such structures are exemplified, or identified with distinct but 
isomorphic structures, is unimportant. I lack the space to discuss the merits o f  structuralism. Suffice it to 
say, that while it seems to defuse the Benacerraf problem, it leaves the very notion o f  structure unexplained. 
The problem is that structures are treated with great success by model theorists as sets. So, it looks as if 
structuralism is just a way o f advocating set-theoretical foundationalism, while refusing to worry about 
which set-theoretical structure is the “real” natural numbers. (In practice, set theorist just take to, the set o f  
finite ordinals). The other problem (if it is a problem) is that structures are abstract entities, and so the 
position is a version o f  Platonism. Shapiro 1997, for example, accepts all this: the structure-theoretic way o f  
putting things is “on a par” with the set-theoretic way. (Incidentally, the further final step o f  saying that set 
theory is also the attempt to characterize a certain structure, the full cumulative hierarchy, is deeply 
unconvincing: this position presupposes what it wishes to eliminate).
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Introduced to avoid commitment to the actual existence o f such structures as 
are characterized by the “structuralized” (second-order) axioms.
On the structuralist theme, (A), Heilman writes,
Perhaps the central puzzle raised by traditional “objects-platonism” ... is the 
difficulty in seeing how it is that the posited abstract objects “play any 
role”—“make any difference"—in our knowledge and in our language. Prima 
facie, at least, it is difficult to understand, for example, how it is that we can 
justify construing mathematical reference as reference to particular abstracta, as 
opposed to other forming a structurally isomorphic system—or how, for that 
matter, such reference ever gets established in the first place.
(Heilman 1989, pp. 3-4).
It is a widely, if not universally accepted view, that, in the theory of arithmetic, 
what matters is structural relations among the items of an arbitrary progression, 
not the individual identity of those items. As one commonly says: “Any co­
sequence will do”.
(Heilman 1989, p. 11).
As for the modalism, Heilman writes,
On the view we should like to articulate, mathematics is the free exploration of 
structural possibilities, pursued by (more or less) rigorous deductive means.
(Heilman 1989, p. 6)
In what follows, we seek to overcome these obstacles [lack of an explicitly 
worked-out structuralist interpretation; the difficulty of seeing in structuralism any 
genuine alternative to set theoretical objects-platonism] by combining insights of 
structuralism with a related, more recent strand of thought in philosophy of 
mathematics, roughly summed up as the view of mathematics "as modal logic”.
The locus classicus of this approach is Putnam’s ‘Mathematics Without 
Foundations’, in which it is suggested that many of the problems plaguing 
objects-platonism (and, in particular, the identification of mathematics with set 
theory) could be overcome by reinterpreting mathematics, as  standardly 
presented, in a  modal language, in which a notion of mathematical or logical 
possibility is taken as primitive.
(Heilman 1989, pp. 7-8).
Let us begin considering the structuralism. Heilman invokes a second-order 
formalization o f the axioms o f arithmetic. An advantage o f a second-order formulation is 
that non-finitely axiomatized first-order theories (using schemes) become finitely 
axiomatizable. That is, PA2 is a single axiom. The first-order axiom scheme o f induction 
is replaced by a second-order axiom. PA is the axiom:
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[Vx(s(x) *  0) a  VxVy(s(x) = s(y) -> x = y) a  VX(X(0) a  Vx(X(x) -»  X(s(x)))] 
VxX(x))
(N.B., + and x are explicitly definable in second-order PA2. One converts the recursive 
axioms o f PA governing + and x to direct definitions using second-order quantification 
over functions. Furthermore, second order logic contains a comprehension axiom 
scheme, 3XVx(X(x) <-» A(x)), where the second-order variable X  is not free in the 
formula A).
Second-order arithmetic PA2 is categorical. Any model o f PA2 is isomorphic to the 
countable intended interpretation 0? o f the language o f arithmetic. So, the second 
advantage o f going second-order is the possibility o f categoricity. One may characterize a 
structure “up to isomorphism”175.
Broadly speaking, structuralism is a hermeneutic strategy which attempts to provide a 
non-literal re-interpretation of mathematical assertions. The structuralist has to specify a 
translation mapping. A mathematical assertion (p is to be reconstrued (to a first 
approximation) as a statement which quantifies over structures, and says something like,
(*) for any structure Q  satisfying certain conditions, <p holds in Q
There are two prima facie problems with this:
i. Collapse to  If-Thenism
If the conditions are simply satisfying some axiom system M, then the 
reconstrual simply says:
(*) <p holds in every structure in which M holds
and this is just equivalent to:
(**) cp is a logical consequence o f M
175 A powerful defence o f second-order logic for the foundational analysis o f mathematics is Shapiro 1991. 
The categoricity o f certain second-order axiomatizations of arithmetic and analysis is a major theme and 
adduced as a significant component in the role o f  formal systems as “implicit definitions” o f  structures. This 
Hilbertian theme is continued in Shapiro 1997 (except that Shapiro is no formalist. He thinks that there are 
what he calls “a/i/c rem” structures, characterized by second-order arithmetic and analysis).
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and this smacks strongly of if-thenism (although, for higher-order logic, the 
model-theoretical notion of logical consequence exceeds the proof- 
theoretical notion o f derivability).
ii. The Mapping is Metalinguistic
The “first approximation” structuralist reconstrual (*) sketched above 
translates a mathematical statement cp about mathematicalia into a 
metalinguistic statement about cp itself and about cp “holding in” or “being 
satisfied by" some structure.
Both defects can be remedied. The first defect and its remedy are quickly summarized 
by Burgess & Rosen 1997:
... a proof of a  theorem about the natural numbers:
(0) For the natural order on the natural numbers, it is the case  th a t ... 
typically will prove more than is stated, namely:
(1) For any progressive order, it is the case th a t ...
... However, if there are no structures of the given type, it will be equally and 
vacuously true that:
(i') For any progressive order, it is not the case th a t ...
So structuralism is, at a second approximation, the view that theorems of 
mathematics like (o) should be construed as assertions like:
(ii) For all progressive orders (and there are some), it is the case  t ha t . . .
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 146-147).
So the remedy for the first defect is this: the structuralist must add  to any hypothetical 
conditional of the form:
(HypM) for any structure Q satisfying condition M, cp holds in Q
a categorical assertion:
(CatM) there exists a structure Q in which M holds
For example, the following assumptions are required by the structuralist,
there exists a structure in which the axioms o f PA hold
there exists a structure in which the axioms o f ZFC hold
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... and so on.
The remedy for the second-defect is more involved. An appropriate structure Q for the 
language o f arithmetic, say, must be (Z), z ,/, g, h), composed o f a non-empty domain of 
entities D , a special object z in Z>, a one-place function/ on D, and two further two-place 
functions g  and h on D. Indeed, the structure 9? = (N, 0, s, +, x) is the intended structure 
for the language o f arithmetic and first-order arithmetic itself is the (non r.e.) class of 
first-order sentences that hold in 9?. Another way to put this is to say that the interpreted 
language of arithmetic is (L, 9i).
The structuralist wants to say that if  Q is a structure o f the “right sort”, then cp is a 
mathematical truth just in case it holds in Q. For example, the theorems of arithmetic are 
simply those statements which always hold in any progression (or co-sequence)176. Note 
that if  a structure Q* is isomorphic to Q, then it follows that the theories of these 
structures (the respective sets o f sentences that hold in each) are identical (that is, Q* and 
Q are elementarily equivalent). Finally, the structuralist has to say that there are such 
things as progressions or co-sequences.
In Chapter 1 of his book, Heilman develops the modal structuralist translation scheme 
for Peano Arithmetic and Analysis. As a starter, he writes,
Intuitively, we should like to construe a (pure) number-theoretic statement as 
elliptical for a statement as to what would be the case in any structure of the 
appropriate type. In this case, the structures are, of course, “progressions” or “co- 
sequences”, so what we seek to make precise is a translation pattern that sends 
a statement of arithmetic S to a conditional such as,
If X  were any ©-sequence, S would hold in X. (1.1)
(Heilman 1989, p. 16).
Notice that the first approximation (1.1) talks of a statement cp’s “holding” in an co­
sequence. Heilman’s way o f developing a structuralist translation o f an arithmetical
176 In set-theoretical terminology, an ©-sequence or a progression is a structure (X, e, s) where:
(i) there is no x  e  X  such that s(x) -  e;
(ii) 5 is an injection from X to X -  (e }; and
(iii) for any subset T o f X, if  e e  Y  and, for any x in X, if  x  e  Y then s(x) e  Y, then Y - X .  
In the terminology o f Drake & Singh 1996 (p. 81), ©-sequences are the same as “Peano Systems”.
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statement <p(z, s) without ascending to metalinguistic talk about cp(z, s) (and thus 
introducing the semantic relation o f “holding in” or “satisfaction”) is to introduce the 
apparatus o f second-order logic in a way reminiscent o f the “Ramsification” of a finitely 
axiomatized scientific theory:
i. replace the constant z by an individual variable x and replace the 
successor function symbol s by a second-order 1-place function variable, 
f. We thus obtain cp(x, f).
ii. relativize quantifications of any individual variables within cp to a second- 
order variable X (e.g., any subformula Vxij; o f cp is replaced by Vx(X(x)
-»  v|/); any subformula 3xvj/ is replaced by 3x(X(x) a  i|/). Call the result 
<px(x, f)
From now on let PA(z, s) (without th e2 superscript) be second-order Peano Arithmetic. 
Then PAx(x, f) is the intermediate reconstrual o f this axiom. Finally, for any cp e 0L, we
PAdefine the structuralist reconstrual mapping Y stru by,
r PAstnl((P): VXVxV/tPAx(x,f)-*<px(x,f)]
And we define the categorical assertion CatpA thus:
CatPA: 3X3x3/[PAx(x, /)]
Part o f the importance of these reconstruals is explained thus:
i. for any cp e  0L, PA (= cp iff r PAstru(cp) is necessarily true.
ii. CatpA is true iff PA holds in some structure
Now, from the structuralist perspective, the important thing about r PAstni(cp) and CatpA 
is that they are both “logically pure”, containing no non-logical symbols. In a sense,
PAi°- r  stru(<p) asserts that cp holds in every (full second-order) model o f PA.
ii°. CatpA asserts that there exists a structure satisfying PA.
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In particular, the Categorical Assertion simply asserts the existence o f some PA  
satisfying structure, some ©-sequence (progression), without specifying a distinguished 
one (the genuine, natural numbers “themselves”).
In consequence, the translation o f an arithmetical statement, like,
(1) for any numbers x , y , x + y = y  + x
becomes, roughly (using set theoretical language)
( l ) slr for any ©-sequence ( X ,/  +, x), if  eh e2 e  X , then +(e\, e2) = +(e2, e\).
The next step is the modalization (described in pages 16-24 o f Heilman 1989). This is 
triviality itself. For any cp e  0L, we define the modal structuralist reconstrual mapping 
rPAmsl by,
r PAmsi(<P): DVXVxV/[PAx(x, f) -* <px(X, f)]
And we define the modal categorical assertion Mod-CatpA thus:
Mod-CatpA: 03X3x3/[PAx(x, f)]
By analogy with the above, we have,
PAi°°- r  msi(cp) asserts that cp would hold in any (full second-order) model o f  
PA;
ii°°. Mod-CatpA asserts that there might have been a structure satisfying PA.
In particular, the Modal Categorical Assertion now asserts the possible existence o f  
some PA satisfying structure, some possible ©-sequence (or progression). Heilman seems 
to think that asserting merely the possible existence o f a natural number structure will 
improve philosophical matters. As we shall see later, this is quite dubious.
This, effectively, is all there is modal structuralism. Generalizing, each mathematical 
theory is to be characterized by a certain second-order axiom M in a formalized language 
L. Ignoring some technicalities about relativizing first-order quantifiers, one performs the 
“Ramsification” and replaces the axiom M by the Modal Categorical Axiom
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03X13X2....M(X1, X2, ...). Second, any closed formula cp o f L is translated as the 
quantified conditional, □VX1VX2... [M(X], X2, ...) -*  cp(Xl5 X2, ...)].
We subject Heilman’s modal structuralism177 to criticism below.
8.6 Criticism I: Adequacy of the Modal Reconstrual
Having described the recent modalisms of Putnam, Chihara and Heilman, I now want to 
discuss some criticisms o f such approaches. In our refutation o f if-thenism in Chapter 6 
above we noted a major difficulty in reconstruing (as the if-thenist should like) 
mathematicized science: those theories of Nature which contain pure and mixed 
mathematical axioms in their description of the Universe. Our example was Tim, whose 
main (contingent) hypothesis is that the set of temporal instants under the “before” 
relation is isomorphic to the set o f reals under <. We pointed out that,
i. Tim is not derivable from pure mathematics alone (say, ZF2, with ur-elements);
ii. ZF2 -> Tim lacks the empirical consequences o f Tim.
Unless the modal logic used is extended in a certain way, some o f the above strategies 
may suffer this same fate.
Consider first Putnam’s modalism. Putnam does not explain how mathematicized 
assertions are to be reconstrued, so it is not clear how he would have proposed to 
reconstrue a theory like Tim modally. Let us try some possibilities (no pun intended). If it 
is reconstrued as the conjunction of,
i. D(ZF2 -> Tim)
ii. OZF2
then the same problems arise as before. First, the modal schema (i) is straightforwardly 
false, because not:- (ZFJ |= Tim). The contingent theory o f time Tim is not a logical
177 Modal Structuralism is significantly reformulated (in particular, using mereology and B oob s’ logic o f  
plural quantifiers) in Chapter II.C o f Burgess & Rosen 1997. This reformulation, which uses actuality 
operator, avoids an objection I sketch below.
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consequence o f ZF2. Second, the sole addition beyond if-thenism is the modal claim (ii). 
But adding (i) and (ii) does not permit the derivation o f non-mathematical empirical 
consequences of Tim. Suppose (simplifying enormously) that Tim \- (po, an observation 
statement. Then, at best, [D(ZF2 - >  Tim)] a  OZF2] f- Ocpo- And this is no good. For cpo 
will be a contingent testable statement about the world (like “if  the apparatus is set up 
thus, the counter will read so-and-so”), Consequently, the modalization 0(po, “it is 
possible that cpo”, is just a modal logical truth, and nothing like a testable empirical 
consequence. In short, the reconstrual does not imply (po.
The same holds o f Heilman’s modalism, as I shall show in rather more detail. Let T^, 
be the modal-structuralist reconstrual mapping and let T be a mathematicized scientific 
theory. Then, we shall see that,
Fmsi(T) simply does not imply the non-mathematical consequences o f T.
That is, there are non-mathematical assertions (p such that T |- cp but not:-(rmsi(T) |- 
cp)178. Since any nominalistically-inspired reconstrual o f a scientific theory is constrained 
by the requirement that it preserve non-mathematical consequences, it follows that 
r msj(T) is not an acceptable or adequate reconstrual o f T.
On this topic o f representing applied mathematical discourse within the modal 
structuralist interpretation, Heilman writes:
To illustrate, let us consider a  simple statement of numerical comparison, say 
“There are more spiders than apes (and a definite number of each)". Using the 
second-order formalism of Chapters 1 and 2, with our language expanded to 
include the relevant non-mathematical predicates (in this case, just 'spider' S(x) 
and ‘ape’ A(x)), we can represent the statement by,
□VXV/(©(X, f) -> 3<J)3vj/3n3m(“<J) is a  1-1 correspondence between the class 
of all x such that S(x) and the f-predecessors of n in X” & >  is a  1-1 
correspondence between the class of all x such that A{x) and the f- 
predecessors of m in X" & m <f /?)] (3.1)
(Heilman 1989, pp. 98-99).
178 Tnjsi will, o f course, preserve implication: that is, if cpi |- cp2 then 1 ^ ( 9 0  |- r msi((p). But what is required 
is different. The statement ^ { (T ), if it is to be a proper replacement for T, must still imply the same non- 
mathematical assertions as T, not their modal structuralist reconstruals. This problem could be remedied if  
an implication-preserving translation could be found such that, for any non-mathematical assertion 9 , 
LmsiOP) 9-
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It is easy to see what’s wrong with this. We have our original statement,
(1) There are more spiders than apes (and a definite number o f each)
which under a natural mathematical formalization becomes something like (or, at least
mathematically equivalent to):
(2) There are bijections <(> and \|/, and natural numbers n, m such that <K{*: 
S ( * ) } ) = { *  e  x <  n} and v p ( { j c :  ; ! ( * ) } )  =  {x e  c d :  x  <  m )  and n <  m
or, more formally,
(3) 3<j>3ip3w3/w(<l> is a bijection a  vp is bijection a  <|)({.x:: S(x ) } )  = {x e  ©: x < 
n} a  \|/({jc: ^4(.x)}) =  {x e co: x < m) a  n < m)
Of course, (1) can be expressed more simply. I have chosen to represent (1) thus to 
remain faithful to Heilman’s version179. Let us call this mathematicized statement A. To 
illustrate the objection, consider the simple fact that A (plus the usual axioms o f set 
theory) logically implies the non-mathematical conditional:
(4) if  there is exactly one spider, then there are no apes
or, if  you prefer,
(4') if  3^ (*S(jc) a  Vy(S(y) -+ y  = x) then -3xA{x)
Call this statement B. This statement is non-mathematical, quantifying only over 
spiders and apes. So,
ZFC u  {A} I- B.
That is, B is part o f the non-mathematical content o f the theory A. Now Heilman’s 
modal structuralist reconstrual o f A is this,
(5) DVAV/IfflCAT,/) -> 3(J)3ij/3/73tf2(“<t> is a 1-1 correspondence between the 
class o f all x such that S(x) and the /predecessors o f n in ^ ” & “vj/ is a 1-1
179 One can o f course represent any such cardinality comparison statement ‘there are more Fs than Gs’ 
without reference to numbers. That is, just say that there is an injection from Gs to Fs and no injection from 
Fs to Gs.
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correspondence between the class of all x such that A(x) and the f-  
predecessors o f n \n X ' & m </«)]
This, roughly, is a modalization o f a quantified conditional. Call it A ^ . It is not hard to 
see that does not imply B.
In fact, it is sufficient to show that a slightly different statement Am :^
(6 ) D(PA2 -» A )
does not imply B, on the sole assumption that A implies B (which can be represented as 
the assumption that D(A —> B) is true). The reason we can simplify is that the 
“Ramsification” within A ^  makes no difference. We need to show that the following set 
I  o f modal formulas is consistent:
I: □(PA2 -> A ),D (A -> B ),- ,B
A simple prepositional model o f E is obtained by taking PA = Pa<7,A = p a < j , B  = p 
and p = T and q = F. Clearly, PA2 |- A, so D(PA2 -»  A) is true; also, A |- B, so D(A —> B) 
is true; and finally -iB is true. To summarize, A |- B but not-CA,^ |- B).
It might be thought that adding the modalized “categorical axiom”, Mod-CatpA, would 
help:
(7) 03X3z3f(PA(X, z, f))
But this is utterly futile. For then we see that {A ^ , Mod-CatpA} implies only a 
modalization OB and, again, {A ^ , Mod-CatpA} does not imply B itself. To see that 
{Amsi, Mod-CatpA} does not imply B, we simply need to show that the following set I ' o f  
formulas is consistent:
Z': D(PA -> A), D(A -> B), OPA, -nB
A propositional model o f If is obtained by taking PA = p  a  q, A = p A p ,  B = q and p  = 
T and q = F. Clearly, PA |- A, so D(PA -»  A) is true; A |- B, so D(A -> B) is true; also, 
not-( |- —«(p a  q)), so OPA is true; and finally —iB is true.
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In short, for any chosen arithmeticized mixed statement A, the modal structuralist 
reconstrual A^, is simply incapable of delivering the non-mathematical consequences o f  
A. From this it follows that neither A^* alone, nor A ^  + Mod-CatpA, are adequate 
replacements for A.
The resolution o f these problems was carefully explained in Burgess & Rosen 1997. It 
is also discussed in Field 1988. Technically, as Field explains, two things are required:
i. One must, in modalizing mixed mathematicized science, invoke an
“actuality operator”, @, whose purpose is to undo the modal effect o f  
modal operators whose scope includes quantifications over non- 
mathematicalia.
Using this operator, a modal reconstrual o f T can be obtained that implies all the 
primary consequences o f T, as it should. Using @, define the actuality predicate Act(x) 
by Vx(Acf(x) <-» @ 3y(y = x)). Then, assuming that T is finitely axiomatized, the 
reconstrual Tmod is, roughly, 0(T a  Vx(~iMath(x) —» Act(x))). It is possible to show180 
that the main adequacy condition, that mathematics-free content be preserved, is 
satisfied. That is, for any primary assertion (p, if  T [* cp, then Tmod cp.
But there is a second objection. Even with @, there will still be substantial non- 
mathematical content o f T which is not preserved, as Field 1988 explains. Suppose that T 
implies a formula VxF(x), where F(x) is a mixed formula containing quantification over 
mathematicalia. This formula will not be implied by Tmod above. Instead, Tmod now 
implies the uninteresting consequence VxOF(x).
For example, suppose that T implies that there are objects x and y  such that m(x) is n 
times m(y). That is, T |- 3x3y(rt7(x) = n x m(y)). Then, Tmod |- 3x3y0(/r?(x) = n x m(y)), 
which is an uninteresting and trivial modal claim (namely, that there are objects whose 
mass might have been thus related, e.g., any two objects you care to mention!). 
Furthermore, Tmod does not imply the original consequence.
180 See Field 1988 (1989), pp. 258-259 (the proof is given in footnote 30).
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If the modalization is to work properly, one must first find a nominalistic formula F°(x, 
y) in possibly an extension L+ of L such that, where T+ is an extension o f T, T+ [- 
VxVy(/T?(x) = n x m(y) <-> F°(x, y)). That is, this nominalistic formula P (x , y) re­
expresses nominalistically the content of the platonistic formula m(x) = n x /7?(y).
It seems clear that,
ii. one must, before applying the modalization procedure, first show how to 
associate with each mathematicized statement a non-mathematical assertion 
which says the “same thing” about concreta. Given our mathematicized theory T 
in a two-sorted notation L, then, one must extend L to a new notation L+, and add 
new axioms to form a new theory T+ such that, for each mixed formula F(xu ..., 
xn) o f L with just free primaiy variables, there is a mathematics-free primary 
formula P (x i, ..., xn) in L+ in the same variables such that T+ |- VXj... Vxn(F(x]} 
xn) <-> F°(x1} xn)). In other words, one must show how to obtain an
expressively conservative reduction of all mixed mathematical apparatus.
A simple but unsatisfying method to obtain this goal is simply to add , for every (!!) such 
mixed formula F(Xj, ..., xn) (with just primary variables free), a new primitive primary 
formula F°(Xi, ..., xn) and an new axiom VXj... Vx0(F(X], ..., xn) <-» F°(x1} ..., xn)). This 
is just the Craigian reconstruction given by Burgess & Rosen 1997 and described in 
Chapter 7 above. It is not satisfactory. One must add infinitely many new primitives (e.g., 
one just adds a primitive meaning ‘the mass of x is n times the mass o f y \  so on for all 
mathematically definable relations amongst primary entities).
The alternative is to look for a small set of nominalistic primitives and axioms 
governing them such that adding them to T in L yields a theory T+ in L+ which is an 
expressively and deductively conservative extension of T. For example, one might add, 
as nominalistic primitives, ‘x is massless’, ‘the mass of x is between that o fy  and z’, ‘the 
difference in mass o f x and y  is the same as the difference in mass o f z  and w \  This is 
Field’s proposal, as set out in Field 1980.
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Having done all this ( if  it can be done), one obtains a (non-modal) mathematicized 
theory T+ in L+ which is a merely redundant extension o f (i.e., is deductively and 
expressively conservative over) the original T in L, and which is deductively and 
expressively conservative over its primary restriction. At this stage, one may drop all 
mixed and secondary axioms o f T+, pertaining to mathematicalia. The result (T+)° in 
( i y  is a nominalistic reconstruction o f T.
Field 1988 stresses that if  such a full nominalization can be achieved, there is then 
simply no point in modalizing the remaining mathematical components o f T+ in L+. For 
one may then simply drop all the mathematical axioms o f T+ (and regard these axioms as 
falsehoods, “convenient fictions”).
To conclude, if  Field is right, the programme of modalization is irrelevant to the 
nominalization o f applied mathematicized theories of Nature.181
8.7 Criticism II: Modal Primitivism
The main modal strategies we have looked at are:
i. Simple Modalism (Putnam),
ii. Modal Constructibility Theory (Chihara),
iii. Modal Structuralism (Heilman).
But how are we to understand the modality as invoked within these strategies?
I suspect that Putnam and Heilman would prefer some kind o f metalogical analysis, 
wherein 0 means “it is logically consistent that...” Even this is unclear. To explain Ocp 
metalogically one asserts that Ocp is true just in case there is a structure in which cp holds, 
so, Platonic mathematicalia reappear in the metatheory. But we have seen that a simple 
metalogical de dicto conception is inadequate for the modalization o f mathematicized 
theories o f Nature. Neither D(ZF2 -»  Tim), nor OTim, nor OZF2 (nor a combination) will
181 N.B. Field does however think that (meta-)logic is to be nominalized via modalization. See next Chapter.
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do as a nominalistic replacement for Tim. At the very least, one must introduce an the 
actuality operator @ or predicate Act(x). This apparatus is equivalent to invoking a 
distinction between entities that are actual and those are merely potential or possible. The 
values o f Chihara’s constructibility quantifier Cx are such non-actual possibilia. Thus, 
we are driven to a metaphysical de re conception o f modality. So, let us concentrate on 
Chihara’s invocation o f de re modality, via his constructibility quantifier Cx.
There is strong evidence that Chihara actually intends his use o f modality to be 
understood metaphysically. Indeed, Chihara suggests a possible worlds reading o f his 
constructibility quantifiers:
The constructibility quantifier (Cx) is to be understood as  saying, roughly,
It is possible to construct an x such that
but in many contexts, it could be rendered
It is possible that there be an x such that
depending upon what sort of x we are talking about. In the beginning, at least, 
the second rendition may appear to be somewhat more natural. Thus, in terms of 
the familiar Kripkean possible worlds semantics,
-(Cx)(x is a tangram in the shape of a circle)
can be understood as  saying (but only as a first approximation)
There is no possible world in which a tangram in the shape of a  circle 
exists
(Chihara 1990, pp. 25-26).
Note only does Chihara introduce such informal renderings, he introduces in Chapter 2
(“The Constructibility Quantifiers”) and Chapter 4 (“The Deductive System”) o f his 1990
a wholesale Kripkean possible worlds semantics:
A Kt-interpretation is an ordered quadruple (W, a, U , I) in which:
W is a  non-empty set—the set of possible worlds; 
a is a member of W—the actual world
U is a function that assigns a  non-empty set to each ordered pair (n, w), 
where n is an Arabic numeral of a non-negative integer, and w is a 
member of W; U(n, w) can be regarded as the set of things of level n 
that exist in w;
I is a function that assigns:
(a) to each individual constant of level 0, some element of U(0, a);
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(b) to the S-predicate of level 0, some subset of the Cartesian product of 
U(0, a) with Z[1] = the union of all the U(1, w), where w e W;
(c) to the l-predicate of level 0, some subset of the Cartesian product of 
U(0, a) with itself;
(d) to each individual constant of level n (n > 0), some element of Z[n];
(e) to the S-predicate of level n (n > 0), some subset of the Cartesian 
product Z[n] x Z[n + 1];
(f) to the l-predicate of level n (n > 0), some subset of Z[n] x Z[n].
(Chihara 1990, p. 57).
Actually, this seems to me like a major own goal for Chihara’s strategy. It really is an 
intellectual cartwheel. He explains only too well the meaning o f his “nominalistic” 
system by using a standard mathematical explanation, talking o f sets, functions and 
membership, and o f such things as possible worlds. If I were to explain to someone why 
iron rusts, say, invoking the valence properties of atoms and molecules, it would be 
nothing more than transparent sophistry to add, “By the way, atoms and the like don’t 
exist!”.
Chihara pours some undeserved scorn on the standard (Platonic, static) possible worlds 
model theory for metaphysical modality.
It should be emphasized again that the above appeal to possible worlds was 
made to relate the constructibility quantifiers to familiar and heavily studied 
areas of semantical research. I, personally, do not take possible worlds 
semantics to be much more than a device to facilitate modal reasoning. Still, I 
hope to convince most philosophers by means of such analyses that the 
predicate calculus I shall be using is at least consistent and that it has a kind of 
coherence and intelligibility that warrants the study of such systems.
(Chihara 1990, p. 38).
Remember that, for me, this whole possible world structure is an elaborate 
myth, useful for clarifying and explaining modal notions, but a  myth just the 
same. It would be a mistake to take this myth too seriously and imagine that we 
are exploring real worlds, finding there real open-sentence tokens that have 
puzzling features.
(Chihara 1990, p. 60).
But this raises a major problem. For Chihara, metaphysical modality is to be understood 
as a primitive notion, not to be explicated using Kripkean model-theoretical semantics. 
This kind o f stance is sometimes known as modal primitivism and is problematic:
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On one side, the modal nominalist must defend intensionalism, or acceptance 
of modal logical notions, against extensionalism, according to which modal 
notions should be avoided as obscure and confused. On the other side, modal 
nominalism must defend primitivism, acceptance of modal logical distinctions as  
undefined, against reductivism, which would reconstrue modal logical notions in 
terms of an apparatus of unactualized possibilia.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 124).
The problem is that the standard (mathematical) possible worlds analysis does in fact 
provide an explanation for the validity and invalidity o f “informally valid and invalid” 
modal arguments. We seem to have a conception o f informal validity and invalidity o f  
modal arguments (and o f truth and falsity for modal assertions). The possible worlds 
analysis clarifies and explains our intuitions. Noone would learns modal logic can fail 
but to be impressed by the fact that, when modal statements are analysed as implicit 
quantifications, modal validity transforms into quantificational validity (roughly, “it is 
necessary that . . .” means “in every possible world w , . . .”)182. Chihara, in arguing that 
modality be taken as basic (primitive and indefinable) is simply repudiating a powerful 
standard explanation (or at least, a powerful set o f competing explanations). And not 
only does he purport to repudiate the explanation. He is prepared to use it to clarify what 
Cx means!
On this topic o f primitivism, consider for a doctrine that might be called Ontic 
Primitivism. Namely, that the concept o f  existence, expressed using ‘there is ... ’ or 3, is 
ultimately primitive and indefinable. Of course, we can “explain” existence by taking 
other notions as primitive. Obviously, we may take V and -» as primitive. Alternatively, 
within arithmetic, we may take ‘the number o f ... ’ and ‘zero’ as primitive and define 3xq> 
thus:
3xcp <-» #<p *  0
Or, within set theory, we may take ‘the set of . . . ’ and ‘empty set’ as primitives and 
define 3xcp thus:
3xcp Exf(<p) * 0
182 See Forbes 1985.
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But there are compelling reasons for regarding such “explanations” o f existence as 
simply being the wrong way round. Rather, the number 0 is the number o f non-self- 
identical things, because there do not exist any such non-self-identical things; and the 
empty set 0  is the set o f such non-self-identical things, again because there do not exist 
any such things. If this is correct, then the concept o f existence is primitive and 
indefinable in simpler terms. As Quine put it,
Existence is what existential quantification expresses. There are things of kind 
F  if and only if (3x)Fx. This is as unhelpful as  it is undebatable, since it is how 
one explains the symbolic notation of quantification to begin with. The fact is that 
it is unreasonable to ask for an explication of existence in simpler terms.
(Quine 1969c, p. 97).
Now turn to Modal Primitivism. The modality expressed by such operators as □ and @ 
is to be taken as primitive and undefinable, and not reducible to other notions (e.g., to 
existence simpliciter, and notions expressed by ‘w is the actual world’, is accessible 
from w2\  and so on). Might something like this be argued in the modal case?
Consider an application o f the possible worlds analysis o f modal reasoning. We have 
the (metaphysical) analysis of,
(1) Quine might have been a chef
via,
(2) There is an accessible possible world at which Quine is a chef
Now can we argue that (1) is true because (2) is true?
Consider a modal argument like,
(3) If Quine had not been at Harvard, he wouldn’t have met B.F. Skinner
Quine might not have been at Harvard
Quine might not have met B.F. Skinner 
This can be analysed (for validity) using possible worlds:
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(4) For any possible world w, if  Quine is not at Harvard at w, then Quine 
doesn’t meet B.F. Skinner at w
For some possible world w \  Quine is not at Harvard at w'
For some possible world w', Quine does not meet B.F. Skinner at w'.
This argument has the form:
(5) Vw(F(w) —» G(w)), 3wF(w); therefore 3wG(w).
Now the important thing is that this argument is quantificationally valid, in first-order 
logic. It is via the quantificational validity o f (5) that we explain the modal validity o f  
(3). In short, we have reduced the explanation o f modal validity to standard 
quantificational validity, where the quantification ranges over possible worlds (This is 
one the standard examples o f trading “ideology” for “ontology”).
One might argue that, irrespective o f our scepticism about such peculiar metaphysical 
entities as “possible worlds”, the possible worlds explanation o f the validity o f modal 
arguments explains their informal validity, just as the quantificational analysis o f  
Aristotelian syllogisms explains their validity, and the analysis o f tensed arguments as 
involving quantificational over temporal instants explains their validity.
So far, I have described the situation between realism and fictionalism 
[modalism] as  a balanced stand-off, but there is an important asymmetry. The 
fictionalist proposes that we rejects the realist’s system—regarding it a s  no more 
than a work of fiction—whereas the realist accommodates the modal language, 
via the model-theoretic explications. The important point is that once the model- 
theoretic explication is in place, the realist has a lot to say about logical 
possibility and logical consequence. It is a gross understatement to point out 
that mathematical logic has been a productive enterprise. The challenge to the 
fictionalist is to show how she can use the results of model theory, as  they bear 
on the primitive modal notion.
(Shapiro 1997, p. 227).
... both Chihara and Heilman occasionally invoke a possible-worlds semantics, 
but they regard it as a heuristic, not to be taken literally. Neither of them believes 
that possible worlds exist. The role of the semantics is to help the reader grasp 
the intended logic of the formulas and to see  what does and what does not 
follow from what. ... If the structure [of possible worlds] is just a  myth, then I do 
not se e  how it explains anything. One cannot, for example, cite a  story about 
Zeus to explain a  perplexing feature of the natural world, such as  the w eather....
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Intuitively, to explain something is to give a reason for it or, according to 
W ebster’s New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary, to clear from obscurity 
and make intelligible. In everyday life, a purported explanation must be true, or 
approximately true, in order to successfully explain. I take it that frictionless 
surfaces and the like, are parts of respectable scientific explanations of physical 
phenomena because they approximate actual physical objects. If they did not, 
then it is hard to see  any explaining. It is not clear what, if anything, possible 
worlds approximate vis-a-vis the modal notions at hand—if not the possibilities 
themselves or the structure of the possibilities. In any case, I propose that the 
burden is on Chihara to tell us more about the modal notions and more about 
explanation before we can see  how possible worlds can clear the modal notions 
from obscurity and make them intelligible.
... the fact that a  myth of possible worlds happens to produce the correct 
modal logic is itself a  phenomenon in need of explanation. That is, from the 
antirealist perspective, the success of possible worlds adds to the philosophical 
puzzle.
(Shapiro 1997, pp. 232-233).
If the above comments about recent technical work on modal logic and tense logic are 
correct, then there is a relatively clear sense in which modality and tense have been, in 
some sense, partially reduced to, or analysed in terms of, demodalized and untensed 
Platonic mathematics. That is, to ordinary objectual quantification over possible worlds 
and temporal instants. In other words, those who claim that modality is “basic”, or that 
tense is “basic”, have got things the wrong way round. Rather, it is the structure o f the set 
o f possible worlds that is basic, and the structure o f the set o f temporal instants that is 
basic. Modal and tensed locutions within natural language are, on this view, highly 
derivative and non-basic183.
8.8 Criticism III: Possible Existence = Existence
Putnam in his 1967b suggests that assertions like,
(1) there is an integer which is between 10 and 12 and is prime
183 Can modal arguments be analysed using the metalogical conception o f modality? This was a problem 
discussed long ago by Quine. See Quine 1953d, ‘Three Grades o f Modal Involvement’. The metalogical or 
de dicio conception is grade 1 (roughly, □ is attachable only to closed formulas). Quine argued that 
quantification into modal contexts requires a more involved, de re modality. But much ordinary modal 
discourse, when regimented, ends up with quantifiers binding variables inside modal contexts. (Indeed, this 
is connected to the analysis o f scope distinctions, which explains how statements like ‘I thought you were 
taller than you are’ can make sense). I lack the space to discuss this controversial matter.
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(2) there is a homomorphism from SU(2) to SO(3)
(3) there is a fixed point sentence Gt such that T |- Gj <-> -nProvjftGjl) 
are equivalent to saying things like,
(1)° it is possible to select an integer between 10 and 12 which is prime
(2)° it is possible to find a homomorphism from SU(2) to SO(3)
(3)° it is possible to construct a fixed point sentence Gj such that T |- Gj <-> 
-iProvt(T Gjl)
I agree (although the demodalized versions (l)-(3) are preferable184). The problem is 
that it can be argued the application o f metaphysical de re possibility and necessity to 
abstract entities is pointless. Abstracta (if there are any) have the properties they do by 
necessity. So, if  it is possible that there is an x such th at..., then there is such an x, and, 
indeed, it is necessarily the case that there is such an x. In other words, “modalities 
collapse” upon application to purely mathematical assertions. If cp is a mathematical 
assertion, and the modal operators express metaphysical modality then cp <-> Ocp and cp 
□cp are both true, and indeed, both necessarily true.
... why was it that the possible existence of concrete numerals rather than that 
of abstract numbers was assum ed? The reason is perhaps mainly that the idea 
of a  distinction between actual and possible existence makes questionable 
sense  in application to pure mathematicalia like numbers and sets of numbers 
; and whether or not it makes sense, the assumption that mathematical entities 
could perfectly well have existed and just happen not to is one few nominalists 
have found attractive. Indeed, even the appeal to the possible existence of new 
sorts of entities that are concrete in that they causally interact with one another, 
but that do not causally interact with actually existing sorts of entities, including 
human beings, might be though nominalistically repellent.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 140).
This is why if  one wants to re-develop mathematics as “modal logic”, one must either
i. Invoke the metalogical de dicto construal o f modality in application to
closed and purely mathematical sentences. The function o f such modality
184 However, the p ro o f o f  the Fixed Point Theorem actually shows how to construct a fixed point sentence 
G given any formula /4(x). See Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, p. 173.
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is to provide not a reconstrual of mathematical assertion per se, but o f  
metalogical assertions. For example, one can re-express the assertion that 
cp is a consequence o f M by saying that D(M - » cp) is true; and one can re­
express the logical consistency of M by saying that OM is true;
or,
ii. One must invoke the metaphysical de re version of modality, reconstruing
mathematical assertions about numbers and sets as modal assertions about 
non-abstract non-mathematicalia, such as numeral tokens or open 
sentence tokens (or whatever).
In other words, one must be very careful if  one wants to say (as Putnam did) that,
(4) co-sequences are possible
This may be taken to mean that,
(5) it is possible to find an abstract structure (X, f), consisting o f a set X  and a 
function/ which is an injection from X t o X -  {e},  for some e g  X, and 
which satisfies the induction principle (so that, for any subset Y o f X, i f  e
g  Y and if fix) e  Y whenever* e Y, then Y=X).
Of course, such a structure (X,f), an co-sequence, is an abstract set-theoretical entity. By 
our comments above, if  it is possible to find such a structure, then it exists. Period. Such 
a construal o f (4) is o f no use to nominalists.
However, (4) may mean merely that,
(5) there could have been a concrete exemplification o f  an co-sequence.
Namely, a concrete entity with denumerably many parts, which are related in a certain 
(physically definable) way. Such a construal of (4) is the one that appeals to nominalism. 
Talk about the existence o f abstracta is to be re-interpreted as talk about the possible 
existence o f certain kinds o f (possibly unactualized) concreta.
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Thus, it seems that the sort o f modal de re reconstrual advocated by Chihara is what 
modal nominalists should be seeking. Chihara’s open sentence tokens and his numerals 
function as concrete surrogates for bona fide mathematicalia, and de re modality makes 
sense in application to these (unless one is an extreme extensionalist, like Quine). If it is 
possible to construct a numeral or an open sentence token o f such-and-such a kind, then 
such a numeral or open sentence token need not actually exist.
Thus, there are really two modal strategies at work:
A. The Modalization of Metalogic
The purpose o f this strategy is the “modal nominalization” o f metalogic. 
According to this, all metalogical assertions about consistency, derivability, 
satisfiability and so on, are to be reconstrued as de dicto modal assertions. 
This, in fact, is a component o f Field’s deflationist programme discussed in 
the next Chapter.
B. The Modalization of M athem atics and M athematicized Science
The purpose o f this strategy is the “modal nominalization” o f mathematical 
assertions, including the mixed assertions used within science (scientific laws 
like Tim, Maxwell’s Laws, Schrodinger’s Law and so on).
We have seen that there are prima facie problems with programme (B) for the sorts of 
reconstrual proposed by Putnam and Heilman. A proper modalization o f mathematics, 
rather than metalogic, will be one that can properly reconstrue mathematicized laws o f  
Nature. It seems to me that the best prospect for such a reconstrual— that is, a reconstrual 
that doesn’t face the prima facie  adequacy problems as explained above— is a Chihara- 
style modalization using constructibility quantifiers, or some appropriate modification o f  
modal logic.
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8.9 Criticism IV: The Epistemology of Modality
The final criticism is perhaps the strongest. What is the main attraction o f modalism 
within mathematics? Presumably, that it provides a quasi-nominalistic resolution for 
epistemic Benacerrafitis, the problem o f “access”. Apparently, because abstract 
mathematicalia are causally isolated from the mechanisms o f sensory input, it follows 
that knowledge of, or epistemic access to, mathematicalia like numbers or sets is 
impossible. Apparently, so the argument goes, modal knowledge o f “what might have 
been”, “what it is possible to construct”, and so on, is nevertheless possible on the very 
same causal empiricist assumptions about sensation. I simply disagree.
It is a standard assumption that possibilia are causally isolated, just as mathematicalia 
are. Indeed, if  the Quinian remedy for epistemic Benacerrafitis briefly outlined in 
Chapter 6 is correct185, then there is a very good holistic epistemology for 
mathematicalia: abstract entities are indispensable posits o f our best high-level 
explanatory theories o f the Universe, and we have at least as much evidence for 
mathematicalia as we have for neutrinos186. Perhaps, one might extend (pace Quine) this 
kind o f epistemology to possible worlds187. When ontological matters are made explicit 
(by translation into first-order logic) such mysterious entities as mathematicalia, 
possibilia and temporal instants are recognized as values o f variables, posits, o f our over­
all theory o f the world.
In contrast, there is no such thing as a standard naturalistic, or empiricist, or causal, 
epistemology for modality. Perhaps the easiest epistemology would be for the 
metalogical de dicto conception o f modality, as standardly explained using mathematical
185 See also Hart 1979.
186 Quine’s argument that evidence for the existence o f  mathematical entities is o f the same kind as evidence 
for neutrinos horrifies some authors (e.g., Parsons 1983b).
187 Indeed, Quine does just this for temporal instants, proposing that tensed statements be regimented via 
quantification over times, rather than using Arthur Prior’s primitive tense operators. To be sure, Quine’s 
argument for this preference is based on the fact that modem physics already speaks o f  temporal instants 
(spatial hypersurfaces). If possible worlds turn up in serious physics, then the objection that they are mere 
“metaphysical fictions” would be significantly undercut. Now, as I noted earlier, some interpretations o f  
Quantum Mechanics, and even some serious physicists, do take the idea o f  possible worlds seriously.
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notions, like consistency, satisfiability or provability. It follows that an epistemology for 
de dicto modality might ride “piggy back” on a suitable epistemology for mathematics. If 
one thinks that mathematical knowledge is impossible, we have a problem even 
explaining knowledge o f de dicto modal assertions, despite the fact that we are clearly 
capable o f using and understanding modal assertions understood in this way.
Furthermore, there is no standard naturalistic, or empiricist, or causal, epistemology for 
metaphysical de re modality. How can we know, for example, that Quine mightn’t have 
gone to Harvard? That is, how can we know that there exists an accessible possible world 
where Quine didn’t go to Harvard? The obvious and natural question is a perfect 
analogue o f Benacerraf s question about mathematical knowledge: how is knowledge o f  
metaphysical modality possible. Since this is a copy o f the problem for mathematics, let 
us call this worry Benacerrafitis^[odal:
BenacerrafitiSModai: A ccess to  Modal Knowledge
How can we know modal truths? Possible worlds and objects in them are 
not spatio-temporally related to the actual world; possible objects, like 
Lewis-ian modal counterparts, do not cause anything in the actual world; 
they do not influence our sense organs and we cannot point to any o f them 
or perceive any o f them. Our presumptions about what possibilia are 
seems to rule out any means by which we could know about them.
It seems to me that this problem is at least as great as epistemic Benacerrafitis is for 
ordinary mathematical knowledge. Unless Chihara and other modalists can give any 
reason for thinking that modal knowledge {de re modality, metaphysically construed) is 
more tractable than mathematical knowledge, then the main motivation for a modal 
reconstrual o f mathematics collapses:
The fact that there are such smooth and straightforward transformations 
between the ontologically rich language of the realist and the supposedly 
austere language of the fictionalist indicates that neither of them can claim a
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major epistemological advantage over the other. There is a positive side to the 
equivalence and a negative s id e ....
My contention is that with the translations, the major philosophical problems 
with realism get “translated” as  well. ... There is, after all, no acclaimed 
epistemology for either language. In short, it is hard to see  how adding primitive 
possibility operators to the formation of epistemic problems can make them any 
more tractable, and consequently, it is hard to see  how the fictionalist has made 
any progress over the realist on the sticky epistemic problems.
(Shapiro 1997, pp. 225-226).
Finally, we might even suggest that an epistemology for mathematical knowledge is 
likely to be more tractable than one for de re modal knowledge. This is Quine’s current 
position. Mathematical knowledge is tractable on Quine’s view via his scientific 
pragmatic holism: extensional (non-modal) mathematics is fully integrated within and 
indispensable from our overall scientific theory. Modal assertions are, on Quine’s view, 
highly derivative and non-basic. It certainly is not legitimate to introduce primitive 
modality as a foundation for mathematics, and to claim that this is innocent of 
problematic consequences.
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C h a p ter  9 
Deflationism About Mathematics
Let us see  how, or to what degree, natural science may be rendered 
independent of platonistic mathematics.
W.V. Quine 1948 (1980), ‘On What There Is’, p. 19.
... any inference from nominalistic premises to a  nominalistic conclusion that 
can be made with the help of mathematics could be made (usually more long- 
windedly) without it.
Hartry Field 1980, Science Without Numbers, p. x.
9.1 Field’s Programme
Along with modalism, the second major strategy for eliminating reference to abstract 
mathematicalia is due to Field, first presented in his 1980, Science Without Numbers and 
further developed in a series o f papers anthologized in his 1989, Realism, Mathematics 
and Modality. Let us refer to this programme as revolutionary deflationism or just 
deflationism. There can be little doubt that Field’s programme is by far the most carefully 
developed, and widely discussed of the various nominalist strategies. Partly as a result o f  
this careful precision in Field’s own development of his programme, and partly because 
of the detailed criticism this programme has received, the basic problems with the 
programme have been made very clear.
Field’s programme may be summarized as follows. The whole o f mathematicized 
science (including physics and logic) is to be disbelieved and renounced. One is to adopt 
a sceptical or fictionalist stance towards standard mathematics and standard 
mathematicized assertions of science. However, this destructive attitude must be 
complemented by a positive, constructive programme. One must show how mathematics 
is dispensable in applications and, indeed, one must provide workable replacement 
theories which are genuinely consistent with the renunciation o f abstract mathematical 
entities.
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i. Fictionalism  About Mathematicalia:
Field calls his position “fictionalism”. Mathematical theories, like arithmetic, analysis 
and set theory, are merely “good stories” which have certain properties that make them 
useful in science. Correspondingly, mathematicalia are “convenient fictions”188. 
According to Field, the primary philosophical motivations for this renunciation of 
mathematicalia189 are the problems for platonism explained in Benacerraf 1965 and 
Benacerraf 1973 (the problems o f identification190,191 and “epistemic access”192).
ii. A cceptance of Quine’s  “Science Entails P la ton ism ” Argum ent
Despite advocating nominalism, Field accepts that standard mathematicized science is 
platonistic. On standard assumptions about truth, such mathematicized theories are 
ontologically committed to mathematicalia, and Field is prepared to accept these 
assumptions193.
188 Field 1989, p. 2: “A fictionalist about mathematics-taken-at-face-value is someone who does not literally 
believe mathematical sentences. (Or, if you prefer to ‘semantically ascend’, a fictionalist is someone who 
does not regard such sentences, taken at face value, as literally true.)”.
189 ibid., p. 6 : “The negative content o f  fictionalism is that it avoids having to answer some questions that 
need answering on a platonistic view. This is the main motivation for fictionalism.”
190 ibid., p. 20-21: “A noteworthy feature o f mathematics is that there is a tremendous amount o f  
arbitrariness as the identification o f different types o f mathematical objects. The most famous example o f this 
is the one highlighted by Paul Benacerraf 1965: if one wants to identify natural numbers with sets, it seems 
rather arbitrary which sets one picks. But o f course, this example is just the tip o f the iceberg. ... It seems 
absurd to suggest that in each such case there is a fact o f the matter as to which sets the mathematical 
objects in question are. ... I think that the most natural conclusion is that topological spaces, and numbers, 
and ordered pairs and functions are neither definitely sets nor definitely not sets: there is no fact o f  the 
matter about whether they are sets or not, in addition to there being no fact o f  the matter as to which sets 
they are if they are sets.”
191 ibid., p. 22: “I think that by far the best explanation o f the pervasive arbitrariness (an explanation 
persuasively developed in Wagner 1982) is the fictionalist one: we have a good story about natural numbers, 
another good story about sets, and so forth; and in these stories it is completely unimportant whether one 
identifies numbers with sets, and unimportant which sets one does identify them with if one does want an 
identification.”
192 ibid, pp. 25-26: “Benacerraf s challenge ... is to provide an account o f the mechanisms that explain how 
our beliefs about these remote [mathematical] entities can so well reflect the facts about them. The idea is 
that if  it appears to be in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to widermine the belief in 
mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing in them.”
193 ibid., p. 17: “After all, the theories that we use in explaining various facts about the world not only 
involve a commitment to electrons and neutrinos, they involve a commitment to numbers andfunctions and 
the like. ... I think that this sort o f argument for the existence o f mathematical entities (the Quine-Putnam 
argument, I’ll call it) is an extremely powerful one, at leastprima facie.”
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iii. Anti-Hermeneuticism:
Any conception o f non-literal hermeneutic “mathematical truth” (e.g., o f the sort 
discussed in Chapters 6-8 above) is, at best, philosophically irrelevant194. If it is possible 
to eliminate mathematics from science fully, then it is unimportant to develop a novel 
understanding of “truth”, according to which mathematics is still “true in some sense”, 
although still not true195.
iv. C onservativeness Claim
At the heart o f Field’s deflationism is the basic idea that mathematics is “insubstantial”, 
“dispensable” or “redundant”. In Science Without Numbers, Field argued that the 
insubstantiality o f mathematics can be formulated more precisely as a conservativeness 
claim196. The result o f “adding” mathematics to any mathematics-free theory must always 
yield a conservative extension. For example, Field argues that the result of expanding a 
any mathematics-free theory N by adding the axioms of applicable set theory (say, ZFU) 
always yields a conservative extension.
Field imposes the following as a constraint on any proposed mathematical theory. Such 
a theory is “good” if  it is conservative with respect to all non-mathematical theories. But, 
Field stresses, mathematics needn’t be true to be good:
Let us call a mathematical theory that is consistent with every internally 
consistent theory about the physical world conservative . . .
Also, Field 1988 (1989), pp. 249-250: “... after all, the existence o f mathematical entities follows from the 
mathematical theory itself, not just from the claim that the mathematical theory is true in the 
correspondence sense.”
194 Field 1989, p. 2: “The fictionalist may believe that there is some non-face-value construal o f  
mathematical sentences under which they come out true; he or she may even believe that some such 
construal gives the ‘real meaning o f  the mathematical sentence, despite its departure from what the 
mathematical sentence appears to mean on the surface. My own view, though, is that the second o f  these 
additional claims is an uninteresting verbal one insofar as it goes beyond the first; and that the first, though 
o f some interest, unnecessarily constricts the fictionalist.”
195 ibid., p. 3: “The fictionalist can say that the sense in which ‘2 + 2 = 4 ’ is true is pretty much the same as 
the sense in which ‘Oliver Twist lived in London’ is true; the latter is true only in the sense that it is true 
according to a  certain well-known story, and the former is true only in that it is true according to standard 
mathematics.”
196 This is connected to one o f the ideas o f Chapter 5 above. A deflationist about truth should analogously 
hold that truth-theoretical principles are similarly dispensable, and this may be formulated as a 
conservativeness claim.
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A mathematical theory M is conservative if and only if for any assertion A 
about the physical world and any body N of such assertions, A doesn’t 
follow from N + M unless it follows from N alone.
Our modified anti-realism, then, says that besides being sufficiently 
comprehensive to be interesting, a mathematical theory must be conservative, 
but need not be true.
(Field 1982 (1989), p. 58).
In the Appendix to Chapter 1 o f his 1980, Field proves a theorem to the effect that if  N 
is a “mathematics-free” theory (i.e., not containing e ), then any model o f N may be 
expanded to a model o f N u  ZFU. (There is a subtlety involved here, involving any 
axioms schemes that appear in the axiomatization o f N, to which we return later). From 
this it follows that any mathematics-free theorem of N u  ZFU is already a theorem o f N. 
In particular, it also implies that any mathematics-free theorem o f ZFU alone must be a 
logical truth197. This settles a question which Quine recently asked,
The accepted wisdom is that mathematics lacks empirical content. ... I do ... 
accept the accepted wisdom. No mathematical sentence has empirical content, 
not does any set of them. No conjunction or class of purely mathematical truths, 
however large, could ever imply a synthetic observation categorical. It seem s 
obvious and I accept it (though I can’t picture how a proof would look)
(Quine 1995, p. 53).
v. Utility of False-But-Conservative M athematics
If mathematics is not true, but merely conservative, then what is its utility in science? 
According to Field, conservative mathematics can be useful in drawing nominalistic 
conclusions from nominalistic premises.
Field gives an example198 analogous to the following. Suppose that there are 7 women 
in the room and that there are 93 men in the room (and that no men are women). Then, 
defining ‘person’ as ‘man or woman’, we immediately infer that there are 100 persons in
197 In Chapter 5 ,1 showed this same “contentlessness” effect in relation to DT, the disquotation theory o f  
truth composed o f all the T-sentences.
198 See Field 1980, Chapter 2, ‘First Illustration o f  Why Mathematical Entities are Useful: Arithmetic’. [The 
recursive definition Field gives on p. 21 o f  the numerical quantifiers is slightly mistaken]. Field’s example 
uses aardvarks, and involves multiplication. Field’s idea here is influenced by a similar argument in Putnam 
1967a, which I cited earlier in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5 on “Abstract Counterparts”). Indeed, I suspect that 
this idea has its origins in some o f the remarks o f  the logical empiricists, notably Hans Reichenbach 
(Putnam’s teacher). In fact, the claim that mathematics is nothing but a useful instrument is defended in 
Hempel 1945.
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the room. But to infer this we need the arithmetical premise ‘7 + 93 = 100’ (plus a few  
other premises199). Field argues that this mathematical premise is actually redundant, 
because the mixed arithmetical premises can be reformulated using numerically definite 
quantifiers. Instead of,
(1) The number of women in the room =  7 
we could (in principle) say something like,
(2) There is a womanx h ... and a woman x7 (all distinct) such that...
(and likewise for the assertions about the number o f men and the number o f persons).
Then, the conclusion (that there are 100 persons in the room) follows from these
mathematics-free premises by ordinary first-order logic. In short, in this application of 
arithmetic, the mathematics used is dispensable. It merely simplifies the reasoning200.
Field generalizes this to a strong claim that mathematics facilitates or simplifies logical 
reasoning:
... any inference from nominalistic premises to a nominalistic conclusion that 
can be made with the help of mathematics could be made (usually more long- 
windedly) without it.
(Field 1980, p. x).
... the conclusions we arrive at [by adding the mathematical theory] are not 
genuinely new, they are already derivable in a  more long-winded fashion from 
the [nominalistic theory] without recourse to mathematical entities
(Field 1980, pp. 10-11).
W e can use [the mathematical theory] as a device for drawing conclusions . . . 
much more easily than we could draw them by a direct p roo f...
(Field 1980, p. 28).
... it might be much easier to see  that q> follows from N + M than it is to see  that 
<p follows from N alone ...
(Field 1982 (1989), p. 58).
199 In particular: if  #F = n and #G = /w and -i3x(F(x) a  G(x)), then #(F v  G) = n + m.
200 To actually perform  such “mathematics-free” deductions in first-order logic, even involving ‘there are 
exactly two’, actually consumes vast amounts o f  space. The complexity o f  the deductions increases at a vast 
rate. But Field’s point is that the reformulation is always possible in principle.
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It will emerge that these claims o f Field are ambiguous. Indeed, on the important 
reading (the deductive reading), they are false.
vi. Rejection of the  Indispensability Thesis
Field’s plan is to argue, against Quine and Putnam, that platonistic mathematicized 
science is dispensable. Roughly, for any standard platonistic theory P, one looks for a 
nominalistic replacement N which is “just as good” as P. The constraints on being “just 
as good” involve a standard accessibility demand (recursive axiomatization with finitely 
many primitives) plus the requirement that the nominalistic replacement N be able to 
express and prove just as much about the concrete domain as P. Technically,
i. P must be a deductively conservative extension o f N;
ii. N must re-express all classifications amongst concreta expressed within P.
vii. Anti-Instrumentalism:
In contrast with the purely destructive, instrumentalist form o f nominalism201, Field 
urges that nominalistic replacements for mathematicized theories are required. He argues 
that unless such replacements are provided, then the advocacy o f nominalism or 
fictionalism is sheer “double-think”202.
viii. Modal Analysis of Metalogic;
In Chapters 1 to 3, we pointed out that metalogic is just as mathematical as 
mathematical physics is. Field proposes (see below) that physics be nominalized using 
geometry. He argues that it is inappropriate to introduce modal notions for this purpose. 
However, he does argue later that metalogical notions o f implication and consistency are
201 These are Burgess’ terms (Burgess 1983, Burgess & Rosen 1997). Burgess argues that this form o f  
nominalism is purely destructive, offering no positive or constructive proposal which might explain why, if  
there are no mathematicalia, the Universe behaves “as i f ’ mathematicized theories were true. Burgess 
compares any such destructive idea with the view advocated in van Fraassen 1980, where the mystery that 
the Universe behaves “as i f ’ General Relativity is true is left unexplained.
202 1 cited Field’s accusation o f “double-think” in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). See Field 1980, p. 2.
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to be analysed modally. The basic notion of nominalistic metalogic is a primitive concept 
o f “logical possibility”. We lack the space to discuss this important topic203.
ix. The Aim: Nominalistic Science
To summarize, Field’s deflationary programme aims to replace platonistic science with 
mathematics-free nominalistic science:
entails
/ \  is a conservative 
subtheory o f
is consistent with
NOMINALISM
PLATONISMMATHEMATICIZED
THEORY
NOMINALISTIC
MATHEMATICS-FREE
THEORY
The question is then: can this programme be fulfilled?
9.2 Geometrical Nominalism
The revolutionary aim of deflationism is to provide replacement non-mathematical 
theories for standard accepted mathematicized theories o f Nature. If P is the platonistic 
theory to be replaced, then the basic constraints on a suitable replacement N are:
i. N must be consistent with nominalism
ii. N must be axiomatized by finitely many primitives.
203 See Field 1984a (1989) and the Introduction to Field 1989. See Chihara 1990, Appendix, for a critique. 
Malament 1982 contains an important criticism that Field requires substantial mathematics in the metatheory 
to prove his metatheorems that “mathematics is dispensable”. See also Burgess & Rosen 1997 (pp. 192- 
194), where they question Field’s use o f  mathematics for metalogical purposes.
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iii. N must have the same “physical content” as P. (N must re-express and 
prove everything about the concrete domain as does P).
Field 1980 contains an explicit development o f an allegedly mathematics-free 
replacement theory for an important mathematicized theory, namely Newtonian 
Gravitational Theory (NG). Let us call this nominalistic replacement theory NG*. Field 
argued that NG* has all the non-mathematical content o f NG, but that it does not 
postulate mathematicalia, like numbers, functions, etc. According to Field, NG* has the 
three crucial properties required (i) - (iii).
Property (iii) would guarantee that NG and NG* have all the same non-mathematical 
theorems (and that any factual classifications amongst concreta expressed in NG are re- 
expressed within NG*). We shall see below that (iii) actually fails. NG is not a 
conservative extension o f NG*.
NG* it is formulated in a mathematics-free or nominalistic language Ln which is an 
extension o f first-order logic, incorporating individual variables, X, y, . . .204 plus monadic 
second-order variables X(x), . . .205 (informally true o f regions o f such points). For the 
purposes o f characterizing the geometry of space-time, Ln contains primitives:
Bet(x, y, z): x, y  and z lie on a straight line and x lies between y  and z;
Cong(x, y, z, w): the line segment .xy is congruent to the line segment zw.
An axiomatization of flat Euclidean geometry using these primitives was given long ago 
by Hilbert206. The resulting axiomatic geometry is sometimes called Synthetic Euclidean 
Geometry, since all notions from mathematical analysis (real numbers) are absent from 
the finished product207. This axiomatic presentation is, in effect, a culmination o f the two 
thousand year programme initiated in Euclid’s Elements. We’ll call the resulting axiom 
system SEG. (In our discussions below we shall, for simplicity, consider that a version
204 Intuitively ranging over spacetime points.
205 Informally true o f regions o f spacetime.
206 See Hilbert 1899.
207 For a comprehensive discussion o f  the geometrical background, including a wealth o f technical material, 
see Burgess & Rosen 1997, Chapter II. A.
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appropriate to just 2-dimensional plane geometry). In fact, Hilbert’s axiomatic 
presentation o f SEG precipitated an interesting controversy around 1901 between Frege 
and Hilbert about the role of mathematical theories as “implicit definitions”208.
Hilbert 1899 proved two important metatheorems about this axiom system SEG, which 
in modem parlance amount to model-theoretic results:
i. R epresentation Theorem
Any model M  = (D, Bet, Cong) o f SEG can be represented by the standard 
mathematical field structure o f analysis F  = (R, 0, / ,  +, x , <). Technically, 
the there is a injection x: D  -»  R such that the relations Bet c  D  and Cong 
c: D4 can be “defined” in the field F209. For geometry, the homomorphism is 
a co-ordinate system21°;
ii. U niqueness Theorem
Any pair o f such representations xa and Xb are related in a certain way: they 
are “unique” up to certain transformations. For SEG, these transformation 
between representing homomorphisms are, in fact, Euclidean co-ordinate 
transformations211.
These metatheorems shed considerable light on how mathematics (that is, analysis) is 
applied to geometry. Any representation function x is a co-ordinate scale, assigning real
208 See Shapiro 1997, pp. 161-165. One o f Hilbert’s colleagues, Otto Blumenthal, reported a remark o f  
Hilbert’s in a Berlin train station in 1891. According to Hilbert, in a proper axiomatization o f  geometry “one 
must always be able to say, instead o f ‘points, straight lines and planes’, ‘tables, chairs, and beer mugs’”.
This position simply infuriated Frege, whose interests were ontological and for whom it was obvious that a 
plane in physical space is not the same thing as a beer mug\
209 More precisely, let d((*i, yi), (x2, >>2)) be the Euclidean metric on R2, i.e., V[(x2 -  *i)2 + y i  - y i ) 2]. Then 
suppose that (E, Bet, Cong) is a model o f SEG. Then,
ifiu <?2, e3) e  Bet o  d(x(e0, x(e2)) + d(x(<?0, x(e3)) = d(x(<?2), x(e3))
and (eh e2, e3, e4) e  Cong o  d(x(eO, x(e2)) = d(x(<?3), x(e4))
210 In the more general case, such a representing homomorphism x is called a measurement scale. See 
Krantz et al. 1971.
211 E.g., suppose that (D, Bet, Cong) is a model o f SEG and xa and xb are such homomorphisms from D  to 
R2. Then xa = O o  xb, where <I> is a Euclidean transformation of R2 (that is, some combination o f  translation, 
reflection, rotation or dilation). See Field 1980, pp. 50-51 (or any decent physics textbook, say Longair 
1984 or Eisberg 1961).
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numbers (more generally, ^-tuples o f reals) to points in any model M  of SEG. After 
Hilbert 1899, various other re-axiomatizations o f SEG and extensions have been 
introduced. In particular, important facts have been established concerning matters of  
completeness and decidability. An important contribution is the monograph by Tarski 
1951.
We have quickly surveyed the geometrical parts o f  the theory NG* that Field 1980 
proposes. But there is a further, and highly non-trivial, component o f NG* involving the 
re-axiomatization o f the laws o f motion (for particles) and the field equation governing 
the gravitational potential (usually known as Poisson’s Law: schematically, V2d> = p). In 
a manner analogous to the synthetic axiomatization o f geometrical laws, Field shows 
how to re-axiomatize these kinematical and dynamical laws in the mathematics-free 
language Ln. The required non-mathematical primitives in Ln are:
Mass-Bet(x, y, z): the mass density at x lies between that at y  and that at z
GPot-Bet(x, y, z): the gravitational potential at x lies between that at y  and
that at z
The axioms governing these physical primitives are analogous to those governing the 
space-time primitives, Bet and Cong. The hard work is to obtain axioms such that an 
Extended Representation Theorem is forthcoming, which, given any model M  of the 
theory NG*, proves the existence o f generalized representation functions d> and p from 
dom(A/) to R3 such that V2d> = p (so that Poisson’s Law is satisfied). This is all carefully 
worked out in great detail in Chapters 7 and 8 of Field 1980.
The central philosophical issues concern NG*’s consistency with nominalism and its 
adequacy as a replacement for NG. But there are some further aspects o f conceptual and 
philosophical interest concerning NG*.
i. “Synthetic” Characterization of Spacetim e S tructure
Field argues that the structure o f (flat, Euclidean) space-time may be characterized 
semantically within NG* in terms o f non-mathematical predicates, which, in effect, 
determine the topological and metric structure o f the set o f space-time points. Because
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there is no direct reference to (quantification over) real numbers or functions, Field 
considers this a major advance212. There are no preferred quantitative measurement 
scales or co-ordinates. In Field’s terminology, NG* explains the motion o f test bodies 
due to gravity “intrinsically”. This is interesting, although the “cost” is the second-order 
nature o f NG*. This ought to be intolerable for a nominalist because, as we shall see, the 
construction of these explanations within NG* (that is, the deduction o f nominalistic 
consequences) actually requires the reintroduction o f mathematics.
ii. The Conventionality of Mathematical R epresentation
The Representation Theorem for NG* shows how for any model M  o f NG*, there is an 
appropriate representation x o f M  within F, and there are functions O and p which 
represent the nominalistically expressible facts about the gravitational potential and the 
density potential (that is, are such that V20  = p). These representations x, O and p are 
unique up to certain transformations. These transformations yield precisely the Galilean 
transformations o f co-ordinate systems and the scale transformations for the field 
potentials. As Field stresses, this explains the conventionality o f measurement scales and 
co-ordinate scales and clarifies some issues concerning invariance:
This result gives an explanation of the fact that the laws of Euclidean geometry, 
when stated in terms of co-ordinates, are invariant under a  shift of origin, 
reflection, rotation and multiplication of all distances by a  constant factor: if we 
assum e that the genuine facts about Euclidean space are just the facts about 
betw eenness and congruence laid down in Hilbert’s axioms, and that the 
function of co-ordinates is simply to facilitate the deduction of facts about 
betw eenness and congruence and the relations definable in terms of these, then 
it follows that in an extrinsic formulation of the laws of geometry in terms of co­
ordinates, the laws will be invariant up to Euclidean transformations and no 
further.
(Field 1980, p. 51)
Perhaps this has implications for conventionalism elsewhere in the philosophy of 
science. One might argue that it shows how we can be realists about the “contentful” 
parts o f our theories, but anti-realists about those parts that are “purely conventional”. 
This can, however, be misleading. The conventionality o f co-ordinate charts does not
212 But Shapiro 1997 urges that because NG* characterizes the structure o f  spacetime correctly, it simply is 
mathematics (in sheep’s clothing, maybe). See below, Section 9.4, Part (d).
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entail the non-existence o f co-ordinate functions or real numbers. It simply entails that 
there is some “slack” in our representation of the world. The “genuine facts” are, loosely 
speaking, what remain invariant under all admissible variations of these possible choices 
(something Einstein put to great effect). But it does not follow from this alone that we 
can eliminate implicit reference to these choices from our mathematicized theories.
This is analogous to the Quine-Benacerraf point about the conventionality available in 
identifying mathematicalia with sets. The conventionality or “non-facticity” in 
identifying 2 as either { { 0 } }  or { 0 ,  { 0 } }  does not entail the non-existence o f numbers. 
Similar non-facticities in identifying real numbers, tensor products, or topological spaces 
with sets does not entail their non-existence. And similar Quinian non-facticities213 
between ordinary common sense discourse (about mountains, desks, galaxies and 
molecules, say) and tough “mereological” physics (about regions of curved space-time 
and quantum fields, say) does not entail the non-existence o f mountains, desks, galaxies 
or molecules.
iii. B urgess: Synthetic M echanics
Field’s geometrical approach o f 1980 is reconstructed in Burgess 1984 (and more fully 
in Burgess & Rosen 1997, Chapter II.A). Burgess begins with analytically formulated 
Euclidean plane geometry. Call this theory AEG. He then shows that AEG has the 
Tarskian “elimination property” (mentioned in Chapter 7 above). That is, AEG may be 
extended to a deductively and expressively conservative extension AEG+ in an expanded 
notation L+, and AEG+ is fully conservative over its primary restriction (AEG'1}0 in (L+)°.
Indeed, the primary restriction (AEG+)° is equivalent to synthetic geometry, SEG. The 
reconstruction provides a re-interpretation which maps all analytic assertions within 
analytic geometry AEG (mentioning real numbers) to synthetic assertions about points in 
synthetic geometry SEG.
213 Quine’s classic discussions o f  “non-facticity” and “inscrutability o f  reference” appear in Quine 1969b and 
Quine 1977. See also Davidson 1977 and Putnam 1988 for Putnam’s “model-theoretic” version o f Quine’s 
arguments.
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The crucial element o f the reconstruction is the existence o f representation formulas for 
the real numbers. That is, there are existence and uniqueness formulas in the language of 
AEG,
i. VX3xi...3xnR(x1, ...,xn,X)
ii. VXi...VxnVX1VX2[(R(Xi, ...,xn, X x) a  R(xh ..., xn,X2» ->Xj =X2]
which are deducible in AEG. Burgess applies what he calls “Tarskian elimination” to 
generate the nominalistic reconstruction SEG. I refer to reader to Chapter II.A o f  
Burgess & Rosen 1997.
9.3 Representation Theorems
In general, a Representation Theorem of the kind desired by Field connects a given non- 
mathematical axiomatic theory N and a given platonistic theory P and says, roughly,
If (D , N x, N2, ...) (= N, then there is a injection x: D  h-> Du  (a domain o f
mathematicalia) such that,
i. for any Xj in D, (xu x2, ...) e Nx iff (x(xi), x(x2) , ....) e  and
ii. the expansion (D u  Z)M, N Xi N2, ..., P lt P2y...) [= P.
(where the P{ are purely mathematical relations on the mathematicalia x(xj), x(x2), etc. 
in the domain Z)M).
For Field, there are two important applications o f such Representation Theorems:
i. Introduction o f “Abstract Counterparts”;
ii. Proof that P is (Semantically) Conservative over N.
Illustrating (i), the Representation Theorem entails:
M I- 3xVxh..[Nt(xu x2, ...) Pi(T(x,), t ( x 2) , ...)]
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This means that any non-mathematical statement <p involving the non-mathematical 
predicates A/j can be “translated” into an abstract counterpart (pabsM, involving 
mathematical predicates Pv For example, suppose Less-M ass(x, y) is a predicate 
meaning, intuitively, \x is less massive than y \  as applied to physical bodies. Then 
equipped with the Representation Theorem for a Less-Mass-representing measurement 
scale t  we can take the contingent nominalistic statement:
(1) 3x3 y(Less-Mass(x, y))
and “translate” it as:
(2) 3x3 y(x(x) < x(y))
This is because we have the following statement, which is entailed by M alone.
(3) 3 t[“t represents Less-M ass” a  VxVy(Less-Mass(x, y)) <-> (x(x) <
t(y))]
Thus, when we have a Representation Theorem for N we can immediately derive an 
abstract counterpart for each nominalistic statement in the language o f N. However, the 
reverse need not obtain: it doesn’t immediately follow that for each platonistic statement 
with physical content in the language o f P, we can find a nominalistic counterpart for it.
Illustrating (ii), Field invokes the appropriate Representation Theorem for his 
nominalistic theory NG* to argue that this particular theory is in fact a suitable 
replacement for the standard platonistic theory NG. Indeed, what Field shows is that NG 
is semantically conservative over NG*. The idea, briefly, is that any model o f NG* may 
be expanded to a model of NG. Let us see how this works. What we want to show is that,
If:
if  (D, Nh N2 i ...) |= N, then there is a representing function x into a domain 
Dm o f mathematicalia such that,
i. for any in D, (xj, x2, ...) € JVj iff AW-Xi), t(x2), ....), and
ii. the expansion (D u  Z>M, N u N2,..., P\, P 2,....)  f= P,
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Then:
if  P cp, then N f= cp, for any cp e 0L°.
Proof: Assume that if  (D, N\, N2,...) |= N, then there is a representing function t  into a 
model (£>*, Nh N2, Pi, P i, ..) o f P such that Ni(xh ...., *n) <-» P i(x (x i) , ..., x(*n)X where 
the N{ are the extensions o f non-mathematical predicates and the P * are the extensions o f  
pure mathematical predicates. Now, also assume P  ^cp and not:-(N J= cp). So, there is a 
model 3  o f N such that 3  (= —.cp. There is a representing function x into model 3 + =  (£)*, 
N\, N2, ..., P u P2y...) o f P such that Si(*i,...., * n) <-> AW-Xi), ..., x(xn)). Clearly, 3 + is an 
expansion o f 3 . So, 3 + |= -.cp. But 3 + (= P. Therefore, 3 +  ^cp. So 3  |= cp. Contradiction. ■
This is how one uses the Representation Theorem for a nominalistic theory N with 
respect to a platonistic theory P to derive a semantical conservativeness theorem. Note 
that one cannot conclude deductive conservativeness unless one has a complete 
derivability relation (e.g., the theories in question are first-order).
For a more concrete example, consider our toy theory o f time Tim considered several 
times earlier. Tim just says that the set of temporal instants under the “before” relation is 
isomorphic to (R, <). Imagine we are looking for a nominalistic replacement N for Tim. 
The required Representation Theorem for N would be simply:
(*) If (D, Bef) is a model o f N then (D, Bef) is isomorphic to (R, <).
Now this would then guarantee that,
(**) If (D, Bef) is a model o f N then (D u  R, B ef <) is a model o f Tim.
Imagine we have such a nominalistic replacement N. The proof o f semantical 
conservativeness proceeds as follows. Suppose that for some cp e  0L ° ,  Tim [= cp and not:- 
(N J= cp ). So there is a model (£>, Bef) o f N and (Z), Bef)  ^ - . c p .  By the Representation 
Theorem (**), there is a model {D u  R, B ef <) of Tim. Thus, (D  u  R, B ef  <) J= cp. Thus, 
(A  Bef) J= cp. Contradiction. ■
It is worth noting for later that a Representation Theorem for a nominalistic 
replacement Tim* for Tim would require that Tim* be categorical and, further, that any
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such model be of cardinality c. Given that almost all interesting applications of 
mathematics involve non-denumerable domains, this constraint effectively rules out 
Representation Theorems for first-order nominalistic theories. For suppose that Tim* is a 
first-order theory and has an infinite model. Then, by the downwards Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorem, Tim* also has an K0-model. But, by Cantor’s Theorem, this cannot be 
isomorphic to R. Hence, we conclude that there is no first-order replacement theory 
Tim* that satisfies the required Representation Theorem for Tim.214
9.4 Criticisms of Geometrical Nominalism
a. Second-O rder Formulation
Field 1980 offers two non-mathematical replacements for Newtonian space-time and 
gravitational field theory. The main one, for which the Representation Theorem is 
actually proved, uses the apparatus o f second-order logic.215 For example, Field uses the 
following second-order axiom to say that “space-time is continuous”:
DedCont: Any bounded line segment has a closest bound.
He calls this postulate the Dedekind continuity postulate216. It is the mereological 
version o f the usual axiom for order-completeness for a linear ordering:
DedCont: Any bounded set has a least upper bound.
Some critics have argued that the use o f second-order logic transcends the limits of 
nominalism. One basis for this argument is Quine’s analysis o f the ontological 
commitments o f statements containing quantified predicate letters. As Quine quipped, 
“second-order logic is set-theory in sheep’s clothing”217.
214 O f course, there may be a second-order theory which satisfies a Representation Theorem.
215 A Representation Theorem for the first-order version cannot be proved.
216 See Field 1980, p. 37.
217 See Quine 1970, pp. 66-68.
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But, the argument may be too quick. Not all applications o f second-order logic must 
receive a set-theoretical interpretation. Briefly, there are two ways o f avoiding sets, if  one 
restricts oneself to just monadic second-order logic
i. Plural Quantification (Boolos)
Boolos 1984, 1985 has supplied an interpretation o f monadic second-order 
logic based on the “logic o f plurality” and argued that second-order variables 
need not be interpreted as taking sets as values, but rather interpreted as 
referring to individuals “plurally”.
ii. Mereological Interpretation
The nominalistic interpretation given by Field to the second-order quantifiers 
is mereological. the second-order variables range over mereological space­
time regions (not sets o f space-time points). That is, if  X(x) is a monadic 
second-order formula in the language of non-mathematical physics and a  is 
such a mereological valuation, then ct |=X(x) iff g[x] c :  o[X], where ct[X] is a 
space-time region, not a set o f points (and x <=>> iff x is a part o fy)218-
Setting aside Boolos’ controversial plural interpretation, we are left wondering whether 
Field’s mereological interpretation o f monadic second-order logic is legitimately 
nominalistic. Of course, the metatheory is mathematical, but the values o f object-level 
second-order variables in the non-mathematical object-level theory are nominalistically 
acceptable regions, rather than nominalistically unacceptable sets o f points.
In any case, the proof theory for such an extension o f first-order logic remains the same 
as the proof theory for second-order logic (that is, one has rules o f instantiation and 
generalization for second-order variables, plus the comprehension axiom scheme: 
3XVx(X(x) <-» O), where the variable X  is not free in the formula O, plus a second-order 
version o f the axiom of choice219). However, for second-order logic with the standard
218 The symbol c  is often used in mereology, mainly because mereology is “almost” isomorphic to Boolean 
algebra o f class inclusion. The difference is that there is no empty or null region 0  which is a part o f  all 
regions. See Simons 1987.
219 See Shapiro 1991, pp. 65-70 for the “Deductive System” for second-order logic.
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semantics220, the Completeness Theorem fails. Indeed, the class o f second-order logical 
truths is not recursively enumerable221.
b. Geom etrical Substantivalism
NG* postulates “geometricalia”: space-time points and regions. It might be argued that 
space-time points are unobservable theoretical entities, better thought o f as abstracta. 
Allegedly, any such reification of unobservable spatio-temporal entities transcends the 
limits o f acceptable nominalism222. Again, it seems to me that such a criticism is very 
weak.
First, it is not clear in what sense quantification over space-time points is meant to 
transcend the ontological constraints o f nominalism. One tentative definition o f  
‘concretum’ makes essential reference to space-time:
A concretum is an entity embedded in space-time.
Thus, it would be very odd to claim that the mereological atomic parts o f space-time (if  
there are such atomic parts) are not themselves concreta223.
Second, although there has been a long tradition in metaphysics and philosophy of 
science o f denying the existence o f space-time regions and points, it seems to me that this 
tradition is neither particularly nominalist in motivation, nor even compatible with 
current physical theory (specifically, general relativistic space-time theory). For current
220 See Shapiro 1991, pp. 70-76. Intuitively, for a given domain D, n-adic predicate variables range over all 
n-place relations on D. That is, ifX is  an «-place predicate variable, it ranges over P(IT).
221 If cp is a formula in the language o f  arithmetic, then 9? }»cp iff P A 2 f= cp. Thus, cp is an arithmetical truth iff 
|= P A 2 - » cp. Let V2 be the class o f second-order logical truths in the second-order language o f arithmetic. 
Suppose V2 were r.e. Then, by Craig’s Theorem, there would be a proof procedure for membership in V2. 
Thus, all logical truths o f the form PA2 —» cp could be proved. From this it would follow that all arithmetical 
truths could be proved (i.e., if the procedure proves PA2 - » cp, then take cp as proved), and this contradicts 
the incompleteness o f any proof procedure for arithmetical truth. See Boolos & Jeffrey 1989, pp. 203-204.
222 See Malament 1982. Malament argues that space-time points are “not concrete physical objects in any 
straight-forward sense. They do not have mass-energy content (unlike, for example, the Klein-Gordon field 
itself). They do no suffer change. It is not even clear in what sense they exist in space and time” [p. 532],
223 The reason is simple. If one added the term ‘concretum’ to mereology. then it would be natural to 
suppose closure principles', ifx  andy are concrete, then all parts o f  them are concrete and all aggregates o f  
them are concrete. It is, o f course, debatable whether aggregation is itself closed (that is, whether 
“unnatural” aggregates exist. E.g., is there such a thing as the aggregate o f The Eiffel Tower and The 
Chrysler Building? If there were, I’d call it concrete, not abstract).
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physical relativistic space-time theory quantifies over space-time points: GR says things 
like:
i. the set o f  space-time points is the domain o f a topological manifold;
ii. the open sets o f space-time points (in the physical topology o f space-time) 
can be assigned co-ordinates in a continuous way.
iii. each space-time point e has a Ricci curvature tensor proportional to its 
energy-momentum tensor
Geometrical objects o f importance in physics, like tensor fields, are (defined as) 
functions from space-time points to mathematicalia, such as tangent vectors in the 
tangent space TfM ) at each space-time point e. To deny this is not to comprehend how 
modem relativistic physics works, irrespective o f nominalistic scruples.
Third, it is debatable to claim that space-time regions are unobservable. Quite the 
opposite. We can point to and observe (fairly large and ostensively vague) regions o f  
space-time. We can point to the spatial region between the legs o f a chair (adding, 
perhaps “I mean the empty gap”).
Fourth, it is implausible to claim that space-time points and regions are causally inert. 
The crucial physical field functions defined over space-time are not causally inert: 
according to the Lorentz force law, the acceleration o f an electron at a space-time 
point e is a function o f the electromagnetic field An at e. The Lorentz Force Law states 
that, at each space-time point e, m afe)  = Q0vv(e)dvA fe )  (where e0 is the electron charge 
and is the velocity 4-vector). It seems to make sense to say that in assigning a causally 
potent electromagnetic field at each point e, we are effectively assigning “causal 
powers” to each point. After all, the way an electron “moves through” the space-time 
manifold depends upon the “causal powers” of the points it happens to move through: if  
an electron is currently located at e, its subsequent motion is determined by the “causal 
powers” o f e. More exactly, the space-time trajectory o f an electron is determined by the 
electromagnetic field AM (and, more generally, by the Ricci curvature tensor R^v o f space­
time as well).
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c. Non-Finitism
Another potential criticism of NG* is that it postulates infinitely many space-time 
points (the domain of a model o f NG* must contain precisely continuum many 
elements). It is not clear that this is an argument against nominalism, as Field himself 
construes the term. It seems to me that a nominalist o f Field’s stripe can quite 
consistently claim that there are infinitely many concreta. The person who criticizes 
Field’s account in this way is conflating anti-platonistic nominalism (which says that 
there are no abstract mathematicalia) with the completely different and much stronger 
ihQS\s,fmitistic nominalism (which says that there are only finitely many entities):
... the nominalistic objection to using real numbers was not the grounds of their 
uncountability or of the structural assumptions (e.g., Cauchy completeness) 
typically made about them. Rather the objection was to their abstractness: even 
postulating one real number would have been a violation of nominalism. ... 
Conversely, postulating uncountably many physical entities ... is not an objection 
to nominalism; nor does it become any questionable when one postulates that 
these physical entities obey structural assumptions analogous to the ones that 
platonists postulate for the real numbers.
(Field 1980, p. 31).
The deflationist about mathematics needn’t advocate finitism. Irrespective o f past usage 
of the term ‘nominalism’, deflationism is quite distinct from finitism. The deflationary 
fictionalist simply rejects abstracta mathematicalia. Indeed, in order to get any 
nominalistic theory o f the ground, Quine, Church and others have argued that it is 
necessary to assume the existence o f (or the modal constructibility of) infinitely many 
concreta. Field and deflationists seem to recognize this.
d. Structural A ssum ptions
The final objection to Field’s programme that we shall consider is related to the 
previous one, and has recently been articulated by Shapiro:
There is a  revealing error in Hartry Field’s Science Without Numbers [1980]... 
W hether abstract or concrete, Field’s  Newtonian space-time is Euclidean, 
consisting of continuum-many points and even more regions. Space-time 
exemplifies most (but not all) of the structure of R4 ... So something like addition 
and multiplication, as well as  the calculus of real-valued functions, can be 
carried out in this nominalistic theory. All of this is supposed to be consistent 
with the nominalistic rejection of abstracta.
(Shapiro 1997, pp. 75-76).
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Field himself was aware o f this, considering the objection that “there doesn’t seem to 
be a very significance difference between postulating such a rich physical space and 
postulating the real numbers” (Field 1980, p. 31). I have quoted Field’s reply above, 
where he says that “even postulating one real number would have been a violation o f  
nominalism”. To this, Shapiro replies:
The structuralist balks at this point. For us, a real number is a  place in the real- 
number structure. It makes no sense to “postulate one real number", because 
each number is part of a  large structure. It would be like trying to imagine a 
shortstop independent of an infield, or a piece that plays the role of the black 
queen’s bishop independent of a chess game. W here would it stand? What 
would its moves be? One can, of course, ask whether the real-number structure 
is exemplified by a given system (like a collection of points). ... But it is 
nonsense to contemplate numbers independent of the structure they are part of.
(Shapiro 1997, p. 76)
But this seems an over-reaction. Field would probably agree that it doesn’t make sense 
to postulate the existence of, say, just thirteen real numbers, without the rest. I expect that 
Field would probably say something like this: “if  there were real numbers, then they 
would have to satisfy the usual axioms for an order-complete field” (He has said 
something exactly analogous to this in his critique o f Wright 1983).224
However, Shapiro thinks that mathematics just is “the deductive study o f various kinds 
o f structure”:
Field concedes that nominalistic physics makes substantial “structural 
assumptions” about space-time, and he articulates these assumptions with 
admirable rigor. Although Field would not put it this way, the “structural 
assumptions" characterize a structure, an uncountable one. This is a 
consequence of the fact that (the second-order version of) Field’s theory of 
space-time is categorical—all of its models are isomorphic. Field’s nominalistic 
physicist would study this structure as such, at least sometimes. Field himself 
proves theorems about this structure. As I see  it, he thereby engages in 
mathematics. The activity of proving things about space-time is the sam e kind of 
activity of proving things about real numbers. Both are the deductive study of a 
structure, no more and certainly no less.
(Shapiro 1997, p. 77).
224 Roughly, Field 1984b replies to Wright that, i f  there were such things as numbers, then they would 
satisfy Hume’s Principle. But Field denies that there are numbers. Very much in the spirit o f fictionalism, he 
could also add that it probably wouldn’t make much sense to postulate Holmes without Watson, or Little 
Red Riding Hood without the Big Bad Wolf, or Santa Claus without Rudolph, his red-nosed reindeer. And 
so on.
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This position seems to lead to a reductio. Any assumption (about, say, the relative 
masses o f the professors as the LSE, or the relative extremity o f varying advocates of 
post-structuralist cyber-feminism) can be thought o f as a “structural assumption”. But if  
one makes such a “structural assumption”, and investigates its deductive consequences, 
one is surely not doing mathematics. One is just thinking (about LSE professors or cyber- 
feminists). Shapiro’s position here leads to a reductio. Indeed, any satisfiable assumption 
about the physical world characterizes a class o f structures. Suppose the class of 
structures characterized by the set o f (non-indexical) statements I say to my wife in a 
certain week happens to be isomorphic to some interesting mathematical structure. Does 
it follow that I am doing mathematics when I speak to my wife? The absurdum o f the 
reductio which Shapiro’s argument yields is that all consistent (satisfiable) discourse 
about the physical world is mathematics! This cannot be right.
Field’s own position is, in a sense, a mirror image o f Shapiro’s. Field argues that some 
of our “intuitions” about what mathematical structures there are, actually arise out o f a 
kind o f abstraction from considerations about aspects o f the physical world. For example,
The reasons for finding certain mathematica! claims natural (even if not literally 
believable) will vary somewhat from one mathematical claim to another. For 
instance,
(a) {Human females} kj {human non-females} = {humans}
is natural to accept largely because of its intimate association with the logical 
truth ' Vx(x is human if and only if either x is human and female or x is human and 
not female)’. Similarly,
(b) 1 + 1 = 2
is natural to accept largely because of its intimate association with logical 
truths like ‘If there is exactly one apple on the table and exactly one green thing 
on the table and no apple on the table is green then there are exactly two things 
on the table which are either apples or green’; ... the situation is similar with,
(c) Between any two real numbers there is another real number
this is natural to accept because of its intimate association with an analogous 
claim about points on a line in physical space......
(d) For any physical objects x and y, there is a  set containing x and y as its
only members
draws some of its naturalness from the claim that there is an aggregate of x 
and y; ...
There are of course mathematical claims that unlike (a)-(d) are not intimately 
connected to non-mathematical claims, and which seem  natural even when we 
hear them, so that education is not directly a  factor: an example is,
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(e) There are inaccessible cardinals
(Field 1989, Introduction, pp. 9-10).
Burgess & Rosen 1997 illustrate this neatly with the quick summary:
For all its wealth of results, and for all the power of its applications, 
mathematics as of 1800 dealt with only a handful of mathematical structures, all 
closely connected with the models of time and space used in classical physics: 
the natural, rational, real, and complex number systems; the Euclidean spaces of 
dimensions one, two, and three. Indeed, mathematics was widely held to deal 
directly with the structure of physical space and time, and to provide an example 
of pure thought arriving at substantive information about the natural world. ... All 
that changed completely during the nineteenth century with the introduction of 
more and more novel mathematical structures, beginning with the first non- 
Euclidean spaces.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. v).
One might argue, with Shapiro, that our “access” to these basic mathematical structures, 
o f time and space, is somehow grounded in their concrete exemplifications in the 
physical world.
e. Extensions: General Relativity and Quantum  Theory
The (allegedly) nominalistic reconstruction given by Field is a reconstruction o f just 
one interesting theory from mathematical physics. It is completely unknown whether 
such a reconstruction is possible other theories.
David Malament expresses scepticism on this matter, arguing that,
Field’s  nominalization strategy, even if successful in some cases, almost 
certainly fails when applied to other physical theories of interest. His example 
(Newtonian gravitational theory) and mine (the theory of the Klein-Gordon field) 
are very special. ...
... Suppose Field wants to give some physical theory a nominalistic 
reformulation. Further suppose the theory determines a class of mathematical 
models, each of which consists of a  set of "points” together with certain 
mathematical structures defined on them. Field’s  nominalization strategy cannot 
be successful unless the objects represented by the points are appropriately 
physical (or non-abstract). But in lots of cases the represented objects are 
abstract. In particular, this is true of all "phase space” theories.
(Malament 1982, p. 533).
Malament’s point is that certain physical theories represent the possible states of a 
physical system by the points inside a certain structure, called a “phase space”. The 
problem for Field would be that these possible states are themselves abstract.
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There are two other groups o f theories o f central importance within modem 
mathematical physics. First, theories along the lines o f Einstein’s General Theory o f  
Relativity, the theory of curved space-time and gravitation225. Second, the various 
Quantum Field Theories, the theories of quantized fields in space-time226.
Burgess & Rosen 1997 briefly discuss this matter, concluding,
... whether the obstacles enumerated can be surmounted is an open research 
problem. As a consequence of nominalism’s being mainly a philosopher’s 
concern, this open research problem is moreover one that has so far been 
investigated only by amateurs—philosophers and logicians—not 
professionals—geometers and physicists; and the failure of amateurs to 
surmount the obstacles is no strong grounds for pessimism about what could be 
achieved by professionals.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 118).
It is impossible to know how this issue will develop. Most serious mathematicians and 
physicists are completely disinterested in the question o f nominalism, and, consequently, 
it is unlikely that someone will even attempt a “nominalistic” version of, say, Kaluza- 
Klein supergravity theory or quantized Yang-Mills gauge theory.
But it seems to me that the complex mathematical structure o f theories used in modem 
theoretical physics (Lie groups, fibres bundles, cohomology groups, path integrals over 
function spaces, and so on) cannot be reduced in any straightforward way to simple
225 Classical General Relativity in 4 dimensions can be generalized in several ways. The most obvious, 
introduced by Theodore Kaluza as early as 1919, is to introduce extra dimensions. With this theory in 5 
dimensions, one can derive Maxwell’s Equations for the extra components o f  the curvature tensor! Such 
theories are still o f  interest, and are now called Kaluza-Klein theories (Klein introduced the idea that the 
extra fifth dimension is “curled up”, and thus hard to see, and its small size determines the electric charge). 
Another generalization is to introduce extra fields on spacetime, in particular spinor fields. The symmetry 
operation that transforms between spinor fields and tensor fields is called “supersymmetry” and the resulting 
theories are called “supergravity theories”. Kaluza-Klein supergravity theories were very popular in the 
1970s and early 1980s until the arrival o f superstring theories (which only work in specific dimensions, like 
26 or 10).
226 The basic quantum field theories currently studied or advocated as fundamental explanations are all 
examples o f  the second-quantized Yang-Mills theory with “gauge-invariance”. A gauge field is, roughly, the 
force field between particles o f matter (fermions). Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) is the simplest such 
theory, with electrons as the matter and photons as the gauge field. The standard Weinberg-Salam-Glashow 
(1967) Electro-Weak Model is also such a theory, incorporating something fancy called “spontaneous 
symmetry breaking” (SSB). Also Quantum Chromodynamics (QCD) is a gauge theory, this time with quarks 
as the matter and gluons as the gauge field.
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polyadic relations between space-time points, like betweenness and congruence (or their 
generalization to deal with scalar fields on space-time).
9.5 Non-Conservativeness Within Mathematics
The above criticisms are somewhat inconclusive. But there is a very powerful criticism 
o f Field’s programme which attacks the main technical claim that constitutes 
deflationism, the alleged property o f conservativeness o f adding or applying standard 
applicable mathematical theories (such as standard set theory with ur-elements) to non- 
mathematical theories. This central claim is statable simply enough:
C onservativeness
The result o f adding applicable mathematical axioms M to a nominalistically 
formulated theory N always yields a conservative extension.
Field 1980 construes conservativeness in the semantical sense, model-theoretically, 
using the (Tarskian) definition o f logical consequence. But the theory he constructs is 
second-order, and because the consequence relation for second-order logic is not 
complete, a strong case can be made for the claim that we can only know facts about this 
relation by presupposing mathematics227.
Indeed, it is plausible to argue that, on the sort o f epistemology favoured by a 
nominalist, the proof-theoretic conception of deductive conservativeness should be
227 Malament 1982 makes a related point: "... a nominalist cannot understand the assertion that sentence SL 
is a logical consequence o f theory T. (What could it mean to say that SL is true in all set-theoretic models o f  
T?)” [p. 530], E.g., let G be a fixed point Godel sentence (for the negation o f  the provability predicate) o f  
PA2. We can prove, using set theory, that PA2 f= G, but we cannot finitely derive G from PA2. Presumably, 
the nominalist cannot understand the assertion that G is a logical consequence o f PA2.
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basic228. That is, like all o f us, the nominalist thinks that our ability to recognize “what 
follows from what” and o f “what is consistent” is somehow grounded in actually 
performing sound derivations involving linguistic tokens (or perhaps mental tokens), 
while he or she argues that the more “mathematical notion” o f semantic logical 
consequence is some kind o f unacceptable abstraction, to be dispensed with.
A mathematical theory M is deductively conservative if  and only if, for any non- 
mathematical theory N and any non-mathematical statement (p, if  M u  N |- cp then N |- cp. 
This is where things get very sticky for the deflationist claim that mathematics is 
“insubstantial”. For Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems entail the phenomenon o f non- 
conservativeness (e.g., for consistent recursively axiomatized extensions o f Q). Consider 
PA, axiomatic first-order Peano Arithmetic. Godel showed in 1931 in effect that there 
are true sentences Gpa and ConpA in the language of arithmetic such that,
not:-(PA | - G p a )  and not:-(PA |-C onpA )
(Indeed, if  T is any recursively axiomatized sound extension o f PA, then there are 
arithmetical truths which T does not imply). Now focus on ConpA (that is, the formula 
-,P /W pA(f 0  *  0*1) of L, the language o f arithmetic). In its “oblique” reading, this formula 
“asserts” that a contradiction is not derivable in PA, and thus that PA is consistent. 
Godel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem tells us that ConpA is not a theorem o f PA229 
(of course, PA is consistent).
Now consider axiomatic set theory. It is possible to prove in axiomatic set theory facts 
about models. In particular, one can prove that PA has a model (and so is consistent), 
that PA is true in the standard model %  and even that any model o f PA is isomorphic to 
Df. Thus,
ZFC |- “There is a model o f PA”
228 N.B. The reader should be aware that Field actually advocates neither approach as basic. Instead, in 
recent papers he turns to modality, introducing a (non-essentialist) primitive modal operator 0 to analyse 
logical notions. Roughly: q> implies x just in case -iO(cp a  —ix) is (disquotationally) true.
229 Proof. Suppose PA f- ConpA. So, PA f- (0 *  0) v  ->Prov(f0  *  0"|). Thus, PA |- Prov(T0  *  Ol) ->  (0 *  
0). Thus, by Lob’s Theorem, PA [ 0 * 0 .  So, PA is inconsistent. ■
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ZFC |- “There is a (unique up to isomorphism) model o f PA2”
Thus,
ZFC |-ConpA
To summarize, adding axiomatic set theory to axiomatic arithmetic allows one to derive 
more true theorems about natural numbers. This is non-conservativeness. The situation is 
quite general. Standard axiomatic set theory ZFC is not conservative over weaker 
axiomatic theories, and ZFC itself, being incomplete o f course, can be non- 
conservatively strengthened by adding further “higher-level” set-theoretical axioms (e.g., 
about the existence o f inaccessible cardinals). These new axioms have the power to settle 
undecidable assertions “lower down”:
Because of this phenomenon of non-conservativeness of richer mathematical 
theories with respect to lower-level theories, there arises the prospect of 
justifying the richer theories indirectly in virtue of their power to decide questions 
at the lower (more “observational”) level that otherwise would remain undecided.
It was just this prospect that led Gddel to some of his well-known speculations 
concerning the possible justification of some strong axioms of infinity for set 
theory.
(Heilman 1989, p. 121).
Godel fully recognized these consequences o f his Incompleteness Theorems, and urged 
the importance o f such considerations in attempted resolutions o f presently undecidable 
assertions:
First of all the axioms of set theory by no m eans form a system closed in itself, 
but, quite on the contrary, the very concept of set on which they are based 
suggests their extension by new axioms which assert the existence of still further 
iterations of the operation ‘set of. These axioms can be formulated also as 
propositions asserting the existence of very great cardinal numbers. ... The 
simplest of these strong “axioms of infinity” asserts the existence of inaccessible 
numbers > K0- ••• These axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system 
of set theory as used today is incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented 
without arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold the content of the concept 
of set explained above.
It can be proved that these axioms also have consequences far outside the 
domain of very great transfinite numbers, which is their immediate subject 
matter: each of them, under the assumption of its consistency, can be shown to 
increase the number of decidable propositions even in the field of Diophantine 
equations.
(Godel 1947+1964 (1983), pp. 476-477).
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Indeed, we have invoked such a non-conservativeness property o f a Tarskian truth 
theory in Chapter 5 above to argue against the adequacy o f deflationary truth theories. 
Tarski’s theory o f truth/satisfaction TS is such that,
PA v j  TS |- Gpa and PA v j  TS ConpA
That is, PA u  TS is not a conservative extension of PA.
Many technical results about the non-conservativeness o f axiomatic set theory, and the 
non-conservativeness o f various independent new axioms for set theory230, are well- 
known.
It transpires that these results about non-conservativeness strike a direct hit on Field’s 
deflationism. When these results are applied to Field’s geometrical nominalism, two 
central facts emerge:
i. adding mathematics to an axiomatic non-mathematical theory N may be 
deductively non-conservative (and thus, if  N is true, then abstract 
mathematics is deductively indispensable for deducing the true (semantic) 
consequences o f N); and,
ii. standard (set-theoretical) space-time theory cannot possess first-order 
“natural” nominalistic sub-theories over which it is a conservative 
extension (in short, a nominalistic replacement N for such platonistic 
mathematicized theories simply do not exist).
In the light o f these facts, the whole motivation of the deflationist programme 
disintegrates. In particular, the analysis o f the utility o f mathematics (i.e., it dispensably 
helps to derive nominalistic conclusions from nominalistic premises) is wrong, and the 
central dispensability claim (i.e., that mathematics is dispensable from our 
mathematicized theories o f Nature) is untenable.
230 Godel 1947+1964 (1983) points out several consequences o f Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis.
C h apter  9. D eflatio nism  A b o u t  M ath em atics
301
9.6 Non-Conservativeness: The Demise of Deflationism
From now on, let N be the second-order nominalistic theory developed by Field in his 
1980. Consider N°, the “first-order weakening” of N. That is, the result o f reformulating 
N in first-order mereology, using the “part-of ’ relation, and replacing any second-order 
axioms by first-order schemes.
i. Second-O rder Deflationism
It transpires, for logical reasons, that Field’s conservativeness claim with respect to the 
second-order theory N is true on a semantical reading but false on a deductive reading. 
(Indeed, semantical conservativeness follows from nothing more than the categoricity of 
N and its relative consistency with set theory). It turns out that this has considerable 
impact on the central destructive claims o f the deflationist. In particular, the crucial 
theses analysing utility o f false-but-conservative mathematics, and asserting the 
dispensability o f mathematics are undermined.
These basic problems with Field’s programme were first explained in Shapiro 1983a. 
This paper develops some Godelian ideas actually mentioned231 in the final Chapter of 
Field 1980.
Using Shapiro’s notation, let S be standard applicable axiomatic set theory. Shapiro 
argues (correctly, I think) that, as a nominalist, Field ought to require a deductive 
conservativeness metatheorem:
(*) if  N u  S \- cp, then N \- <p
After all, the second-order logical consequence relation is not even recursively 
enumerable (this relation f= thoroughly transcends the limits o f finite derivability). A 
second-order theory T (say, PA2) may have a logical consequence cp (a Godel sentence, 
say, the consistency o f PA2) which is not deducible in T. In this case, even though T [= cp,
231 The ideas originated from comments made to Field ( before writing his 1980) by John Burgess and 
Yiannis Moschovakis.
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it requires full-blown mathematics to prove that T |= cp232. To be sure, i f  N is a first-order 
axiomatic theory, or if  any axiom schemes in N are treated as lists, rather than as rules 
(for this terminology, see Burgess & Rosen 1997), then the result (*) is true, because o f  
Godel’s Completeness Theorem (for first-order logic, |= and |- are co-extensive).
However, many interesting theories N (in particular, the geometrical theory employed 
by Field 1980) include axiom schemes (e.g., a scheme asserting the existence o f space­
time regions satisfying any arbitrary non-mathematically expressible condition). The 
natural formulation of N is second-order and, in this case, the deductive conservativeness 
theorem actually fails.
We need to suppose two things:
i. One may prove in S  that N is consistent;
ii. There is an interpretation o f axiomatic Peano Arithmetic within N.
Both assumptions are fulfilled. After all, the Representation Theorem for N says, in 
effect, that the reals R form a model o f N: the construction o f such a model o f N can, of 
course, be formalized within axiomatic set theory. So, S  can prove the consistency o f N. 
(Indeed, S  can prove that any pair o f models of N are have cardinality c). The second 
assumption, again, is fulfilled. Indeed, Field himself shows in his 1980 that it is possible 
to define a formula \\f(R,p) meaning intuitively ‘p  is an end-point o f a region R o f equally 
spaced space-time points’.
In fact, N proves the non-mathematical assertion 3R3p\\f(R, p), saying there is such a 
region. Interpreting ‘0’ as p  and the successor predicate V  as the next-point-in-the- 
region-relation, we can model Peano Arithmetic within N. This is how Shapiro sketches 
the construction:
232 In first-order logic, if T |* q>, then T [  cp, and thus, by the very explanation o f  deducibility |-, a finite 
subset o f T u  {—icp} generates a formal contradiction (using a tree say). In second-order logic, 
Completeness fails, so even ifT  q>, it needn’t follow that T f- (p; and thus it needn’t follow that T u  {—icp} 
is inconsistent (and thus formally refutable). E.g., PA2 CoripA but PA2 l j  {-.ConpA} is not form ally  
inconsistent (although it is unsatisfiable). In this case, in order to prove  that T f=cp one requires substantial 
mathematical assumptions (not just symbol manipulation).
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Field indicates the definition in N of a spatio-temporally equally spaced region, 
a class of (discrete) points all of which lie on a single straight line and such that 
the distance between adjacent points is uniform. Let v|/(R, p) be a formula 
equivalent to ‘R is an infinite, spatio-temporal ly equally spaced region containing 
p as  end-point’. We have N |- 3R3pn/(R, p). Such pairs (R, p) are models of the 
natural numbers. Relative to R and p, one can construct a  formula I(x, y) 
equivalent to ‘x and y are both in R, there is no point in R strictly between x and 
y, and if x * p, then x is strictly between p and y \ The formula represents the 
'successor relation’ of (R, p). The analogues of addition and multiplication can 
also be defined. It follows from N that if vj/(R, p) holds, then (R, p) under E 
satisfies the axioms of Peano arithmetic.
(Shapiro 1983a (1996), p. 230)233.
This means that we can formulate within the language o f N a Godel sentence CoriN 
expressing the consistency o f N. Since N is an axiomatic (consistent) theory, Godel’s 
Second Incompleteness Theorem applies, so,
a. CoriN is not a theorem of N.
But we agreed at the outset that,
b. CoriN is a theorem of S  u  N.
Hence, N u  S  is not a deductively conservative extension o f N.
Let me emphasize. There are “non-mathematical” geometrical logical consequences of 
N which are not derivable in N, but which are derivable in N u  S. It seems that the set- 
theoretical mathematics involved in N u  S  is not dispensable. It is indispensable for 
deriving these physical facts about space-time:
Since (presumably) N is recursively axiomatized, Godel’s incompleteness 
theorems apply. Let ConN(R, p) be the formula asserting the ‘consistency’ of N in 
terms of the points of R (analogous to the usual formulation using the natural 
numbers). Finally, let 9 be the sentence:
VRVp[i|/(R, p) -> ConN(R, p)].
233 For completeness here are the definitions (see Shapiro 1983a, footnotes 8 and 9):
(I) R is an spatio-temporally equally spaced region: “any three points in R are co-linear and for every point x 
in R which lies strictly between two points o f  R, there are points y  and z  in R such that (a) exactly one point 
in R  lies strictly between y  and z  and that point is x, and (b) the distance between y  and x  is equal to the 
distance between x and z”.
(II) \\i(R, p): “R  is a spatio-temporally equally spaced region, p  is in R, p  does not lie strictly between any 
two points in R, and, for every x in R, if  x *  p , then there is a point y  in R  such that x lies strictly between p  
and y \
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The relevant version of the incompleteness theorem entails that not:-(N |- 0).
Notice that 0 is sentence in the language of nominalistic physics. Its variables 
range over space-time points and regions.
A second presumption is that the consistency of N is provable in the set theory 
S. Let ConN(co> 0) be the usual sentence asserting the ''consistency” of N in 
terms of the natural numbers. We have S |- ConN(Q, 0). Notice that it is provable 
in N + S that the formula \j/(R, p) is “categorical” and that any pair (R, p) 
satisfying \|/ is isomorphic to the natural numbers (co, 0). The latter follows from 
the existence of a representing homomorphism from the points of space-time to 
R4. Thus, we have
N + S }- VRVp[\j/(R, p) -» (ConN(Q, 0) ConN(R, p))].
Hence, N + S |- 0. This refutes the deductive conservativeness of S over N.
(Shapiro 1983a (1996), p. 230)234.
Shapiro further comments on the semantical conservativeness o f set theory over N:
A few brief remarks may be in order. The preceding result shows that for 
second-order theories, deductive conservativeness is not coextensive with 
semantic conservativeness. The gap can be substantial. Notice that if T is any 
categorical theory and S + T is satisfiable, then S is semantically conservative 
over T. Thus, for example, set theory is semantically conservative over second- 
order arithmetic. As is well known, however, in set theory one can deduce many 
arithmetical statements that are not theorems of arithmetic alone.
(Shapiro 1983a (1996), p. 231).
ii. First-Order Deflationism
Turning to the first-order theory N°, the crucial changes are these. First, any formula 
with a monadic second-order variable, e.g., R(x), is to be replaced by a first-order 
mereological formula x c  r, meaning “x is a part o f the region r \  Second, geometrical 
second-order axioms are replaced by axiom schemes.
The general non-conservativeness o f mathematics is established, as above, via GOdel’s 
Theorems. But didn’t Field show in the Appendix to Chapter 1 o f his 1980, via an 
Expansion Lemma, that set theory is semantically conservative over first-order 
nominalistic theories? Well, yes and no. In the situation where it does hold, it follows, by 
Gddel’s Completeness Theorem for first-order logic, that if  N is a first-order theory, then
234 The reprint in Hart (ed.) 1996 contains a typographical mistake, omitting the remainder o f the sentence 
after the appearance o f  ‘ConN(o), 0) ’, and the following sentence.
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the N u S ,  the simple union o f the axioms o f N and those o f S , is also a deductively 
conservative extension o f N. But now an important subtlety intrudes.
There is a crucial ambiguity involved in “adding” a pair o f theories, where one theory is 
formulated in an expanded language (i.e., the extra terminology in our case is 
mathematical, namely e). Normally, by “axiom” o f a combined theory Tj u  T2 we 
simply take the union o f all the axioms o f Ti and T2. However, i f  T! contains axiom 
schemes, are we to count the occurrence of new terminology in such axiom schemes as 
axioms o f the combined theory? It turns out that it makes a difference to what can be 
proved.
From now on, let us write,
Ti u  T2: the result o f simply pooling all the axioms o f T j and T2.
And let us write,
Ti + T2: the result o f simply pooling all the axioms o f T] and T2, and taking
as additional axioms, any that arise from axiom schemes o f Ti by 
including formulas containing the new terminology.235
In the terminology o f Burgess & Rosen 1997, Ti u  T2 is the result o f treating these 
schemes as lists, and Tj + T2 is the result o f treating these axiom schemes as rules.
The Expansion Lemma proved in the Appendix to Chapter 1 o f Field 1980 remains 
invariant under both proposals, since it does not concern any particular theory in L°. 
However, in applying the Expansion Lemma, we want to show that, for any model o f  
some particular non-mathematical theory N, there is an expansion which is a model o f N 
u  ZFU. This, again, is fine. But is it true that, for any model o f N, there is an expansion 
which is a model o f N + ZFU? The answer is “Not necessarily”. In short, although, any 
interpretation o f L° may still be expanded to a model o f axiomatic set theory ZFU itself, 
it does not follow that, for any nominalistic theory N, any model o f N may be expanded
235 N.B. This is implicitly what happens when Ti is a second-order theory containing a second-order axiom 
VX[...X...]. In deriving theorems within u  T2, one permits formulas expressed in T2 vocabulary as 
instances o f  the predicate variable X.
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to a model of N + ZFU. Indeed, this cannot be true, for we can show that N + ZFU is not 
in general a conservative extension of N.
This is how Burgess & Rosen report the technical situation:
The technical issues in part turn on a subtle distinction pertaining to axiom 
schemes. When a theory T in a language L involves a  scheme, we have said 
that we conceive of the scheme as a rule to the effect that:
(i) for every formula Q, —Q— is an axiom
An alternative would be to conceive of it as a  list of all the axioms:
(ii) —Qo—, —Qi—, —Q2—. • • ■
that result when this rule is applied to all formulas:
(iii) Qo, Q1, Q2, • ■ •
of the language L. The difference in conception makes a difference only when 
the theory T in the language L is extended to or incorporated in some stronger 
theory V  in some richer language L' which will have new formulas Q' not on the 
list (iii), and for each such formula a new formula —Q'— not on the list (ii). To 
conceive of the scheme a s  a rule (i) means that these new formulas —Q'— are 
taken as new axioms; to conceive of the scheme as  a list (ii) means that they are 
not.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, pp. 194-195).
With this in mind, consider N°, the first-order theory obtained by weakening all second- 
order axioms in N to axiom schemes. Again, it is possible to show that the standard 
platonistic theory o f flat space-time P is still not conservative over N°. Shapiro 1983a 
explained why. The argument is proof-theoretic. Again, N° has a godel sentence, which 
can be proved in P.
We assume that P is equivalent to N° + S, obtained by applying the set theory to the 
nominalistic theory N°. In this case, the undecidable assertion is still CoriN°. Again, by 
Godel’s Theorem, N° does not imply the Godel sentence CoriN°. However, the platonistic 
space-time theory N° + S does prove CoriN°, as long as axiom schemes are expanded. In 
short, N° + S is again not a conservative extension o f N°.
Burgess & Rosen 1997 summarize the situation:
Returning to the description of Field’s strategy, his intermediate theory may be 
described as follows. The synthetic theory T° involves a  schem e of continuity.
The intermediate theory Tto Field considers is the result of adding the apparatus 
of set theory while treating that schem e as  a list (and contrasts with T*° 
considered in article II.A.5.b, the result of adding the apparatus of set theory
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while treating the scheme as a rule). ... More is provable from the standard 
axioms of set theory about the real numbers as standardly reconstructed in set 
theory than is provable about real numbers in analysis. ...
Field shows that T*° is conservative over T° (as T*° is not, since adding set 
theory gives new geometric results, and adding proposed further axioms beyond 
standard set theory gives further geometric results, with the majority and minority 
proposals leading to incompatible geometric results). In fact, adding the 
apparatus of set theory to any theory produces a  conservative extension, 
provided any and all schem es in the original theory are treated as  lists, not rules.
(Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 195-196).
That is, in my notation,
i. N° u  S is a conservative extension o f N°, but
ii. N° + S is not a conservative extension o f N°.
This proof theoretic result has an important model-theoretic consequence. The theory P 
asserts that there is an isomorphism from the set o f space-time points to R4. Now, N° + S 
is not conservative over N°, so there must be non-standard models o f N° that cannot be 
expanded to models of N° + S. Indeed, since N° has countable models, it is impossible to 
prove the sort o f Representation Theorem (that Field requires) to the effect that there is a 
representing homomorphism from any model of N° to the reals R.236
9.7 The Indispensability of Mathematics
What are we to make of this? The above argument suggest that mathematics is 
indispensable in deducing facts about space-time (that is, in deducing mathematics-free 
theorem • about space-time that logically follow from currently accepted space-time 
theory). For any sufficiently powerful axiomatic platonistic theory P, a proposed 
mathematics-free replacement N must lose some mathematics-free theorems. In general, 
N is not “just as good” as the platonistic theory P which it is meant to replace.
In our introduction to Field’s deflationary programme, we highlighted three major 
claims about mathematics:
236 See Field 1985 (1989), p. 131: “It is immediately clear that if the extended representation theorem ... is 
to hold, N cannot be formulated in first-order logic”.
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The Conservativeness Claim
The result o f adding standard mathematics M to a body N of non- 
mathematical nominalistic assertions is a conservative extension.
The Utility of Mathematics
Any inference from nominalistic premises to a nominalistic conclusion 
that can be made with the help of mathematics could be made (usually 
more long-windedly) without it.
Eliminability of Mathematics in Science
For each platonistic mathematicized theory o f Nature P, there is a “nice” 
nominalistic theory N axiomatized using finitely many primitives such 
that P is a deductively conservative extension o f N.
We now see that each claim is false. Adding mathematics is not conservative. There are 
bodies o f nominalistic assertions such that adding mathematics yield new nominalistic 
conclusions. So, the Conservativeness Claim is false. This implies that, for some 
inferences between nominalistic statements involving mathematics, the mathematics is 
not dispensable. So, the Utility Claim is false. Finally, there exist platonistic theories 
incorporating set theory for which there do not exist “nice” nominalistic replacements. 
So, the Eliminability Claim is false.
There are two further points to be made:
i. Perhaps, the undecidable consequences o f N are somehow “recherche”: 
Field suggests that, although such consequences are nominalistic 
witnesses to non-conservativeness, they are perhaps not “physically
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significant”. In short, the sort of Godelian assertions undecided by N, but 
provable in N u  S, simply don't matter.
ii. Standard axiomatic platonistic space-time theory P is itself “Godelizable”, 
and its consistency assertion, Conp is likewise not a theorem o f P. 
Furthermore, P itself still cannot be “nominalistically complete”. There 
will always be sentences in the nominalistic notation that are undecided, 
no matter how many mathematical axioms are added (in an effective way)
As for point (i), Shapiro himself notes:
The sentence 0, taken a s  a  statement about space-time points and regions, is 
rather obscure—it is not likely to form an essential part of the account of any 
phenomenon to be explained by physics. It may be the case  that every 
interesting or scientifically relevant theorem of N + S is a  theorem of N. ... The 
latter, however, remains to be shown (provided that a notion of ‘scientific 
relevance’ can be formulated).
(Shapiro 1983a (1996), p. 231)
However, this is an exact replica of the debate within the philosophy o f  pure 
mathematics concerning the significance o f non-conservativeness. On this topic, it has 
emerged recently that a whole series o f important mathematical facts are undecided by 
certain weak theories: there are important facts about the natural numbers, expressible in 
PA but not decided by PA. The most famous example is the demonstration by Paris & 
Harrington 1977 o f the unprovability o f a variant o f the finite Ramsey Theorem in PA. 
As Isaacson 1987 puts it,
Attention has focused in recent years on some extremely interesting examples 
of arithmetical truths unprovable in Peano arithmetic which are thought of as 
much more genuinely and purely mathematical than the Gddel sentences. They 
include the study by Kirby and Paris of Goodstein’s  Theorem, the Paris- 
Harrington variant of the finite Ramsey theorem, and Friedman’s finite version of 
Kruskal’s theorem.
(Isaacson 1987 (1996), p. 215).
Indeed, there are important facts about the real numbers not decided by low-level set 
theories which become decidable by extending the set theory,
A whole series of remarkable results along similar lines [to Paris-Harringtonl 
has been obtained by Harvey Friedman, in which the lower-level set theory is 
already some axiomatic set theory (e.g., some natural modification of Z or ZF) 
and the higher-level set theory is a  richer set theory (e.g., ZFC or ZFC + a large
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cardinal axiom, etc.). But the statement in question is not an "esoteric” set- 
theoretical statement, but a  statement pertaining to functions of sort encountered 
in “normal” mathematics “lower down” (e.g., Borel functions from Rn -> R).
(Heilman 1989, p. 122).
There may be important geometrical facts about (flat) space-time expressible in 
axiomatic synthetic geometry which may be settled by adding strong enough set- 
theoretical axioms. (See Burgess & Rosen, pp. 120-123).
As for (ii), this does not lessen the failure o f the deflationist programme: no-one expects 
that standard axiomatic theories should be deductively complete (with respect to the 
“physical” facts), and it is an intriguing fact that decisions about the structure o f space­
time may depend upon extensions o f the so-called “standard framework” for 
mathematics (axiomatic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZFC).
Heilman makes a related point,
... granted that as  much mathematics as  can be formulated within Z* is to be 
included in a framework for applied mathematics, is this really enough? Might we 
not require, for example, the full power of ZF, or ZFC, or ZFC plus large cardinal 
axioms? Just because we haven’t encountered the need for such stronger 
axioms yet doesn’t mean that we won’t, much less that we couldn’t. ...
Now it may seem on the face of it outlandish that large cardinal axioms, or 
even the Axiom of Replacement, should ever be needed in scientific 
applications. However, remarkable recent investigations of Harvey Friedman 
suggest that the idea is not so outlandish after all.
(Heilman 1989, p. 120).
This puts the Indispensability Argument in a new light. Although Quine and Putnam 
themselves never argued this way using such Godelian considerations, it certainly seems 
to have occurred to Godel:
... even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axiom, and even in 
case  it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable decision concerning its truth 
is possible in another way, namely inductively by studying its “success”. Success 
here m eans fruitfulness in consequences, in particular, in “verifiable” 
consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable without the new axiom, whose 
proofs with the help of the new axiom, however, are considerably simpler and 
easier to discover, and make it possible to contract into one proof many different 
proofs. ... There might exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable 
consequences, shedding so much light upon a whole field, and yielding such 
powerful methods for solving problems (and even solving them constructively, as  
far as that is possible) that no matter whether or not they are intrinsically 
necessary, they would have to be accepted at least in the sam e sense as any 
well-established physical theory.
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(GSdel 1947+1964 (1983), p. 477).
The central claim of Field’s deflationism is that mathematics is “insubstantial”237, 
adding no new physical content to any purely nominalistic theory. The Godelian 
argument explained by Shapiro shows that this claim is false (if arithmetic can be 
modelled in the nominalistic theory).
Similarly, if  a mathematicized scientific theory P can be represented as N + ZFC, 
where N is an underlying “mathematics-free” theory, then in some important cases N is 
not “just as good” as P, because P will have “mathematics-free” theorems that N does 
not have.
This concludes our discussion o f deflationism about mathematics. Mathematics is 
“substantial” in the sense that mathematics is indispensable to our scientific description 
o f the world238.
237 Just as deflationism about truth claims that “truth is insubstantial”, adding no new content. I argued 
against this claim in Chapter 5.
238 1 have ignored the natural question o f just “how much” mathematics is indispensable to science. The 
reason is that I am sceptical that any clear-cut answer can be given. In contrast, Burgess 1984 (p. 386) 
claims that mathematical analysis is “probably sufficient to develop, making use o f  coding devices, all the 
mathematics that has found scientific applications up to the present”. But anyone familiar with the standard 
mathematics used in modem theoretical physics (e.g., differential geometry, topology, cohomology, fibre 
bundle theory, symplectic manifold theory, dimensional regularization in non-integral (!) dimensional space­
time, infinite-dimensional path integrals, and so on) will treat any view that all this machinery can be gotten 
down to mathematical analysis with extreme scepticism. For example, the “phase space” Q  for a scalar field 
<X> on spacetime contains all functions/:  R4 ->  R. This phase space is larger than the continuum.
Quine discusses this matter briefly in his reply to Charles Parsons (Quine 1986), and Heilman discusses the 
matter in some detail in Heilman 1989, Chapter 3, §2.
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C h a p ter  10 
Conclusion: Mathematics and Truth
Renouncing classes means rejecting mathematics. That will not do. 
Mathematics is an established going concern. Philosophy is as  shaky as  can be.
To reject mathematics on philosophical grounds would be absurd. ... I laugh to 
think how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for philosophical 
reasons.
David Lewis 1991, Parts of Classes, §2.8.
I find it quite amazing that it is possible to predict what will happen by 
mathematics, which is simply following rules which really have nothing to do with 
the original thing.
R.P. Feynman 1965 (1992), The Character of the Physical Law, p. 171.
It is positively spooky how the physicist finds the mathematician has been 
there before him or her.
S. Weinberg 1986, ‘Lecture on the Applicability of Mathematics’, p. 725.
10.1 Science Entails Platonism
The burden o f Chapters 1, 2 and 3 was to clarify how mathematics is integrated within 
scientific theories o f the world, and how this integration entails ontological commitment 
to mathematical entities. In short, “Science Entails Platonism”.
The point is, in a sense, quite trivial, as soon as one is clearly about what it means for 
an interpreted theory to be true. A theory T is true if  and only if  the entities it quantifies 
over—the range o f its bound quantificational variables— are related exactly as the 
theorems o f  T say they are. This remains the case whether T is a nominalistic theory, or a 
pure mathematical theory, or a mixed “impure” mathematicized theory o f Nature. Part of 
the burden o f Chapter 4 was to explain how our modem understanding o f the concept of 
truth, grounded on the so-called T-sentences, but developed within a full Tarskian theory 
o f satisfaction, explicates this informal talk of entities “being related as T says they are”.
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Chapter 6 defended a Tarskian conception of mathematical truth and criticized attempts 
to repudiate such a Tarskian conception. In particular, Tarski’s conception o f truth is one 
which defines truth in terms o f the referential relation o f satisfaction. Loosely speaking, 
the language and mind-independent facts in the abstract world o f numbers, functions, sets 
and mathematical structures make mathematical statements true. Mw-Tarskian semantics 
for mathematics is implausible, especially when we turn to the applications of 
mathematics. An assertion is not true because it is provable, or because it is justifiable, 
or because it has warranted assertibility, or anything like that. ‘Tachyons travel faster 
than light’ would be a true sentence if  tachyons travelled faster than light. And this 
proposition would be true even if  we never found out. After all, Godel taught us that, for 
any sound axiomatic theory containing a fragment o f arithmetic, there are truths it does 
not prove. And Tarski taught us that the class o f true sentences in any sufficiently rich 
language is not computable.
10.2 The Possibilities of Nominalism
The various programmes o f modem nominalism are primarily motivated by an 
epistemological concern, which we have christened Benacerrafitis, the problem of  
“epistemic access”. Roughly, abstract mathematical entities are “unknowable 
abstractions”, causally disconnected from the sensory processes o f knowledge 
acquisition.
The most promising version of nominalism, one that does not immediately collapse 
when applications are considered239, is some version o f modal ism, incorporating a 
substantial modal logical machinery o f constructibility quantifiers and actuality 
operators. Statements about mathematicalia are to be reconstrued as statements about 
possible-but-non-actual entities, which might have existed or might have been 
constructed (like Chihara’s type-theoretic hierarchy o f unactualized open sentence
239 Like if-thenism, as I argue in Chapter 6. Or simplistic modalizations using just the metalogical 0, as I 
argue in Chapter 8.
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tokens). One immediate problem is that many philosophers, like Quine, Putnam and 
Field, would simply say that this apparatus o f modality is highly anti-nominalistic.
In any case, such modal apparatus is standardly analysed using mathematics, rather than 
the other way round! If intelligibility is conferred on modal notions by recent technical 
work in model theory for modal logic, then it is quite unacceptable to pretend that this 
explanation is just an “elaborate myth”, as Chihara claims. Furthermore, an ontology o f  
possibilia (or an ideology o f modal notions: ‘x might have been F*) is just as inaccessible 
or inexplicable (on the causal empiricist account of knowledge) as is a standard ontology 
of abstract mathematicalia, like numbers and sets.
I conclude that if  anything resembling nominalism is to succeed, it must adopt a modal 
framework which is every bit as difficult to make epistemological sense o f as standard 
mathematics is. Indeed, if  we accept a Quinian pragmatic holism as our working 
epistemology, then (as Hart 1979 pointed out) there is no problem with justifying our 
acceptance of theories that reify or posit mathematicalia: such theories are conjectures 
which are justified holistically by their evidential and pragmatic virtues (simplicity, 
elegance, predictive and explanatory power, and so on). Indeed, they are already part o f  
our working theory o f the world. It would be odd, to say the least, to suggest that this 
mathematical ontology (and/or ideology) be replaced by a quite puzzling modal ontology 
(and/or ideology).
Modal nominalism is thus an inflated version of nominalism. It repudiates an abstract 
ontology in favour of a resplendent ideology o f modal concepts (and even, a resplendent 
ontology o f unactualized possibilia). Furthermore, Benacerraf s argument can be run 
through for modal knowledge. Thus, given the similar epistemological problems o f  
modal nominalism, what is its conceptual attraction? Extreme constructivists apart, 
mathematics seems to make perfect sense as it is standardly practised. Mathematicians 
and mathematical scientists do not find anything bizarre about talk o f functions o f real 
numbers, fibre bundles, phases spaces, and so on. What would be the advantage o f
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introducing a bizarre modal framework, which appears to have been invented in a 
thoroughly parasitic manner, using standard mathematical theories?240
10.3 The Substantiality of Truth and Mathematics
In Chapter 5, I argued that the deflationary conception o f truth (erected upon a 
“deflationary truth theory” like DT or MT, constructed simply o f the T-sentences) is 
inadequate as a theory o f truth. One of the properties o f such theories is deductive 
conservativeness, a property the deflationist might aspire to. For if  a truth theory is 
conservative, then anything proved with it can be proved without it. In short, a 
conservative deflationary truth theory yields an “insubstantial theory o f truth”.
But the crux o f the matter is that an adequate theory o f truth needs to be non­
conservative. Our ability to recognize the truth of Godel sentences is a complete mystery 
on a conservative truth theory. Indeed, a conservative truth theory cannot satisfy the 
simple “Equivalence Principle”, the constraint that,
i. T + truth theory |- ‘all theorems of T are true’
In a sense, this is nothing more than a generalization o f the constraint that a truth theory 
be such that,
ii. (p + truth theory (- Ccp is a true sentence’
However, the constraint (i) immediately yields the conclusion that the truth theory must 
be non-conservative. The reason is that if  T is sufficiently powerful (an extension o f Q), 
it is able to formulate a fixed point (Gddel) sentence Gy such that T implies that Gy is 
not true if  and only if  Gy is a theorem of T. From (i), we infer that T + truth theory 
implies that if  Gy is not true, then it is true; so it implies that Gy is true. If the truth 
theory were conservative, then T would imply Gy. But, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem 
says that, if  T is consistent, then T does not imply Gy. Thus, a truth theory that satisfies 
constraint (i) must be non-conservative.
240 Chihara’s modal constructibility theory is a notational rewrite o f  Russellian type theory.
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Tarski’s theory satisfies the constraint (i), as Tarski himself proved (Tarski 1936). This 
shows that Tarskian truth is adequate. In short, truth is substantial. It follows that 
deflationism about truth is false.
Analogously, the (Field-style) deflationist about mathematics asserts that mathematics 
is insubstantial: standard set theory is allegedly conservative over any internally 
consistent nominalistic theory. However, the logical results outlined in Chapter 9 about 
non-conservativeness indicate the substantiality o f  mathematics within (rich enough) 
scientific theories. The pure and mixed axioms within such a theory T cannot be simply 
dropped. The non-conservativeness o f mathematics results totally undermines perhaps 
the most central idea o f deflationism. Adding mathematics to a non-mathematical theory 
can increase its deductive power. So mathematics is not dispensable. It is required in 
theorem-proving. In general, a platonistic mathematicized theory P cannot be represented 
as N + S, where N is a first-order recursively axiomatized theory and S  is axiomatic set 
theory, while demanding that P be a conservative extension o f N241. Mathematicized 
scientific theories are not dispensable. In short, mathematicized platonistic theories 
cannot in general be replaced, at zero cost, by non-mathematical theories.
To summarize—-pace deflationism—truth and mathematics are both substantial. In 
Quinian terminology, they make substantial contributions to our “over-all scientific 
system of the world”. Nominalism (whether deflationary or modal) seems to offer no real 
advantages over standard platonistic mathematics. The deflationary version of 
nominalism, favoured by Field, seems to be riddled with insurmountable technical 
problems, concerning the basic Godelian logical facts about non-conservativeness. The 
modal version, favoured by Chihara, seems to be riddled with epistemological problems 
concerning modal knowledge which are simply analogues o f the problem for standard 
non-modal mathematics detected by Benacerraf in 1973.
241 For, in the cases o f interest (where N contains enough geometry), the result o f applying mathematics, N 
+ S is simply not a conservative extension o f N.
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As this work has been driven by the ideas o f Quine (and to a lesser extent by those of 
G6del), let me finish with a final quote from the author o f the most promising argument 
for mathematical realism:
I have explained early and late that I see  no way of meeting the needs of 
scientific theory, let alone those of everyday discourse, without admitting 
universals irreducibly into our ontology ... Mathematics, moreover, and applied 
mathematics at that, is up to its neck in universals; we have to quantify over 
numbers of all sorts, functions and much else. I have argued that there is no 
blinking these assumptions; they are as integral to the physical theory that uses 
them as  are the atoms, the electrons, the sticks, for that matter, and the stones. I 
have inveighed early and late against the ostrichlike failure to recognize these 
assumptions. ...
Nominalism, ostriches apart, is evidently inadequate to a  modern scientific 
system of the world.
(Quine 1981c (1981a), pp. 182-183).
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A d d e n d u m
Indispensability and Constructivism
If number were an idea, then arithmetic would be psychology. ... It would be 
strange if the most exact of all the sciences had to seek support from 
psychology, which is still feeling its way none too surely.
Gottlob Frege 1884, Grundlagen der Arithmetic §27.
Pure mathematics, on the other hand, seem s to me a rock on which all 
idealism founders: 317 is prime, not because we think so or because our 
minds are shaped in one way or another, but because it is so, because 
mathematical reality is built that way.
G.H. Hardy 1940, A Mathematician’s Apology, p. 70.
... on a limited idealist view, one that views mathematical entities as some 
sort of human construction but makes no claim about the physical world, the 
application of mathematics to the physical world may turn out to be a mystery. 
The danger, in other word's, is that in order to explain the applicability of mind- 
dependent mathematical entities to the physical world, the idealist about 
mathematics may have to become a full-blown idealist, and hold that even 
things like electrons and dinosaurs are somehow ‘human constructions’. If 
this danger were realized, I would regard that as a reductio ad absurdum of 
the idea that mathematical objects were human constructions.
Hartry Field 1989, Realism, Mathematics and Modality, p. 27. Footnote
16.
A.1 Constructivism & Indispensability
I have argued in the main body o f the thesis that nominalism cannot answer the 
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. However, perhaps we have not paid 
sufficient attention to another school: constructivism. The constructivist conception of  
mathematics claims that mathematicalia themselves are mental constructions. Thus, 
constructivism involves a plainly idealistic premise that mathematicalia are dependent 
on our definitions and constructions. Such entities are alleged to be “produced” by 
mathematical constructions.242 There are several ways to implement mathematical
242 I find it exceedingly difficult to grasp this metaphor in the literal sense required by the 
constructivist (c.f., the notion o f “construction” in Kant’s (first) Critique, Russell’s 1914 Our 
Knowledge o f  the External World and Carnap’s 1934 Aufbau. What these authors intend (I think) is 
construction o f representations o f an object, not construction of the object itself. To conflate these is to 
commit the preposterous crime o f idealism about the physical world). I can construct something
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idealism: intuitionism (e.g., Brouwer, Heyting, Dummett), definitionism (c.f., 
Poincare) or constructivism (e.g., Kronecker, Weyl, Bishop, Feferman). And there are 
various sub-schools and sub-programmes.
The guiding spirit o f constructivism was neatly summarized by G.T. Kneebone:
Many eminent mathematicians in fact, from Kronecker onwards, have held 
that a mathematical entity is not properly defined unless the definition that is 
offered permits the construction of the entity (or at least a controlled 
approximation to it) by a finite process.
(Kneebone 1963, p. 274).
In Chapter 1 I argued that there is in fact not even a prima facie  reason to suppose 
that an idealistic interpretation of mathematics is true. The objectivity (or inter­
subjectivity) of mathematics is prima facie evidence that mathematical facts are found 
and not “made” or “constructed” (c.f., Hardy 1940). However, perhaps the 
constructivist can appeal to some universal human ability of “mental construction” to 
explain this inter-subjectivity. (C.f., the Chomskyan appeal to a universal (human) 
language acquisition ability for the natural biological development o f language by 
infants).
A standard reason for rejecting constructivism was stressed by Hilbert.243 
Constructivism imposes severe constraints on what might count as intelligible 
reasoning within mathematics (or as an acceptable proof within mathematics) and, 
indeed, on the structure o f the mathematical universe (for example, it cannot be non- 
countable).
In particular, constructivism counts as unacceptable various forms o f reasoning 
involving impredicative existence assumptions, indirect existence proofs (e.g., by 
reductio ad absurdum), proofs requiring the law o f excluded middle (LEM), 
quantification over arbitrary subsets of any denumerable infinity (and, indeed,
physical like a chair by taking some pieces o f wood, some glue and some nails. Likewise, I can 
construct a physical sentence token by vibrating my larynx or moving my hands. But, to speak strictly,
I have no idea how to “construct” a neutron or a galaxy, a transfinite number or a manifold. (O f course, 
we can make lots of neutrons by refining some uranium ore, forming a critical mass o f U235 and 
dropping the ingenious result on innocent civilians).
243 Although Hilbert welcomed non-constructive axioms and proofs within mathematics as “ideal 
elements”, he imposed the analogous demand for a highly constructive (Unitary) metamathematics. In 
particular, Hilbert proposed that mathematicians attempt to find finitary metamathematical consistency 
proofs for (axiomatic) arithmetic, analysis and set theory. This proposal was o f course scuppered by 
Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931).
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reference to non-denumerable sets). Hilbert compared these demands of 
constructivism to the absurd demand that a “boxer should fight with both hands tied 
behind his back”. In particular, two severe limitations arise: one cannot develop 
standard (impredicative) real analysis and modem impredicative set theory (e.g., as 
codified in ZFC).
For similar reasons, very many working mathematicians who reflect upon the topic 
are opposed to constructivism, whatever its a priori philosophical defence. As noted 
by Gardner 1996 (and many others), the working mathematician thinks of 
mathematics as having an objective mind-independent subject matter, which would 
exist even if  there were no such things as proofs, definitions and constructions.
One of the most important recent philosophical defences o f mathematical platonism 
(via considerations largely internal to the practice of mathematics) was given by Kurt 
Godel (Godel 1944 and 1947+1964). Moreover, platonism (in some form or another) 
has been defended by a variety o f mathematicians and physicists (e.g., Hardy, Jeans, 
Stewart, Gardner, Penrose, Smullyan and many others). Virtually all mathematicians 
are realists, and many are prepared to defend their mathematical realism by 
philosophical argument.
How does the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument relate to constructivism? 
Again, I briefly mentioned this in Chapter 1. In an important sense, constructivism is 
prima facie incompatible with modem spacetime theory, with its assumption o f a non- 
countable set of spacetime points and quantification over arbitrary sets o f spacetime 
points and functions on the set of spacetime points. The electromagnetic field A ,^ for 
example, is one such function. And such functions are presumed by physicists to exist 
prior to our discovering them. In other words, if  one wants to remain a constructivist 
when considering the application o f mathematics, one will have to claim that the 
electromagnetic field is a “mental constmcf’. That leads to idealism in physics, 
and, like Field 1989,1 take that to be a reductio of the position.
However, suppose that we are charitable to the constructivist and consider an 
idealistic interpretation of sets o f spacetime points and functions on spacetime. To 
provide a constmctivistic response to the Quine-Putnam argument, we will then 
search for constructive replacements for all scientifically applicable mathematics. The
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central issue concerns the question of how much mathematics is indispensable to 
science. The importance of the Quine-Putnam argument is that it provides a powerful 
weapon in the anti-nominalisf s armoury. Unless one advocates some a priori (and 
unscientific) scepticism about science itself (e.g., van Fraassen 1980, Cartwright 
1983), at least some mathematical entities must exist. One might argue that this 
argument justifies the existence only o f a “small universe” o f mathematicalia that has 
found applications in science. In particular, it might be possible to subsume this small 
mathematical universe under some version of constructivism (i.e., idealism). This is a 
view that has recently been urged, for example, by Solomon Feferman.
But I shall now argue that this prospect is highly unlikely.
A.2 Non-Constructive Mathematics in Physics
How much mathematics does science need? If science only needs mathematics of a 
certain “minimal” kind, then perhaps all the “surplus” can be treated 
instrumentalistically, as some kind of convenient fiction. I will argue that this 
dispensability claim is false. In fact, I am sceptical that there is any sharp or 
interesting distinction between mathematics “needed” for applications and 
mathematics that “transcends” application. As well as the pure machinery o f the 
various number systems (N, Z, Q, R and C), abstract algebras and so on, the modem 
theoretical physicist needs to assume that there exists a (non-countable) set E  o f  
spacetime points (to form the spacetime manifold) and that there exist uncountably- 
many arbitrary subsets o f this set (e.g., there is no reason to suppose that the natural 
topology on E is countable subset of P(E); physical geodesics in E  are ordered sets in 
E  and there are uncountably-many such geodesics; and so on). From a realist 
viewpoint, it would be simply astonishing if  the presumably ultra-complicated mind- 
independent structure o f the external world o f matter in physical spacetime were fully 
“constructible” by the all-too-limited human mind. There is no reason to believe that 
this is so. The constructivist about applied mathematics has to establish that all o f the 
mathematics used in applications can be compressed into the Procrustean bed of  
constructive mathematics.
A d d e n d u m : In d is p e n s a b il it y  &  C o n s t r u c t iv is m
335
John Burgess has neatly summarized the situation:
Even accepting the opinion that 95% of applications can be fairly easily 
handled by a moderately liberal constructivistic mathematics, if one is going to 
adopt the militant attitude of the early constructivists like Brouwer, and call for 
the outright abolition of classical mathematics, one has a responsibility to look 
at the more problematic 5% remainder. And the most problematic cases seem 
to be connected with highly theoretical science. Professor Heilman cited one 
such example in Uppsala, connected with quantum mechanics; Roger 
Penrose cited another from his own research, related to general relativity.
Had I been a participant rather than a moderator, I would probably have said 
something about measurable selection theory, a cluster of results on the 
theoretical fringes of subjects whose cores are applied: optimization and 
control theory, probability and statistics, mathematical economics, operator 
theory.
(Burgess 1992, pp. 436-437).
Further emphasizing the likely fragility of the constructivist case, Geoffrey Heilman 
has given fairly detailed analyses of the applicable mathematics required in both 
Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity. An important result along these lines is 
that the constructive statement o f Gleason’s Theorem, which plays an important role 
in foundational studies of Quantum Mechanics cannot be constructively proved (see 
Heilman 1993). He concludes that,
The demand to respect scientifically applicable mathematics has important 
consequences tending to rule against the adequacy of Brouwer and Bishop 
constructivism. Classical, non-constructive concepts and reasoning would 
seem indispensable to some of our best science.
(Heilman 1992, p. 462).
Let us quickly survey some of the mathematics used in modem physics.
A.2.1 Application of the real number structure
Constructivists do not admit, as a constructible reality, the uncountable real number 
stmcture of impredicative real analysis. However, we certainly want to refer to this 
structure in describing the physical world. The standard application involves 
spacetime, but an even simpler application of the ordered real number stmcture (R, <) 
involves just time itself.
Let Tim be the set of temporal instants and let Before be the before-after relation on 
Tim. Standard spacetime theory asserts that there exists an isomorphism p from (Tim, 
Before) to (R, <). It follows from this that the “impure stmcture” (Tim, Before) is non-
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denumerable and is order-complete (that each bounded set o f temporal instants has a 
supremum244). This is prima facie unacceptable to a constructivist, for the supremum 
axiom is impredicative.
In short, this implies that, because the real number structure is (in a sense) “built-in” 
to the physical world, as soon as we discover this (objective) fact, we are compelled to 
use impredicative non-constructive mathematics to study this aspect of the structure of 
the real world (namely, the before-after ordering of time instants).
A.2.2 Important non-constructive sp aces in physics
Burgess and Rosen 1997 suggest that mathematical analysis is “probably sufficient 
to develop, making use o f coding devices, all the mathematics that has found 
scientific applications up to the present” (Burgess & Rosen 1997, p. 386). In footnote 
328 above, I expressed strong reservations about this claim, citing differential 
geometry, topology, cohomology, fibre bundle theory, symplectic manifold theory, 
dimensional regularization in non-integral-dimensional spacetime and infinite­
dimensional path integrals.
To be more specific, the following notions from differential geometry, “topological 
manifold”, “metric tensor”, “geodesic completeness”, “affine connection”, “time 
function”, “Cauchy surface”, “fibre bundle” are all firmly embedded within highly 
successful mathematicized theories from modem theoretical physics.
Can differential geometry be given a constructive formulation? It is tme that a 
certain amount of differential geometry can be reproduced within real analysis, by 
coding techniques. This is the reductive technique that Burgess and Rosen allude to. 
However, as Heilman 1989 has stressed, it seems to be the case that the general 
notions above (e.g., of a topological manifold) and several other notions required in 
GR, for example, transcend even the (coding capacities) of analysis:
The abstract theory of manifolds transcends the RA2 framework245, but 
essentially only at the earliest stages, namely in the abstract characterization 
of manifolds themselves.
244 This is sometimes called Dirichlet’s axiom (see Kneebone 1963, p. 256).
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(Heilman 1989, p. 108).
(This is essentially because, according to classical set theory, there are more such 
structures (manifolds, functions on a given manifold, geodesics, etc.) than real 
numbers. You cannot code every manifold as a real).
Indeed, the modem theoretical physicist has no qualms about quantifying over 
arbitrary subsets o f a given base set. Thus, “big” spaces are invoked in modem 
physics. In the standard case, the base space is usually related to spacetime and is 
uncountable itself (as big as the classical continuum, R). Examples o f big spaces 
introduced via power set operations on the base space are,
(i) phase spaces for classical fields,
(ii) the space of arbitrary functions on a given hyper-surface in phase space or
spacetime,
(iii) spaces o f trajectories and paths on a configuration space or on spacetime.
A physical field on spacetime is a function cp: E -»  V, where E  is the set o f 
spacetime points and V is some vector space. The physics itself asserts that there is a 
bijection between E  and R, but this bijection is not constmctible. The set o f all these 
fields constitutes the configuration space for the field (p in question. This set is bigger 
than the continuum. The same applies to a field 9  specified on an boundary 
hypersurface E in space-time.
For example, the “initial value problem” asks whether the time-evolution o f cp, 
constrained by the equation of motion for (p, is uniquely determined by the initial 
values on E at t = 0 and to what extent arbitrary perturbations o f the initial state cp(x, 
y, z, 0) affect the evolution at later times. The spaces involved are large: the class o f 
all functions cp(x, y, z, 0) on the boundary surface E.
An even more involved example is the “Path-Integral” formulation of Quantum 
Mechanics introduced by Richard Feynman. The quantum-mechanical “amplitude” 
for a particle to travel from a spacetime position (q, t) to position (q*, t*) is given by 
an integral over all possible space-time trajectories from (q, t) to (q*, t*):
245 RA2 is (axiomatic) second-order analysis: the usual axioms for the ordered archimedean field with 
the second-order version of the order-completeness axiom (= l.u.b. axiom = Dirichlet’s axiom).
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<q, t; q*, t*> = J Df{q, t) exp{z jdt S(f, df /dt, 0}
The space of possible trajectories is enormous, since they are parametrized by all 
possible continuous maps/(f): [0, 1] -> E such that/(0) = (q, t) and^(l) = (q*, t*). The 
measure for the path integral Df{q, t) contains a function variable / which ranges over 
the (non-denumerable) totality of all paths, not just the definable ones.
A.2.3 Feferman’s predicative set theory
Solomon Feferman has devised a predicative type-theoretic set theory, which treats 
the natural numbers as urelements (see Feferman 1988, 1992). Feferman calls this set 
theory W (after Hermann Weyl). Feferman proves two important facts about W:
(i) W is proof-theoretically reducible to PA
(ii) IF is a conservative extension of PA
Feferman then argues that “by the fact of the proof-theoretical reduction o f W to PA, 
the only ontology it commits one to is that which justifies acceptance o f PA” (1992, p. 
451). Since mainstream constructivists are happy to treat PA as an acceptable account 
of our arithmetical constructional abilities, it follows that the W similarly satisfies 
such constructivist demands. In his 1988, Feferman conjectures that,
... all scientifically applicable mathematics can be formalized in (a subtheory 
of) W, and hence does not require the assumption of impredicative set theory 
or of uncountable cardinal numbers for its eventual justification”
(Feferman 1988, p. 89-90).
In his 1992, Feferman notes that mathematical physics “makes primary use of 
mathematical analysis on Euclidean, complex and Riemannian spaces, and of 
functional analysis on various Hilbert and Banach spaces” (p. 443). After a short 
discussion of which theorems of classical analysis can be proved in W, he concludes 
that,
... while there are clearly parts of theoretical analysis that cannot be carried 
out in W ..., the working hypothesis that all of scientifically applicable analysis 
can be developed in W has been verified in its core parts”.
(Feferman 1992, p. 449).
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This is highly controversial, at best. It would be surprising if  the basic axioms and 
assumptions of modem spacetime theory could be redeveloped within a predicative 
set theory which is conservative over PA. Here is an argument, analogous to Shapiro’s 
1983 argument against Field. Field showed how to find a rather natural replacement 
theory N  such that N  + ZFC is equivalent to P, where P  is a certain standard axiomatic 
spacetime theory (also talking about the gravitational field). Field required for his 
instrumentalist interpretation o f the mathematics ZFC that P  be a conservative 
extension o f N. But Shapiro showed that P  is not a conservative extension o f N, since 
P \- Con(N).
Now, let us apply a similar argument to W. We know from Field and Shapiro that 
PA is interpretable within the spacetime theory N. By theorem (i), Feferman’s 
predicative set theory W is interpretable within PA. It follows that W is interpretable 
within N. It then follows that N +  IF is a conservative extension o f N. It then follows, 
via Shapiro’s argument, that N  is not “just as good as” the original platonistic theory 
P, for P  can prove the consistency of N  (coded as a statement in the nominalistic 
spacetime language Ljf). In short, this indicates that the mathematics contained in 
Feferman’s set theory W is {prima facie) not sufficient to do the sort o f spacetime 
physics that our standard (platonistic) theory P  does.
Indeed, the platonistic spacetime theory P  states explicitly that there exist in physical 
spacetime both physical exemplifications of the natural number structure (thereby 
proving that PA is consistent) and, indeed, physical exemplifications of the real 
number structure (i.e., open line segments homeomorphic to R thereby proving that 
classical real analysis is consistent). This is the reverse of Hilbert’s 1899 method of 
providing analytic models of geometry: contingent physical spacetime theory asserts 
the existence of (impure) geometrical models of arithmetic and analysis.
A.3 Conclusion: Naturalism and Constructivism
Einstein once remarked that the working physicist (and scientist generally) must 
“appear to the systematic epistemologist as an opportunist”. As any working 
philosopher knows, scholarly epistemological battles about the justification of
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scientific principles are at best uninteresting to the scientist. Although in Einstein’s 
own case (as he often stressed), epistemological considerations (especially the 
empiricism of Hume and Mach) were influential in his theorizing, his magnum opus 
(GR) provides little (if any) support for sceptical positions such as epistemological 
positivism  (Mach) or ontological spacetime relationism (Leibniz).
Consider some venerable sceptical arguments from bygone days: “continuous 
motion is impossible” (Zeno), “infinitesimals are nonsense” (Berkeley), “the time 
series must have had a beginning” (Kant), “atoms and molecules are fictions” (Mach, 
Vaihinger), “the Axiom of Choice is unjustifiable” (Borel, Lebesgue), “completed 
infinities are nonsense” (Brouwer), “Dirac’s delta function 5(x) is nonsense” (a 
common mathematical view around the time of Dirac’s work in the 1920s) Although 
the arguments o f venerable sceptics were indubitably clever, the sceptical conclusions 
were just wrong. The sceptical criticisms exhibit a certain level o f rationality, but the 
sceptical instincts o f these authors were utterly irrational. Is there any example in the 
history of science o f the epistemological sceptic actually winning the argument? The 
conceptual intelligibility o f continuous motion turned out fine (pace Parmenides and 
Zeno). Leibniz’s infinitesimals and Newton’s moments turned out fine (pace 
Berkeley). The possibility o f an infinite time series turned out fine (pace Kant). 
Dalton’s atoms and molecules turned out fine (pace Mach, Duhem and Vaihinger). 
The Axiom of Choice turned out fine (pace Lebesgue and Borel). Dirac’s delta 
function turned out fine. And so on.
So, why advance such sceptical conclusions now? Criticism, even sceptical 
criticism, is healthy. But to claim that a concept C or a principle P  is “meaningless” or 
untenable (on a priori epistemological grounds) is often little more than a wild claim. 
To be sure, continuous motion, infinitesimals, infinite ordered series, Dirac’s function, 
and so on, all had their attendant conceptual problems. But some of these problems 
were solved, and almost always, it seems, in a way quite opposite to the sceptic’s 
intentions.246
246 New problems, o f course, arise out o f the solutions to the old problems. But, c ’est la vie\ This is 
why the so-called “Pessimistic Meta-Induction” from the past falsity o f three or four scientific theories 
is so utterly muddle-headed. The proper “induction” from the real history o f science is an Optimistic 
Meta-Induction. The creation of new explanatory conjectures, the solution o f sceptical puzzles, the 
resolutions o f anomalies, the daily solutions of problems—both tiny and deeply conceptual—by
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A better philosophical strategy is naturalism, construed in the broad sense intended 
by Quine 1969. We already own our overall conceptual scheme o f physical bodies and 
events, of mental and mathematical entities, indeed o f abstract concepts and ideas: we 
cannot philosophize from a perspective prior to (or “external to”) science itself. There 
is no first philosophy. Our duty as epistemologists is to analyse the concepts we 
already use and to understand, from a scientific perspective, how human knowledge of  
our already accepted science is possible. Such analysis may lead to small-scale 
revisions, but large-scale scepticism is not a rational option. For example, our attitude 
to science cannot be one of “uncompromising empiricism” (Russell’s phrase, in his 
1950 rebuttal of Logical Positivism), if  the logical consequence o f such empiricism is 
the sceptical abandonment of science. In Neurath’s pleasing metaphor, we must 
rebuild the ship of knowledge while still at sea, for the epistemological terra fiirma o f  
philosophical imagination is a mere fantasy.
In full accord with such naturalism, we conclude via the examples mentioned above 
that the mathematics used and required in modem theoretical science (especially 
theoretical physics) transcends the limits of constructivism. Constructive mathematics 
is (even in principle) not enough to do science. Putting it crudely, non-constructive 
mathematics is indispensable because the physical universe itself exemplifies non­
constructive structures.
working scientists. All o f these indicate optimism (a kind of Hegelian-Popperian optimism, perhaps, 
about the growth of objective knowledge).
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p. 6 , In. 8 : 
p. 7, In. 12:
p. 1 0 , fin. 2 , In. 2 : 
p. 30, In. 24: 
p. 31, In. 1: 
p. 31, In. 12: 
p. 32, In. 16:
p. 38, In. 15:
p. 40, fin. 33, In. 2:
p. 45, In. 23: 
p. 51, fin. 44:
p. 52, In. 14: 
p. 52, In. 16:
p. 54, In. 7:
p. 60:
p. 73, In. 4: 
p. 90, In. 13:
p. 106, In. 35:
“Hersh & Davis” should be replaced by “Davis & Hersh”. 
Unless otherwise qualified, references to “Peano Arithmetic” 
are to be understood as references to first-order Peano 
Arithmetic.
“is nothing more that” should be “is nothing more than”, 
“injective” should be omitted, 
the symbol “•->•” should be replaced by the symbol 
“3!p(p(;t0) = 1” should be replaced by “3!p(p(x0) = 1)”.
The phrase “as well as the meaningless square [distm(x, y)]2” 
should be omitted.
The term “non-finitistic” here refers to strict finitism (i.e., there 
is a fixed finite upper bound on the number of things).
The second occurrence of “F(x, y)” should be replaced by “F(y, 
x)”.
The first “made” should be replaced by “may”.
The footnote is wrong. Cantor’s writings and intuitions seem 
more in accord with a conception o f set theory known as 
“limitation o f size”. Zermelo’s discussion o f the “iterative 
conception” does not appear in his orignal 1908 paper, but later 
(in the 1930s).
Formula (3) should be “3!x(-i U(x) a  Vz(z g  x))”.
“there is a set with no elements” should be “there is a unique 
set with no elements”.
“P/1” refers to first-order Peano Arithmetic.
The discussion here is restricted to Euclidean plane geometry, 
“expansion” should be replaced by “extension”.
“continuum many” refers to the classical (non-denumerable) 
continuum.
The phrase “it seems to me that” should be omitted.
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p. 108, ftn. 70: 
p. 122, In. 4:
p. 127, In. 13: 
p. 127, In. 23: 
p. 130, In. 22: 
p. 157, In. 2:
p. 160, In. 26: 
p. 161, ftn. I l l :  
p. 169, ftn. 121, In. 5
p. 170, In. 5: 
p. 193, In. 9:
p. 193, In. 12: 
p. 214, In. 3:
p. 222, In. 3: 
p. 223, ftn. 151, ln.l: 
p. 237, In. 20:
p. 255, ftn. 178: 
p. 280, ftn. 205:
This footnote is too pessimistic. The mathematical 
complications described are in fact simple to avoid.
The following parenthetical clause should be added after “the 
formula whose godel number is «”: “(if there is none, then let 
diag(n) = 1)”.
“expansion” should be replaced by “extension”.
“expansion” should be replaced by “extension”.
The phrase “= DT n  A” should be omitted.
The symbol “[A]y” means “The equivalence class o f all lines x 
such that x \ \ A”.
The second occurrence of “were” should be omitted.
“famous” should be “famously”.
The phrase “recursively specifiable” should be omitted.
The final sentence of the paragraph, beginning “Of course, if  
the “axioms” o f M are .. .” should be omitted.
The phrase “(a refutation of —icp)” should be omitted.
In statement (14), the initial phrase “There is a set . . .” should 
be replaced by “there is a non-empty s e t .. .”.
In the formula (15), the inequality “y  * z” should be “y  *  x”. 
The term “implication” here refers to the relation o f logical 
implication, not to the syntactic operation o f forming the 
conditional cp —> % o f the formulas cp and %.
The symbol ‘W* should be replaced by
The term “full” should be replaced by “complete”.
The sentence “The negation of FLT is then, prima facie, an 
existence claim” should be replaced by “The negation o f FLT is 
then classically equivalent to the following prima facie 
existence claim”.
Implication is a relation. See above, for p. 214.
This footnote should be omitted, because it repeats the content 
of line 15 above.
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.281, 10: “homomorphism” should (in this particular context) be replaced
by “isomorphism”.
. 285, In. 11: The symbol “m>” should be replaced by
. 292, In. 15: The phrase “any questionable” should be replaced by “any
more questionable”.
. 292, In. 21: “abstracta” should be replaced by “abstract”.
Many thanks to Professor Moshe Machover for providing a list o f errata.
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